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THE SUBJECT MATTER OF COPYRIGHT 
■   ■   ■ 
A. USEFUL ARTICLES 
  
MAZER V. STEIN 
347 U.S. 201, 74 S.Ct. 460 (1954). 
MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case involves the validity of copyrights obtained by respondents 
for statuettes of male and female dancing figures made of semivitreous 
china. The controversy centers around the fact that although copyrighted 
as “works of art,” the statuettes were intended for use and used as bases 
for table lamps, with electric wiring, sockets and lamp shades attached. 
[The defendant contended that the statuettes were not copyrightable 
because plaintiff intended to, and did, mass produce them and use them as 
lamp bases.] 
* * * 
This Court once essayed to fix the limits of the fine arts. That effort 
need not be appraised in relation to this copyright issue. It is clear Congress 
intended the scope of the [1909] copyright statute to include more than the 
traditional fine arts. Herbert Putnam, Esq., then Librarian of Congress 
and active in the movement to amend the copyright laws, told the joint 
meeting of the House and Senate Committees: 
* * * “The term ‘works of art’ is deliberately intended as a broader 
specification than ‘works of the fine arts’ in the present statute 
with the idea that there is subject-matter (for instance, of applied 
design, not yet within the province of design patents), which may 
properly be entitled to protection under the copyright law.” 
The successive acts, the legislative history of the 1909 Act and the 
practice of the Copyright Office unite to show that “works of art” and 
“reproductions of works of art” are terms that were intended by Congress 
to include the authority to copyright these statuettes. Individual perception 
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of the beautiful is too varied a power to permit a narrow or rigid concept of 
art. * * * 
But petitioners assert that congressional enactment of the design 
patent laws should be interpreted as denying protection to artistic articles 
embodied or reproduced in manufactured articles. They say: 
“Fundamentally and historically, the Copyright Office is the 
repository of what each claimant considers to be a cultural 
treasure, whereas the Patent Office is the repository of what each 
applicant considers to be evidence of the advance in industrial and 
technological fields.” 
Their argument is that design patents require the critical examination 
given patents to protect the public against monopoly. Attention is called to 
Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 14 Wall. 511, interpreting the design patent law 
of 1842, 5 Stat. 544, granting a patent to anyone who by “their own 
industry, genius, efforts, and expense, may have invented or produced any 
new and original design for a manufacture * * *.” A pattern for flat silver 
was there upheld. The intermediate and present law differs little. 
“Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for an article 
of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor, . . .” subject generally to the 
provisions concerning patents for invention. § 171, 66 Stat. 805. As 
petitioner sees the effect of the design patent law: 
“If an industrial designer can not satisfy the novelty requirements 
of the design patent laws, then his design as used on articles of 
manufacture can be copied by anyone.” 
Petitioner has furnished the Court a booklet of numerous design 
patents for statuettes, bases for table lamps and similar articles for 
manufacture, quite indistinguishable in type from the copyrighted 
statuettes here in issue. Petitioner urges that overlapping of patent and 
copyright legislation so as to give an author or inventor a choice between 
patents and copyrights should not be permitted. We assume petitioner 
takes the position that protection for a statuette for industrial use can only 
be obtained by patent, if any protection can be given. 
As we have held the statuettes here involved copyrightable, we need 
not decide the question of their patentability. Though other courts have 
passed upon the issue as to whether allowance by the election of the author 
or patentee of one bars a grant of the other, we do not. We do hold that the 
patentability of the statuettes, fitted as lamps or unfitted, does not bar 
copyright as works of art. Neither the Copyright Statute nor any other says 
that because a thing is patentable it may not be copyrighted. We should 
not so hold. 
* * * The copyright protects originality rather than novelty or 
invention—conferring only “the sole right of multiplying copies.” Absent 
copying there can be no infringement of copyright. Thus, respondents may 
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not exclude others from using statuettes of human figures in table lamps; 
they may only prevent use of copies of their statuettes as such or as 
incorporated in some other article. [Copyright Office] Regulation § 202.8, 
supra, makes clear that artistic articles are protected in “form but not their 
mechanical or utilitarian aspects.” See Stein v. Rosenthal, 103 F.Supp. 227, 
231. The dichotomy of protection for the aesthetic is not beauty and utility 
but art for the copyright and the invention of original and ornamental 
design for design patents. We find nothing in the copyright statute to 
support the argument that the intended use or use in industry of an article 
eligible for copyright bars or invalidates its registration. We do not read 
such a limitation into the copyright law. 
* * * 
“The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the 
owner a secondary consideration.” United States v. Paramount Pictures, 
334 U.S. 131, 158. However, it is “intended definitely to grant valuable, 
enforceable rights to authors, publishers, etc., without burdensome 
requirements; ‘to afford greater encouragement to the production of 
literary [or artistic] works of lasting benefit to the world.’ ” Washingtonian 
Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36. 
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to 
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of 
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare 
through the talents of authors and inventors in “Science and useful Arts.” 
Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards 
commensurate with the services rendered. 
Affirmed. 
STAR ATHLETICA, L.L.C. V. VARSITY BRANDS, INC. 
137 S. Ct. (2017). 
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 
Congress has provided copyright protection for original works of art, 
but not for industrial designs. The line between art and industrial design, 
however, is often difficult to draw. This is particularly true when an 
industrial design incorporates artistic elements. Congress has afforded 
limited protection for these artistic elements by providing that “pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural features” of the “design of a useful article” are eligible 
for copyright protection as artistic works if those features “can be identified 
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the 
utilitarian aspects of the article.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
  
We granted certiorari to resolve widespread disagreement over the 
proper test for implementing § 101’s separate-identification and 
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independent-existence requirements.  We hold that a feature incorporated 
into the design of a useful article is eligible for copyright protection only if 
the feature (1) can be perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art 
separate from the useful article and (2) would qualify as a protectable 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work—either on its own or fixed in some 
other tangible medium of expression—if it were imagined separately from 
the useful article into which it is incorporated. Because that test is satisfied 




Respondents Varsity Brands, Inc., Varsity Spirit Corporation, and 
Varsity Spirit Fashions & Supplies, Inc., design, make, and sell 
cheerleading uniforms. Respondents have obtained or acquired more than 
200 U.S. copyright registrations for two-dimensional designs appearing on 
the surface of their uniforms and other garments. These designs are 
primarily “combinations, positionings, and arrangements of elements” that 
include “chevrons ..., lines, curves, stripes, angles, diagonals, inverted 
[chevrons], coloring, and shapes.”  
  
Petitioner Star Athletica, L.L.C., also markets and sells cheerleading 
uniforms. Respondents sued petitioner for infringing their copyrights in 
the five designs. The District Court entered summary judgment for 
petitioner on respondents’ copyright claims on the ground that the designs 
did not qualify as protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works. It 
reasoned that the designs served the useful, or “utilitarian,” function of 
identifying the garments as “cheerleading uniforms” and therefore could 
not be “physically or conceptually” separated under § 101 “from the 
utilitarian function” of the uniform.  
  
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.  In its view, the 
“graphic designs” were “separately identifiable” because the designs “and 
a blank cheerleading uniform can appear ‘side by side’—one as a graphic 
design, and one as a cheerleading uniform.”  And it determined that the 
designs were “ ‘capable of existing independently’ ” because they could be 
incorporated onto the surface of different types of garments, or hung on the 
wall and framed as art.  
  
Judge McKeague dissented. He would have held that, because 
“identifying the wearer as a cheerleader” is a utilitarian function of a 
cheerleading uniform and the surface designs were “integral to” achieving 
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* * * 
  
“Works of authorship” include “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works,” § 102(a)(5), which the statute defines to include “two-dimensional 
and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, 
photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, 
models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans,” § 101. And 
a work of authorship is “ ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when 
it[ is] embodi[ed] in a” “material objec[t] ... from which the work can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.” Ibid. (definitions of 
“fixed” and “copies”). 
  
The Copyright Act also establishes a special rule for copyrighting a 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work incorporated into a “useful article,” 
which is defined as “an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that 
is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey 
information.” Ibid. The statute does not protect useful articles as such. 
Rather, “the design of a useful article” is “considered a pictorial, graphical, 
or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design 
incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified 
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the 
utilitarian aspects of the article.” Ibid. 
  
Courts, the Copyright Office, and commentators have described the 
analysis undertaken to determine whether a feature can be separately 
identified from, and exist independently of, a useful article as 
“separability.” In this case, our task is to determine whether the 
arrangements of lines, chevrons, and colorful shapes appearing on the 
surface of respondents’ cheerleading uniforms are eligible for copyright 





As an initial matter, we must address whether separability analysis is 




Respondents argue that “[s]eparability is only implicated when a 
[pictorial, graphic, or sculptural] work is the ‘design of a useful article.’ ” 
They contend that the surface decorations in this case are “two-
dimensional graphic designs that appear on useful articles,” but are not 
themselves designs of useful articles. Consequently, the surface 
decorations are protected two-dimensional works of graphic art without 
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regard to any separability analysis under § 101. See 2 W. Patry, Copyright 
§ 3:151, p. 3–485 (2016) (Patry) (“Courts looking at two-dimensional design 
claims should not apply the separability analysis regardless of the three-
dimensional form that design is embodied in”). Under this theory, two-
dimensional artistic features on the surface of useful articles are 
“inherently separable.” 
  
This argument is inconsistent with the text of § 101. The statute 
requires separability analysis for any “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 
features” incorporated into the “design of a useful article.” “Design” refers 
here to “the combination” of “details” or “features” that “go to make up” the 
useful article. 3 Oxford English Dictionary 244 (def. 7, first listing) (1933) 
(OED). Furthermore, the words “pictorial” and “graphic” include, in this 
context, two-dimensional features such as pictures, paintings, or drawings. 
See 4 id., at 359 (defining “[g]raphic” to mean “[o]f or pertaining to drawing 
or painting”); 7 id., at 830 (defining “[p]ictorial” to mean “of or pertaining 
to painting or drawing”). And the statute expressly defines “[p]ictorial, 
graphical, and sculptural works” to include “two-dimensional ... works of ... 
art.” § 101. The statute thus provides that the “design of a useful article” 
can include two-dimensional “pictorial” and “graphic” features, and 
separability analysis applies to those features just as it does to three-
dimensional “sculptural” features. 
  




We must now decide when a feature incorporated into a useful article “can 
be identified separately from” and is “capable of existing independently of” 
“the utilitarian aspects” of the article. This is not a free-ranging search for 
the best copyright policy, but rather “depends solely on statutory 
interpretation.” Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). “The controlling 
principle in this case is the basic and unexceptional rule that courts must 
give effect to the clear meaning of statutes as written.” Estate of Cowart v. 
Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 476 (1992). We thus begin and end our 
inquiry with the text, giving each word its “ordinary, contemporary, 
common meaning.” Walters v. Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc., 519 U.S. 
202, 207 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). We do not, however, 
limit this inquiry to the text of § 101 in isolation. “[I]nterpretation of a 
phrase of uncertain reach is not confined to a single sentence when the text 
of the whole statute gives instruction as to its meaning.” Maracich v. 
Spears, 133 S.Ct. 2191, 2203 (2013). We thus “look to the provisions of the 
whole law” to determine § 101’s meaning. United States v. Heirs of 
Boisdore, 8 How. 113, 122 (1849). 
 




The statute provides that a “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural featur[e]” 
incorporated into the “design of a useful article” is eligible for copyright 
protection if it (1) “can be identified separately from,” and (2) is “capable of 
existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.” § 101. The 
first requirement—separate identification—is not onerous. The 
decisionmaker need only be able to look at the useful article and spot some 
two- or three-dimensional element that appears to have pictorial, graphic, 
or sculptural qualities. See 2 Patry § 3:146, at 3–474 to 3–475. 
  
The independent-existence requirement is ordinarily more difficult to 
satisfy. The decisionmaker must determine that the separately identified 
feature has the capacity to exist apart from the utilitarian aspects of the 
article. See 2 OED 88 (def. 5) (defining “[c]apable” of as “[h]aving the 
needful capacity, power, or fitness for”). In other words, the feature must 
be able to exist as its own pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work as defined 
in § 101 once it is imagined apart from the useful article. If the feature is 
not capable of existing as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work once 
separated from the useful article, then it was not a pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural feature of that article, but rather one of its utilitarian aspects. 
  
Of course, to qualify as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work on its 
own, the feature cannot itself be a useful article or “[a]n article that is 
normally a part of a useful article” (which is itself considered a useful 
article). § 101. Nor could someone claim a copyright in a useful article 
merely by creating a replica of that article in some other medium—for 
example, a cardboard model of a car. Although the replica could itself be 





The statute as a whole confirms our interpretation. The Copyright Act 
provides “the owner of [a] copyright” with the “exclusive righ[t] ... to 
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies.” § 106(1). The statute clarifies 
that this right “includes the right to reproduce the [copyrighted] work in or 
on any kind of article, whether useful or otherwise.” § 113(a). *1011 Section 
101 is, in essence, the mirror image of § 113(a). Whereas § 113(a) protects 
a work of authorship first fixed in some tangible medium other than a 
useful article and subsequently applied to a useful article, § 101 protects 
art first fixed in the medium of a useful article. The two provisions make 
clear that copyright protection extends to pictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works regardless of whether they were created as freestanding art or as 
features of useful articles. The ultimate separability question, then, is 
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whether the feature for which copyright protection is claimed would have 
been eligible for copyright protection as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 
work had it originally been fixed in some tangible medium other than a 




This interpretation is also consistent with the history of the Copyright 
Act. In Mazer, a case decided under the 1909 Copyright Act, the 
respondents copyrighted a statuette depicting a dancer. The statuette was 
intended for use as a lamp base, “with electric wiring, sockets and lamp 
shades attached.” 347 U.S., at 202, 74 S.Ct. 460. Copies of the statuette 
were sold both as lamp bases and separately as statuettes. Id., at 203. The 
petitioners copied the statuette and sold lamps with the statuette as the 
base. They defended against the respondents’ infringement suit by arguing 
that the respondents did not have a copyright in a statuette intended for 
use as a lamp base. Id., at 204–205. 
  
Two of Mazer’s holdings are relevant here. First, the Court held that 
the respondents owned a copyright in the statuette even though it was 
intended for use as a lamp base. See id., at 214. In doing so, the Court 
approved the Copyright Office’s regulation extending copyright protection 
to works of art that might also serve a useful purpose. See ibid. (approving 
37 C.F.R. § 202.8(a) (1949) (protecting “works of artistic craftsmanship, in 
so far as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are 
concerned”)). 
  
Second, the Court held that it was irrelevant to the copyright inquiry 
whether the statuette was initially created as a freestanding sculpture or 
as a lamp base. 347 U.S., at 218–219 (“Nor do we think the subsequent 
registration of a work of art published as an element in a manufactured 
article, is a misuse of copyright. This is not different from the registration 
of a statuette and its later embodiment in an industrial article”). Mazer 
thus interpreted the 1909 Act consistently with the rule discussed above: 
If a design would have been copyrightable as a standalone pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural work, it is copyrightable if created first as part of a 
useful article. 
  
Shortly thereafter, the Copyright Office enacted a regulation 
implementing the holdings of Mazer. See 1 Nimmer § 2A.08[B][1][b] (2016). 
As amended, the regulation introduced the modern separability test to 
copyright law: 
 
“If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact that the 
article is unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work of 
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art. However, if the shape of a utilitarian article incorporates features, 
such as artistic sculpture, carving, or pictorial representation, which 
can be identified separately and are capable of existing independently 
as a work of art, such features will be eligible for registration.” 37 
C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1960) (punctuation altered). 
  
Congress essentially lifted the language governing protection for the 
design of a useful article directly from the post-Mazer regulations and 
placed it into § 101 of the 1976 Act. Consistent with Mazer, the approach 
we outline today interprets §§ 101 and 113 in a way that would afford 
copyright protection to the statuette in Mazer regardless of whether it was 
first created as a standalone sculptural work or as the base of the lamp. 




In sum, a feature of the design of a useful article is eligible for copyright 
if, when identified and imagined apart from the useful article, it would 
qualify as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work either on its own or when 
fixed in some other tangible medium. 
  
Applying this test to the surface decorations on the cheerleading 
uniforms is straightforward. First, one can identify the decorations as 
features having pictorial, graphic, or sculptural qualities. Second, if the 
arrangement of colors, shapes, stripes, and chevrons on the surface of the 
cheerleading uniforms were separated from the uniform and applied in 
another medium—for example, on a painter’s canvas—they would qualify 
as “two-dimensional ... works of ... art,” § 101. And imaginatively removing 
the surface decorations from the uniforms and applying them in another 
medium would not replicate the uniform itself. Indeed, respondents have 
applied the designs in this case to other media of expression—different 
types of clothing—without replicating the uniform. The decorations are 
therefore separable from the uniforms and eligible for copyright protection. 
  
The dissent argues that the designs are not separable because 
imaginatively removing them from the uniforms and placing them in some 
other medium of expression—a canvas, for example—would create 
“pictures of cheerleader uniforms.” Post, at 1035 – 1036 (opinion of BREYER, 
J.). Petitioner similarly argues that the decorations cannot be copyrighted 
because, even when extracted from the useful article, they retain the 
outline of a cheerleading uniform. 
  
This is not a bar to copyright. Just as two-dimensional fine art 
corresponds to the shape of the canvas on which it is painted, two-
dimensional applied art correlates to the contours of the article on which it 
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is applied. A fresco painted on a wall, ceiling panel, or dome would not lose 
copyright protection, for example, simply because it was designed to track 
the dimensions of the surface on which it was painted. Or consider, for 
example, a design etched or painted on the surface of a guitar. If that entire 
design is imaginatively removed from the guitar’s surface and placed on an 
album cover, it would still resemble the shape of a guitar. But the image 
on the cover does not “replicate” the guitar as a useful article. Rather, the 
design is a two-dimensional work of art that corresponds to the shape of 
the useful article to which it was applied. The statute protects that work of 
art whether it is first drawn on the album cover and then applied to the 
guitar’s surface, or vice versa. Failing to protect that art would create an 
anomaly: It would extend protection to two-dimensional designs that cover 
a part of a useful article but would not protect the same design if it covered 
the entire article. The statute does not support that distinction, nor can it 
be reconciled with the dissent’s recognition that “artwork printed on a t-
shirt” could be protected. Post, at 1019 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  
To be clear, the only feature of the cheerleading uniform eligible for a 
copyright in this case is the two-dimensional work of art fixed in the 
tangible medium of the uniform fabric. Even if respondents ultimately 
succeed in establishing a valid copyright in the surface decorations at issue 
here, respondents have no right to prohibit any person from manufacturing 
a cheerleading uniform of identical shape, cut, and dimensions to the ones 
on which the decorations in this case appear. They may prohibit only the 
reproduction of the surface designs in any tangible medium of expression—




Petitioner and the Government raise several objections to the approach 




Petitioner first argues that our reading of the statute is missing an 
important step. It contends that a feature may exist independently only if 
it can stand alone as a copyrightable work and if the useful article from 
which it was extracted would remain equally useful. In other words, 
copyright extends only to “solely artistic” features of useful articles.  
According to petitioner, if a feature of a useful article “advance[s] the utility 
of the article,” then it is categorically beyond the scope of copyright. The 
designs here are not protected, it argues, because they are necessary to two 
of the uniforms’ “inherent, essential, or natural functions”—identifying the 
wearer as a cheerleader and enhancing the wearer’s physical appearance.  
Because the uniforms would not be equally useful without the designs, 
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petitioner contends that the designs are inseparable from the “utilitarian 
aspects” of the uniform.  
  
The Government raises a similar argument, although it reaches a 
different result. It suggests that the appropriate test is whether the useful 
article with the artistic feature removed would “remai[n] similarly useful.” 
In the view of the United States, however, a plain white cheerleading 
uniform is “similarly useful” to uniforms with respondents’ designs. 
  
The debate over the relative utility of a plain white cheerleading 
uniform is unnecessary. The focus of the separability inquiry is on the 
extracted feature and not on any aspects of the useful article that remain 
after the imaginary extraction. The statute does not require the 
decisionmaker to imagine a fully functioning useful article without the 
artistic feature. Instead, it requires that the separated feature qualify as a 
nonuseful pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work on its own. 
  
Of course, because the removed feature may not be a useful article—as 
it would then not qualify as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work—there 
necessarily would be some aspects of the original useful article “left behind” 
if the feature were conceptually removed. But the statute does not require 
the imagined remainder to be a fully functioning useful article at all, much 
less an equally useful one. Indeed, such a requirement would deprive the 
Mazer statuette of protection had it been created first as a lamp base rather 
than as a statuette. Without the base, the “lamp” would be just a shade, 
bulb, and wires. The statute does not require that we imagine a nonartistic 
replacement for the removed feature to determine whether that feature is 
capable of an independent existence. 
  
Petitioner’s argument follows from its flawed view that the statute 
protects only “solely artistic” features that have no effect whatsoever on a 
useful article’s utilitarian function. This view is inconsistent with the 
statutory text. The statute expressly protects two- and three-dimensional 
“applied art.” § 101. “Applied art” is art “employed in the decoration, 
design, or execution of useful objects,” Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary 105 (1976) (emphasis added), or “those arts or crafts that have 
a primarily utilitarian function, or ... the designs and decorations used in 
these arts,” Random House Dictionary 73 (1966) (emphasis added); see also 
1 OED 576 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “applied” as “[p]ut to practical use”). An 
artistic feature that would be eligible for copyright protection on its own 
cannot lose that protection simply because it was first created as a feature 
of the design of a useful article, even if it makes that article more useful. 
  
Indeed, this has been the rule since Mazer. In holding that the statuette 
was protected, the Court emphasized that the 1909 Act abandoned any 
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“distinctions between purely aesthetic articles and useful works of art.” 347 
U.S., at 211. Congress did not enact such a distinction in the 1976 Act. 
Were we to accept petitioner’s argument that the only protectable features 
are those that play absolutely no role in an article’s function, we would 
effectively abrogate the rule of Mazer and read “applied art” out of the 
statute. 
  
Because we reject the view that a useful article must remain after the 
artistic feature has been imaginatively separated from the article, we 
necessarily abandon the distinction between “physical” and “conceptual” 
separability, which some courts and commentators have adopted based on 
the Copyright Act’s legislative history. See H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, p. 55 
(1976). According to this view, a feature is physically separable from the 
underlying useful article if it can “be physically separated from the article 
by ordinary means while leaving the utilitarian aspects of the article 
completely intact.” Compendium § 924.2(A); see also Chosun Int’l, Inc. v. 
Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F.3d 324, 329 (C.A.2 2005). Conceptual 
separability applies if the feature physically could not be removed from the 
useful article by ordinary means. See Compendium § 924.2(B); but see 1 P. 
Goldstein, Copyright § 2.5.3, p. 2:77 (3d ed. 2016) (explaining that the lower 
courts have been unable to agree on a single conceptual separability test); 
2 Patry §§ 3:140–3:144.40 (surveying the various approaches in the lower 
courts). 
  
The statutory text indicates that separability is a conceptual 
undertaking. Because separability does not require the underlying useful 




Petitioner next argues that we should incorporate two “objective” 
components into our test to provide guidance to the lower courts: (1) 
“whether the design elements can be identified as reflecting the designer’s 
artistic judgment exercised independently of functional influence,” and (2) 
whether “there is [a] substantial likelihood that the pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural feature would still be marketable to some significant segment of 
the community without its utilitarian function.” 
  
We reject this argument because neither consideration is grounded in 
the text of the statute. The first would require the decisionmaker to 
consider evidence of the creator’s design methods, purposes, and reasons. 
Id., at 48. The statute’s text makes clear, however, that our inquiry is 
limited to how the article and feature are perceived, not how or why they 
were designed. See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 
F.2d 1142, 1152 (C.A.2 1987) (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
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in part) (The statute “expressly states that the legal test is how the final 
article is perceived, not how it was developed through various stages”). 
  
The same is true of marketability. Nothing in the statute suggests that 
copyrightability depends on market surveys. Moreover, asking whether 
some segment of the market would be interested in a given work threatens 
to prize popular art over other forms, or to substitute judicial aesthetic 
preferences for the policy choices embodied in the Copyright Act. See 
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It 
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to 
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, 




Finally, petitioner argues that allowing the surface decorations to 
qualify as a “work of authorship” is inconsistent with Congress’ intent to 
entirely exclude industrial design from copyright. Petitioner notes that 
Congress refused to pass a provision that would have provided limited 
copyright protection for industrial designs, including clothing, when it 
enacted the 1976 Act, see S. 22, Tit. II, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 Cong. Rec. 
3856–3859 (1976), and that it has enacted laws protecting designs for 
specific useful articles—semiconductor chips and boat hulls, see 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 901–914, 1301–1332—while declining to enact other industrial design 
statutes. From this history of failed legislation petitioner reasons that 
Congress intends to channel intellectual property claims for industrial 
design into design patents. It therefore urges us to approach this question 
with a presumption against copyrightability. 
  
We do not share petitioner’s concern. As an initial matter, 
“[c]ongressional inaction lacks persuasive significance” in most 
circumstances. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. LTV Corp., 496 
U.S. 633, 650 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, we 
have long held that design patent and copyright are not mutually exclusive. 
See Mazer, 347 U.S., at 217. Congress has provided for limited copyright 
protection for certain features of industrial design, and approaching the 
statute with presumptive hostility toward protection for industrial design 
would undermine Congress’ choice.  In any event, as explained above, our 
test does not render the shape, cut, and physical dimensions of the 




We hold that an artistic feature of the design of a useful article is 
eligible for copyright protection if the feature (1) can be perceived as a two- 
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or three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article and (2) 
would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work either 
on its own or in some other medium if imagined separately from the useful 
article. Because the designs on the surface of respondents’ cheerleading 
uniforms in this case satisfy these requirements, the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals is affirmed. 
 
JUSTICE GINSBURG, concurring in the judgment. 
 
I concur in the Court’s judgment but not in its opinion. Unlike the 
majority, I would not take up in this case the separability test appropriate 
under 17 U.S.C. § 101.  Consideration of that test is unwarranted because 
the designs at issue are not designs of useful articles. Instead, the designs 
are themselves copyrightable pictorial or graphic works reproduced on 
useful articles. 
  
* * * 
 
The designs here in controversy are standalone pictorial and graphic 
works that respondents Varsity Brands, Inc., et al. (Varsity) reproduce on 
cheerleading uniforms. Varsity’s designs first appeared as pictorial and 
graphic works that Varsity’s design team sketched on paper. * * * 
 
In short, Varsity’s designs are not themselves useful articles meet for 
separability determination under § 101; they are standalone PGS works 
that may gain copyright protection as such, including the exclusive right to 
reproduce the designs on useful articles. 
 
JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE KENNEDY joins, dissenting. 
 
I agree with much in the Court’s opinion. But I do not agree that the 
designs that Varsity Brands, Inc., submitted to the Copyright Office are 
eligible for copyright protection. Even applying the majority’s test, the 
designs cannot “be perceived as ... two- or three-dimensional work[s] of art 
separate from the useful article.” 
  
Look at the designs that Varsity submitted to the Copyright Office. See 
Appendix to opinion of the Court, ante. You will see only pictures of 
cheerleader uniforms. And cheerleader uniforms are useful articles. A 
picture of the relevant design features, whether separately “perceived” on 
paper or in the imagination, is a picture of, and thereby “replicate[s],” the 
underlying useful article of which they are a part.  Hence the design 
features that Varsity seeks to protect are not “capable of existing 
independently o[f] the utilitarian aspects of the article.”  
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OWNERSHIP, ASSIGNMENT, AND 
LICENSING OF COPYRIGHTS 
 
CHILDRESS V. TAYLOR 
945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991). 
NEWMAN, CIRCUIT JUDGE. 
This appeal requires consideration of the standards for determining 
when a contributor to a copyrighted work is entitled to be regarded as a 
joint author. The work in question is a play about the legendary Black 
comedienne Jackie “Moms” Mabley. The plaintiff-appellee Alice Childress 
claims to be the sole author of the play. Her claim is disputed by defendant-
appellant Clarice Taylor, who asserts that she is a joint author of the play. 
* * * 
Facts 
[Actress Taylor asked playwright Childress to write her a play based 
on the life of legendary black comedienne Jackie “Moms” Mabley. While 
Childress was writing the play, the two spoke regularly about its progress, 
and Taylor contributed her own research and ideas. Childress registered 
the script’s copyright in her own name, and declined to enter an agreement 
for co-ownership with Taylor. Taylor then hired another writer, Caldwell, 
to revise the play without Childress’s consent.] 
* * * 
Taylor identifies the following as her major contributions to the play: 
(1) she learned through interviews that “Moms” Mabley called all of her 
piano players “Luther,” so Taylor suggested that the play include such a 
character; (2) Taylor and Childress together interviewed Carey Jordan, 
“Moms” Mabley’s housekeeper, and upon leaving the interview they came 
to the conclusion that she would be a good character for the play, but Taylor 
could not recall whether she or Childress suggested it; (3) Taylor informed 
Childress that “Moms” Mabley made a weekly trip to Harlem to do ethnic 
food shopping; (4) Taylor suggested a street scene in Harlem with speakers 
because she recalled having seen or listened to such a scene many times; 
(5) the idea of using a minstrel scene came out of Taylor’s research; (6) the 
idea of a card game scene also came out of Taylor’s research, although 
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Taylor could not recall who specifically suggested the scene; (7) some of the 
jokes used in the play came from Taylor’s research; and (8) the 
characteristics of “Moms” Mabley’s personality portrayed in the play 
emerged from Taylor’s research. Essentially, Taylor contributed facts and 
details about “Moms” Mabley’s life and discussed some of them with 
Childress. However, Childress was responsible for the actual structure of 
the play and the dialogue. 
* * * 
Childress sued Taylor and other defendants alleging violations of the 
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1988) * * *. Taylor contended that 
she was a joint author with Childress, and therefore shared the rights to 
the play. Childress moved for summary judgment, which the District Court 
granted. The Court concluded that Taylor was not a joint author of 
Childress’s play and that Caldwell’s play was substantially similar to and 
infringed Childress’s play. In rejecting Taylor’s claim of joint authorship, 
Judge Haight ruled (a) that a work qualifies as a “joint work” under the 
definition section of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101, only when both 
authors intended, at the time the work was created, “that their 
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a 
unitary whole,” id., and (b) that there was insufficient evidence to permit 
a reasonable trier to find that Childress had the requisite intent. The Court 
further ruled that copyright law requires the contributions of both authors 
to be independently copyrightable, and that Taylor’s contributions, which 
consisted of ideas and research, were not copyrightable. 
Discussion 
In common with many issues arising in the domain of copyrights, the 
determination of whether to recognize joint authorship in a particular case 
requires a sensitive accommodation of competing demands advanced by at 
least two persons, both of whom have normally contributed in some way to 
the creation of a work of value. Care must be taken to ensure that true 
collaborators in the creative process are accorded the perquisites of co-
authorship and to guard against the risk that a sole author is denied 
exclusive authorship status simply because another person rendered some 
form of assistance. Copyright law best serves the interests of creativity 
when it carefully draws the bounds of “joint authorship” so as to protect the 
legitimate claims of both sole authors and co-authors. 
* * * 
The Copyright Act defines a “joint work” as 
a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that 
their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent 
parts of a unitary whole. 
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17 U.S.C. § 101. As Professor Nimmer has pointed out, this definition is 
really the definition of a work of joint authorship. See 1 NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 6.01 (1991). The definition concerns the creation of the work 
by the joint authors, not the circumstances, in addition to joint authorship, 
under which a work may be jointly owned, for example, by assignment of 
an undivided interest. The distinction affects the rights that are acquired. 
Joint authors hold undivided interests in a work, like all joint owners of a 
work, but joint authors, unlike other joint owners, also enjoy all the rights 
of authorship, including the renewal rights applicable to works in which a 
statutory copyright subsisted prior to January 1, 1978. See 17 U.S.C. § 304. 
* * * 
The legislative history also clarifies other aspects of the statutory 
definition, but leaves some matters in doubt. Endeavoring to flesh out the 
definition, the committee reports state: 
[A] work is “joint” if the authors collaborated with each other, or 
if each of the authors prepared his or her contribution with the 
knowledge and intention that it would be merged with the 
contributions of other authors as “inseparable or interdependent 
parts of a unitary whole.” The touchstone here is the intention, at 
the time the writing is done, that the parts be absorbed or 
combined into an integrated unit. . . . 
House Report at 120; Senate Report at 103 (emphasis added). This passage 
appears to state two alternative criteria—one focusing on the act of 
collaboration and the other on the parties’ intent. However, it is hard to 
imagine activity that would constitute meaningful “collaboration” 
unaccompanied by the requisite intent on the part of both participants that 
their contributions be merged into a unitary whole, and the case law has 
read the statutory language literally so that the intent requirement applies 
to all works of joint authorship. See, e.g., Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 
1313, 1317–19 (2d Cir.1989); Eckert v. Hurley Chicago Co., Inc., 638 F. 
Supp. 699, 702–03 (N.D.Ill.1986). 
A more substantial issue arising under the statutory definition of 
“joint work” is whether the contribution of each joint author must be 
copyrightable or only the combined result of their joint efforts must be 
copyrightable. The Nimmer treatise argues against a requirement of 
copyrightability of each author’s contribution, see 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 6.07; Professor Goldstein takes the contrary view, see 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 
COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.2.1.2 (1989), with the 
apparent agreement of the Latman treatise, see WILLIAM F. PATRY, 
LATMAN’S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 116 (6th ed. 1986). The case law supports 
a requirement of copyrightability of each contribution. * * * The Register 
of Copyrights strongly supports this view, arguing that it is required by the 
statutory standard of “authorship” and perhaps by the Constitution. See 
Moral Rights in Our Copyright Laws: Hearings on S. 1198 and S. 1253 
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Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 210–11 (1989) 
(statement of Ralph Oman). 
The issue, apparently open in this Circuit, is troublesome. If the focus 
is solely on the objective of copyright law to encourage the production of 
creative works, it is difficult to see why the contributions of all joint authors 
need be copyrightable. An individual creates a copyrightable work by 
combining a non-copyrightable idea with a copyrightable form of 
expression; the resulting work is no less a valuable result of the creative 
process simply because the idea and the expression came from two different 
individuals. Indeed, it is not unimaginable that there exists a skilled writer 
who might never have produced a significant work until some other person 
supplied the idea. The textual argument from the statute is not convincing. 
The Act surely does not say that each contribution to a joint work must be 
copyrightable, and the specification that there be “authors” does not 
necessarily require a copyrightable contribution. “Author” is not defined in 
the Act and appears to be used only in its ordinary sense of an originator. 
The “author” of an uncopyrightable idea is nonetheless its author even 
though, for entirely valid reasons, the law properly denies him a copyright 
on the result of his creativity. And the Register’s tentative constitutional 
argument seems questionable. It has not been supposed that the statutory 
grant of “authorship” status to the employer of a work made for hire 
exceeds the Constitution, though the employer has shown skill only in 
selecting employees, not in creating protectable expression. 
Nevertheless, we are persuaded to side with the position taken by the 
case law and endorsed by the agency administering the Copyright Act. The 
insistence on copyrightable contributions by all putative joint authors 
might serve to prevent some spurious claims by those who might otherwise 
try to share the fruits of the efforts of a sole author of a copyrightable work, 
even though a claim of having contributed copyrightable material could be 
asserted by those so inclined. More important, the prevailing view strikes 
an appropriate balance in the domains of both copyright and contract law. 
In the absence of contract, the copyright remains with the one or more 
persons who created copyrightable material. Contract law enables a person 
to hire another to create a copyrightable work, and the copyright law will 
recognize the employer as “author.” 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). Similarly, the 
person with non-copyrightable material who proposes to join forces with a 
skilled writer to produce a copyrightable work is free to make a contract to 
disclose his or her material in return for assignment of part ownership of 
the resulting copyright. Id. § 201(d). And, as with all contract matters, the 
parties may minimize subsequent disputes by formalizing their agreement 
in a written contract. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“work made for hire” definition 
of “specially ordered” or “commissioned” work includes requirement of 
written agreement). It seems more consistent with the spirit of copyright 
law to oblige all joint authors to make copyrightable contributions, leaving 
20  CH.  1 
  
those with non-copyrightable contributions to protect their rights through 
contract. 
There remains for consideration the crucial aspect of joint 
authorship—the nature of the intent that must be entertained by each 
putative joint author at the time the contribution of each was created. The 
wording of the statutory definition appears to make relevant only the state 
of mind regarding the unitary nature of the finished work—an intention 
“that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent 
parts of a unitary whole.” However, an inquiry so limited would extend 
joint author status to many persons who are not likely to have been within 
the contemplation of Congress. For example, a writer frequently works 
with an editor who makes numerous useful revisions to the first draft, some 
of which will consist of additions of copyrightable expression. Both intend 
their contributions to be merged into inseparable parts of a unitary whole, 
yet very few editors and even fewer writers would expect the editor to be 
accorded the status of joint author, enjoying an undivided half interest in 
the copyright in the published work. Similarly, research assistants may on 
occasion contribute to an author some protectable expression or merely a 
sufficiently original selection of factual material as would be entitled to a 
copyright, yet not be entitled to be regarded as a joint author of the work 
in which the contributed material appears. What distinguishes the writer-
editor relationship and the writer-researcher relationship from the true 
joint author relationship is the lack of intent of both participants in the 
venture to regard themselves as joint authors. 
Focusing on whether the putative joint authors regarded themselves 
as joint authors is especially important in circumstances, such as the 
instant case, where one person (Childress) is indisputably the dominant 
author of the work and the only issue is whether that person is the sole 
author or she and another (Taylor) are joint authors. * * * This concern 
requires less exacting consideration in the context of traditional forms of 
collaboration, such as between the creators of the words and music of a 
song. 
In this case, appellant contends that Judge Haight’s observation that 
“Childress never shared Taylor’s notion that they were co-authors of the 
play” misapplies the statutory standard by focusing on whether Childress 
“intended the legal consequences which flowed from her prior acts.” * * * 
We do not think Judge Haight went so far. He did not inquire whether 
Childress intended that she and Taylor would hold equal undivided 
interests in the play. But he properly insisted that they entertain in their 
minds the concept of joint authorship, whether or not they understood 
precisely the legal consequences of that relationship. Though joint 
authorship does not require an understanding by the co-authors of the legal 
consequences of their relationship, obviously some distinguishing 
characteristic of the relationship must be understood in order for it to be 
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the subject of their intent. In many instances, a useful test will be whether, 
in the absence of contractual agreements concerning listed authorship, 
each participant intended that all would be identified as co-authors. 
Though “billing” or “credit” is not decisive in all cases and joint authorship 
can exist without any explicit discussion of this topic by the parties, 
consideration of the topic helpfully serves to focus the fact-finder’s 
attention on how the parties implicitly regarded their undertaking. 
* * * 
Examination of whether the putative co-authors ever shared an intent 
to be co-authors serves the valuable purpose of appropriately confining the 
bounds of joint authorship arising by operation of copyright law, while 
leaving those not in a true joint authorship relationship with an author 
free to bargain for an arrangement that will be recognized as a matter of 
both copyright and contract law. Joint authorship entitles the co-authors 
to equal undivided interests in the work, see 17 U.S.C. § 201(a); Community 
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1498 (D.C.Cir.1988), aff’d 
without consideration of this point, 490 U.S. 730 (1989). That equal sharing 
of rights should be reserved for relationships in which all participants fully 
intend to be joint authors. The sharing of benefits in other relationships 
involving assistance in the creation of a copyrightable work can be more 
precisely calibrated by the participants in their contract negotiations 
regarding division of royalties or assignment of shares of ownership of the 
copyright, see 17 U.S.C. § 201(d). 
In this case, the issue is not only whether Judge Haight applied the 
correct standard for determining joint authorship but also whether he was 
entitled to conclude that the record warranted a summary judgment in 
favor of Childress. We are satisfied that Judge Haight was correct as to 
both issues. We need not determine whether we agree with his conclusion 
that Taylor’s contributions were not independently copyrightable since, 
even if they were protectable as expression or as an original selection of 
facts, we agree that there is no evidence from which a trier could infer that 
Childress had the state of mind required for joint authorship. As Judge 
Haight observed, whatever thought of co-authorship might have existed in 
Taylor’s mind “was emphatically not shared by the purported co-author.” 
There is no evidence that Childress ever contemplated, much less would 
have accepted, crediting the play as “written by Alice Childress and Clarice 
Taylor.” 
Childress was asked to write a play about “Moms” Mabley and did so. 
To facilitate her writing task, she accepted the assistance that Taylor 
provided, which consisted largely of furnishing the results of research 
concerning the life of “Moms” Mabley. As the actress expected to portray 
the leading role, Taylor also made some incidental suggestions, 
contributing ideas about the presentation of the play’s subject and possibly 
some minor bits of expression. But there is no evidence that these aspects 
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of Taylor’s role ever evolved into more than the helpful advice that might 
come from the cast, the directors, or the producers of any play. A playwright 
does not so easily acquire a co-author. 
* * * 
b. Works Made for Hire 
COMMUNITY FOR CREATIVE NON-VIOLENCE ET AL. V. REID 
490 U.S. 730, 109 S.Ct. 2166 (1989). 
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case, an artist and the organization that hired him to produce 
a sculpture contest the ownership of the copyright in that work. To resolve 
this dispute, we must construe the “work made for hire” provisions of the 
Copyright Act of 1976 (Act or 1976 Act), 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 201(b), and 
in particular, the provision in § 101, which defines as a “work made for 
hire” a “work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her 
employment” (hereinafter § 101(1)). 
I 
[Petitioners are the Community for Creative Non-Violence (“CCNV”), 
an organization dedicated to helping the homeless, and Mitch Snyder, a 
member and trustee of CCNV. CCNV conceived the idea of commissioning, 
as a Christmastime display, a modern Nativity scene titled “Third World 
America,” which featured a sculpture of a homeless family on a steam 
grate.] 
* * * 
Snyder made inquiries to locate an artist to produce the sculpture. He 
was referred to respondent James Earl Reid, a Baltimore, Maryland, 
sculptor. In the course of two telephone calls, Reid agreed to sculpt the 
three human figures. CCNV agreed to make the steam grate and pedestal 
for the statue. Reid proposed that the work be cast in bronze, at a total cost 
of approximately $100,000 and taking six to eight months to complete. 
Snyder rejected that proposal because CCNV did not have sufficient funds, 
and because the statue had to be completed by December 12 to be included 
in the pageant. Reid then suggested, and Snyder agreed, that the sculpture 
would be made of a material known as “Design Cast 62,” a synthetic 
substance that could meet CCNV’s monetary and time constraints, could 
be tinted to resemble bronze, and could withstand the elements. The 
parties agreed that the project would cost no more than $15,000, not 
including Reid’s services, which he offered to donate. The parties did not 
sign a written agreement. Neither party mentioned copyright. 
After Reid received an advance of $3,000, he made several sketches of 
figures in various poses. At Snyder’s request, Reid sent CCNV a sketch of 
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a proposed sculpture showing the family in a crechelike setting: the mother 
seated, cradling a baby in her lap; the father standing behind her, bending 
over her shoulder to touch the baby’s foot. Reid testified that Snyder asked 
for the sketch to use in raising funds for the sculpture. Snyder testified that 
it was also for his approval. Reid sought a black family to serve as a model 
for the sculpture. Upon Snyder’s suggestion, Reid visited a family living at 
CCNV’s Washington shelter but decided that only their newly born child 
was a suitable model. While Reid was in Washington, Snyder took him to 
see homeless people living on the streets. Snyder pointed out that they 
tended to recline on steam grates, rather than sit or stand, in order to warm 
their bodies. From that time on, Reid’s sketches contained only reclining 
figures. 
Throughout November and the first two weeks of December 1985, Reid 
worked exclusively on the statue, assisted at various times by a dozen 
different people who were paid with funds provided in installments by 
CCNV. On a number of occasions, CCNV members visited Reid to check on 
his progress and to coordinate CCNV’s construction of the base. CCNV 
rejected Reid’s proposal to use suitcases or shopping bags to hold the 
family’s personal belongings, insisting instead on a shopping cart. Reid and 
CCNV members did not discuss copyright ownership on any of these visits. 
On December 24, 1985, 12 days after the agreed-upon date, Reid 
delivered the completed statue to Washington. There it was joined to the 
steam grate and pedestal prepared by CCNV and placed on display near 
the site of the pageant. Snyder paid Reid the final installment of the 
$15,000. * * * 
[When a dispute over copyright in the statue arose, both Reid and 
CCNV filed certificates of copyright registration, and petitioners 
commenced this action. The District Court held that CCNV owned the 
copyright under the “work made for hire” doctrine, because Reid had acted 
as an employee of CCNV.] 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and 
remanded, holding that Reid owned the copyright because “Third World 
America” was not a work for hire. 846 F.2d 1485, 1494 (1988). Adopting 
what it termed the “literal interpretation” of the Act as articulated by the 
Fifth Circuit in Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children & Adults of 
Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises, 815 F.2d 323, 329 (1987), the court 
read § 101 as creating “a simple dichotomy in fact between employees and 
independent contractors.” Because, under agency law, Reid was an 
independent contractor, the court concluded that the work was not 
“prepared by an employee” under § 101(1). Nor was the sculpture a “work 
made for hire” under the second subsection of § 101 (hereinafter § 101(2)): 
sculpture is not one of the nine categories of works enumerated in that 
subsection, and the parties had not agreed in writing that the sculpture 
would be a work for hire. The court suggested that the sculpture 
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nevertheless may have been jointly authored by CCNV and Reid, and 
remanded for a determination whether the sculpture is indeed a joint work 
under the Act. 
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals 
over the proper construction of the “work made for hire” provisions of the 
Act. * * * We now affirm. 
II 
A 
The Copyright Act of 1976 provides that copyright ownership “vests 
initially in the author or authors of the work.” 17 U.S.C. § 201(a). As a 
general rule, the author is the party who actually creates the work, that is, 
the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression entitled 
to copyright protection. § 102. The Act carves out an important exception, 
however, for “works made for hire.” If the work is for hire, “the employer or 
other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author” 
and owns the copyright, unless there is a written agreement to the 
contrary. § 201(b). Classifying a work as “made for hire” determines not 
only the initial ownership of its copyright, but also the copyright’s duration, 
§ 302(c), and the owners’ renewal rights, § 304(a), [and] termination rights, 
§ 203(a) * * *. The contours of the work for hire doctrine therefore carry 
profound significance for freelance creators—including artists, writers, 
photographers, designers, composers, and computer programmers—and 
for the publishing, advertising, music, and other industries which 
commission their works. 
Section 101 of the 1976 Act provides that a work is “for hire” under two 
sets of circumstances * * *. Petitioners do not claim that the statue satisfies 
the terms of § 101(2). Quite clearly, it does not. Sculpture does not fit within 
any of the nine categories of “specially ordered or commissioned” works 
enumerated in that subsection, and no written agreement between the 
parties establishes “Third World America” as a work for hire. 
The dispositive inquiry in this case therefore is whether “Third World 
America” is “a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her 
employment” under § 101(1). The Act does not define these terms. In the 
absence of such guidance, four interpretations have emerged. The first 
holds that a work is prepared by an employee whenever the hiring party 
retains the right to control the product. Petitioners take this view. A 
second, and closely related, view is that a work is prepared by an employee 
under § 101(1) when the hiring party has actually wielded control with 
respect to the creation of a particular work. This approach was formulated 
by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. 
Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (1984), and adopted by the Fourth Circuit, 
Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publishing Co., 810 F.2d 410 
(1987), the Seventh Circuit, Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Systems 
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Software, 793 F.2d 889 (1986), and, at times, by petitioners. A third view 
is that the term “employee” within § 101(1) carries its common-law agency 
law meaning. This view was endorsed by the Fifth Circuit in Easter Seal 
Society for Crippled Children & Adults of Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy 
Enterprises, 815 F.2d 323 (1987), and by the Court of Appeals below. 
Finally, respondent and numerous amici curiae contend that the term 
“employee” only refers to “formal, salaried” employees. * * * The Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently adopted this view. See Dumas v. 
Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093 (1989). 
The starting point for our interpretation of a statute is always its 
language. The Act nowhere defines the terms “employee” or “scope of 
employment.” It is, however, well established that “[w]here Congress uses 
terms that have accumulated settled meaning under . . . the common law, 
a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress 
means to incorporate the established meaning of these terms.” NLRB v. 
Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981). In the past, when Congress has 
used the term “employee” without defining it, we have concluded that 
Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant 
relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine. See, e.g., Kelley 
v. Southern Pacific Co., 419 U.S. 318, 322–323 (1974); Baker v. Texas & 
Pacific R. Co., 359 U.S. 227, 228 (1959) (per curiam); Robinson v. Baltimore 
& Ohio R. Co., 237 U.S. 84, 94 (1915). Nothing in the text of the work for 
hire provisions indicates that Congress used the words “employee” and 
“employment” to describe anything other than “ ‘the conventional relation 
of employer and employee.’ ” Kelley, supra, at 323, quoting Robinson, 
supra, at 94 * * *. 
In past cases of statutory interpretation, when we have concluded that 
Congress intended terms such as “employee,” “employer,” and “scope of 
employment” to be understood in light of agency law, we have relied on the 
general common law of agency, rather than on the law of any particular 
State, to give meaning to these terms. This practice reflects the fact that 
“federal statutes are generally intended to have uniform nationwide 
application.” Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, [490 U.S. 
30 (1989)] at 43. Establishment of a federal rule of agency, rather than 
reliance on state agency law, is particularly appropriate here given the 
Act’s express objective of creating national, uniform copyright law by 
broadly pre-empting state statutory and common-law copyright regulation. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). We thus agree with the Court of Appeals that the 
term “employee” should be understood in light of the general common law 
of agency. 
In contrast, neither test proposed by petitioners is consistent with the 
text of the Act. The exclusive focus of the right to control the product test 
on the relationship between the hiring party and the product clashes with 
the language of § 101(1), which focuses on the relationship between the 
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hired and hiring parties. The right to control the product test also would 
distort the meaning of the ensuing subsection, § 101(2). Section 101 plainly 
creates two distinct ways in which a work can be deemed for hire: one for 
works prepared by employees, the other for those specially ordered or 
commissioned works which fall within one of the nine enumerated 
categories and are the subject of a written agreement. The right to control 
the product test ignores this dichotomy by transforming into a work for hire 
under § 101(1) any “specially ordered or commissioned” work that is subject 
to the supervision and control of the hiring party. Because a party who 
hires a “specially ordered or commissioned” work by definition has a right 
to specify the characteristics of the product desired, at the time the 
commission is accepted, and frequently until it is completed, the right to 
control the product test would mean that many works that could satisfy 
§ 101(2) would already have been deemed works for hire under § 101(1). 
Petitioners’ interpretation is particularly hard to square with § 101(2)’s 
enumeration of the nine specific categories of specially ordered or 
commissioned works eligible to be works for hire, e.g., “a contribution to a 
collective work,” “a part of a motion picture,” and “answer material for a 
test.” The unifying feature of these works is that they are usually prepared 
at the instance, direction, and risk of a publisher or producer. By their very 
nature, therefore, these types of works would be works by an employee 
under petitioners’ right to control the product test. 
The actual control test, articulated by the Second Circuit in Aldon 
Accessories, fares only marginally better when measured against the 
language and structure of § 101. Under this test, independent contractors 
who are so controlled and supervised in the creation of a particular work 
are deemed “employees” under § 101(1). Thus work for hire status under 
§ 101(1) depends on a hiring party’s actual control of, rather than right to 
control, the product. Under the actual control test, a work for hire could 
arise under § 101(2), but not under § 101(1), where a party commissions, 
but does not actually control, a product which falls into one of the nine 
enumerated categories. Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit that “[t]here is simply no way to milk the ‘actual 
control’ test of Aldon Accessories from the language of the statute.” Easter 
Seal Society, 815 F.2d, at 334. Section 101 clearly delineates between works 
prepared by an employee and commissioned works. Sound though other 
distinctions might be as a matter of copyright policy, there is no statutory 
support for an additional dichotomy between commissioned works that are 
actually controlled and supervised by the hiring party and those that are 
not. 
We therefore conclude that the language and structure of § 101 of the 
Act do not support either the right to control the product or the actual 
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control approaches.8 The structure of § 101 indicates that a work for hire 
can arise through one of two mutually exclusive means, one for employees 
and one for independent contractors, and ordinary canons of statutory 
interpretation indicate that the classification of a particular hired party 
should be made with reference to agency law. 
[The Court also examined the legislative history of the “work made for 
hire” definition and found no support there for a “control” test of 
employment status.] 
* * * 
Finally, petitioners’ construction of the work for hire provisions would 
impede Congress’ paramount goal in revising the 1976 Act of enhancing 
predictability and certainty of copyright ownership. In a “copyright 
marketplace,” the parties negotiate with an expectation that one of them 
will own the copyright in the completed work. With that expectation, the 
parties at the outset can settle on relevant contractual terms, such as the 
price for the work and the ownership of reproduction rights. 
To the extent that petitioners endorse an actual control test, CCNV’s 
construction of the work for hire provisions prevents such planning. 
Because that test turns on whether the hiring party has closely monitored 
the production process, the parties would not know until late in the process, 
if not until the work is completed, whether a work will ultimately fall 
within § 101(1). Under petitioners’ approach, therefore, parties would have 
to predict in advance whether the hiring party will sufficiently control a 
given work to make it the author. “If they guess incorrectly, their reliance 
on ‘work for hire’ or an assignment may give them a copyright interest that 
they did not bargain for.” Easter Seal Society, 815 F.2d, at 333.This 
understanding of the work for hire provisions clearly thwarts Congress’ 
goal of ensuring predictability through advance planning. Moreover, 
petitioners’ interpretation “leaves the door open for hiring parties, who 
have failed to get a full assignment of copyright rights from independent 
contractors falling outside the subdivision (2) guidelines, to unilaterally 
obtain work-made-for-hire rights years after the work has been completed 
as long as they directed or supervised the work, a standard that is hard not 
to meet when one is a hiring party.” Hamilton, Commissioned Works as 
Works Made for Hire Under the 1976 Copyright Act: Misinterpretation and 
Injustice, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1304 (1987). 
                                                 
8 We also reject the suggestion of respondent and amici that the § 101(1) term “employee” 
refers only to formal, salaried employees. While there is some support for such a definition in the 
legislative history, * * * the language of § 101(1) cannot support it. The Act does not say “formal” 
or “salaried” employee, but simply “employee.” Moreover, respondent and those amici who endorse 
a formal, salaried employee test do not agree upon the content of this test. * * * Even the one Court 
of Appeals to adopt what it termed a formal, salaried employee test in fact embraced an approach 
incorporating numerous factors drawn from the agency law definition of employee which we 
endorse. See Dumas, 865 F.2d, at 1104. 
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In sum, we must reject petitioners’ argument. Transforming a 
commissioned work into a work by an employee on the basis of the hiring 
party’s right to control, or actual control of, the work is inconsistent with 
the language, structure, and legislative history of the work for hire 
provisions. To determine whether a work is for hire under the Act, a court 
first should ascertain, using principles of general common law of agency, 
whether the work was prepared by an employee or an independent 
contractor. After making this determination, the court can apply the 
appropriate subsection of § 101. 
B 
We turn, finally, to an application of § 101 to Reid’s production of 
“Third World America.” In determining whether a hired party is an 
employee under the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring 
party’s right to control the manner and means by which the product is 
accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill 
required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the 
work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the 
hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; 
the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work; 
the method of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying 
assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring 
party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee 
benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party. See Restatement 
§ 220(2) (setting forth a nonexhaustive list of factors relevant to 
determining whether a hired party is an employee). No one of these factors 
is determinative. 
Examining the circumstances of this case in light of these factors, we 
agree with the Court of Appeals that Reid was not an employee of CCNV 
but an independent contractor. True, CCNV members directed enough of 
Reid’s work to ensure that he produced a sculpture that met their 
specifications. But the extent of control the hiring party exercises over the 
details of the product is not dispositive. Indeed, all the other circumstances 
weigh heavily against finding an employment relationship. Reid is a 
sculptor, a skilled occupation. Reid supplied his own tools. He worked in 
his own studio in Baltimore, making daily supervision of his activities from 
Washington practicably impossible. Reid was retained for less than two 
months, a relatively short period of time. During and after this time, CCNV 
had no right to assign additional projects to Reid. Apart from the deadline 
for completing the sculpture, Reid had absolute freedom to decide when 
and how long to work. CCNV paid Reid $15,000, a sum dependent on 
“completion of a specific job, a method by which independent contractors 
are often compensated.” Holt v. Winpisinger, 811 F.2d 1532, 1540 (1987). 
Reid had total discretion in hiring and paying assistants. “Creating 
sculptures was hardly ‘regular business’ for CCNV.” 846 F.2d, at 1494, n. 
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11. Indeed, CCNV is not a business at all. Finally, CCNV did not pay 
payroll or Social Security taxes, provide any employee benefits, or 
contribute to unemployment insurance or workers’ compensation funds. 
Because Reid was an independent contractor, whether “Third World 
America” is a work for hire depends on whether it satisfies the terms of 
§ 101(2). This petitioners concede it cannot do. Thus, CCNV is not the 
author of “Third World America” by virtue of the work for hire provisions 
of the Act. However, as the Court of Appeals made clear, CCNV 
nevertheless may be a joint author of the sculpture if, on remand, the 
District Court determines that CCNV and Reid prepared the work “with 
the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or 
interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. In that case, 
CCNV and Reid would be co-owners of the copyright in the work. See 
§ 201(a). 
For the aforestated reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 
* * * 
COPYRIGHT TRANSFER/LICENSING 
EFFECTS ASSOCIATES, INC. V. COHEN 
908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990). 
KOZINSKI, CIRCUIT JUDGE. 
What we have here is a failure to compensate. Larry Cohen, a low-
budget horror movie mogul, paid less than the agreed price for special 
effects footage he had commissioned from Effects Associates. Cohen then 
used this footage without first obtaining a written license or assignment of 
the copyright; Effects sued for copyright infringement. We consider 
whether a transfer of copyright without a written agreement, an 
arrangement apparently not uncommon in the motion picture industry, 
conforms with the requirements of the Copyright Act. 
[When Effects orally agreed to provide special effects footage for 
Cohen’s film, the parties never discussed who would own the copyright in 
the commissioned footage. When Effects sued Cohen for infringement 
(after Cohen failed to tender full payment), the district court granted 
summary judgment, holding that Effects had granted Cohen an implied 
license to use the footage. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that Effects 
(which both parties agree is the initial copyright owner) had not 
transferred the copyright to Cohen, because an oral transfer of copyright 
ownership is invalid under 17 U.S.C. § 204(a). However, because a 
“transfer” of copyright is defined by 17 U.S.C. § 101 to include an exclusive 
license but not a nonexclusive license, the court then addressed the 
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question whether Cohen had acquired an oral nonexclusive license to use 
the footage.] 
* * * 
Although we reject any suggestion that moviemakers are immune to 
section 204, we note that there is a narrow exception to the writing 
requirement that may apply here. Section 204 provides that all transfers 
of copyright ownership must be in writing; section 101 defines transfers of 
ownership broadly, but expressly removes from the scope of section 204 a 
“nonexclusive license.” The sole issue that remains, then, is whether Cohen 
had a nonexclusive license to use plaintiff’s special effects footage. 
The leading treatise on copyright law states that “[a] nonexclusive 
license may be granted orally, or may even be implied from conduct.” 3 M. 
NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.03[A], at 10–36 (1989). 
Cohen relies on the latter proposition; he insists that, although Effects 
never gave him a written or oral license, Effects’s conduct created an 
implied license to use the footage in “The Stuff.” 
Cohen relies largely on our decision in Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630 (9th 
Cir.1984). There, we held that Oddo, the author of a series of articles on 
how to restore Ford F-100 pickup trucks, had impliedly granted a limited 
non-exclusive license to Ries, a publisher, to use plaintiff’s articles in a book 
on the same topic. We relied on the fact that Oddo and Ries had formed a 
partnership to create and publish the book, with Oddo writing and Ries 
providing capital. Id. at 632 & n. 1. Oddo prepared a manuscript consisting 
partly of material taken from his prior articles and submitted it to Ries. Id. 
at 632. Because the manuscript incorporated pre-existing material, it was 
a derivative work; by publishing it, Ries would have necessarily infringed 
the copyright in Oddo’s articles, unless Oddo had granted him a license. Id. 
at 634. We concluded that, in preparing and handing over to Ries a 
manuscript intended for publication that, if published, would infringe 
Oddo’s copyright, Oddo “impliedly gave the partnership a license to use the 
articles insofar as they were incorporated in the manuscript, for without 
such a license, Oddo’s contribution to the partnership venture would have 
been of minimal value.” Id.5 
The district court agreed with Cohen, and we agree with the district 
court: Oddo controls here. Like the plaintiff in Oddo, Effects created a work 
at defendant’s request and handed it over, intending that defendant copy 
                                                 
5 Oddo did nevertheless prevail, but on other grounds. Ries was unhappy with Oddo’s 
manuscript and hired another writer to do the job right. This writer added much new material, 
but also used large chunks of Oddo’s manuscript, thereby incorporating portions of Oddo’s pre-
existing articles. 743 F.2d at 632. By publishing the other writer’s book, Ries exceeded the scope 
of his implied license to use Oddo’s articles and was liable for copyright infringement. Id. at 634. 
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and distribute it.6 To hold that Effects did not at the same time convey a 
license to use the footage in “The Stuff” would mean that plaintiff’s 
contribution to the film was “of minimal value,” a conclusion that can’t be 
squared with the fact that Cohen paid Effects almost $56,000 for this 
footage. Accordingly, we conclude that Effects impliedly granted 
nonexclusive licenses to Cohen and his production company to incorporate 
the special effects footage into “The Stuff” and to New World 
Entertainment to distribute the film. 
Nor can we construe payment in full as a condition precedent to 
implying a license. Conditions precedent are disfavored and will not be 
read into a contract unless required by plain, unambiguous language. 
Sulmeyer v. United States (In re Bubble Up Delaware, Inc.), 684 F.2d 1259, 
1264 (9th Cir.1982). The language of the October 29, 1984, agreement 
doesn’t support a conclusion that full payment was a condition precedent 
to Cohen’s use of the footage. Moreover, Effects’s president conceded at his 
deposition that he never told Cohen that a failure to pay would be viewed 
as copyright infringement. * * * 
Conclusion 
We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Cohen and the other defendants. We note, however, that plaintiff doesn’t 
leave this court empty-handed. Copyright ownership is comprised of a 
bundle of rights; in granting a nonexclusive license to Cohen, Effects has 
given up only one stick from that bundle—the right to sue Cohen for 
copyright infringement. It retains the right to sue him in state court on a 
variety of other grounds, including breach of contract. Additionally, Effects 
may license, sell or give away for nothing its remaining rights in the special 
effects footage. * * * 
NEW YORK TIMES CO., INC. V. TASINI 
533 U.S. 483, 121 S.Ct. 2381 (2001). 
JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This copyright case concerns the rights of freelance authors and a 
presumptive privilege of their publishers. The litigation was initiated by 
six freelance authors and relates to articles they contributed to three print 
periodicals (two newspapers and one magazine). Under agreements with 
the periodicals’ publishers, but without the freelancers’ consent, two 
                                                 
6 As the district court found, “every objective fact concerning the transaction at issue 
supports a finding that an implied license existed.” Effects’s copyright registration certificate 
states that the footage is to be used in “The Stuff,” so does the letter agreement of October 29, 
1984, and Effects’s President James Danforth agreed at his deposition that this was his 
understanding. Also, Effects delivered the film negatives to Cohen, never warning him that cutting 
the negatives into the film would constitute copyright infringement. While delivery of a copy “does 
not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work,” 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1988) (emphasis added), 
it is one factor that may be relied upon in determining that an implied license has been granted. 
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computer database companies placed copies of the freelancers’ articles—
along with all other articles from the periodicals in which the freelancers’ 
work appeared—into three databases. Whether written by a freelancer or 
staff member, each article is presented to, and retrievable by, the user in 
isolation, clear of the context the original print publication presented. 
The freelance authors’ complaint alleged that their copyrights had 
been infringed by the inclusion of their articles in the databases. The 
publishers, in response, relied on the privilege of reproduction and 
distribution accorded them by § 201(c) of the Copyright Act * * *. 
Specifically, the publishers maintained that, as copyright owners of 
collective works, i.e., the original print publications, they had merely 
exercised “the privilege” § 201(c) accords them to “reproduc[e] and 
distribut[e]” the author’s discretely copyrighted contribution. 
In agreement with the Second Circuit, we hold that § 201(c) does not 
authorize the copying at issue here. The publishers are not sheltered by 
§ 201(c), we conclude, because the databases reproduce and distribute 
articles standing alone and not in context, not “as part of that particular 
collective work” to which the author contributed, “as part of . . . any 
revision” thereof, or “as part of . . . any later collective work in the same 
series.” Both the print publishers and the electronic publishers, we rule, 
have infringed the copyrights of the freelance authors. 
I 
A 
* * * The Authors registered copyrights in each of the[ir] Articles. The 
Times, Newsday, and Time (Print Publishers) registered collective work 
copyrights in each periodical edition in which an Article originally 
appeared. The Print Publishers engaged the Authors as independent 
contractors (freelancers) under contracts that in no instance secured 
consent from an Author to placement of an Article in an electronic 
database. 
At the time the Articles were published, all three Print Publishers had 
agreements with petitioner LEXIS/NEXIS (formerly Mead Data Central 
Corp.), owner and operator of NEXIS, a computerized database that stores 
information in a text-only format. NEXIS contains articles from hundreds 
of journals (newspapers and periodicals) spanning many years. The Print 
Publishers have licensed to LEXIS/NEXIS the text of articles appearing in 
the three periodicals. The licenses authorize LEXIS/NEXIS to copy and sell 
any portion of those texts. 
Pursuant to the licensing agreements, the Print Publishers regularly 
provide LEXIS/NEXIS with a batch of all the articles published in each 
periodical edition. The Print Publisher codes each article to facilitate 
computerized retrieval, then transmits it in a separate file. After further 
coding, LEXIS/NEXIS places the article in the central discs of its database. 
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Subscribers to NEXIS, accessing the system through a computer, may 
search for articles by author, subject, date, publication, headline, key term, 
words in text, or other criteria. * * * Each article appears as a separate, 
isolated “story”—without any visible link to the other stories originally 
published in the same newspaper or magazine edition. NEXIS does not 
contain pictures or advertisements, and it does not reproduce the original 
print publication’s formatting features such as headline size, page 
placement (e.g., above or below the fold for newspapers), or location of 
continuation pages. 
* * * 
We granted certiorari to determine whether the copying of the 
Authors’ Articles in the Databases is privileged by 17 U.S.C. § 201(c). Like 
the Court of Appeals, we conclude that the § 201(c) privilege does not 
override the Authors’ copyrights, for the Databases do not reproduce and 
distribute the Articles as part of a collective work privileged by § 201(c). 
Accordingly, and again like the Court of Appeals, we find it unnecessary to 
determine whether the privilege is transferable. 
II 
* * * 
Section 201(c) both describes and circumscribes the “privilege” a 
publisher acquires regarding an author’s contribution to a collective work: 
“In the absence of an express transfer of the copyright or of any 
rights under it, the owner of copyright in the collective work is 
presumed to have acquired only the privilege of reproducing and 
distributing the contribution as part of that particular collective 
work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective 
work in the same series.” (Emphasis added.) 
A newspaper or magazine publisher is thus privileged to reproduce or 
distribute an article contributed by a freelance author, absent a contract 
otherwise providing, only “as part of” any (or all) of three categories of 
collective works: (a) “that collective work” to which the author contributed 
her work, (b) “any revision of that collective work,” or (c) “any later 
collective work in the same series.” In accord with Congress’ prescription, 
a “publishing company could reprint a contribution from one issue in a later 
issue of its magazine, and could reprint an article from a 1980 edition of an 
encyclopedia in a 1990 revision of it; the publisher could not revise the 
contribution itself or include it in a new anthology or an entirely different 
magazine or other collective work.” H.R. Rep. 122–123, U.S.Code Cong. & 
Admin.News 1976, pp. 5659, 5738. 
Essentially, § 201(c) adjusts a publisher’s copyright in its collective 
work to accommodate a freelancer’s copyright in her contribution. If there 
is demand for a freelance article standing alone or in a new collection, the 
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Copyright Act allows the freelancer to benefit from that demand; after 
authorizing initial publication, the freelancer may also sell the article to 
others. * * * It would scarcely “preserve the author’s copyright in a 
contribution” as contemplated by Congress, H.R. Rep. 122, U.S. Code Cong. 
& Admin. News 1976, pp. 5659, 5738, if a newspaper or magazine publisher 
were permitted to reproduce or distribute copies of the author’s 
contribution in isolation or within new collective works. * * * 
III 
In the instant case, the Authors wrote several Articles and gave the 
Print Publishers permission to publish the Articles in certain newspapers 
and magazines. It is undisputed that the Authors hold copyrights and, 
therefore, exclusive rights in the Articles.1 It is clear, moreover, that the 
Print and Electronic Publishers have exercised at least some rights that 
§ 106 initially assigns exclusively to the Authors * * *. 
Against the Authors’ charge of infringement, the Publishers do not 
here contend the Authors entered into an agreement authorizing 
reproduction of the Articles in the Databases. * * * Each discrete edition of 
the periodicals in which the Articles appeared is a “collective work,” the 
Publishers agree. They contend, however, that reproduction and 
distribution of each Article by the Databases lie within the “privilege of 
reproducing and distributing the [Articles] as part of . . . [a] revision of that 
collective work,” § 201(c). The Publishers’ encompassing construction of the 
§ 201(c) privilege is unacceptable, we conclude, for it would diminish the 
Authors’ exclusive rights in the Articles. 
In determining whether the Articles have been reproduced and 
distributed “as part of” a “revision” of the collective works in issue, we focus 
on the Articles as presented to, and perceptible by, the user of the 
Databases. In this case, the three Databases present articles to users clear 
of the context provided either by the original periodical editions or by any 
revision of those editions. * * * When the user conducts a search, each 
article appears as a separate item within the search result. [The] article 
appears to a user without the graphics, formatting, or other articles with 
which the article was initially published. * * * [W]e cannot see how the 
Database perceptibly reproduces and distributes the article “as part of” 
either the original edition or a “revision” of that edition. 
* * * 
The Publishers press an analogy between the Databases, on the one 
hand, and microfilm and microfiche, on the other. We find the analogy 
                                                 
1 The Publishers do not claim that the Articles are “work[s] made for hire.” 17 U.S.C. 
§ 201(b). As to such works, the employer or person for whom a work was prepared is treated as the 
author. Ibid. The Print Publishers, however, neither engaged the Authors to write the Articles as 
“employee[s]” nor “commissioned” the Articles through “a written instrument signed by [both 
parties]” indicating that the Articles shall be considered “work[s] made for hire.” § 101 (1994 ed., 
Supp. V) (defining “work made for hire”). 
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wanting. Microforms typically contain continuous photographic 
reproductions of a periodical in the medium of miniaturized film. 
Accordingly, articles appear on the microforms, writ very small, in 
precisely the position in which the articles appeared in the newspaper. * * * 
True, the microfilm roll contains multiple editions, and the microfilm user 
can adjust the machine lens to focus only on the Article, to the exclusion of 
surrounding material. Nonetheless, the user first encounters the Article in 
context. In the Databases, by contrast, the Articles appear disconnected 
from their original context. * * * In short, unlike microforms, the Databases 
do not perceptibly reproduce articles as part of the collective work to which 
the author contributed or as part of any “revision” thereof. 
* * * 
IV 
The Publishers warn that a ruling for the Authors will have 
“devastating” consequences. The Databases, the Publishers note, provide 
easy access to complete newspaper texts going back decades. A ruling for 
the Authors, the Publishers suggest, will punch gaping holes in the 
electronic record of history. * * * 
Notwithstanding the dire predictions from some quarters, it hardly 
follows from today’s decision that an injunction against the inclusion of 
these Articles in the Databases (much less all freelance articles in any 
databases) must issue. The parties (Authors and Publishers) may enter 
into an agreement allowing continued electronic reproduction of the 
Authors’ works; they, and if necessary the courts and Congress, may draw 
on numerous models for distributing copyrighted works and remunerating 
authors for their distribution. In any event, speculation about future harms 
is no basis for this Court to shrink authorial rights Congress established in 
§ 201(c). Agreeing with the Court of Appeals that the Publishers are liable 
for infringement, we leave remedial issues open for initial airing and 
decision in the District Court. 
* * * 
We conclude that the Electronic Publishers infringed the Authors’ 
copyrights by reproducing and distributing the Articles in a manner not 
authorized by the Authors and not privileged by § 201(c). We further 
conclude that the Print Publishers infringed the Authors’ copyrights by 
authorizing the Electronic Publishers to place the Articles in the Databases 
and by aiding the Electronic Publishers in that endeavor. We therefore 
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
It is so ordered. 
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MILNE V. STEPHEN SLESINGER, INC. 
430 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2005). 
CALLAHAN, CIRCUIT JUDGE: 
This copyright action arises from a termination notice sent by the 
appellant to the appellee, seeking to recapture rights to various characters 
created by her grandfather, Alan Alexander Milne, who authored the 
“Winnie-the-Pooh” children’s books. Milne originally granted various 
rights in those works to the appellee in 1930. Then, in 1983, due to a change 
in copyright law in 1976, Milne’s heirs considered terminating the 1930 
grant outright, but instead entered into a new agreement that revoked the 
original grant and re-issued rights in the works to the appellee. The 
appellant seeks to invalidate the 1983 agreement based on 1998 legislation. 
The 1998 legislation only authorizes the termination of copyright 
agreements executed before 1978. Because the 1983 revocation and re-
grant were valid, we affirm the district court’s decision. 
* * * 
In the 1920s, Alan Alexander Milne (“the author”) created in his classic 
children’s books the characters of the boy Christopher Robin and his stuffed 
bear, Winnie-the-Pooh, as well as their friends Eeyore, Owl, Piglet, Rabbit, 
Kanga, Roo, and Tigger. Four of those works are involved in this action: (1) 
When We Were Very Young; (2) Winnie-the-Pooh; (3) Now We Are Six; and 
(4) House at Pooh Corner (collectively, “Pooh works”). U.S. copyrights in the 
Pooh works were registered between 1924 and 1928, and renewed between 
1952 and 1956. 
[In 1930, the author granted exclusive merchandising and other rights 
in the Pooh works, throughout the U.S. and Canada, to Stephen Slesinger, 
Inc. (SSI) for the entire period of copyright and any renewal thereof, in 
exchange for royalties.] 
* * * 
In 1956, the author passed away and was survived by his widow and 
their son, Christopher Robin Milne. The author’s will bequeathed all 
beneficial interests in the Pooh works to a trust for the benefit of his widow 
during her lifetime (“Milne Trust”), and, after her death, to other 
beneficiaries (“Pooh Properties Trust”), which included his son, 
Christopher, and Christopher’s daughter, Clare. Clare is the author’s sole 
grandchild and the plaintiff-appellant in this case. 
In 1961, SSI granted exclusively to Walt Disney Productions 
(“Disney”) the rights it had acquired in the 1930 grant, and Disney agreed 
to pay certain royalties to SSI. Around the same time, Disney also entered 
into a similar agreement with the author’s widow and the Milne Trust, 
granting Disney exclusive motion-picture rights, foreign-merchandising 
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rights, and other exclusive rights in the Pooh works in exchange for 
royalties 
In 1971, the author’s widow passed away and, in 1972, her beneficial 
interests under the Milne Trust were assigned to the Pooh Properties Trust 
in accordance with the author’s will. This meant that the Pooh Properties 
Trust would receive the author’s copyright interest in the Pooh works plus 
the royalties payable under the 1961 Milne-Disney agreement. 
* * * 
In 1983, faced with the possibility that Christopher might seek to 
terminate the rights Disney had received in 1961 from SSI, Disney 
proposed that the parties renegotiate the rights to the Pooh works. 
Christopher accepted Disney’s proposal and, using the bargaining power 
conferred by his termination right, negotiated and signed on April 1, 1983 
a more lucrative deal with SSI and Disney that would benefit the Pooh 
Properties Trust and its beneficiaries. 
The new agreement acknowledged the 1930 grant and the 1961 
assignment of rights to Disney, and observed that although ownership of 
the copyrights had been transferred to the Pooh Properties Trust, there 
were “disputes[which] had existed[.]” Recognizing that the author’s heir, 
Christopher, may well have a right of termination under the 1976 
Copyright Act, the agreement declared that the parties were resolved to 
“clarify certain aspects of their contractual arrangements and to settle 
revised agreements.” Christopher therefore agreed not to seek termination 
of the existing arrangements in return for executing the new agreement. 
The agreement then provided for the revocation of the 1930 and 1961 
agreements in favor of the new agreement, followed by the re-granting (on 
the same page) of the rights in the Pooh works to SSI. In exchange for 
royalties, SSI turned around and granted Disney the radio, television, 
motion-picture, and merchandising rights to those works. 
One result of the 1983 agreement was an increase of the amounts that 
the Pooh Properties Trust received over the sums that had been payable 
under the 1961 Milne-Disney agreement. The Pooh Properties Trust now 
received double SSI’s share of the royalties, compared to about half of SSI’s 
share before the 1983 agreement. Thus, the renegotiations between the 
parties resulted, by some estimates, in a net gain of hundreds of millions 
of dollars to the Pooh Properties Trust, which included Clare as a prime 
beneficiary. 
On November 4, 2002, motivated by the recent enactment of the CTEA 
and its favorable treatment of authors’ heirs, Clare set out to recapture the 
rights to the Pooh works. Toward that end, she served SSI with a notice of 
termination, which referenced November 5, 2004 as the effective date for 
termination of the 1930 grant of rights to SSI. The same day that she 
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served the termination notice, Clare entered into an agreement with 
Disney, assigning the rights expected to revert to her in 2004. 
[Clare sought a declaratory judgment that her termination was 
effective to terminate SSI’s rights in the Pooh works. SSI argued that the 
notice was invalid because the 1930 grant was revoked by the 1983 
agreement. The District Court held the notice invalid, and Clare appealed.] 
* * * 
A. Right of Termination Under the CTEA 
Clare argues that she properly terminated SSI’s rights in the Pooh 
works. We hold that the district court’s contrary conclusion is correct. 
In a copyright case, as in most cases, the language of the statute 
provides the starting point for our analysis. The CTEA provides in relevant 
part: 
In the case of any copyright other than a work made for hire, 
subsisting in its renewal term on the effective date of the Sonny 
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act [effective October 27, 1998] 
for which the termination right provided in subsection (c) [of this 
section] has expired by such date, where the author or owner of 
the termination right has not previously exercised such 
termination right, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a 
transfer or license of the renewal copyright or any right under it, 
executed before January 1, 1978, by any of the persons designated 
in subsection (a)(1)(C) of this section, other than by will, is subject 
to termination. . . . 
17 U.S.C. § 304(d). 
Although Clare’s termination notice purports to terminate the 1930 
grant under the CTEA (section 304(d)), that statute provides a termination 
right to only those transfers or licences “executed before January 1, 1978[.]” 
Id. (emphasis added). The only pre-1978 grant of rights to SSI, and the only 
grant to SSI specified in the termination notice, was the 1930 grant made 
by the author to Slesinger. The 1930 grant, however, was terminated by 
the beneficiaries of the Pooh Properties Trust upon the execution of the 
1983 agreement. Accordingly, there was no pre-1978 grant of rights to SSI 
in existence when Congress enacted the CTEA in 1998. 
The sole grant of rights to SSI, either at the time of the CTEA’s 
enactment or when Clare served her termination notice, was the grant of 
rights embodied in the 1983 agreement. As the district court correctly 
explained, however, this grant is not subject to termination under section 
304(d) because it was not “executed before January 1, 1978,” as the statute 
expressly requires. 17 U.S.C. § 304(d). 
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1. “Agreement to the Contrary” 
Faced with the reality that she is dealing with a post-1978 agreement, 
Clare attempts to circumvent the 1983 agreement by claiming that another 
provision of the CTEA, 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(5), requires this court to regard 
the 1983 agreement as an “agreement to the contrary” that does not 
prevent her from terminating SSI’s rights to the Pooh works. Section 
304(c)(5) states that a “[t]ermination . . . may be effected notwithstanding 
any agreement to the contrary, including any agreement to make a will or 
to make any future grant.” 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(5). 
The statute does not define the phrase “agreement to the contrary,” 
although it does provide two examples of agreements that would constitute 
an “agreement to the contrary”: “an agreement to make a will” and an 
agreement “to make any future grant.” Id. The undisputed fact that the 
1983 agreement does not fall into either category supports the district 
court’s finding that the 1983 agreement is not “an agreement to the 
contrary.” 
* * * 
Clare also relies on the Second Circuit’s decision in Marvel Characters, 
Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280 (2d Cir.2002), to support her claim that the 
1983 agreement is an “agreement to the contrary” under section 304(c)(5). 
The contract at issue there was a settlement agreement between the 
parties, which ended a series of lawsuits filed in the 1960s by the creator 
of a copyrighted work. The creator argued that the settlement agreement 
should not be given effect because it contractually changed the nature of 
the copyrighted work, labeling it as a “work made for hire” many years 
after its creation. The effects of this after-the-fact label were to make the 
creator an “employee for hire” rather than the author of the copyrighted 
work, and to foreclose his right to terminate the grant he had made in the 
copyrighted work. Thus, unlike the issue presented in the case at bar, the 
issue facing the Second Circuit was “whether § 304(c)(5)’s phrase ‘any 
agreement to the contrary’ includes a settlement agreement stating that a 
work was created for hire[.]” Id. at 290. 
After examining the legislative history and considering the purpose of 
section 304(c), the court concluded “that an agreement made subsequent to 
a work’s creation which retroactively deems it a work for hire constitutes 
an agreement to the contrary under § 304(c)(5) of the 1976 Act.” Id. at 292. 
The Second Circuit held that an employer cannot contractually transform 
a creator or author of a copyrighted work into an “employee for hire.” Id. 
The court expressed concern that if it held otherwise, works not satisfying 
the relationship-based “for hire” test could be coerced by post-facto 
agreements that designate such works to be something they are not: “works 
for hire.” 
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The facts, reasoning, and holding of Marvel have little relevance to this 
case because, here, there is no after-the-fact attempt to recharacterize the 
work or a prior agreement. Instead, the 1983 agreement involves 
contractual provisions that operated prospectively through the revocation 
of an existing grant and the making of a new one. As the district court 
recognized, “[t]he parties in the 1983 [a]greement did not attempt to 
change or modify the nature of their association with one another, or alter 
the character of their long-standing author/grantee relationship.” 
Reinforcing this reasoning are the undisputed facts that the 1930 
grant was expressly revoked by the Pooh Properties Trust, which made a 
new grant of rights to SSI that, inter alia, was more lucrative for the 
author’s heirs. The fact that the 1983 agreement was meant to protect the 
continuing viability of the author’s grant of rights to SSI is evident from 
the agreement itself. In that vein, it is important to note that the parties 
describe their 1983 agreement as a “new agreement for the future which 
the parties believe would not be subject to any right of termination under 
17 U.S.C. Secs. 203 or 304(c).” 
Neither Marvel nor any other of Clare’s cited authority supplies a basis 
for us to question the district court’s decision or to undo the 1983 
agreement, which was freely and intelligently entered into by the parties. 
The beneficiaries of the Pooh Properties Trust were able to obtain 
considerably more money as a result of the bargaining power wielded by 
the author’s son, Christopher, who was believed to own a statutory right to 
terminate the 1930 grant under section 304(c) of the 1976 Copyright Act. 
Although Christopher presumably could have served a termination notice, 
he elected instead to use his leverage to obtain a better deal for the Pooh 
Properties Trust. His daughter, Clare, was a beneficiary of this new 
arrangement, and her current dissatisfaction provides no reason to 
discredit the validity of the 1983 agreement and the rights conferred 
thereby. 
2. Legislative History of Section 304(c) 
* * * 
After more than 50 years of advancement of the Pooh works in the 
marketplace, their value was sufficiently demonstrated, and the 1976 
Copyright Act provided Christopher a window for termination. The Pooh 
Properties Trust recognized the perceived right to terminate as a valuable 
bargaining chip, and used it to obtain an advantageous agreement that 
doubled its royalty share relative to SSI’s share. Thus, the 1983 agreement 
exemplifies the increased bargaining power that Congress intended to 
bestow on authors and their heirs by creating the termination right under 
the 1976 Copyright Act. As the 1983 agreement appears to be the type 
expressly contemplated and endorsed by Congress, we do not consider it to 
be a prohibited “agreement to the contrary” under section 304(c)(5). 
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* * * 
B. “Moment of Freedom” 
Clare also advances the theory that the 1983 agreement did not serve 
to revoke the 1930 grant to Slesinger because no “moment of freedom” was 
built in between the agreement’s simultaneous revocation and re-granting 
of rights in the Pooh works. She claims that section 304(c)(6)(D) requires 
such a “moment of freedom” before a re-grant of rights may take place, and 
that without such a moment of freedom, the 1983 agreement is nothing 
more than an amendment to the original 1930 agreement, one that is 
terminable under the CTEA. 
Section 304(c)(6)(D) reads as follows: 
A further grant, or agreement to make a further grant, of any 
right covered by a terminated grant is valid only if it is made after 
the effective date of the termination. As an exception, however, an 
agreement for such a further grant may be made between the 
author [or statutory heir(s)] . . . and the original grantee or such 
grantee’s successor in title, after the notice of termination has 
been served. . . . 
17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(D). This provision sets forth the proper timing 
mechanism for grants and agreements to make grants where the statutory 
termination under section 304(c)(5) has been exercised. But Clare does not 
contend and cannot contend that in 1983 anyone exercised a statutory right 
of termination with respect to the Pooh works. 
Clare’s sole support for her position is found in a treatise authored by 
the late-Professor Melville Nimmer. In his treatise, Professor Nimmer 
expressed his assumption that this subsection—which on its face applies 
only to the statutory termination of a prior copyright grant—is intended to 
benefit authors and should therefore be extended to prohibit a 
simultaneous contractual termination and re-grant of copyright rights. See 
3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 11.07(6th ed.1978). * * * 
We note that the district court reasonably posited that if Congress 
intended to require a “moment of freedom,” it would have clearly said so. 
After all, such an implied condition is difficult to harmonize with the 
statute’s purpose of benefitting the original grantee or with other 
provisions of Title 17. For example, three other statutory provisions require 
advance notice of termination to be served at least two years before the 
effective date of the termination. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(4)(A), 304(c)(4)(A), 
304(d)(1). 
During the two-year period between service of the notice and the 
termination’s effective date, the original grant remains in effect so that the 
holder of the termination right is no freer to walk away from the to-be-
terminated grant than he was before he served the notice. Thus, contrary 
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to the argument advanced by Clare and the Nimmer treatise, section 
304(c)(6)(D) does not require a “moment of freedom” between termination 
of a grant and the creation of a new grant in its place because it allows the 
author or his heirs to enter into a binding agreement with the original 
grantee after service of the termination notice but before its effective date. 
* * * 
III 
For the foregoing reasons, the district court correctly declared Clare’s 
termination notice ineffective. The CTEA’s termination provision does not 
apply to post-1978 agreements such as the parties’ 1983 agreement, which 
continues to control the parties’ rights and royalty shares in the Pooh 
works. In addition, Clare is unable to show that the 1983 agreement 
constitutes an “agreement to the contrary” under section 304(c)(5), and 
thus the courts cannot disregard the 1983 agreement. Nor are we 
persuaded by Clare’s “moment of freedom” argument. Quite simply, there 
is no principle of logic, canon of statutory construction, or consideration of 
fairness that supports Clare’s reading of the CTEA. Accordingly, the 
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A. THE SECTION 106 RIGHTS 
1. REPRODUCTION 
HORGAN V. MACMILLAN, INC. 
789 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1986). 
FEINBERG, CHIEF JUDGE: 
This appeal presents the novel question whether still photographs of 
a ballet can infringe the copyright on the choreography for the ballet. 
Barbara Horgan, executrix of the estate of the renowned choreographer 
George Balanchine, appeals from a judgment of the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York, Richard Owen, J., denying 
her motion for a preliminary injunction. Appellant Horgan sought to enjoin 
the publication of a book entitled “The Nutcracker: A Story & a Ballet,” 
which portrays, in text and photographs, the New York City Ballet 
Company’s production of The Nutcracker ballet, choreographed by 
Balanchine. Defendant Macmillan is the publisher, and defendant Ellen 
Switzer the author, of the book; defendants Steven Caras and Costas 
provided the photographs. The district court held that the book did not 
infringe Balanchine’s copyright because choreography is the flow of steps 
in a ballet, which could not be reproduced from the still photographs in the 
book. 621 F. Supp. 1169 (S.D.N.Y.1985). * * * 
I. 
[In 1954, Balanchine choreographed his now-classic version of the 
ballet The Nutcracker, an adaptation of a folk tale set to music by 
Tchaikovsky. Balanchine’s version of the ballet also incorporates elements 
of a previous version by Russian choreographer Ivanov. The New York City 
Ballet Company and other entities pay Balanchine’s estate a royalty or 
other consideration in exchange for a license to publicly perform his 
copyrighted choreography.] 
In December 1981, Balanchine registered his claim to copyright in the 
choreography of The Nutcracker with the United States Copyright Office. 
As part of his claim, he deposited with the Copyright Office a videotape of 
a New York City Ballet Company dress rehearsal of the ballet. * * * 
In early April 1985, appellant Horgan learned for the first time that 
Macmillan was planning to publish, under its Atheneum imprint, a book 
about the New York City Ballet/Balanchine version of The Nutcracker. 
* * * 
The book is designed primarily for an audience of young people. The 
title page displays three black and white photographs of George 
Balanchine directing a rehearsal of the ballet. The book begins with a 15-
page text by defendant Switzer regarding the origins of The Nutcracker as 
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a story and as a ballet. The remainder of the book is introduced by a second 
title page, as follows: 
The Balanchine Ballet 
As Performed by the Dancers of the New York City Ballet Company 
The principal section of the book consists of 60 color photographs by 
Caras and Costas of scenes from the New York City Ballet Company 
production of The Nutcracker, following the sequence of the ballet’s story 
and dances. The photographs are interspersed with Switzer’s narration of 
the story, including those portions not portrayed visually. The final section 
of the book contains interviews with ten of the dancers, with black and 
white photographs of them out of costume. Defendants Switzer, Caras and 
Costas obtained this material through their access to company rehearsals 
and performances. Switzer is a free lance journalist who was apparently 
given such access by the press liaison for the Company. Caras and Costas 
are considered “official photographers” of the New York City Ballet. 
According to appellant, this means that Balanchine authorized them to 
take photographs of the Company, some of which might be purchased by 
the Company for publicity and related purposes. 
* * * 
On October 11, 1985, Horgan brought suit on behalf of the estate, 
seeking declaratory relief and both a preliminary and permanent 
injunction against publication of the book. * * * [T]he judge denied 
Horgan’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The judge stated, in an 
opinion and order substantially similar to his earlier memorandum, that 
the book did not infringe the copyright on Balanchine’s choreography 
because 
choreography has to do with the flow of the steps in a ballet. The 
still photographs in the Nutcracker book, numerous though they 
are, catch dancers in various attitudes at specific instants of time; 
they do not, nor do they intend to, take or use the underlying 
choreography. The staged performance could not be recreated 
from them. 
621 F. Supp. at 1170 [(adding in a footnote: “Just as a Beethoven symphony 
could not be recreated from a document containing only every twenty-fifth 
chord of the symphony.”)]. * * * 
II. 
The principal question on appeal, whether still photographs of a ballet 
can infringe the copyright on the choreography for the ballet, is a matter of 
first impression. Explicit federal copyright protection for choreography is a 
fairly recent development, and the scope of that protection is an uncharted 
area of the law. The 1976 Copyright Act (the Act), 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., 
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was the first federal copyright statute expressly to include “choreographic 
works” as a subject of protection. * * * 
The Act does not define choreography, and the legislative reports on 
the bill indicate only that “social dance steps and simple routines” are not 
included. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53–54. The 
Compendium of Copyright Office Practices, Compendium II (1984), which 
is issued by that office, defines choreographic works as follows: 
Choreography is the composition and arrangement of dance 
movements and patterns, and is usually intended to be 
accompanied by music. Dance is static and kinetic successions of 
bodily movement in certain rhythmic and spatial relationships. 
Choreographic works need not tell a story in order to be protected 
by copyright. 
Section 450.01. Under “Characteristics of choreographic works,” 
Compendium II states that 
Choreography represents a related series of dance movements and 
patterns organized into a coherent whole. 
Section 450.03(a). * * * The Act grants the owner of a copyrighted original 
work that is “fixed in any tangible medium of expression,” 17 U.S.C. 
§ 102(a), the exclusive right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies 
. . .,” “to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work” and, 
“in the case of . . . choreographic works, . . . to display the copyrighted work 
publicly.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (2) & (5). Appellant claims that the Switzer 
book is a “copy” of Balanchine’s copyrighted work because it portrays the 
essence of the Balanchine Nutcracker, or, in the alternative, that the book 
is an infringing “derivative work.” * * * 
In response, appellees assert that the photographs in the Switzer book 
do not capture the flow of movement, which is the essence of dance, and 
thus cannot possibly be substantially similar to the choreographic 
component of the production of the ballet. Appellees rely on the various 
definitions of choreography in Compendium II, quoted above, to support 
their position that the central characteristic of choreography is 
“movement.” According to appellees, since each photograph in the book 
captures only a fraction of an instant, even the combined effect of 60 color 
photographs does not reproduce the choreography itself, nor provide 
sufficient details of movement to enable a choreographic work to be 
reproduced from the photographs. 
* * * [T]he district judge took a far too limited view of the extent to 
which choreographic material may be conveyed in the medium of still 
photography. A snapshot of a single moment in a dance sequence may 
communicate a great deal. It may, for example, capture a gesture, the 
composition of dancers’ bodies or the placement of dancers on the stage. 
Such freezing of a choreographic moment is shown in a number of the 
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photographs in the Switzer book * * *. A photograph may also convey to the 
viewer’s imagination the moments before and after the split second 
recorded. On page 76–77 of the Switzer book, for example, there is a two-
page photograph of the “Sugar Canes,” one of the troupes that perform in 
The Nutcracker. In this photograph, the Sugar Canes are a foot or more off 
the ground, holding large hoops above their heads. One member of the 
ensemble is jumping through a hoop, which is held extended in front of the 
dancer. The dancer’s legs are thrust forward, parallel to the stage and 
several feet off the ground. The viewer understands instinctively, based 
simply on the laws of gravity, that the Sugar Canes jumped up from the 
floor only a moment earlier, and came down shortly after the photographed 
moment. An ordinary observer, who had only recently seen a performance 
of The Nutcracker, could probably perceive even more from this 
photograph. The single instant thus communicates far more than a single 
chord of a Beethoven symphony—the analogy suggested by the district 
judge. 
It may be that all of the photographs mentioned above are of 
insufficient quantity or sequencing to constitute infringement; it may also 
be that they do copy but also are protected as fair use. But that is not what 
the district judge said in denying a preliminary injunction. The judge 
erroneously held that still photographs cannot infringe choreography. 
Since the judge applied the wrong test in evaluating appellant’s likelihood 
of success on the preliminary injunction, we believe that a remand is 
appropriate. * * * 
We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
WALT DISNEY PRODUCTIONS V. FILMATION ASSOCIATES 
628 F.Supp. 871 (C.D. Cal. 1986). 
STOTLER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 
Introduction 
* * * 
[Plaintiff Walt Disney Productions (“Disney”) alleges that Filmation 
Associates (“Filmation”) copied cartoon figures from Disney’s animated 
film “Pinocchio” and has begun to use them in producing an animated film 
entitled “The New Adventures of Pinocchio.”] 
* * * In the course of production, Filmation has produced a script, 
“story board,” “story reel,”5 models, and designs, which are said to be 
                                                 
5 A “story reel” is a working model used to create the final animated product. To create a 
story reel, Filmation first records a reading of the script. It then creates a “story board” comprising 
sketches of the various scenes in the film set in the order in which they will be portrayed and 
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tangible and permanent reproductions of characters and scenes, 
“constituting copies of material” copyrighted by Disney. Id., para. 61. 
It is undisputed that Filmation has generated a substantial body of 
work preliminary to a “finished film.” It is also undisputed, however, that 
it has not completed its film “The New Adventures of Pinocchio.” Filmation 
contends that Count Six is not actionable until it has completed work on 
its motion picture. Alternatively, Filmation asserts it is entitled to 
judgment because any articles so far produced are not substantially similar 
to Disney’s copyrighted expressions. 
1. Actionable “Copies” 
Filmation argues that the materials so far created are only transitory 
steps en route to a fixed product, and that until its film is completed and 
ready for distribution, there exists no article that could be said to infringe 
any of Disney’s copyrights. 
Filmation’s argument is refuted by the provisions of the 1976 
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–914 (the “Act”). Under the Act, “ ‘copies’ 
are material objects . . . in which a work is fixed by any method now known 
or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, 
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. The definition “includes the material object . . . in 
which the work is first fixed.” Id. Further, a work is “ ‘fixed’ in a tangible 
medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy . . . is sufficiently 
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” Id. When the 
work is “prepared over a period of time, the portion of it that has been fixed 
at any particular time constitutes the work as of that time, and where the 
work has been prepared in different versions, each version constitutes a 
separate work.” Id. To constitute an actionable copy, therefore, an 
expression need only be a material object permanently cast in some 
intelligible form. 
The articles created by Filmation in the production of its film, 
including a script, story board, story reel, and promotional “trailer,” satisfy 
this definition, and thus can constitute copies for purposes of the Act. 
Because the right of reproduction affords a copyright owner protection 
against an infringer even if he does not also infringe the § 106(3) right of 
distribution, Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 474 
(1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); House Report No. 94–1476, 94th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1976), p. 61, the fact that the articles may never be published or, 
indeed, may be prepared only for the use of Filmation’s animators, does not 
obviate the possibility of infringement. See Harper & Row v. Nation 
                                                 
“shoots” the sketches to synchronize with the recorded dialogue track and a rough music track. By 
viewing the reel, the director can get a “feel” for the story line and pacing of the anticipated picture 
and can begin allocating responsibility for its animation. * * * 
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Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (noting that the Act “eliminated 
publication ‘as a dividing line between common law and statutory 
protection,’ . . . extending statutory protection to all works from the time of 
their creation”). As explained by Professor Nimmer, “subject to the 
privilege of fair use, and subject to certain other exemptions, copyright 
infringement occurs whenever an unauthorized copy . . . is made, even if it 
is used solely for the private purposes of the reproducer.” 2 NIMMER, 
§ 8.02(C), p. 8–26. It is thus irrelevant that Filmation has not concluded or 
“realized” what it considers to be a final motion picture: the Act prohibits 
the creation of copies, even if the creator considers those copies mere 
interim steps toward some final goal. 
It is similarly no defense to copying that some of Filmation’s 
expressions may be embodied in a medium different from that of plaintiff’s. 
Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir.1985) (“in comparing . . . a 
film with a written work, the proper question . . . is whether the ordinary, 
reasonable audience would recognize the defendant’s work as a 
‘dramatization’ or ‘picturization’ of the plaintiff’s work”). See also Eden 
Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.1982) (copying 
from gift wrapping paper to clothing actionable). But see Sid & Marty Krofft 
Television v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir.1977) 
(observing, in dicta, that a painting of a nude would not infringe a statue 
of a nude). Thus, Filmation’s materials, including scripts and story 
outlines, can infringe Disney’s copyright on “Pinocchio” even though they 
are not rendered as a motion picture. 
This had been the law in the Ninth Circuit even under the Copyright 
Act of 1909. In Walker v. University Books, Inc., 602 F.2d 859 (9th 
Cir.1979), plaintiff had copyrighted a set of fortune telling cards. She 
attempted unsuccessfully to strike a marketing deal with defendants, 
submitting to them a sample of her deck in the process. Afterward, she 
assigned her copyright to a third party. Plaintiff subsequently discovered 
that defendant planned to market a deck of cards similar to the ones she 
had supplied them in the course of negotiations. She received from 
defendants “certain blueprints,” which were produced before the date of the 
assignment (id. at 863), but could adduce no evidence of a completed deck 
of cards produced and sold during the period in which she owned the 
copyright. 
On appeal from summary judgment in defendant’s favor, the court of 
appeals rejected defendant’s argument that the blueprints were not 
themselves copies: 
The district court viewed the making of the blueprints as merely 
a preliminary step or process directed towards the manufacture of 
[defendants’] finished product, their set of [cards]. . . . However, 
the fact that an allegedly infringing copy of a protected work may 
itself be only an inchoate representation of some final product to 
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be marketed commercially does not in itself negate the possibility 
of infringement. 
Walker, 602 F.2d at 864. According to the Walker court, the operative 
question was not whether defendants considered the article a final product, 
but “whether they unauthorizedly utilized [plaintiff’s] work in the 
manufacture of their blueprints.” Id. 
Finally, the absence of a completed motion picture does not preclude 
meaningful comparison of Disney’s character depictions and film with 
Filmation’s materials. Although Filmation contends that copyright 
infringement of a cartoon character cannot be based on a mere sketch that 
is not part of a story, there is no support for this proposition. It is true that 
courts generally have considered “not only the visual resemblances but also 
the totality of the characters’ attributes and traits,” 1 Nimmer § 2.12, p. 
175, n. 16.2, and, thus, that the trier of fact would ordinarily evaluate a 
character in the context of a story. But where the work sued upon is not a 
“completed” story, but a series of depictions and other works, comparison 
of the expressions may be made in the form in which they are presented. 
Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir.1978) 
(comparison of graphic images of cartoon characters sufficient to allow 
action for copyright infringement). 
* * * 
CARTOON NETWORK LP V. CSC HOLDINGS, INC. 
536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
JOHN M. WALKER, JR., CIRCUIT JUDGE. 
Defendant-Appellant Cablevision Systems Corporation (“Cablevision”) 
wants to market a new “Remote Storage” Digital Video Recorder system 
(“RS-DVR”), using a technology akin to both traditional, set-top digital 
video recorders, like TiVo (“DVRs”), and the video-on-demand (“VOD”) 
services provided by many cable companies. Plaintiffs-Appellees produce 
copyrighted movies and television programs that they provide to 
Cablevision pursuant to numerous licensing agreements. They contend 
that Cablevision, through the operation of its RS-DVR system as proposed, 
would directly infringe their copyrights both by making unauthorized 
reproductions, and by engaging in public performances, of their 
copyrighted works. * * * 
In the district court, plaintiffs successfully argued that Cablevision’s 
proposed system would directly infringe their copyrights * * *. First, by 
briefly storing data in the primary ingest buffer and other data buffers 
integral to the function of the RS-DVR, Cablevision would make copies of 
protected works and thereby directly infringe plaintiffs’ exclusive right of 
reproduction under the Copyright Act. Second, by copying programs onto 
the Arroyo Server hard disks (the “playback copies”), Cablevision would 
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again directly infringe the reproduction right. * * * Agreeing with 
[plaintiffs,] the district court awarded summary declaratory judgment to 
plaintiffs and enjoined Cablevision from operating the RS-DVR system 
without obtaining licenses from the plaintiff copyright holders. 
As to the buffer data, the district court rejected defendants’ arguments 
1) that the data were not “fixed” and therefore were not “copies” as defined 
in the Copyright Act, and 2) that any buffer copying was de minimis 
because the buffers stored only small amounts of data for very short periods 
of time. In rejecting the latter argument, the district court noted that the 
“aggregate effect of the buffering” was to reproduce the entirety of 
Cablevision’s programming, and such copying “can hardly be called de 
minimis.” 
* * * 
I. The Buffer Data 
It is undisputed that Cablevision, not any customer or other entity, 
takes the content from one stream of programming, after the split, and 
stores it, one small piece at a time, in the BMR buffer and the primary 
ingest buffer. As a result, the information is buffered before any customer 
requests a recording, and would be buffered even if no such request were 
made. The question is whether, by buffering the data that make up a given 
work, Cablevision “reproduce[s]” that work “in copies,” 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), 
and thereby infringes the copyright holder’s reproduction right. 
“Copies,” as defined in the Copyright Act, “are material objects . . . in 
which a work is fixed by any method . . . and from which the work can be 
. . . reproduced.” Id. § 101. The Act also provides that a work is “ ‘fixed’ in 
a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment . . . is sufficiently 
permanent or stable to permit it to be . . . reproduced . . . for a period of 
more than transitory duration.” Id. (emphasis added). We believe that this 
language plainly imposes two distinct but related requirements: the work 
must be embodied in a medium, i.e., placed in a medium such that it can 
be perceived, reproduced, etc., from that medium (the “embodiment 
requirement”), and it must remain thus embodied “for a period of more 
than transitory duration” (the “duration requirement”). Unless both 
requirements are met, the work is not “fixed” in the buffer, and, as a result, 
the buffer data is not a “copy” of the original work whose data is buffered. 
The district court mistakenly limited its analysis primarily to the 
embodiment requirement. As a result of this error, once it determined that 
the buffer data was “[c]learly . . . capable of being reproduced,” i.e., that the 
work was embodied in the buffer, the district court concluded that the work 
was therefore “fixed” in the buffer, and that a copy had thus been made. In 
doing so, it relied on a line of cases beginning with MAI Systems Corp. v. 
Peak Computer Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir.1993). It also relied on the 
United States Copyright Office’s 2001 report on the Digital Millennium 
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Copyright Act, which states, in essence, that an embodiment is fixed 
“[u]nless a reproduction manifests itself so fleetingly that it cannot be 
copied.” U.S. Copyright Office, DMCA Section 104 Report 111 (Aug.2001) 
(“DMCA Report”) (emphasis added). 
The district court’s reliance on cases like MAI Systems is misplaced. In 
general, those cases conclude that an alleged copy is fixed without 
addressing the duration requirement; it does not follow, however, that 
those cases assume, much less establish, that such a requirement does not 
exist. Indeed, the duration requirement, by itself, was not at issue in MAI 
Systems and its progeny. As a result, they do not speak to the issues 
squarely before us here: If a work is only “embodied” in a medium for a 
period of transitory duration, can it be “fixed” in that medium, and thus a 
copy? And what constitutes a period “of more than transitory duration”? 
* * * 
The MAI Systems court referenced the “transitory duration” language 
but did not discuss or analyze it. The opinion notes that the defendants 
“vigorously” argued that the program’s embodiment in the RAM was not a 
copy, but it does not specify the arguments defendants made. This omission 
suggests that the parties did not litigate the significance of the “transitory 
duration” language, and the court therefore had no occasion to address it. 
This is unsurprising, because it seems fair to assume that in these cases 
the program was embodied in the RAM for at least several minutes. 
Accordingly, we construe MAI Systems and its progeny as holding that 
loading a program into a computer’s RAM can result in copying that 
program. We do not read MAI Systems as holding that, as a matter of law, 
loading a program into a form of RAM always results in copying. Such a 
holding would read the “transitory duration” language out of the definition, 
and we do not believe our sister circuit would dismiss this statutory 
language without even discussing it. It appears the parties in MAI Systems 
simply did not dispute that the duration requirement was satisfied; this 
line of cases simply concludes that when a program is loaded into RAM, the 
embodiment requirement is satisfied—an important holding in itself, and 
one we see no reason to quibble with here. 
At least one court, relying on MAI Systems in a highly similar factual 
setting, has made this point explicitly. In Advanced Computer Services of 
Michigan, Inc. v. MAI Systems Corp., the district court expressly noted that 
the unlicensed user in that case ran copyrighted diagnostic software “for 
minutes or longer,” but that the program’s embodiment in the computer’s 
RAM might be too ephemeral to be fixed if the computer had been shut 
down “within seconds or fractions of a second” after loading the copyrighted 
program. 845 F.Supp. 356, 363 (E.D.Va. 1994). We have no quarrel with 
this reasoning; it merely makes explicit the reasoning that is implicit in 
the other MAI Systems cases. Accordingly, those cases provide no support 
52  CH.  1 
  
for the conclusion that the definition of “fixed” does not include a duration 
requirement. * * * 
Nor does the Copyright Office’s 2001 DMCA Report, also relied on by 
the district court in this case, explicitly suggest that the definition of “fixed” 
does not contain a duration requirement. However, as noted above, it does 
suggest that an embodiment is fixed “[u]nless a reproduction manifests 
itself so fleetingly that it cannot be copied, perceived or communicated.” 
DMCA Report, supra, at 111. As we have stated, to determine whether a 
work is “fixed” in a given medium, the statutory language directs us to ask 
not only 1) whether a work is “embodied” in that medium, but also 2) 
whether it is embodied in the medium “for a period of more than transitory 
duration.” According to the Copyright Office, if the work is capable of being 
copied from that medium for any amount of time, the answer to both 
questions is “yes.” The problem with this interpretation is that it reads the 
“transitory duration” language out of the statute. 
* * * 
In sum, no case law or other authority dissuades us from concluding 
that the definition of “fixed” imposes both an embodiment requirement and 
a duration requirement. Accord CoStar Group Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 
F.3d 544, 551 (4th Cir.2004) (while temporary reproductions “may be made 
in this transmission process, they would appear not to be ‘fixed’ in the sense 
that they are ‘of more than transitory duration’ ”). We now turn to whether, 
in this case, those requirements are met by the buffer data. 
Cablevision does not seriously dispute that copyrighted works are 
“embodied” in the buffer. Data in the BMR buffer can be reformatted and 
transmitted to the other components of the RS-DVR system. Data in the 
primary ingest buffer can be copied onto the Arroyo hard disks if a user has 
requested a recording of that data. Thus, a work’s “embodiment” in either 
buffer “is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, 
reproduced,” (as in the case of the ingest buffer) “or otherwise 
communicated” (as in the BMR buffer). 17 U.S.C. § 101. The result might 
be different if only a single second of a much longer work was placed in the 
buffer in isolation. In such a situation, it might be reasonable to conclude 
that only a minuscule portion of a work, rather than “a work” was embodied 
in the buffer. Here, however, where every second of an entire work is 
placed, one second at a time, in the buffer, we conclude that the work is 
embodied in the buffer. 
Does any such embodiment last “for a period of more than transitory 
duration”? Id. No bit of data remains in any buffer for more than a fleeting 
1.2 seconds. And unlike the data in cases like MAI Systems, which 
remained embodied in the computer’s RAM memory until the user turned 
the computer off, each bit of data here is rapidly and automatically 
overwritten as soon as it is processed. While our inquiry is necessarily fact-
specific, and other factors not present here may alter the duration analysis 
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significantly, these facts strongly suggest that the works in this case are 
embodied in the buffer for only a “transitory” period, thus failing the 
duration requirement. 
Against this evidence, plaintiffs argue only that the duration is not 
transitory because the data persist “long enough for Cablevision to make 
reproductions from them.” As we have explained above, however, this 
reasoning impermissibly reads the duration language out of the statute, 
and we reject it. Given that the data reside in no buffer for more than 1.2 
seconds before being automatically overwritten, and in the absence of 
compelling arguments to the contrary, we believe that the copyrighted 
works here are not “embodied” in the buffers for a period of more than 
transitory duration, and are therefore not “fixed” in the buffers. 
Accordingly, the acts of buffering in the operation of the RS-DVR do not 
create copies, as the Copyright Act defines that term. Our resolution of this 
issue renders it unnecessary for us to determine whether any copies 
produced by buffering data would be de minimis, and we express no opinion 
on that question. 
II. Direct Liability for Creating the Playback Copies 
In most copyright disputes, the allegedly infringing act and the 
identity of the infringer are never in doubt. These cases turn on whether 
the conduct in question does, in fact, infringe the plaintiff’s copyright. In 
this case, however, the core of the dispute is over the authorship of the 
infringing conduct. After an RS-DVR subscriber selects a program to 
record, and that program airs, a copy of the program—a copyrighted 
work—resides on the hard disks of Cablevision’s Arroyo Server, its creation 
unauthorized by the copyright holder. The question is who made this copy. 
If it is Cablevision, plaintiffs’ theory of direct infringement succeeds; if it is 
the customer, plaintiffs’ theory fails because Cablevision would then face, 
at most, secondary liability, a theory of liability expressly disavowed by 
plaintiffs. 
Few cases examine the line between direct and contributory liability. 
Both parties cite a line of cases beginning with Religious Technology Center 
v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, 907 F.Supp. 1361 
(N.D.Cal.1995). In Netcom, a third-party customer of the defendant 
Internet service provider (“ISP”) posted a copyrighted work that was 
automatically reproduced by the defendant’s computer. The district court 
refused to impose direct liability on the ISP, reasoning that “[a]lthough 
copyright is a strict liability statute, there should still be some element of 
volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant’s system is merely 
used to create a copy by a third party.” Id. at 1370. Recently, the Fourth 
Circuit endorsed the Netcom decision, noting that 
to establish direct liability under . . . the Act, something more 
must be shown than mere ownership of a machine used by others 
to make illegal copies. There must be actual infringing conduct 
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with a nexus sufficiently close and causal to the illegal copying 
that one could conclude that the machine owner himself 
trespassed on the exclusive domain of the copyright owner. 
CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir.2004). 
Here, the district court pigeon-holed the conclusions reached in 
Netcom and its progeny as “premised on the unique attributes of the 
Internet.” Cablevision I, 478 F.Supp.2d at 620. While the Netcom court was 
plainly concerned with a theory of direct liability that would effectively 
“hold the entire Internet liable” for the conduct of a single user, 907 F.Supp. 
at 1372, its reasoning and conclusions, consistent with precedents of this 
court and the Supreme Court, and with the text of the Copyright Act, 
transcend the Internet. Like the Fourth Circuit, we reject the contention 
that “the Netcom decision was driven by expedience and that its holding is 
inconsistent with the established law of copyright,” CoStar, 373 F.3d at 
549, and we find it “a particularly rational interpretation of § 106,” id. at 
551, rather than a special-purpose rule applicable only to ISPs. 
When there is a dispute as to the author of an allegedly infringing 
instance of reproduction, Netcom and its progeny direct our attention to the 
volitional conduct that causes the copy to be made. There are only two 
instances of volitional conduct in this case: Cablevision’s conduct in 
designing, housing, and maintaining a system that exists only to produce 
a copy, and a customer’s conduct in ordering that system to produce a copy 
of a specific program. In the case of a VCR, it seems clear—and we know of 
no case holding otherwise—that the operator of the VCR, the person who 
actually presses the button to make the recording, supplies the necessary 
element of volition, not the person who manufactures, maintains, or, if 
distinct from the operator, owns the machine. We do not believe that an 
RS-DVR customer is sufficiently distinguishable from a VCR user to 
impose liability as a direct infringer on a different party for copies that are 
made automatically upon that customer’s command. 
The district court emphasized the fact that copying is “instrumental” 
rather than “incidental” to the function of the RS-DVR system. Cablevision 
I, 478 F.Supp.2d at 620. While that may distinguish the RS-DVR from the 
ISPs in Netcom and CoStar, it does not distinguish the RS-DVR from a 
VCR, a photocopier, or even a typical copy shop. And the parties do not 
seem to contest that a company that merely makes photocopiers available 
to the public on its premises, without more, is not subject to liability for 
direct infringement for reproductions made by customers using those 
copiers. They only dispute whether Cablevision is similarly situated to such 
a proprietor. 
The district court found Cablevision analogous to a copy shop that 
makes course packs for college professors. In the leading case involving 
such a shop, for example, “[t]he professor [gave] the copyshop the materials 
of which the coursepack [was] to be made up, and the copyshop [did] the 
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rest.” Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1384 
(6th Cir.1996) (en banc). There did not appear to be any serious dispute in 
that case that the shop itself was directly liable for reproducing copyrighted 
works. The district court here found that Cablevision, like this copy shop, 
would be “doing” the copying, albeit “at the customer’s behest.” Cablevision 
I, 478 F.Supp.2d at 620. 
But because volitional conduct is an important element of direct 
liability, the district court’s analogy is flawed. In determining who actually 
“makes” a copy, a significant difference exists between making a request to 
a human employee, who then volitionally operates the copying system to 
make the copy, and issuing a command directly to a system, which 
automatically obeys commands and engages in no volitional conduct. In 
cases like Princeton University Press, the defendants operated a copying 
device and sold the product they made using that device. See 99 F.3d at 
1383 (“The corporate defendant . . . is a commercial copyshop that 
reproduced substantial segments of copyrighted works of scholarship, 
bound the copies into ‘coursepacks,’ and sold the coursepacks to 
students. . . .”). Here, by selling access to a system that automatically 
produces copies on command, Cablevision more closely resembles a store 
proprietor who charges customers to use a photocopier on his premises, and 
it seems incorrect to say, without more, that such a proprietor “makes” any 
copies when his machines are actually operated by his customers. See 
Netcom, 907 F.Supp. at 1369. Some courts have held to the contrary, but 
they do not explicitly explain why, and we find them unpersuasive. See, 
e.g., Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Elec. Distribs., Inc., 360 F.Supp. 821, 823 
(E.D.N.Y.1973) (concluding that, “regardless” of whether customers or 
defendants’ employees operated the tape-copying machines at defendants’ 
stores, defendant had actively infringed copyrights). 
* * * 
 
2. PREPARATION OF DERIVATIVE WORKS 
LEWIS GALOOB TOYS, INC. V. NINTENDO OF AMERICA, INC. 
964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992). 
FARRIS, CIRCUIT JUDGE: 
Nintendo of America appeals the district court’s judgment following a 
bench trial (1) declaring that Lewis Galoob Toys’ Game Genie does not 
violate any Nintendo copyrights and dissolving a temporary injunction and 
(2) denying Nintendo’s request for a permanent injunction enjoining 
Galoob from marketing the Game Genie. * * * We affirm. 
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Facts 
The Nintendo Entertainment System is a home video game system 
marketed by Nintendo. To use the system, the player inserts a cartridge 
containing a video game that Nintendo produces or licenses others to 
produce. By pressing buttons and manipulating a control pad, the player 
controls one of the game’s characters and progresses through the game. 
The games are protected as audiovisual works under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6). 
The Game Genie is a device manufactured by Galoob that allows the 
player to alter up to three features of a Nintendo game. For example, the 
Game Genie can increase the number of lives of the player’s character, 
increase the speed at which the character moves, and allow the character 
to float above obstacles. The player controls the changes made by the Game 
Genie by entering codes provided by the Game Genie Programming 
Manual and Code Book. The player also can experiment with variations of 
these codes. 
The Game Genie functions by blocking the value for a single data byte 
sent by the game cartridge to the central processing unit in the Nintendo 
Entertainment System and replacing it with a new value. If that value 
controls the character’s strength, for example, then the character can be 
made invincible by increasing the value sufficiently. The Game Genie is 
inserted between a game cartridge and the Nintendo Entertainment 
System. The Game Genie does not alter the data that is stored in the game 
cartridge. Its effects are temporary. 
Discussion 
1. Derivative work 
The Copyright Act of 1976 confers upon copyright holders the exclusive 
right to prepare and authorize others to prepare derivative works based on 
their copyrighted works. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). Nintendo argues that the 
district court erred in concluding that the audiovisual displays created by 
the Game Genie are not derivative works. * * * 
A derivative work must incorporate a protected work in some concrete 
or permanent “form.” * * * 
Our analysis is not controlled by the Copyright Act’s definition of 
“fixed.” The Act defines copies as “material objects, other than 
phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(emphasis added). The Act’s definition of “derivative work,” in contrast, 
lacks any such reference to fixation. See id. Further, we have held in a 
copyright infringement action that “it makes no difference that the 
derivation may not satisfy certain requirements for statutory copyright 
registration itself.” Lone Ranger Television v. Program Radio Corp., 740 
F.2d 718, 722 (9th Cir.1984). See also Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights 
and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209, 231 
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n.75 (1983) (“the Act does not require that the derivative work be 
protectable for its preparation to infringe”). Cf. Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 
222 U.S. 55, 61 (1911) (finding the movie “Ben Hur” infringed copyright in 
the book Ben Hur even though Copyright Act did not yet include movies as 
protectable works). A derivative work must be fixed to be protected under 
the Act, see 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), but not to infringe. 
The argument that a derivative work must be fixed because “[a] 
‘derivative work’ is a work,” 17 U.S.C. § 101, and “[a] work is ‘created’ when 
it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first time,” id., relies on a 
misapplication of the Copyright Act’s definition of “created”: 
A work is ‘created’ when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the 
first time; where a work is prepared over a period of time, the 
portion of it that has been fixed at any particular time constitutes 
the work as of that time, and where the work has been prepared 
in different versions, each version constitutes a separate work. 
Id. The definition clarifies the time at which a work is created. If the 
provision were a definition of “work,” it would not use that term in such a 
casual manner. The Act does not contain a definition of “work.” Rather, it 
contains specific definitions: “audiovisual works,” “literary works,” and 
“pictorial, graphic and sculptural works,” for example. The definition of 
“derivative work” does not require fixation. 
The district court’s finding that no independent work is created, see 
Galoob, 780 F. Supp. at 1291, is supported by the record. The Game Genie 
merely enhances the audiovisual displays (or underlying data bytes) that 
originate in Nintendo game cartridges. The altered displays do not 
incorporate a portion of a copyrighted work in some concrete or permanent 
form. Nintendo argues that the Game Genie’s displays are as fixed in the 
hardware and software used to create them as Nintendo’s original displays. 
Nintendo’s argument ignores the fact that the Game Genie cannot produce 
an audiovisual display; the underlying display must be produced by a 
Nintendo Entertainment System and game cartridge. Even if we were to 
rely on the Copyright Act’s definition of “fixed,” we would similarly 
conclude that the resulting display is not “embodied,” see 17 U.S.C. § 101, 
in the Game Genie. It cannot be a derivative work. 
Mirage Editions is illustrative. Albuquerque A.R.T. transferred 
artworks from a commemorative book to individual ceramic tiles. See 
Mirage Editions, 856 F.2d at 1342. We held that “by borrowing and 
mounting the preexisting, copyrighted individual art images without the 
consent of the copyright proprietors . . . [Albuquerque A.R.T.] has prepared 
a derivative work and infringed the subject copyrights.” Id. at 1343. The 
ceramic tiles physically incorporated the copyrighted works in a form that 
could be sold. Perhaps more importantly, sales of the tiles supplanted 
purchasers’ demand for the underlying works. Our holding in Mirage 
Editions would have been much different if Albuquerque A.R.T. had 
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distributed lenses that merely enabled users to view several artworks 
simultaneously. 
Nintendo asserted at oral argument that the existence of a $150 
million market for the Game Genie indicates that its audiovisual display 
must be fixed. We understand Nintendo’s argument; consumers clearly 
would not purchase the Game Genie if its display was not “sufficiently 
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived . . . for a period of more 
than transitory duration.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. But, Nintendo’s reliance on the 
Copyright Act’s definition of “fixed” is misplaced. Nintendo’s argument also 
proves too much; the existence of a market does not, and cannot, determine 
conclusively whether a work is an infringing derivative work. For example, 
although there is a market for kaleidoscopes, it does not necessarily follow 
that kaleidoscopes create unlawful derivative works when pointed at 
protected artwork. The same can be said of countless other products that 
enhance, but do not replace, copyrighted works. 
Nintendo also argues that our analysis should focus exclusively on the 
audiovisual displays created by the Game Genie, i.e., that we should 
compare the altered displays to Nintendo’s original displays. Nintendo 
emphasizes that “ ‘audiovisual works’ are works that consist of a series of 
related images . . . regardless of the nature of the material objects . . . in 
which the works are embodied.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). The 
Copyright Act’s definition of “audiovisual works” is inapposite; the only 
question before us is whether the audiovisual displays created by the Game 
Genie are “derivative works.” The Act does not similarly provide that a 
work can be a derivative work regardless of the nature of the material 
objects in which the work is embodied. A derivative work must incorporate 
a protected work in some concrete or permanent form. We cannot ignore 
the actual source of the Game Genie’s display. 
Nintendo relies heavily on Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d 
1009 (7th Cir. 1983). Midway can be distinguished. The defendant in 
Midway, Artic International, marketed a computer chip that could be 
inserted in Galaxian video games to speed up the rate of play. The Seventh 
Circuit held that the speeded-up version of Galaxian was a derivative work. 
Id. at 1013–14. Artic’s chip substantially copied and replaced the chip that 
was originally distributed by Midway. Purchasers of Artic’s chip also 
benefited economically by offering the altered game for use by the general 
public. The Game Genie does not physically incorporate a portion of a 
copyrighted work, nor does it supplant demand for a component of that 
work. The court in Midway acknowledged that the Copyright Act’s 
definition of “derivative work” “must be stretched to accommodate speeded-
up video games.” Id. at 1014. Stretching that definition further would chill 
innovation and fail to protect “society’s competing interest in the free flow 
of ideas, information, and commerce.” Sony Corp. of America v. Universal 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
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In holding that the audiovisual displays created by the Game Genie 
are not derivative works, we recognize that technology often advances by 
improvement rather than replacement. * * * Some time ago, for example, 
computer companies began marketing spell-checkers that operate within 
existing word processors by signalling the writer when a word is 
misspelled. These applications, as well as countless others, could not be 
produced and marketed if courts were to conclude that the word processor 
and spell-checker combination is a derivative work based on the word 
processor alone. The Game Genie is useless by itself. It can only enhance, 
and cannot duplicate or recast, a Nintendo game’s output. It does not 
contain or produce a Nintendo game’s output in some concrete or 
permanent form, nor does it supplant demand for Nintendo game 
cartridges. Such innovations rarely will constitute infringing derivative 
works under the Copyright Act. * * * 
Galoob has not violated the Copyright Act. Nintendo therefore is not 
entitled to a temporary or permanent injunction. 
AFFIRMED. 
LEE V. A.R.T. CO. 
125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997). 
EASTERBROOK, CIRCUIT JUDGE. 
Annie Lee creates works of art, which she sells through her firm Annie 
Lee & Friends. Deck the Walls, a chain of outlets for modestly priced art, 
is among the buyers of her works, which have been registered with the 
Register of Copyrights. One Deck the Walls store sold some of Lee’s 
notecards and small lithographs to A.R.T. Company, which mounted the 
works on ceramic tiles (covering the art with transparent epoxy resin in 
the process) and resold the tiles. Lee contends that these tiles are 
derivative works, which under 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) may not be prepared 
without the permission of the copyright proprietor. She seeks both 
monetary and injunctive relief. Her position has the support of two cases 
holding that A.R.T.’s business violates the copyright laws. Munoz v. 
Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 38 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir.1994), affirming without 
published opinion, 829 F. Supp. 309 (D.Alaska 1993); Mirage Editions, Inc. 
v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir.1988). Mirage Editions, 
the only full appellate discussion, dealt with pages cut from books and 
mounted on tiles; the court of appeals’ brief order in Munoz concludes that 
the reasoning of Mirage Editions is equally applicable to works of art that 
were sold loose. Our district court disagreed with these decisions and 
entered summary judgment for the defendant. 925 F.Supp. 576 
(N.D.Ill.1996). 
Now one might suppose that this is an open and shut case under the 
doctrine of first sale, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). A.R.T. bought the work 
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legitimately, mounted it on a tile, and resold what it had purchased. 
Because the artist could capture the value of her art’s contribution to the 
finished product as part of the price for the original transaction, the 
economic rationale for protecting an adaptation as “derivative” is absent. 
An alteration that includes (or consumes) a complete copy of the original 
lacks economic significance. One work changes hands multiple times, 
exactly what sec. 109(a) permits, so it may lack legal significance too. But 
sec. 106(2) creates a separate exclusive right, to “prepare derivative works”, 
and Lee believes that affixing the art to the tile is “preparation,” so that 
A.R.T. would have violated sec. 106(2) even if it had dumped the finished 
tiles into the Marianas Trench. For the sake of argument we assume that 
this is so and ask whether card-on-a-tile is a “derivative work” in the first 
place. 
“Derivative work” is a defined term: 
A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting 
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, 
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound 
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any 
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or 
adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, 
elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent 
an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”. 
17 U.S.C. § 101. The district court concluded that A.R.T.’s mounting of 
Lee’s works on tile is not an “original work of authorship” because it is no 
different in form or function from displaying a painting in a frame or 
placing a medallion in a velvet case. No one believes that a museum 
violates sec. 106(2) every time it changes the frame of a painting that is 
still under copyright, although the choice of frame or glazing affects the 
impression the art conveys, and many artists specify frames (or pedestals 
for sculptures) in detail. Munoz and Mirage Editions acknowledge that 
framing and other traditional means of mounting and displaying art do not 
infringe authors’ exclusive right to make derivative works. Nonetheless, 
the Ninth Circuit held, what A.R.T. does creates a derivative work because 
the epoxy resin bonds the art to the tile. Our district judge thought this a 
distinction without a difference, and we agree. If changing the way in which 
a work of art will be displayed creates a derivative work, and if Lee is right 
about what “prepared” means, then the derivative work is “prepared” when 
the art is mounted; what happens later is not relevant, because the 
violation of the sec. 106(2) right has already occurred. If the framing 
process does not create a derivative work, then mounting art on a tile, 
which serves as a flush frame, does not create a derivative work. What is 
more, the Ninth Circuit erred in assuming that normal means of mounting 
and displaying art are easily reversible. A painting is placed in a wooden 
“stretcher” as part of the framing process; this leads to some punctures 
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(commonly tacks or staples), may entail trimming the edges of the canvas, 
and may affect the surface of the painting as well. Works by Jackson 
Pollock are notoriously hard to mount without damage, given the thickness 
of their paint. As a prelude to framing, photographs, prints, and posters 
may be mounted on stiff boards using wax sheets, but sometimes glue or 
another more durable substance is employed to create the bond. 
Lee wages a vigorous attack on the district court’s conclusion that 
A.R.T.’s mounting process cannot create a derivative work because the 
change to the work “as a whole” is not sufficiently original to support a 
copyright. Cases such as Gracen v. The Bradford Exchange, Inc., 698 F.2d 
300 (7th Cir.1983), show that neither A.R.T. nor Lee herself could have 
obtained a copyright in the card-on-a-tile, thereby not only extending the 
period of protection for the images but also eliminating competition in one 
medium of display. After the Ninth Circuit held that its mounting process 
created derivative works, A.R.T. tried to obtain a copyright in one of its 
products; the Register of Copyrights sensibly informed A.R.T. that the 
card-on-a-tile could not be copyrighted independently of the note card itself. 
But Lee says that this is irrelevant—that a change in a work’s appearance 
may infringe the exclusive right under sec. 106(2) even if the alteration is 
too trivial to support an independent copyright. Pointing to the word 
“original” in the second sentence of the statutory definition, the district 
judge held that “originality” is essential to a derivative work. This 
understanding has the support of both cases and respected commentators. 
E.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.1976); MELVILLE 
B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS sec. 3.03 (1997). 
Pointing to the fact that the first sentence in the statutory definition omits 
any reference to originality, Lee insists that a work may be derivative 
despite the mechanical nature of the transformation. This view, too, has 
the support of both cases and respected commentators. E.g., Lone Ranger 
Television, Inc. v. Program Radio Corp., 740 F.2d 718, 722 (9th Cir.1984); 
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE sec. 5.3.1 
(2d ed.1996) (suggesting that a transformation is covered by sec. 106(2) 
whenever it creates a “new work for a different market”). 
Fortunately, it is not necessary for us to choose sides. Assume for the 
moment that the first sentence recognizes a set of non-original derivative 
works. To prevail, then, Lee must show that A.R.T. altered her works in 
one of the ways mentioned in the first sentence. The tile is not an “art 
reproduction”; A.R.T. purchased and mounted Lee’s original works. That 
leaves the residual clause: “any other form in which a work may be recast, 
transformed, or adapted.” None of these words fits what A.R.T. did. Lee’s 
works were not “recast” or “adapted”. “Transformed” comes closer and gives 
the Ninth Circuit some purchase for its view that the permanence of the 
bond between art and base matters. Yet the copyrighted note cards and 
lithographs were not “transformed” in the slightest. The art was bonded to 
a slab of ceramic, but it was not changed in the process. It still depicts 
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exactly what it depicted when it left Lee’s studio. If mounting works a 
“transformation,” then changing a painting’s frame or a photograph’s mat 
equally produces a derivative work. Indeed, if Lee is right about the 
meaning of the definition’s first sentence, then any alteration of a work, 
however slight, requires the author’s permission. We asked at oral 
argument what would happen if a purchaser jotted a note on one of the note 
cards, or used it as a coaster for a drink, or cut it in half, or if a collector 
applied his seal (as is common in Japan); Lee’s counsel replied that such 
changes prepare derivative works, but that as a practical matter artists 
would not file suit. A definition of derivative work that makes criminals 
out of art collectors and tourists is jarring despite Lee’s gracious offer not 
to commence civil litigation. 
If Lee (and the Ninth Circuit) are right about what counts as a 
derivative work, then the United States has established through the back 
door an extraordinarily broad version of authors’ moral rights, under which 
artists may block any modification of their works of which they disapprove. 
No European version of droit moral goes this far. Until recently it was 
accepted wisdom that the United States did not enforce any claim of moral 
rights; even bowdlerization of a work was permitted unless the 
modifications produced a new work so different that it infringed the 
exclusive right under sec. 106(2). Compare WGN Continental Broadcasting 
Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622 (7th Cir.1982), with Gilliam v. 
American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir.1976). The 
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub.L. 101–650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5123–
33, moves federal law in the direction of moral rights, but the cornerstone 
of the new statute, 17 U.S.C. § 106A, does not assist Lee. Section 
106A(a)(3)(A) gives an artist the right to “prevent any intentional 
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which would be 
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation”. At oral argument Lee’s 
lawyer disclaimed any contention that the sale of her works on tile has 
damaged her honor or reputation. What is more, sec. 106A applies only to 
a “work of visual art”, a new term defined in sec. 101 to mean either a 
unique work or part of a limited edition (200 copies or fewer) that has been 
“signed and consecutively numbered by the author”. Lee’s note cards and 
lithographs are not works of visual art under this definition, so she could 
not invoke sec. 106A even if A.R.T.’s use of her works to produce kitsch had 
damaged her reputation. It would not be sound to use sec. 106(2) to provide 
artists with exclusive rights deliberately omitted from the Visual Artists 
Rights Act. We therefore decline to follow Munoz and Mirage Editions. 
Affirmed. 
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3. PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION 
WALT DISNEY CO. V. VIDEO 47, INC. 
972 F.Supp. 595 (S.D. Fla. 1996). 
UNGARO-BENAGES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE. 
* * * 
[Upon learning that defendants’ video stores rented to the public 
unauthorized copies of plaintiffs’ copyrighted motion picture 
videocassettes, plaintiffs filed an action for infringement. Pursuant to a 
court order, the videotapes were seized and, upon examination, were 
determined to be counterfeit. The district court then entered a Consent 
Decree and Final Judgment pursuant to a settlement agreement. Upon 
learning that the defendants were continuing to rent counterfeit tapes, the 
plaintiffs filed this action for contempt.] 
Findings of Fact 
* * * 
3. Plaintiffs are the lawful owners of the exclusive right under the 
United States Copyright Act to reproduce, to distribute and to authorize 
the reproduction and distribution of thirteen (13) motion picture titles at 
issue in this action. * * * 
4. Plaintiffs are members of the Motion Picture Association of 
America (MPAA), a trade association whose film security office investigates 
unlawful duplication and distribution of videocassette tapes whose 
copyrights are owned by members of the MPAA. 
5. Based upon a tip to the MPAA, an investigation of Defendants was 
conducted from October 10, 1995 to October 11, 1995 as testified to by 
Robert W. Butler (“Butler”), presently a field representative for the Film 
Security office of the MPAA and formerly a Special Agent in Charge of the 
Tampa Office for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). 
6. The investigation of VIDEO 47 was conducted by Patrick R. 
Cooney (“Cooney”), a former FBI agent who currently works for the anti-
piracy office of the MPAA. Cooney employed a “stringer” from the 
neighborhood to rent tapes from VIDEO 47. Initially, six (6) tapes were 
rented and five (5) were counterfeit * * *. 
14. Defendants did not produce any documentation that showed any 
authorization by Plaintiffs or any of their distributors to distribute copies 
of the Plaintiffs’ copyrighted motion pictures. 
15. Defendant Eduardo Celorio testified and stated that he * * * 
purchased tapes from individuals who sold videocassettes from their cars 
and that he contacted his distributors by beeper. 
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16. Defendant Eduardo Celorio testified that the 16 videocassettes at 
issue were not available for rental to the public, whereas Mr. Cooney 
testified that these videocassettes were seized from the portion of the store 
where the videocassettes were available for rental. The Court rejects the 
testimony of Defendant Eduardo Celorio and accepts the testimony of Mr. 
Cooney on this factual issue. 
* * * 
Conclusions of Law 
* * * [T]his Court entered a Consent Decree and Final Judgment in 
this case on or about August 4, 1994, pursuant to which the Defendants 
were permanently enjoined from infringing or participating in the 
infringement by others of Plaintiffs’ rights in any motion pictures as to 
which Plaintiffs own the copyrights or other exclusive interests. * * * 
Plaintiffs now move to hold the Defendants in contempt for violation of 
such Final Judgment. Therefore, the Court must determine whether 
Defendants have violated Plaintiffs’ rights under the copyright laws, and 
whether Defendants are liable for contempt for violation of this Court’s 
prior Orders. 
1. Copyright 
* * * Plaintiffs’ copyright registrations give Plaintiffs the exclusive 
right to reproduce, distribute and sell videocassette tapes of the movie 
titles at issue in this litigation. 17 U.S.C. § 106. The Court finds that 
Defendants infringed Plaintiffs’ rights in the titles at issue in this litigation 
by renting counterfeit videocassette tapes without Plaintiffs’ authorization 
to do so. 17 U.S.C. § 501. Plaintiffs need not demonstrate knowledge or 
intent on the part of the Defendants. * * * 
As the Court finds that Defendants have violated Plaintiffs’ rights in 
the motion pictures at issue here, it follows that Defendants are in direct 
violation of this Court’s Consent Decree and Final Judgment dated August 
4, 1994, which permanently enjoined Defendants from: 
(a) manufacturing, duplicating or performing publicly, without 
authorization, any motion picture as to which any Plaintiff holds 
legal or beneficial ownership of the copyright or other exclusive 
interest; (b) in any manner infringing or contributing to or 
participating in the infringement by others of any copyright or 
other exclusive interest owned by any Plaintiff in, for or to any 
motion picture; or (c) acting in concert or confederacy with, or 
aiding or abetting others to infringe in any way any copyright or 
other exclusive interest owned by any Plaintiff. 
* * * 
[The court therefore held the defendants in contempt.] 
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RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER V. NETCOM 
ON-LINE COMMUNICATION SERVICES, INC. 
907 F.Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
WHYTE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE. 
* * * 
Plaintiffs Religious Technology Center (“RTC”) and Bridge 
Publications, Inc. (“BPI”) hold copyrights in the unpublished and published 
works of L. Ron Hubbard, the late founder of the Church of Scientology 
(“the Church”). Defendant Dennis Erlich (“Erlich”) is a former minister of 
Scientology turned vocal critic of the Church, whose pulpit is now the 
Usenet newsgroup alt.religion.scientology (“a.r.s.”), an on-line forum for 
discussion and criticism of Scientology. Plaintiffs maintain that Erlich 
infringed their copyrights when he posted portions of their works on a.r.s. 
Erlich gained his access to the Internet through defendant Thomas 
Klemesrud’s (“Klemesrud’s”) BBS [bulletin board service] “support.com.” 
Klemesrud is the operator of the BBS, which is run out of his home and has 
approximately 500 paying users. Klemesrud’s BBS is not directly linked to 
the Internet, but gains its connection through the facilities of defendant 
Netcom On-Line Communications, Inc. (“Netcom”), one of the largest 
providers of Internet access in the United States. 
* * * 
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena involved a suit against the operator 
of a small BBS whose system contained files of erotic pictures. 839 F. Supp. 
1552, 1554 (M.D.Fla.1993). A subscriber of the defendant’s BBS had 
uploaded files containing digitized pictures copied from the plaintiff’s 
copyrighted magazine, which files remained on the BBS for other 
subscribers to download. Id. The court did not conclude, as plaintiffs 
suggest in this case, that the BBS is itself liable for the unauthorized 
reproduction of plaintiffs’ work; instead, the court concluded that the BBS 
operator was liable for violating the plaintiff’s right to publicly distribute 
and display copies of its work. Id. at 1556–57. 
* * * 
Plaintiffs allege that Netcom is directly liable for making copies of 
their works. They also allege that Netcom violated their exclusive rights to 
publicly display copies of their works. There are no allegations that Netcom 
violated plaintiffs’ exclusive right to publicly distribute their works. 
However, in their discussion of direct infringement, plaintiffs insist that 
Netcom is liable for “maintaining copies of [Erlich’s] messages on its server 
for eleven days for access by its subscribers and ‘USENET neighbors’ ” and 
they compare this case to the Playboy case, which discussed the right of 
public distribution. Plaintiffs also argued this theory of infringement at 
oral argument. Because this could be an attempt to argue that Netcom has 
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infringed plaintiffs’ rights of public distribution and display, the court will 
address these arguments. 
Playboy concluded that the defendant infringed the plaintiff’s 
exclusive rights to publicly distribute and display copies of its works. 839 
F. Supp. at 1556–57. The court is not entirely convinced that the mere 
possession of a digital copy on a BBS that is accessible to some members of 
the public constitutes direct infringement by the BBS operator. Such a 
holding suffers from the same problem of causation as the reproduction 
argument. Only the subscriber should be liable for causing the distribution 
of plaintiffs’ work, as the contributing actions of the BBS provider are 
automatic and indiscriminate. Erlich could have posted his messages 
through countless access providers and the outcome would be the same: 
anyone with access to Usenet newsgroups would be able to read his 
messages. There is no logical reason to draw a line around Netcom and 
Klemesrud and say that they are uniquely responsible for distributing 
Erlich’s messages. Netcom is not even the first link in the chain of 
distribution—Erlich had no direct relationship with Netcom but dealt 
solely with Klemesrud’s BBS, which used Netcom to gain its Internet 
access. Every Usenet server has a role in the distribution, so plaintiffs’ 
argument would create unreasonable liability. Where the BBS merely 
stores and passes along all messages sent by its subscribers and others, the 
BBS should not be seen as causing these works to be publicly distributed 
or displayed. 
Even accepting the Playboy court’s holding, the case is factually 
distinguishable. Unlike the BBS in that case, Netcom does not maintain an 
archive of files for its users. Thus, it cannot be said to be “supplying a 
product.” In contrast to some of its larger competitors, Netcom does not 
create or control the content of the information available to its subscribers; 
it merely provides access to the Internet, whose content is controlled by no 
single entity. Although the Internet consists of many different computers 
networked together, some of which may contain infringing files, it does not 
make sense to hold the operator of each computer liable as an infringer 
merely because his or her computer is linked to a computer with an 
infringing file. It would be especially inappropriate to hold liable a service 
that acts more like a conduit, in other words, one that does not itself keep 
an archive of files for more than a short duration. Finding such a service 
liable would involve an unreasonably broad construction of public 
distribution and display rights. No purpose would be served by holding 
liable those who have no ability to control the information to which their 
subscribers have access, even though they might be in some sense helping 
to achieve the Internet’s automatic “public distribution” and the users’ 
“public” display of files. 
* * * 
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4. PUBLIC PERFORMANCE AND PUBLIC DISPLAY 
ON COMMAND VIDEO CORPORATION V. 
COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES 
777 F.Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
WEIGEL, DISTRICT JUDGE: 
Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that its hotel video-movie 
viewing system does not infringe defendants’ copyrights in the movies 
shown through the system. * * * Plaintiff, the designer and builder of an 
innovative video viewing system currently installed in a number of hotels, 
insists that a hotel occupant’s viewing of one or more of defendants’ movies 
through its system does not constitute a “public performance” under the 
1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. Defendants, seven major 
United States movie companies, contend that such viewings do constitute 
public performances and that plaintiff’s system therefore violates 
defendants’ exclusive right of public performance under § 106(4) of the Act. 
I. Facts 
The material facts of this case are not in dispute. On Command has 
developed a system for the electronic delivery of movie video tapes. The 
system consists of a computer program, a sophisticated electronic switch, 
and a bank of video cassette players (“VCPs”), all of which are centrally 
located in a hotel equipment room. The VCPs are connected to the hotel’s 
guest rooms by wiring. The computer program directs the electronic 
switches so that a particular VCP will be dedicated to the guest room where 
a particular movie is requested. Each VCP contains a video tape. When a 
guest requests a particular movie, the computer identifies the VCP 
containing that movie, switches the VCP to that particular room, and starts 
the movie video. 
A hotel guest operates the system from his or her room by remote 
control. After the television is turned on, the screen lists a menu of 
available movies. The guest selects a movie by entering the appropriate 
code on the remote control. Once a particular video is selected, that video 
selection disappears from the menu of available videos displayed on all 
other television sets in the hotel. The video is seen only in the room where 
it was selected by the guest. It cannot be seen in any other guest room or 
in any other location in the hotel. The viewer cannot pause, rewind, or fast-
forward the video. When the movie ends, it is automatically rewound and 
then immediately available for viewing by another hotel guest. 
The only components of the system installed in the guest rooms are 
the hand-held remote control and a microprocessor in the television set. 
When a guest checks in to the hotel, the hotel clerk uses a front-desk 
terminal connected to the On Command computer program to activate 
movie transmission to the appropriate room. At the guest’s request, the 
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clerk can prevent the transmission of adult movies to a room or deactivate 
service to a room altogether. The apparent advantages On Command’s 
system enjoys over existing closed-circuit hotel video systems with pre-set 
movie times, such as “Spectravision,” are the larger variety of movies 
available for viewing and the guests’ freedom to watch them on their own 
schedule. On Command’s system also eliminates the effort and potential 
guest embarrassment of in-house hotel video rental programs, in which 
VCPs are installed in individual rooms and guests must physically rent 
videos from the hotel staff. 
II. Discussion 
A copyright owner has the exclusive right “to perform the copyrighted 
work publicly” or to authorize any such public performance. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106(4). What constitutes a public performance is defined by the Copyright 
Act in two clauses. Under clause (1), the “public place” clause, a 
performance is public if it occurs 
at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial 
number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its 
social acquaintances is gathered. 
17 U.S.C. § 101. Under clause (2), the “transmit” clause, a performance is 
public if someone 
transmits or otherwise communicates a performance or display of 
the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by 
means of any device or process. 
Id. Under the transmit clause, a performance is public “whether the 
members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display 
receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or 
at different times.” Id. 
Both plaintiff and defendants base their motions for summary 
judgment on favorable interpretations of these clauses. Both also rely 
heavily on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Columbia Pictures v. Professional 
Real Estate, 866 F.2d 278 (9th Cir.1989). This Court must therefore 
determine whether On Command’s system results in the public 
performance of defendants’ movies under the statutory clauses and 
Professional Real Estate. 
A. The Public Place Clause. 
Professional Real Estate held that hotel guest rooms are not “public 
places” for the purposes of the Copyright Act. Defendants do not challenge 
this holding. Rather, defendants argue that because On Command’s system 
comprises components dispersed throughout a hotel—i.e., the command 
center is located in a hotel equipment room, the hotel operator’s terminal 
is in the front lobby, the transmission wiring is installed throughout the 
walls and ceilings—the relevant place of performance is not the individual 
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hotel rooms but the entire hotel, which defendants contend is a public place 
under the language of the Act. This argument is unavailing. At least for 
the purposes of public place analysis, a performance of a work does not 
occur every place a wire carrying the performance passes through; a 
performance occurs where it is received. Accepting defendants’ argument 
would eviscerate both the concepts of “performance” and “public place.” The 
Act defines the performance of a motion picture as the “showing of its 
images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible.” 
17 U.S.C. § 101. A movie video is thus performed only when it is visible and 
audible. In On Command’s system, this viewing and hearing occurs only in 
an individual guest room. That can be the only relevant place of 
performance for public place analysis. Since hotel guest rooms are 
indisputably not public places for copyright purposes, On Command’s 
system results in no public performances under the public place clause. 
B. The Transmit Clause. 
Public performance of defendants’ movies under this clause occurs if 
On Command “transmits” the movies “to the public.” Under the Copyright 
Act, to “transmit” a performance is 
to communicate it by any device or process whereby images or 
sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent. 
Id. Plaintiff’s argument that On Command’s system involves not 
“transmissions” but “electronic rentals” similar to patrons’ physical 
borrowing of videotapes is without merit. On Command transmits movie 
performances directly under the language of the definition. The system 
“communicates” the motion picture “images and sounds” by a “device or 
process”—the equipment and wiring network—from a central console in a 
hotel to individual guest rooms, where the images and sounds are received 
“beyond the place from which they are sent.” The fact that hotel guests 
initiate this transmission by turning on the television and choosing a video 
is immaterial. 
On Command’s video transmissions are also “to the public” for the 
purposes of the transmit clause. Hotel guests watching a video movie in 
their room through On Command’s system are not watching it in a “public 
place” but they are nonetheless members of “the public.” See Columbia 
Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Redd Horne, 568 F.Supp. 494 (W.D.Pa.1983), 
aff’d 749 F.2d 154, 159 (3d Cir.1984) (“the transmission of a performance 
to members of the public, even in private settings such as hotel rooms . . . 
constitutes a public performance”) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 
2d Sess. at 64 (1976) (“1976 House Report”)); ESPN Inc. v. Edinburg 
Community Hotel, Inc., 735 F.Supp. 1334, 1340 (S.D.Tex.1986) (“The [1976] 
House Report . . . on the Copyright Act makes explicit that performances 
to occupants of hotel rooms fall within the definition of a public 
performance”). This is because the relationship between the transmitter of 
the performance, On Command, and the audience, hotel guests, is a 
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commercial, “public” one regardless of where the viewing takes place. The 
non-public nature of the place of the performance has no bearing on 
whether or not those who enjoy the performance constitute “the public” 
under the transmit clause. 
A performance may still be public under the transmit clause “whether 
the members of the public . . . receive it in the same place or in separate 
places and at the same time or at different times.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. A 1967 
Report by the House of Representatives reveals that Congress added this 
language to the transmit clause to cover precisely the sort of single-viewer 
system developed by plaintiff: 
[This language makes doubly clear that] a performance made 
available by transmission to the public at large is “public” even 
though the recipients are not gathered in a single place, and even 
if there is no direct proof that any of the potential recipients was 
operating his receiving apparatus at the time of the transmission. 
The same principles apply whenever the potential recipients of 
the transmission represent a limited segment of the public, such 
as the occupants of hotel rooms. . . .; they are also applicable 
where the transmission is capable of reaching different recipients 
at different times, as in the case of sounds or images stored in an 
information system and capable of being performed or displayed 
at the initiative of individual members of the public. 
H.R. Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. at 29 (1967). Thus, whether the 
number of hotel guests viewing an On Command transmission is one or one 
hundred, and whether these guests view the transmission simultaneously 
or sequentially, the transmission is still a public performance since it goes 
to members of the public. See also Redd Horne, 749 F.2d at 159 
(transmissions of videos to private viewing booths occupied by one to four 
persons infringing under transmit clause); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. 
Labus, 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1142, 1147 (W.D. Wisc.1990) (hotel’s 
distribution of unauthorized copies of video cassettes to single guest 
violated copyright owner’s exclusive right to distribute work to “the 
public”). On Command therefore “publicly performs” defendants’ movies 
under the meaning of the transmit clause. 
* * * 
CARTOON NETWORK LP V. CSC HOLDINGS, INC. 
536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
JOHN M. WALKER, JR., CIRCUIT JUDGE: 
[The facts and background for this case can be found in part A.1. of 
this chapter, supra] 
* * * 
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DISCUSSION 
* * * [T]he district court found that Cablevision would infringe the 
public performance right by transmitting a program to an RS-DVR 
customer in response to that customer’s playback request. * * * 
* * * The Act grants a copyright owner the exclusive right, “in the case 
of . . . motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). Section 101, the definitional 
section of the Act, explains that 
[t]o perform or display a work “publicly” means (1) to perform or 
display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a 
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a 
family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or (2) to transmit 
or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to 
a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any 
device or process, whether the members of the public capable of 
receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place 
or in separate places and at the same time or at different times. 
Id.§ 101. 
The parties agree that this case does not implicate clause (1). 
Accordingly, we ask whether these facts satisfy the second, “transmit 
clause” of the public performance definition: Does Cablevision “transmit 
. . . a performance . . . of the work . . . to the public”? Id. No one disputes 
that the RS-DVR playback results in the transmission of a performance of 
a work—the transmission from the Arroyo Server to the customer’s 
television set. Cablevision contends that (1) the RS-DVR customer, rather 
than Cablevision, does the transmitting and thus the performing and (2) 
the transmission is not “to the public” under the transmit clause. 
As to Cablevision’s first argument, we note that our conclusion in Part 
II [see excerpt, supra page ___] that the customer, not Cablevision, “does” 
the copying does not dictate a parallel conclusion that the customer, and 
not Cablevision, “performs” the copyrighted work. The definitions that 
delineate the contours of the reproduction and public performance rights 
vary in significant ways. For example, the statute defines the verb 
“perform” and the noun “copies,” but not the verbs “reproduce” or “copy.” 
Id. We need not address Cablevision’s first argument further because, even 
if we assume that Cablevision makes the transmission when an RS-DVR 
playback occurs, we find that the RS-DVR playback, as described here, does 
not involve the transmission of a performance “to the public.” 
The statute itself does not expressly define the term “performance” or 
the phrase “to the public.” It does explain that a transmission may be “to 
the public . . . whether the members of the public capable of receiving the 
performance . . . receive it in the same place or in separate places and at 
the same time or at different times.” Id. This plain language instructs us 
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that, in determining whether a transmission is “to the public,” it is of no 
moment that the potential recipients of the transmission are in different 
places, or that they may receive the transmission at different times. The 
implication from this same language, however, is that it is relevant, in 
determining whether a transmission is made to the public, to discern who 
is “capable of receiving” the performance being transmitted. The fact that 
the statute says “capable of receiving the performance,” instead of “capable 
of receiving the transmission,” underscores the fact that a transmission of 
a performance is itself a performance. Cf. Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty 
Co., 283 U.S. 191, 197–98 (1931). 
The legislative history of the transmit clause supports this 
interpretation. The House Report on the 1976 Copyright Act states that 
[u]nder the bill, as under the present law, a performance made 
available by transmission to the public at large is “public” even 
though the recipients are not gathered in a single place, and even 
if there is no proof that any of the potential recipients was 
operating his receiving apparatus at the time of the transmission. 
The same principles apply whenever the potential recipients of the 
transmission represent a limited segment of the public, such as 
the occupants of hotel rooms or the subscribers of a cable 
television service. 
H.R.Rep. No. 94–1476, at 64–65 (1976) (emphases added). 
* * * 
From the foregoing, it is evident that the transmit clause directs us to 
examine who precisely is “capable of receiving” a particular transmission 
of a performance. Cablevision argues that, because each RS-DVR 
transmission is made using a single unique copy of a work, made by an 
individual subscriber, one that can be decoded exclusively by that 
subscriber’s cable box, only one subscriber is capable of receiving any given 
RS-DVR transmission. This argument accords with the language of the 
transmit clause, which, as described above, directs us to consider the 
potential audience of a given transmission. We are unpersuaded by the 
district court’s reasoning and the plaintiffs’ arguments that we should 
consider a larger potential audience in determining whether a 
transmission is “to the public.” 
The district court, in deciding whether the RS-DVR playback of a 
program to a particular customer is “to the public,” apparently considered 
all of Cablevision’s customers who subscribe to the channel airing that 
program and all of Cablevision’s RS-DVR subscribers who request a copy 
of that program. Thus, it concluded that the RS-DVR playbacks constituted 
public performances because “Cablevision would transmit the same 
program to members of the public, who may receive the performance at 
different times, depending on whether they view the program in real time 
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or at a later time as an RS-DVR playback.” Cablevision I, 478 F.Supp.2d at 
623 (emphasis added). In essence, the district court suggested that, in 
considering whether a transmission is “to the public,” we consider not the 
potential audience of a particular transmission, but the potential audience 
of the underlying work (i.e., “the program”) whose content is being 
transmitted. 
We cannot reconcile the district court’s approach with the language of 
the transmit clause. That clause speaks of people capable of receiving a 
particular “transmission” or “performance,” and not of the potential 
audience of a particular “work.” Indeed, such an approach would render 
the “to the public” language surplusage. Doubtless the potential audience 
for every copyrighted audiovisual work is the general public. As a result, 
any transmission of the content of a copyrighted work would constitute a 
public performance under the district court’s interpretation. But the 
transmit clause obviously contemplates the existence of non-public 
transmissions; if it did not, Congress would have stopped drafting that 
clause after “performance.” 
On appeal, plaintiffs offer a slight variation of this interpretation. 
They argue that both in its real-time cablecast and via the RS-DVR 
playback, Cablevision is in fact transmitting the “same performance” of a 
given work: the performance of the work that occurs when the 
programming service supplying Cablevision’s content transmits that 
content to Cablevision and the service’s other licensees. * * * 
Thus, according to plaintiffs, when Congress says that to perform a 
work publicly means to transmit . . . a performance . . . to the public, they 
really meant “transmit . . . the ‘original performance’ . . . to the public.” The 
implication of this theory is that to determine whether a given 
transmission of a performance is “to the public,” we would consider not only 
the potential audience of that transmission, but also the potential audience 
of any transmission of the same underlying “original” performance. 
Like the district court’s interpretation, this view obviates any 
possibility of a purely private transmission. Furthermore, it makes 
Cablevision’s liability depend, in part, on the actions of legal strangers. 
Assume that HBO transmits a copyrighted work to both Cablevision and 
Comcast. Cablevision merely retransmits the work from one Cablevision 
facility to another, while Comcast retransmits the program to its 
subscribers. Under plaintiffs’ interpretation, Cablevision would still be 
transmitting the performance to the public, solely because Comcast has 
transmitted the same underlying performance to the public. Similarly, a 
hapless customer who records a program in his den and later transmits the 
recording to a television in his bedroom would be liable for publicly 
performing the work simply because some other party had once 
transmitted the same underlying performance to the public. 
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We do not believe Congress intended such odd results. Although the 
transmit clause is not a model of clarity, we believe that when Congress 
speaks of transmitting a performance to the public, it refers to the 
performance created by the act of transmission. Thus, HBO transmits its 
own performance of a work when it transmits to Cablevision, and 
Cablevision transmits its own performance of the same work when it 
retransmits the feed from HBO. 
* * * 
Given that each RS-DVR transmission is made to a given subscriber 
using a copy made by that subscriber, we conclude that such a transmission 
is not “to the public,” without analyzing the contours of that phrase in great 
detail. No authority cited by the parties or the district court persuades us 
to the contrary. 
* * * 
This holding, we must emphasize, does not generally permit content 
delivery networks to avoid all copyright liability by making copies of each 
item of content and associating one unique copy with each subscriber to the 
network, or by giving their subscribers the capacity to make their own 
individual copies. We do not address whether such a network operator 
would be able to escape any other form of copyright liability, such as 
liability for unauthorized reproductions or liability for contributory 
infringement. 
In sum, because we find, on undisputed facts, that Cablevision’s 
proposed RS-DVR system would not directly infringe plaintiffs’ exclusive 
rights to reproduce and publicly perform their copyrighted works, we grant 
summary judgment in favor of Cablevision with respect to both rights. 
* * * 
AMERICAN BROADCASTING COS., INC. V. AEREO, INC. 
___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 2498 (2014). 
JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Copyright Act of 1976 gives a copyright owner the “exclusive 
righ[t]” to “perform the copyrighted work publicly.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). The 
Act’s Transmit Clause defines that exclusive right as including the right to 
“transmit or otherwise communicate a performance . . . of the [copyrighted] work 
. . . to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the 
public capable of receiving the performance . . . receive it in the same place or in 
separate places and at the same time or at different times.” § 101. 
We must decide whether respondent Aereo, Inc., infringes this 
exclusive right by selling its subscribers a technologically complex service 
that allows them to watch television programs over the Internet at about 
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For a monthly fee, Aereo offers subscribers broadcast television 
programming over the Internet, virtually as the programming is being 
broadcast. Much of this programming is made up of copyrighted works. 
Aereo neither owns the copyright in those works nor holds a license from 
the copyright owners to perform those works publicly. 
Aereo’s system is made up of servers, transcoders, and thousands of 
dime-sized antennas housed in a central warehouse. It works roughly as 
follows: First, when a subscriber wants to watch a show that is currently 
being broadcast, he visits Aereo’s website and selects, from a list of the local 
programming, the show he wishes to see. 
Second, one of Aereo’s servers selects an antenna, which it dedicates 
to the use of that subscriber (and that subscriber alone) for the duration of 
the selected show. A server then tunes the antenna to the over-the-air 
broadcast carrying the show. The antenna begins to receive the broadcast, 
and an Aereo transcoder translates the signals received into data that can 
be transmitted over the Internet. 
Third, rather than directly send the data to the subscriber, a server 
saves the data in a subscriber-specific folder on Aereo’s hard drive. In other 
words, Aereo’s system creates a subscriber-specific copy—that is, a 
“personal” copy—of the subscriber’s program of choice. 
Fourth, once several seconds of programming have been saved, Aereo’s 
server begins to stream the saved copy of the show to the subscriber over 
the Internet. (The subscriber may instead direct Aereo to stream the 
program at a later time, but that aspect of Aereo’s service is not before us.) 
The subscriber can watch the streamed program on the screen of his 
personal computer, tablet, smart phone, Internet-connected television, or 
other Internet-connected device. The streaming continues, a mere few 
seconds behind the over-the-air broadcast, until the subscriber has 
received the entire show. See A DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING 494 (6th ed. 
2008) (defining “streaming” as “[t]he process of providing a steady flow of 
audio or video data so that an Internet user is able to access it as it is 
transmitted”). 
Aereo emphasizes that the data that its system streams to each 
subscriber are the data from his own personal copy, made from the 
broadcast signals received by the particular antenna allotted to him. Its 
system does not transmit data saved in one subscriber’s folder to any other 
subscriber. When two subscribers wish to watch the same program, Aereo’s 
system activates two separate antennas and saves two separate copies of 
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the program in two separate folders. It then streams the show to the 
subscribers through two separate transmissions—each from the 
subscriber’s personal copy. 
B 
Petitioners are television producers, marketers, distributors, and 
broadcasters who own the copyrights in many of the programs that Aereo’s 
system streams to its subscribers. They brought suit against Aereo for 
copyright infringement in Federal District Court. They sought a 
preliminary injunction, arguing that Aereo was infringing their right to 
“perform” their works “publicly,” as the Transmit Clause defines those 
terms. 
[The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s denial of a 
preliminary injunction, relying on Cartoon Network (excerpted at page ___, 
supra).] * * * In the Second Circuit’s view, Aereo does not perform publicly 
within the meaning of the Transmit Clause because it does not transmit 
“to the public.” Rather, each time Aereo streams a program to a subscriber, 
it sends a private transmission that is available only to that subscriber. 
* * * 
II 
This case requires us to answer two questions: First, in operating in 
the manner described above, does Aereo “perform” at all? And second, if so, 
does Aereo do so “publicly”? We address these distinct questions in turn. 
Does Aereo “perform”? See § 106(4) (“[T]he owner of [a] copyright . . . 
has the exclusive righ[t] . . . to perform the copyrighted work publicly” 
(emphasis added)); § 101 (“To perform . . . a work ‘publicly’ means [among 
other things] to transmit . . . a performance . . . of the work . . . to the public 
. . .” (emphasis added)). Phrased another way, does Aereo “transmit . . . a 
performance” when a subscriber watches a show using Aereo’s system, or 
is it only the subscriber who transmits? In Aereo’s view, it does not perform. 
It does no more than supply equipment that “emulate[s] the operation of a 
home antenna and [digital video recorder (DVR)].” Like a home antenna 
and DVR, Aereo’s equipment simply responds to its subscribers’ directives. 
So it is only the subscribers who “perform” when they use Aereo’s 
equipment to stream television programs to themselves. 
Considered alone, the language of the Act does not clearly indicate 
when an entity “perform[s]” (or “transmit[s]”) and when it merely supplies 
equipment that allows others to do so. But when read in light of its purpose, 
the Act is unmistakable: An entity that engages in activities like Aereo’s 
performs. 
A 
History makes plain that one of Congress’ primary purposes in 
amending the Copyright Act in 1976 was to overturn this Court’s 
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determination that community antenna television (CATV) systems (the 
precursors of modern cable systems) fell outside the Act’s scope. In 
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968), the 
Court considered a CATV system that carried local television broadcasting, 
much of which was copyrighted, to its subscribers in two cities. The CATV 
provider placed antennas on hills above the cities and used coaxial cables 
to carry the signals received by the antennas to the home television sets of 
its subscribers. The system amplified and modulated the signals in order 
to improve their strength and efficiently transmit them to subscribers. A 
subscriber “could choose any of the . . . programs he wished to view by 
simply turning the knob on his own television set.” The CATV provider 
“neither edited the programs received nor originated any programs of its 
own.” 
Asked to decide whether the CATV provider infringed copyright 
holders’ exclusive right to perform their works publicly, the Court held that 
the provider did not “perform” at all. The Court drew a line: “Broadcasters 
perform. Viewers do not perform.” And a CATV provider “falls on the 
viewer’s side of the line.” 
The Court reasoned that CATV providers were unlike broadcasters: 
“Broadcasters select the programs to be viewed; CATV systems 
simply carry, without editing, whatever programs they receive. 
Broadcasters procure programs and propagate them to the public; 
CATV systems receive programs that have been released to the 
public and carry them by private channels to additional viewers.” 
Instead, CATV providers were more like viewers, for “the basic function 
[their] equipment serves is little different from that served by the 
equipment generally furnished by” viewers. “Essentially,” the Court said, 
“a CATV system no more than enhances the viewer’s capacity to receive 
the broadcaster’s signals [by] provid[ing] a well-located antenna with an 
efficient connection to the viewer’s television set.” Viewers do not become 
performers by using “amplifying equipment,” and a CATV provider should 
not be treated differently for providing viewers the same equipment. 
In Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 
U.S. 394 (1974), the Court considered the copyright liability of a CATV 
provider that carried broadcast television programming into subscribers’ 
homes from hundreds of miles away. Although the Court recognized that a 
viewer might not be able to afford amplifying equipment that would 
provide access to those distant signals, it nonetheless found that the CATV 
provider was more like a viewer than a broadcaster. It explained: “The 
reception and rechanneling of [broadcast television signals] for 
simultaneous viewing is essentially a viewer function, irrespective of the 
distance between the broadcasting station and the ultimate viewer.” 
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The Court also recognized that the CATV system exercised some 
measure of choice over what to transmit. But that fact did not transform 
the CATV system into a broadcaster. A broadcaster exercises significant 
creativity in choosing what to air, the Court reasoned. In contrast, the 
CATV provider makes an initial choice about which broadcast stations to 
retransmit, but then “ ‘simply carr[ies], without editing, whatever 
programs [it] receive[s].’ ” 
B 
In 1976 Congress amended the Copyright Act in large part to reject 
the Court’s holdings in Fortnightly and Teleprompter. See H.R. REP. NO. 
94–1476, pp. 86–87 (1976) (hereinafter H.R. REP.) (The 1976 amendments 
“completely overturned” this Court’s narrow construction of the Act in 
Fortnightly and Teleprompter). Congress enacted new language that 
erased the Court’s line between broadcaster and viewer, in respect to 
“perform[ing]” a work. The amended statute clarifies that to “perform” an 
audiovisual work means “to show its images in any sequence or to make 
the sounds accompanying it audible.” § 101; see ibid. (defining 
“[a]udiovisual works” as “works that consist of a series of related images 
which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines . . ., 
together with accompanying sounds”). Under this new language, both the 
broadcaster and the viewer of a television program “perform,” because they 
both show the program’s images and make audible the program’s sounds. 
See H.R. REP., at 63 (“[A] broadcasting network is performing when it 
transmits [a singer’s performance of a song] . . . and any individual is 
performing whenever he or she . . . communicates the performance by 
turning on a receiving set”). 
Congress also enacted the Transmit Clause, which specifies that an 
entity performs publicly when it “transmit[s] . . . a performance . . . to the 
public.” § 101; see ibid. (defining “[t]o ‘transmit’ a performance” as “to 
communicate it by any device or process whereby images or sounds are 
received beyond the place from which they are sent”). Cable system 
activities, like those of the CATV systems in Fortnightly and Teleprompter, 
lie at the heart of the activities that Congress intended this language to 
cover. The Clause thus makes clear that an entity that acts like a CATV 
system itself performs, even if when doing so, it simply enhances viewers’ 
ability to receive broadcast television signals. 
Congress further created a new section of the Act to regulate cable 
companies’ public performances of copyrighted works. See § 111. Section 
111 creates a complex, highly detailed compulsory licensing scheme that 
sets out the conditions, including the payment of compulsory fees, under 
which cable systems may retransmit broadcasts. 
Congress made these three changes to achieve a similar end: to bring 
the activities of cable systems within the scope of the Copyright Act. 
CH. 1  79 
  
C 
This history makes clear that Aereo is not simply an equipment 
provider. Rather, Aereo, and not just its subscribers, “perform[s]” (or 
“transmit[s]”). Aereo’s activities are substantially similar to those of the 
CATV companies that Congress amended the Act to reach. See id., at 89 
(“[C]able systems are commercial enterprises whose basic retransmission 
operations are based on the carriage of copyrighted program material”). 
Aereo sells a service that allows subscribers to watch television programs, 
many of which are copyrighted, almost as they are being broadcast. In 
providing this service, Aereo uses its own equipment, housed in a 
centralized warehouse, outside of its users’ homes. By means of its 
technology (antennas, transcoders, and servers), Aereo’s system “receive[s] 
programs that have been released to the public and carr[ies] them by 
private channels to additional viewers.” Fortnightly, 392 U.S., at 400. It 
“carr[ies] . . . whatever programs [it] receive[s],” and it offers “all the 
programming” of each over-the-air station it carries. Id., at 392, 400. 
Aereo’s equipment may serve a “viewer function”; it may enhance the 
viewer’s ability to receive a broadcaster’s programs. It may even emulate 
equipment a viewer could use at home. But the same was true of the 
equipment that was before the Court, and ultimately before Congress, in 
Fortnightly and Teleprompter. 
We recognize, and Aereo and the dissent emphasize, one particular 
difference between Aereo’s system and the cable systems at issue in 
Fortnightly and Teleprompter. The systems in those cases transmitted 
constantly; they sent continuous programming to each subscriber’s 
television set. In contrast, Aereo’s system remains inert until a subscriber 
indicates that she wants to watch a program. Only at that moment, in 
automatic response to the subscriber’s request, does Aereo’s system 
activate an antenna and begin to transmit the requested program. 
This is a critical difference, says the dissent. It means that Aereo’s 
subscribers, not Aereo, “selec[t] the copyrighted content” that is 
“perform[ed],” (opinion of SCALIA, J.), and for that reason they, not Aereo, 
“transmit” the performance. Aereo is thus like “a copy shop that provides 
its patrons with a library card.” A copy shop is not directly liable whenever 
a patron uses the shop’s machines to “reproduce” copyrighted materials 
found in that library. See § 106(1) (“exclusive righ[t] . . . to reproduce the 
copyrighted work”). And by the same token, Aereo should not be directly 
liable whenever its patrons use its equipment to “transmit” copyrighted 
television programs to their screens. 
In our view, however, the dissent’s copy shop argument, in whatever 
form, makes too much out of too little. Given Aereo’s overwhelming likeness 
to the cable companies targeted by the 1976 amendments, this sole 
technological difference between Aereo and traditional cable companies 
does not make a critical difference here. The subscribers of the Fortnightly 
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and Teleprompter cable systems also selected what programs to display on 
their receiving sets. Indeed, as we explained in Fortnightly, such a 
subscriber “could choose any of the . . . programs he wished to view by 
simply turning the knob on his own television set.” The same is true of an 
Aereo subscriber. Of course, in Fortnightly the television signals, in a 
sense, lurked behind the screen, ready to emerge when the subscriber 
turned the knob. Here the signals pursue their ordinary course of travel 
through the universe until today’s “turn of the knob”—a click on a 
website—activates machinery that intercepts and reroutes them to Aereo’s 
subscribers over the Internet. But this difference means nothing to the 
subscriber. It means nothing to the broadcaster. We do not see how this 
single difference, invisible to subscriber and broadcaster alike, could 
transform a system that is for all practical purposes a traditional cable 
system into “a copy shop that provides its patrons with a library card.” 
In other cases involving different kinds of service or technology 
providers, a user’s involvement in the operation of the provider’s 
equipment and selection of the content transmitted may well bear on 
whether the provider performs within the meaning of the Act. * * * We 
conclude that Aereo is not just an equipment supplier and that Aereo 
“perform[s].” 
III 
Next, we must consider whether Aereo performs petitioners’ works 
“publicly,” within the meaning of the Transmit Clause. Under the Clause, 
an entity performs a work publicly when it “transmit[s] . . . a performance 
. . . of the work . . . to the public.” § 101. Aereo denies that it satisfies this 
definition. It reasons as follows: First, the “performance” it “transmit[s]” is 
the performance created by its act of transmitting. And second, because 
each of these performances is capable of being received by one and only one 
subscriber, Aereo transmits privately, not publicly. Even assuming Aereo’s 
first argument is correct, its second does not follow. 
We begin with Aereo’s first argument. What performance does Aereo 
transmit? Under the Act, “[t]o ‘transmit’ a performance . . . is to 
communicate it by any device or process whereby images or sounds are 
received beyond the place from which they are sent.” Ibid. And “[t]o 
‘perform’ ” an audiovisual work means “to show its images in any sequence 
or to make the sounds accompanying it audible.” Ibid. 
Petitioners say Aereo transmits a prior performance of their works. 
Thus when Aereo retransmits a network’s prior broadcast, the underlying 
broadcast (itself a performance) is the performance that Aereo transmits. 
Aereo, as discussed above, says the performance it transmits is the new 
performance created by its act of transmitting. That performance comes 
into existence when Aereo streams the sounds and images of a broadcast 
program to a subscriber’s screen. 
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We assume arguendo that Aereo’s first argument is correct. Thus, for 
present purposes, to transmit a performance of (at least) an audiovisual 
work means to communicate contemporaneously visible images and 
contemporaneously audible sounds of the work. Cf. United States v. 
American Soc. of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 627 F.3d 64, 73 (2d 
Cir. 2010) (holding that a download of a work is not a performance because 
the data transmitted are not “contemporaneously perceptible”). When an 
Aereo subscriber selects a program to watch, Aereo streams the program 
over the Internet to that subscriber. Aereo thereby “communicate[s]” to the 
subscriber, by means of a “device or process,” the work’s images and 
sounds. And those images and sounds are contemporaneously visible and 
audible on the subscriber’s computer (or other Internet-connected device). 
So under our assumed definition, Aereo transmits a performance whenever 
its subscribers watch a program. 
But what about the Clause’s further requirement that Aereo transmit 
a performance “to the public”? As we have said, an Aereo subscriber 
receives broadcast television signals with an antenna dedicated to him 
alone. Aereo’s system makes from those signals a personal copy of the 
selected program. It streams the content of the copy to the same subscriber 
and to no one else. One and only one subscriber has the ability to see and 
hear each Aereo transmission. The fact that each transmission is to only 
one subscriber, in Aereo’s view, means that it does not transmit a 
performance “to the public.” 
In terms of the Act’s purposes, these differences do not distinguish 
Aereo’s system from cable systems, which do perform “publicly.” Viewed in 
terms of Congress’ regulatory objectives, why should any of these 
technological differences matter? They concern the behind-the-scenes way 
in which Aereo delivers television programming to its viewers’ screens. 
They do not render Aereo’s commercial objective any different from that of 
cable companies. Nor do they significantly alter the viewing experience of 
Aereo’s subscribers. Why would a subscriber who wishes to watch a 
television show care much whether images and sounds are delivered to his 
screen via a large multisubscriber antenna or one small dedicated antenna, 
whether they arrive instantaneously or after a few seconds’ delay, or 
whether they are transmitted directly or after a personal copy is made? 
And why, if Aereo is right, could not modern CATV systems simply 
continue the same commercial and consumer-oriented activities, free of 
copyright restrictions, provided they substitute such new technologies for 
old? Congress would as much have intended to protect a copyright holder 
from the unlicensed activities of Aereo as from those of cable companies. 
The text of the Clause effectuates Congress’ intent. Aereo’s argument 
to the contrary relies on the premise that “to transmit . . . a performance” 
means to make a single transmission. But the Clause suggests that an 
entity may transmit a performance through multiple, discrete 
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transmissions. That is because one can “transmit” or “communicate” 
something through a set of actions. Thus one can transmit a message to 
one’s friends, irrespective of whether one sends separate identical e-mails 
to each friend or a single e-mail to all at once. So can an elected official 
communicate an idea, slogan, or speech to her constituents, regardless of 
whether she communicates that idea, slogan, or speech during individual 
phone calls to each constituent or in a public square. 
The fact that a singular noun (“a performance”) follows the words “to 
transmit” does not suggest the contrary. One can sing a song to his family, 
whether he sings the same song one-on-one or in front of all together. 
Similarly, one’s colleagues may watch a performance of a particular play—
say, this season’s modern-dress version of “Measure for Measure”—
whether they do so at separate or at the same showings. By the same 
principle, an entity may transmit a performance through one or several 
transmissions, where the performance is of the same work. 
The Transmit Clause must permit this interpretation, for it provides 
that one may transmit a performance to the public “whether the members 
of the public capable of receiving the performance . . . receive it . . . at the 
same time or at different times.” § 101. Were the words “to transmit . . . a 
performance” limited to a single act of communication, members of the 
public could not receive the performance communicated “at different 
times.” Therefore, in light of the purpose and text of the Clause, we 
conclude that when an entity communicates the same contemporaneously 
perceptible images and sounds to multiple people, it transmits a 
performance to them regardless of the number of discrete communications 
it makes. 
We do not see how the fact that Aereo transmits via personal copies of 
programs could make a difference. The Act applies to transmissions “by 
means of any device or process.” And retransmitting a television program 
using user-specific copies is a “process” of transmitting a performance. A 
“cop[y]” of a work is simply a “material objec[t] . . . in which a work is fixed 
. . . and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated.” Ibid. So whether Aereo transmits from the same or 
separate copies, it performs the same work; it shows the same images and 
makes audible the same sounds. Therefore, when Aereo streams the same 
television program to multiple subscribers, it “transmit[s] . . . a 
performance” to all of them. 
* * * 
For these reasons, we conclude that Aereo transmits a performance of 
petitioners’ copyrighted works to the public, within the meaning of the 
Transmit Clause. 
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IV 
Aereo and many of its supporting amici argue that to apply the 
Transmit Clause to Aereo’s conduct will impose copyright liability on other 
technologies, including new technologies, that Congress could not possibly 
have wanted to reach. We agree that Congress, while intending the 
Transmit Clause to apply broadly to cable companies and their equivalents, 
did not intend to discourage or to control the emergence or use of different 
kinds of technologies. But we do not believe that our limited holding today 
will have that effect. 
* * * 
We cannot now answer more precisely how the Transmit Clause or 
other provisions of the Copyright Act will apply to technologies not before 
us. We agree with the Solicitor General that “[q]uestions involving cloud 
computing, [remote storage] DVRs, and other novel issues not before the 
Court, as to which ‘Congress has not plainly marked [the] course,’ should 
await a case in which they are squarely presented.” And we note that, to 
the extent commercial actors or other interested entities may be concerned 
with the relationship between the development and use of such 
technologies and the Copyright Act, they are of course free to seek action 
from Congress. 
3 
In sum, having considered the details of Aereo’s practices, we find 
them highly similar to those of the CATV systems in Fortnightly and 
Teleprompter. And those are activities that the 1976 amendments sought 
to bring within the scope of the Copyright Act. Insofar as there are 
differences, those differences concern not the nature of the service that 
Aereo provides so much as the technological manner in which it provides 
the service. We conclude that those differences are not adequate to place 
Aereo’s activities outside the scope of the Act. 
For these reasons, we conclude that Aereo “perform[s]” petitioners’ 
copyrighted works “publicly,” as those terms are defined by the Transmit 
Clause. We therefore reverse the contrary judgment of the Court of 
Appeals, and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS and JUSTICE ALITO join, 
dissenting. 
This case is the latest skirmish in the long-running copyright battle 
over the delivery of television programming. * * * The Networks sued Aereo 
for several forms of copyright infringement, but we are here concerned with 
a single claim: that Aereo violates the Networks’ “exclusive righ[t]” to 
“perform” their programs “publicly.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). That claim fails at 
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the very outset because Aereo does not “perform” at all. The Court manages 
to reach the opposite conclusion only by disregarding widely accepted rules 
for service-provider liability and adopting in their place an improvised 
standard (“looks-like-cable-TV”) that will sow confusion for years to come. 
I. Legal Standard 
There are two types of liability for copyright infringement: direct and 
secondary. As its name suggests, the former applies when an actor 
personally engages in infringing conduct. See Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984). Secondary liability, 
by contrast, is a means of holding defendants responsible for infringement 
by third parties, even when the defendants “have not themselves engaged 
in the infringing activity.” Id., at 435. It applies when a defendant 
“intentionally induc[es] or encourag[es]” infringing acts by others or profits 
from such acts “while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit [them].” 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 
(2005). 
Most suits against equipment manufacturers and service providers 
involve secondary-liability claims. For example, when movie studios sued 
to block the sale of Sony’s Betamax videocassette recorder (VCR), they 
argued that Sony was liable because its customers were making 
unauthorized copies. Record labels and movie studios relied on a similar 
theory when they sued Grokster and StreamCast, two providers of peer-to-
peer file-sharing software. See Grokster, supra, at 920–921, 927. 
This suit, or rather the portion of it before us here, is fundamentally 
different. The Networks claim that Aereo directly infringes their public-
performance right. Accordingly, the Networks must prove that Aereo 
“perform[s]” copyrighted works, § 106(4), when its subscribers log in, select 
a channel, and push the “watch” button. That process undoubtedly results 
in a performance; the question is who does the performing. If Aereo’s 
subscribers perform but Aereo does not, the claim necessarily fails. 
The Networks’ claim is governed by a simple but profoundly important 
rule: A defendant may be held directly liable only if it has engaged in 
volitional conduct that violates the Act. This requirement is firmly 
grounded in the Act’s text, which defines “perform” in active, affirmative 
terms: One “perform[s]” a copyrighted “audiovisual work,” such as a movie 
or news broadcast, by “show[ing] its images in any sequence” or “mak[ing] 
the sounds accompanying it audible.” § 101. And since the Act makes it 
unlawful to copy or perform copyrighted works, not to copy or perform in 
general, see § 501(a), the volitional-act requirement demands conduct 
directed to the plaintiff’s copyrighted material. Every Court of Appeals to 
have considered an automated-service provider’s direct liability for 
copyright infringement has adopted that rule. See Fox Broadcasting Co. v. 
Dish Network LLC, 747 F.3d 1060, 1066–1068 (9th Cir. 2014); Cartoon 
Network, supra, at 130–131 (2d Cir. 2008); CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, 
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Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 549–550 (4th Cir. 2004). Although we have not opined 
on the issue, our cases are fully consistent with a volitional-conduct 
requirement. For example, we gave several examples of direct infringement 
in Sony, each of which involved a volitional act directed to the plaintiff’s 
copyrighted material. See 464 U.S., at 437, n. 18. 
The volitional-conduct requirement is not at issue in most direct-
infringement cases; the usual point of dispute is whether the defendant’s 
conduct is infringing (e.g., Does the defendant’s design copy the plaintiff’s?), 
rather than whether the defendant has acted at all (e.g., Did this defendant 
create the infringing design?). But it comes right to the fore when a direct-
infringement claim is lodged against a defendant who does nothing more 
than operate an automated, user-controlled system. Internet-service 
providers are a prime example. When one user sends data to another, the 
provider’s equipment facilitates the transfer automatically. Does that 
mean that the provider is directly liable when the transmission happens to 
result in the “reproduc[tion],” § 106(1), of a copyrighted work? It does not. 
The provider’s system is “totally indifferent to the material’s content,” 
whereas courts require “some aspect of volition” directed at the copyrighted 
material before direct liability may be imposed. CoStar, 373 F.3d, at 550–
551.2 The defendant may be held directly liable only if the defendant itself 
“trespassed on the exclusive domain of the copyright owner.” Id., at 550. 
Most of the time that issue will come down to who selects the copyrighted 
content: the defendant or its customers. 
A comparison between copy shops and video-on-demand services 
illustrates the point. A copy shop rents out photocopiers on a per-use basis. 
One customer might copy his 10-year-old’s drawings—a perfectly lawful 
thing to do—while another might duplicate a famous artist’s copyrighted 
photographs—a use clearly prohibited by § 106(1). Either way, the 
customer chooses the content and activates the copying function; the 
photocopier does nothing except in response to the customer’s commands. 
Because the shop plays no role in selecting the content, it cannot be held 
directly liable when a customer makes an infringing copy. 
Video-on-demand services, like photocopiers, respond automatically to 
user input, but they differ in one crucial respect: They choose the content. 
* * * That selection and arrangement by the service provider constitutes a 
volitional act directed to specific copyrighted works and thus serves as a 
basis for direct liability. 
The distinction between direct and secondary liability would collapse 
if there were not a clear rule for determining whether the defendant 
committed the infringing act. The volitional-conduct requirement supplies 
that rule; its purpose is not to excuse defendants from accountability, but 
                                                 
2 Congress has enacted several safe-harbor provisions applicable to automated network 
processes, see, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(b), but those provisions do not foreclose “any other defense,” 
§ 512(l), including a volitional-conduct defense. 
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to channel the claims against them into the correct analytical track. Thus, 
in the example given above, the fact that the copy shop does not choose the 
content simply means that its culpability will be assessed using secondary-
liability rules rather than direct-liability rules. 
II. Application to Aereo 
So which is Aereo: the copy shop or the video-on-demand service? In 
truth, it is neither. Rather, it is akin to a copy shop that provides its patrons 
with a library card. Aereo offers access to an automated system consisting 
of routers, servers, transcoders, and dime-sized antennae. Like a 
photocopier or VCR, that system lies dormant until a subscriber activates 
it. When a subscriber selects a program, Aereo’s system picks up the 
relevant broadcast signal, translates its audio and video components into 
digital data, stores the data in a user-specific file, and transmits that file’s 
contents to the subscriber via the Internet—at which point the subscriber’s 
laptop, tablet, or other device displays the broadcast just as an ordinary 
television would. The result of that process fits the statutory definition of 
a performance to a tee: The subscriber’s device “show[s]” the broadcast’s 
“images” and “make[s] the sounds accompanying” the broadcast “audible.” 
§ 101. The only question is whether those performances are the product of 
Aereo’s volitional conduct. 
They are not. Unlike video-on-demand services, Aereo does not provide 
a prearranged assortment of movies and television shows. Rather, it 
assigns each subscriber an antenna that—like a library card—can be used 
to obtain whatever broadcasts are freely available. Some of those 
broadcasts are copyrighted; others are in the public domain. The key point 
is that subscribers call all the shots: Aereo’s automated system does not 
relay any program, copyrighted or not, until a subscriber selects the 
program and tells Aereo to relay it. Aereo’s operation of that system is a 
volitional act and a but-for cause of the resulting performances, but, as in 
the case of the copy shop, that degree of involvement is not enough for 
direct liability. See Grokster, 545 U.S., at 960 (BREYER, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he producer of a technology which permits unlawful copying does not 
himself engage in unlawful copying”). 
In sum, Aereo does not “perform” for the sole and simple reason that 
it does not make the choice of content. And because Aereo does not perform, 
it cannot be held directly liable for infringing the Networks’ public-
performance right. That conclusion does not necessarily mean that Aereo’s 
service complies with the Copyright Act. Quite the contrary. The Networks’ 
complaint alleges that Aereo is directly and secondarily liable for 
infringing their public-performance rights (§ 106(4)) and also their 
reproduction rights (§ 106(1)). Their request for a preliminary injunction—
the only issue before this Court—is based exclusively on the direct-liability 
portion of the public-performance claim (and further limited to Aereo’s 
“watch” function, as opposed to its “record” function). Affirming the 
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judgment below would merely return this case to the lower courts for 
consideration of the Networks’ remaining claims. 
III. Guilt By Resemblance 
The Court’s conclusion that Aereo performs boils down to the following 
syllogism: (1) Congress amended the Act to overrule our decisions holding 
that cable systems do not perform when they retransmit over-the-air 
broadcasts; (2) Aereo looks a lot like a cable system; therefore (3) Aereo 
performs. * * * 
* * * 
* * * The Court vows that its ruling will not affect cloud-storage 
providers and cable-television systems, but it cannot deliver on that 
promise given the imprecision of its result-driven rule. Indeed, the 
difficulties inherent in the Court’s makeshift approach will become 
apparent in this very case. Today’s decision addresses the legality of 
Aereo’s “watch” function, which provides nearly contemporaneous access to 
live broadcasts. On remand, one of the first questions the lower courts will 
face is whether Aereo’s “record” function, which allows subscribers to save 
a program while it is airing and watch it later, infringes the Networks’ 
public-performance right. The volitional-conduct rule provides a clear 
answer to that question: Because Aereo does not select the programs 
viewed by its users, it does not perform. But it is impossible to say how the 
issue will come out under the Court’s analysis, since cable companies did 
not offer remote recording and playback services when Congress amended 
the Copyright Act in 1976. 
I share the Court’s evident feeling that what Aereo is doing (or 
enabling to be done) to the Networks’ copyrighted programming ought not 
to be allowed. But perhaps we need not distort the Copyright Act to forbid 
it. * * * It is not the role of this Court to identify and plug loopholes. It is 
the role of good lawyers to identify and exploit them, and the role of 
Congress to eliminate them if it wishes. * * * 
UNITED STATES V. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF COMPOSERS, 
AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS 
627 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2010). 
JOHN M. WALKER, JR., CIRCUIT JUDGE: 
This case presents two distinct questions that arise from the 
transmittal of musical works over the Internet: First, whether a download 
of a digital file containing a musical work constitutes a public performance 
of that musical work; and, second, whether the district court, acting in its 
capacity as the rate court, was reasonable in its assessment of the blanket 
license fees of Yahoo! Inc. and RealNetworks, Inc. (collectively, “the 
Internet Companies”) to publicly perform any of the millions of musical 
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compositions in the American Society of Composers, Authors and 
Publishers (“ASCAP”) repertory. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court’s ruling 
that a download of a musical work does not constitute a public performance 
of that work * * *. 
I. Public Performance Right as Applied to Downloads 
The Copyright Act confers upon the owner of a copyright “a bundle of 
discrete exclusive rights,” each of which may be transferred or retained 
separately by the copyright owner. N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 
495–96 (2001). Section 106 of the Copyright Act sets forth these various 
rights, including the right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies” 
and the right “to perform the copyrighted work publicly.” 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 106(1), (4). In this case, the Internet Companies offer their customers 
the ability to download musical works over the Internet. It is undisputed 
that these downloads create copies of the musical works, for which the 
parties agree the copyright owners must be compensated. However, the 
parties dispute whether these downloads are also public performances of 
the musical works, for which the copyright owners must separately and 
additionally be compensated. The district court held that these downloads 
are not public performances, and we agree. 
In answering the question of whether a download is a public 
performance, we turn to Section 101 of the Copyright Act, which states that 
“[t]o ‘perform’ a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either 
directly or by means of any device or process.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. A download 
plainly is neither a “dance” nor an “act.” Thus, we must determine whether 
a download of a musical work falls within the meaning of the terms “recite,” 
“render,” or “play.” 
* * * 
The ordinary sense of the words “recite,” “render,” and “play” refer to 
actions that can be perceived contemporaneously. To “recite” is “to repeat 
from memory or read aloud esp[ecially] before an audience,” WEBSTER’S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1895 (1981); to “render” is to “say 
over: recite, repeat,” id. at 1922; and to “play” is to “perform on a musical 
instrument,” “sound in performance,” “reproduce sound of recorded 
material,” or “act on a stage or in some other dramatic medium,” id. at 
1737. All three actions entail contemporaneous perceptibility. 
These definitions comport with our common-sense understandings of 
these words. Itzakh Perlman gives a “recital” of Beethoven’s Violin 
Concerto in D Major when he performs it aloud before an audience. Jimmy 
Hendrix memorably (or not, depending on one’s sensibility) offered a 
“rendition” of the Star-Spangled Banner at Woodstock when he performed 
it aloud in 1969. Yo-Yo Ma “plays” the Cello Suite No. 1 when he draws the 
bow across his cello strings to audibly reproduce the notes that Bach 
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inscribed. Music is neither recited, rendered, nor played when a recording 
(electronic or otherwise) is simply delivered to a potential listener. 
The final clause of the § 101 definition of “to perform” further confirms 
our interpretation. It states that “[t]o ‘perform’ . . . a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work . . . [is] to show its images in any sequence or to make the 
sounds accompanying it audible.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. The fact that the statute 
defines performance in the audio-visual context as “show[ing]” the work or 
making it “audible” reinforces the conclusion that “to perform” a musical 
work entails contemporaneous perceptibility. ASCAP has provided no 
reason, and we can surmise none, why the statute would require a 
contemporaneously perceptible event in the context of an audio-visual 
work, but not in the context of a musical work. 
The downloads at issue in this appeal are not musical performances 
that are contemporaneously perceived by the listener. They are simply 
transfers of electronic files containing digital copies from an on-line server 
to a local hard drive. The downloaded songs are not performed in any 
perceptible manner during the transfers; the user must take some further 
action to play the songs after they are downloaded. Because the electronic 
download itself involves no recitation, rendering, or playing of the musical 
work encoded in the digital transmission, we hold that such a download is 
not a performance of that work, as defined by § 101. 
ASCAP, pointing to the definition of “publicly” in § 101, argues that a 
download constitutes a public performance. Section 101 defines “[t]o 
perform or display a work ‘publicly’ ” as follows: 
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any 
place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal 
circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or (2) to 
transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of 
the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by 
means of any device or process, whether the members of the public 
capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the 
same place or in separate places and at the same time or at 
different times. 
Id. § 101. ASCAP argues that downloads fall under clause (2) of this 
definition because downloads “transmit or otherwise communicate a 
performance,” id., namely the initial or underlying performance of the 
copyrighted work, to the public. We find this argument unavailing. The 
definition of “publicly” simply defines the circumstances under which a 
performance will be considered public; it does not define the meaning of 
“performance.” Moreover, ASCAP’s proposed interpretation misreads the 
definition of “publicly.” As we concluded in Cartoon Network LP v. CSC 
Holdings, Inc., “when Congress speaks of transmitting a performance to 
the public, it refers to the performance created by the act of transmission,” 
not simply to transmitting a recording of a performance. 536 F.3d 121, 136 
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(2d Cir.2008). ASCAP’s alternative interpretation is flawed because, in 
disaggregating the “transmission” from the simultaneous “performance” 
and treating the transmission itself as a performance, ASCAP renders 
superfluous the subsequent “a performance . . . of the work” as the object 
of the transmittal. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (“It is 
our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.”). 
In contrast, our interpretation in Cartoon Network recognizes that a 
“transmittal of a work” is distinct from a transmittal of “a performance”—
the former being a transmittal of the underlying work and the latter being 
a transmittal that is itself a performance of the underlying work. See 536 
F.3d at 134 (“The fact that the statute says ‘capable of receiving the 
performance,’ instead of ‘capable of receiving the transmission,’ 
underscores the fact that a transmission of a performance is itself a 
performance.”). 
The Internet Companies’ stream transmissions, which all parties 
agree constitute public performances, illustrate why a download is not a 
public performance. A stream is an electronic transmission that renders 
the musical work audible as it is received by the client-computer’s 
temporary memory. This transmission, like a television or radio broadcast, 
is a performance because there is a playing of the song that is perceived 
simultaneously with the transmission. In contrast, downloads do not 
immediately produce sound; only after a file has been downloaded on a 
user’s hard drive can he perceive a performance by playing the downloaded 
song. Unlike musical works played during radio broadcasts and stream 
transmissions, downloaded musical works are transmitted at one point in 
time and performed at another. Transmittal without a performance does 
not constitute a “public performance.” Cf. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 
v. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d 278, 282 (9th Cir.1989) 
(holding that renting videodiscs to a hotel guest for playback in the guest’s 
room does not constitute the “transmission” of a public performance). 
ASCAP misreads our opinion in NFL v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 
211 F.3d 10, 11–13 (2d Cir.2000), to hold that the Copyright Act does not, 
in fact, require a contemporaneously perceptible performance to infringe 
on the public performance right. In NFL, defendant PrimeTime, a satellite 
television provider, captured protected content in the United States from 
the NFL, transmitted it from the United States to a satellite (“the uplink”), 
and then transmitted it from the satellite to subscribers in both the United 
States and Canada (“the downlink”). PrimeTime had a license to transmit 
NFL games to its subscribers in the United States but not to Canada. The 
NFL sought to enjoin the transmissions sent to Canada by arguing that the 
uplink in the United States constituted unauthorized public performances 
of the games in the United States. The relevant issue was whether the 
uplink transmission was a public performance even though the uplink was 
only to a satellite and could not, itself, be perceived by viewers. We 
determined that PrimeTime’s uplink transmission of signals captured in 
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the United States amounted to a public performance because it was an 
integral part of the larger process by which the NFL’s protected work was 
delivered to a public audience. 
ASCAP seizes on the fact that the uplink to the satellite was not 
contemporaneously perceptible to argue against a contemporaneous 
perceptibility requirement in this case. ASCAP’s argument, however, fails 
to accord controlling significance to the fact that the immediately 
sequential downlink from the satellite to Canadian PrimeTime subscribers 
was a public performance of the games. Id. at 11–13; see also David v. 
Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 697 F.Supp. 752, 758–60 
(S.D.N.Y.1988) (finding that because “Showtime and The Movie Channel 
both broadcast television programming . . . to cable system operators,” 
which, in turn, “pass[ed] the signal along to their individual customers,” 
the initial transmissions constituted public performances because they 
were a “step in the process by which a protected work wends its way to its 
audience”); MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 2 NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 8.14[C][2] at 190.6 & n. 63 (2009) (explaining that when a 
transmission is made “to cable systems that will in turn transmit directly 
to the public,” the earlier transmission is a public performance despite the 
absence of any contemporaneous perceptibility). In holding the 
transmission in Cartoon Network not to be a public performance, we 
distinguished NFL on the basis that in that case the final act in the 
sequence of transmissions was a public performance. That same distinction 
applies here. Just as in Cartoon Network, the Internet Companies transmit 
a copy of the work to the user, who then plays his unique copy of the song 
whenever he wants to hear it; because the performance is made by a unique 
reproduction of the song that was sold to the user, the ultimate 
performance of the song is not “to the public.” See id. at 137, 138. 
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of partial summary 
judgment on the basis that downloads do not constitute public 
performances of the downloaded musical works. 
[Discussion of royalty rates omitted.] 
* * * 
5. THE SCOPE OF EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS 
IN SOUND RECORDINGS 
Statutes: 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(6), 114–15 
In the case of sound recordings, section 114 defines the exclusive rights 
to reproduce a work and to incorporate it in derivative works more 
narrowly than in the case of other copyrightable works. In addition, section 
114(a) clarifies that there is no exclusive public performance right in sound 
recordings under section 106(4). Sound recordings are one instance in 
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which the classification of a work under section 102(a) significantly affects 
the scope of the copyright owner’s rights. 
Until 1995, the United States did not recognize performance rights in 
sound recordings at all. However, the Digital Performance Right in Sound 
Recordings Act, Pub. L. 104–39 (1995), added new section 106(6), giving 
the owners of copyrights in sound recordings a public performance right 
limited to performances via transmission by digital subscription services. 
In 1998, the right was extended to encompass certain nonsubscription 
services, most notably webcasting. The Act reflected the concern that 
digital transmissions have the potential to supplant record sales, thus 
reducing the revenues which those sales previously generated for the 
owners of sound recording copyrights. In addition, any decrease in record 
sales will reduce the mechanical royalties payable by record companies to 
composers, publishers, and performers according to their contracts. 
The new law benefits recording artists regardless of whether they own 
copyright interests in the recordings on which they perform; new section 
114(g) allocates a portion of the digital licensing revenues to the recording 
artists. 
Section 114(d)(3) limits the right of the sound recording copyright 
owner to grant exclusive licenses of the section 106(6) right to interactive 
subscription services (where the user selects the recording to be 
performed), in response to the concern expressed by composers and 
publishers “that the copyright owners of sound recordings might become 
‘gatekeepers’ and limit opportunities for public performances of the musical 
works embodied in the sound recordings.” S. Rep. No. 104–128, 104th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1995). No restrictions are imposed on the granting of 
nonexclusive licenses for section 106(6) rights. New sections 114(e) through 
(i) establish licensing rules and statutory royalty rates for digital 
performance rights. 
Nations that recognize broader performance rights in sound 
recordings have in the past refused to allow United States persons owning 
sound recording copyrights to collect royalties for public performances in 
those countries, because the United States did not reciprocate. Most 
nations have continued this practice in spite of the enactment of Pub. L. 
104–39, although some nations will remit royalties for digital 
performances. 
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B. LIMITS ON SECTION 106 RIGHTS 
1. SECTION 117:  COMPUTER SOFTWARE 
 
VAULT CORP. V. QUAID SOFTWARE LTD. 
847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988). 
REAVLEY, CIRCUIT JUDGE: 
[Plaintiff Vault manufactured and marketed PROLOK computer 
diskettes containing Vault’s copyrighted copy-protection software, which 
prevented persons from making fully functional copies of any other 
computer programs contained on those diskettes. Vault sold its diskettes 
to software makers who would place their own copyrighted programs on 
the copy-protected diskettes in order to prevent unauthorized copying. 
Defendant Quaid manufactured and sold CopyWrite diskettes, which 
contained software with a feature known as “RAMKEY” that could “unlock” 
the PROLOK copy protection. Buyers of Copywrite diskettes could use 
them to make fully functional copies of any software contained in a 
PROLOK diskette.] 
* * * Vault claims that Quaid infringed its copyright under § 501(a) by: 
(1) directly copying Vault’s program into the memory of Quaid’s computer; 
(2) contributing to the unauthorized copying of Vault’s program and the 
programs Vault’s customers place on PROLOK diskettes; and (3) preparing 
derivative works of Vault’s program. 
Section 117 of the Copyright Act limits a copyright owner’s exclusive 
rights under § 106 by permitting an owner of a computer program to make 
certain copies of that program without obtaining permission from the 
program’s copyright owner. With respect to Vault’s first two claims of 
copyright infringement, Quaid contends that its activities fall within the 
§ 117 exceptions and that it has, therefore, not infringed Vault’s exclusive 
rights under § 501(a). To appreciate the arguments of the parties, we 
examine the legislative history of § 117. 
A. Background 
In 1974 Congress established the National Commission on New 
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (the “CONTU”) to perform 
research and make recommendations concerning copyright protection for 
computer programs. Before receiving the CONTU’s recommendations, 
Congress amended the Copyright Act in 1976 to include computer 
programs in the definition of protectable literary works and to establish 
that a program copied into a computer’s memory constitutes a 
reproduction. * * * 
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In 1978 the CONTU issued its final report in which it recognized that 
“the cost of developing computer programs is far greater than the cost of 
their duplication,” CONTU Report at 26, and concluded that “some form of 
protection is necessary to encourage the creation and broad distribution of 
computer programs in a competitive market,” id. at 27. After 
acknowledging the importance of balancing the interest of proprietors in 
obtaining “reasonable protection” against the risks of “unduly burdening 
users of programs and the general public,” id. at 29, the Report 
recommended * * * the enactment of a new section 117 which would 
proscribe the unauthorized copying of computer programs but permit a 
“rightful possessor” of a program 
to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of 
that computer program provided: 
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an 
essential step in the utilization of the computer program in 
conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other 
manner, or 
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes 
only and that all archival copies are destroyed in the event 
that continued possession of the computer program should 
cease to be rightful. 
Id. at 30 (emphasis in original). 
Because the act of loading a program from a medium of storage into a 
computer’s memory creates a copy of the program, the CONTU reasoned 
that “one who rightfully possesses a copy of a program . . . should be 
provided with a legal right to copy it to that extent which will permit its 
use by the possessor,” and drafted proposed § 117(1) to “provide that 
persons in rightful possession of copies of programs be able to use them 
freely without fear of exposure to copyright liability.” Id. at 31. With respect 
to proposed section 117(2), the “archival exception,” the Report explained 
that a person in rightful possession of a program should have the right “to 
prepare archival copies of it to guard against destruction or damage by 
mechanical or electrical failure. But this permission would not extend to 
other copies of the program. Thus one could not, for example, make archival 
copies of a program and later sell some to another while retaining some for 
use.” Id. 
In 1980, Congress enacted the Computer Software Copyright Act 
which adopted the recommendations contained in the CONTU Report. 
Section 11711 * * * was enacted, and the proposed definition of “computer 
program” was added to section 101. The Act’s legislative history, contained 
                                                 
11 In enacting the new section 117, Congress adopted the proposed section with only one 
change. The final version grants “owners,” as opposed to “rightful possessors,” a limited right to 
copy and adapt their software. * * * 
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in a short paragraph in a committee report, merely states that the Act, 
“embodies the recommendations of [the CONTU] with respect to clarifying 
the law of copyright of computer software.” H.R. Rep. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 
2d Sess., pt. 1, at 23. The absence of an extensive legislative history and 
the fact that Congress enacted proposed section 117 with only one change 
have prompted courts to rely on the CONTU Report as an expression of 
legislative intent. 
B. Direct Copying 
In order to develop RAMKEY, Quaid analyzed Vault’s program by 
copying it into its computer’s memory. Vault contends that, by making this 
unauthorized copy, Quaid directly infringed upon Vault’s copyright. The 
district court held that “Quaid’s actions clearly fall within [the § 117(1)] 
exemption. The loading of [Vault’s] program into the [memory] of a 
computer is an ‘essential step in the utilization’ of [Vault’s] program. 
Therefore, Quaid has not infringed Vault’s copyright by loading [Vault’s 
program] into [its computer’s memory].” Vault, 655 F. Supp. at 758. 
Section 117(1) permits an owner of a program to make a copy of that 
program provided that the copy “is created as an essential step in the 
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that 
it is used in no other manner.” Congress recognized that a computer 
program cannot be used unless it is first copied into a computer’s memory, 
and thus provided the § 117(1) exception to permit copying for this 
essential purpose. See CONTU Report at 31. Vault contends that, due to 
the inclusion of the phrase “and that it is used in no other manner,” this 
exception should be interpreted to permit only the copying of a computer 
program for the purpose of using it for its intended purpose. Because Quaid 
copied Vault’s program into its computer’s memory for the express purpose 
of devising a means of defeating its protective function, Vault contends that 
§ 117(1) is not applicable. 
We decline to construe § 117(1) in this manner. Even though the copy 
of Vault’s program made by Quaid was not used to prevent the copying of 
the program placed on the PROLOK diskette by one of Vault’s customers 
(which is the purpose of Vault’s program), and was, indeed, made for the 
express purpose of devising a means of defeating its protective function, 
the copy made by Quaid was “created as an essential step in the utilization” 
of Vault’s program. Section 117(1) contains no language to suggest that the 
copy it permits must be employed for a use intended by the copyright 
owner, and, absent clear congressional guidance to the contrary, we refuse 
to read such limiting language into this exception. We therefore hold that 
Quaid did not infringe Vault’s exclusive right to reproduce its program in 
copies under § 106(1). 
* * * 
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C. Contributory Infringement 
Vault contends that, because purchasers of programs placed on 
PROLOK diskettes use the RAMKEY feature of CopyWrite to make 
unauthorized copies, Quaid’s advertisement and sale of CopyWrite 
diskettes with the RAMKEY feature violate the Copyright Act by 
contributing to the infringement of Vault’s copyright and the copyrights 
owned by Vault’s customers. Vault asserts that it lost customers and 
substantial revenue as a result of Quaid’s contributory infringement 
because software companies which previously relied on PROLOK diskettes 
to protect their programs from unauthorized copying have discontinued 
their use. 
* * * 
[The court reviewed the test for contributory copyright infringement 
(see Chapter 20.C.2, infra) and determined that Quaid could not be held 
liable for the infringing acts of RAMKEY customers if RAMKEY also had 
substantial “commercially significant” noninfringing uses.] 
Quaid asserts that RAMKEY serves the legitimate purpose of 
permitting purchasers of programs recorded on PROLOK diskettes to make 
archival copies under § 117(2) and that this purpose constitutes a 
substantial noninfringing use. At trial, witnesses for Quaid testified that 
software programs placed on floppy diskettes are subject to damage by 
physical and human mishap and that RAMKEY protects a purchaser’s 
investment by providing a fully functional archival copy that can be used 
if the original program on the PROLOK protected diskette, or the diskette 
itself, is destroyed. Quaid contends that an archival copy of a PROLOK 
protected program, made without RAMKEY, does not serve to protect 
against these forms of damage because a computer will not read the 
program into its memory from the copy unless the PROLOK diskette 
containing the original undamaged program is also in one of its disk drives, 
which is impossible if the PROLOK diskette, or the program placed 
thereon, has been destroyed due to physical or human mishap. 
Computer programs can be stored on a variety of mediums, including 
floppy diskettes, hard disks, non-erasable read only memory (“ROM”) 
chips, and a computer’s random access memory, and may appear only as 
printed instructions on a sheet of paper. Vault contends that the archival 
exception was designed to permit only the copying of programs which are 
subject to “destruction or damage by mechanical or electrical failure.” 
CONTU Report at 31 (emphasis added). While programs stored on all 
mediums may be subject to damage due to physical abuse or human error, 
programs stored on certain mediums are not subject to damage by 
mechanical or electrical failure. Therefore, Vault argues, the medium of 
storage determines whether the archival exception applies, thus providing 
only owners of programs, placed on mediums of storage which subject them 
to damage by mechanical or electrical failure, the right to make back-up 
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copies. To support its construction of § 117(2), Vault notes that one court 
has held that the archival exception does not apply to the copying of 
programs stored on ROM chips where there was no evidence that programs 
stored on this medium were subject to damage by mechanical or electrical 
failure, Atari[, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 5, 9–10 
(N.D.Ill.1983)], and another court has likewise held that the archival 
exception does not apply to the copying of programs which appear only in 
the form of printed instructions in a magazine, Micro-Sparc, Inc. v. Amtype 
Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33, 35–36 (D.Mass.1984). 
Vault contends that the district court’s finding that programs stored 
on floppy diskettes are subject to damage by mechanical or electrical failure 
is erroneous because there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to 
support it, and, based on this contention, Vault asserts that the archival 
exception does not apply to permit the unauthorized copying of these 
programs. Vault performed a trial demonstration to prove that even if a 
program on an original PROLOK diskette, and Vault’s protective program, 
were completely erased from this diskette, these programs could be 
restored on the original diskette using a copy made without RAMKEY. 
Therefore, Vault argues that even if a program recorded on a PROLOK 
diskette is subject to damage by mechanical or electrical failure, the non-
operational copy of a PROLOK protected program made without RAMKEY 
is sufficient to protect against this type of damage. Vault concludes that, in 
light of the fact that RAMKEY facilitates the making of unauthorized 
copies and owners of PROLOK protected programs can make copies to 
protect against damage by mechanical and electrical failure without 
RAMKEY, the RAMKEY feature is not capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses. 
* * * We read the stated causes of damage [in CONTU] to be 
illustrative only, and not exclusive. Similarly, the statement follows with 
the prohibited use of the archival copies which does not include a 
prohibition against copying for purposes other than to protect against 
“mechanical or electrical failure.” The Report, or Congress, could have 
easily limited the scope of § 117(2) to authorize the making of archival 
copies of programs subject to damage, and to guard against, only 
mechanical or electrical failure. CONTU did not recommend that language, 
nor did Congress enact it. Congress, following CONTU’s advice, provided 
that an owner of a computer program may make a copy of that program 
provided that “such new copy . . . is for archival purposes only.” 17 U.S.C. 
§ 117(2). Congress did not choose to spell out detailed restrictions on the 
copying as was done in sections 108 and 112. Congress imposed no 
restriction upon the purpose or reason of the owner in making the archival 
copy; only the use made of that copy is restricted. See CONTU Report at 31 
(“one could not, for example, make archival copies of a program and later 
sell some to another while retaining some for use”). An owner of a program 
is entitled, under § 117(2), to make an archival copy of that program in 
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order to guard against all types of risks, including physical and human 
mishap as well as mechanical and electrical failure. 
A copy of a PROLOK protected program made with RAMKEY protects 
an owner from all types of damage to the original program, while a copy 
made without RAMKEY only serves the limited function of protecting 
against damage to the original program by mechanical and electrical 
failure. Because § 117(2) permits the making of fully functional archival 
copies, it follows that RAMKEY is capable of substantial noninfringing 
uses. Quaid’s advertisement and sale of CopyWrite diskettes with the 
RAMKEY feature does not constitute contributory infringement. 
* * * 
2. SECTION 109: THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE 
 
a. Sale vs. License 
VERNOR V. AUTODESK, INC. 
621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010). 
CALLAHAN, CIRCUIT JUDGE: 
Timothy Vernor purchased several used copies of Autodesk, Inc.’s 
AutoCAD Release 14 software from one of Autodesk’s direct customers, and 
he resold the Release 14 copies on eBay. Vernor brought this declaratory 
judgment action against Autodesk to establish that these resales did not 
infringe Autodesk’s copyright. The district court issued the requested 
declaratory judgment, holding that Vernor’s sales were lawful because of 
two of the Copyright Act’s affirmative defenses that apply to owners of 
copies of copyrighted works, the first sale doctrine and the essential step 
defense. 
Autodesk distributes Release 14 pursuant to a limited license 
agreement in which it reserves title to the software copies and imposes 
significant use and transfer restrictions on its customers. We determine 
that Autodesk’s direct customers are licensees of their copies of the 
software rather than owners, which has two ramifications. Because Vernor 
did not purchase the Release 14 copies from an owner, he may not invoke 
the first sale doctrine, and he also may not assert an essential step defense 
on behalf of his customers. For these reasons, we vacate the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment to Vernor and remand for further proceedings. 
I. 
A. Autodesk’s Release 14 software and licensing practices 
* * * 
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Since at least 1986, Autodesk has offered AutoCAD to customers 
pursuant to an accompanying software license agreement (“SLA”), which 
customers must accept before installing the software. A customer who does 
not accept the SLA can return the software for a full refund. Autodesk 
offers SLAs with different terms for commercial, educational institution, 
and student users. The commercial license, which is the most expensive, 
imposes the fewest restrictions on users and allows them software 
upgrades at discounted prices. 
The SLA for Release 14 first recites that Autodesk retains title to all 
copies. Second, it states that the customer has a nonexclusive and 
nontransferable license to use Release 14. Third, it imposes transfer 
restrictions, prohibiting customers from renting, leasing, or transferring 
the software without Autodesk’s prior consent and from electronically or 
physically transferring the software out of the Western Hemisphere. 
Fourth, it imposes significant use restrictions: 
YOU MAY NOT: (1) modify, translate, reverse-engineer, 
decompile, or disassemble the Software . . . (3) remove any 
proprietary notices, labels, or marks from the Software or 
Documentation; (4) use . . . the Software outside of the Western 
Hemisphere; (5) utilize any computer software or hardware 
designed to defeat any hardware copy-protection device, should 
the software you have licensed be equipped with such protection; 
or (6) use the Software for commercial or other revenue-
generating purposes if the Software has been licensed or labeled 
for educational use only. 
Fifth, the SLA provides for license termination if the user copies the 
software without authorization or does not comply with the SLA’s 
restrictions. Finally, the SLA provides that if the software is an upgrade of 
a previous version [then the customer must destroy its copies of the 
previous version.] 
Autodesk takes measures to enforce these license requirements. It 
assigns a serial number to each copy of AutoCAD and tracks registered 
licensees. It requires customers to input “activation codes” within one 
month after installation to continue using the software. * * * 
B. Autodesk’s provision of Release 14 software to CTA 
[Autodesk customer CTA acquired Release 14 and agreed to the terms 
of the SLA. However, when it later upgraded to Release 15, CTA did not 
destroy its copies of Release 14 as the SLA required, but sold them to 
Vernor along with the activation codes. Vernor acquired an additional copy 
from another source. While Vernor was aware of the SLA’s existence, he 
never agreed to its terms. Vernor offered his copies for sale on eBay. When 
Autodesk alleged that these sales were infringing, Vernor sought and 
obtained a declaratory judgment of non-infringement. Autodesk appealed.] 
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III. 
Copyright is a federal law protection provided to the authors of 
“original works of authorship,” including software programs. 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 101–103. The Copyright Act confers several exclusive rights on 
copyright owners, including the exclusive rights to reproduce their works 
and to distribute their works by sale or rental. Id. § 106(1), (3). The 
exclusive distribution right is limited by the first sale doctrine, an 
affirmative defense to copyright infringement that allows owners of copies 
of copyrighted works to resell those copies. The exclusive reproduction right 
is limited within the software context by the essential step defense, another 
affirmative defense to copyright infringement that is discussed further 
infra. Both of these affirmative defenses are unavailable to those who are 
only licensed to use their copies of copyrighted works. 
This case requires us to decide whether Autodesk sold Release 14 
copies to its customers or licensed the copies to its customers. If CTA owned 
its copies of Release 14, then both its sales to Vernor and Vernor’s 
subsequent sales were non-infringing under the first sale doctrine.6 
However, if Autodesk only licensed CTA to use copies of Release 14, then 
CTA’s and Vernor’s sales of those copies are not protected by the first sale 
doctrine and would therefore infringe Autodesk’s exclusive distribution 
right. 
A. The first sale doctrine 
The Supreme Court articulated the first sale doctrine in 1908, holding 
that a copyright owner’s exclusive distribution right is exhausted after the 
owner’s first sale of a particular copy of the copyrighted work. See Bobbs-
Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350–51 (1908). In Bobbs-Merrill, the 
plaintiff-copyright owner sold its book with a printed notice announcing 
that any retailer who sold the book for less than one dollar was responsible 
for copyright infringement. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief against 
defendants-booksellers who failed to comply with the price restriction. The 
Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim, holding that its exclusive 
distribution right applied only to first sales of copies of the work. The 
distribution right did not permit plaintiff to dictate that subsequent sales 
of the work below a particular price were infringing. The Court noted that 
its decision solely applied to the rights of a copyright owner that distributed 
its work without a license agreement. Id. at 350 (“There is no claim in this 
case of contract limitation, nor license agreement controlling the 
subsequent sales of the book.”). 
Congress codified the first sale doctrine the following year. See 17 
U.S.C. § 41 (1909). In its current form, it allows the “owner of a particular 
                                                 
6 If Autodesk’s transfer of Release 14 copies to CTA was a first sale, then CTA’s resale of the 
software in violation of the SLA’s terms would be a breach of contract, but would not result in 
copyright liability. 
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copy” of a copyrighted work to sell or dispose of his copy without the 
copyright owner’s authorization. Id. § 109(a) (enacted 1976). The first sale 
doctrine does not apply to a person who possesses a copy of the copyrighted 
work without owning it, such as a licensee. See id. § 109(d); cf. Quality King 
Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 146–47 (1998) 
(“[T]he first sale doctrine would not provide a defense to . . . any non-owner 
such as a bailee, a licensee, a consignee, or one whose possession of the copy 
was unlawful.”). 
B. Owners vs. licensees 
We turn to our precedents governing whether a transferee of a copy of 
a copyrighted work is an owner or licensee of that copy. We then apply 
those precedents to CTA’s and Vernor’s possession of Release 14 copies. 
1. United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir.1977) 
In Wise, a criminal copyright infringement case, we considered 
whether copyright owners who transferred copies of their motion pictures 
pursuant to written distribution agreements had executed first sales. The 
defendant was found guilty of copyright infringement based on his for-
profit sales of motion picture prints. The copyright owners distributed their 
films to third parties pursuant to written agreements that restricted their 
use and transfer. On appeal, the defendant argued that the government 
failed to prove the absence of a first sale for each film. If the copyright 
owners’ initial transfers of the films were first sales, then the defendant’s 
resales were protected by the first sale doctrine and thus were not 
copyright infringement. 
To determine whether a first sale occurred, we considered multiple 
factors pertaining to each film distribution agreement. Specifically, we 
considered whether the agreement (a) was labeled a license, (b) provided 
that the copyright owner retained title to the prints, (c) required the return 
or destruction of the prints, (d) forbade duplication of prints, or (e) required 
the transferee to maintain possession of the prints for the agreement’s 
duration. * * * 
2. The “MAI trio” of cases 
Over fifteen years after Wise, we again considered the distinction 
between owners and licensees of copies of copyrighted works in three 
software copyright cases, the “MAI trio”. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak 
Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir.1993); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express 
Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir.1995); Wall Data, Inc. v. Los Angeles County 
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir.2006). In the MAI trio, we considered 
which software purchasers were owners of copies of copyrighted works for 
purposes of a second affirmative defense to infringement, the essential step 
defense. 
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The enforcement of copyright owners’ exclusive right to reproduce 
their work under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), has posed special 
challenges in the software context. In order to use a software program, a 
user’s computer will automatically copy the software into the computer’s 
random access memory (“RAM”), which is a form of computer data storage. 
Congress enacted the essential step defense to codify that a software user 
who is the “owner of a copy” of a copyrighted software program does not 
infringe by making a copy of the computer program, if the new copy is 
“created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in 
conjunction with a machine and . . . is used in no other manner.” 17 U.S.C. 
§ 117(a)(1). 
The Copyright Act provides that an “owner of a copy” of copyrighted 
software may claim the essential step defense, and the “owner of a 
particular copy” of copyrighted software may claim the first sale doctrine. 
17 U.S.C. §§ 109(a), 117(a)(1). The MAI trio construed the phrase “owner 
of a copy” for essential step defense purposes. Neither Vernor nor Autodesk 
contends that the first sale doctrine’s inclusion of the word “particular” 
alters the phrase’s meaning, and we “presume that words used more than 
once in the same statute have the same meaning throughout.” Moldo v. 
Matsco, Inc. (In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc.), 252 F.3d 1039, 1051 (9th 
Cir.2001). Accordingly, we consider the MAI trio’s construction of “owner 
of a copy” controlling in our analysis of whether CTA and Vernor became 
“owner[s] of a particular copy” of Release 14 software. 
In MAI and Triad, the defendants maintained computers that ran the 
plaintiffs’ operating system software. When the defendants ran the 
computers, the computers automatically loaded plaintiffs’ software into 
RAM. The plaintiffs in both cases sold their software pursuant to 
restrictive license agreements, and we held that their customers were 
licensees who were therefore not entitled to claim the essential step 
defense. We found that the defendants infringed plaintiffs’ software 
copyrights by their unauthorized loading of copyrighted software into 
RAM. In Triad, the plaintiff had earlier sold software outright to some 
customers. We noted that these customers were owners who were entitled 
to the essential step defense, and the defendant did not infringe by making 
RAM copies in servicing their computers. 
In Wall Data, plaintiff sold 3,663 software licenses to the defendant. 
The licenses (1) were non-exclusive; (2) permitted use of the software on a 
single computer; and (3) permitted transfer of the software once per month, 
if the software was removed from the original computer. The defendant 
installed the software onto 6,007 computers via hard drive imaging, which 
saved it from installing the software manually on each computer. It made 
an unverified claim that only 3,663 users could simultaneously access the 
software. 
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The plaintiff sued for copyright infringement, contending that the 
defendant violated the license by “over-installing” the software. The 
defendant raised an essential step defense, contending that its hard drive 
imaging was a necessary step of installation. * * * Citing MAI, we held that 
the essential step defense does not apply where the copyright owner grants 
the user a license and significantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer 
the software. Since the plaintiff’s license imposed “significant restrictions” 
on the defendant’s software rights, the defendant was a licensee and was 
not entitled to the essential step defense. 
* * * 
We read Wise and the MAI trio to prescribe three considerations that 
we may use to determine whether a software user is a licensee, rather than 
an owner of a copy. First, we consider whether the copyright owner 
specifies that a user is granted a license. Second, we consider whether the 
copyright owner significantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer the 
software. Finally, we consider whether the copyright owner imposes 
notable use restrictions. Our holding reconciles the MAI trio and Wise, even 
though the MAI trio did not cite Wise. 
* * * 
IV. 
* * * 
A. Analysis 
We hold today that a software user is a licensee rather than an owner 
of a copy where the copyright owner (1) specifies that the user is granted a 
license; (2) significantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer the software; 
and (3) imposes notable use restrictions. Applying our holding to 
Autodesk’s SLA, we conclude that CTA was a licensee rather than an owner 
of copies of Release 14 and thus was not entitled to invoke the first sale 
doctrine or the essential step defense. 
Autodesk retained title to the software and imposed significant 
transfer restrictions: it stated that the license is nontransferable, the 
software could not be transferred or leased without Autodesk’s written 
consent, and the software could not be transferred outside the Western 
Hemisphere. The SLA also imposed use restrictions against the use of the 
software outside the Western Hemisphere and against modifying, 
translating, or reverse-engineering the software, removing any proprietary 
marks from the software or documentation, or defeating any copy 
protection device. Furthermore, the SLA provided for termination of the 
license upon the licensee’s unauthorized copying or failure to comply with 
other license restrictions. Thus, because Autodesk reserved title to Release 
14 copies and imposed significant transfer and use restrictions, we 
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conclude that its customers are licensees of their copies of Release 14 rather 
than owners. 
CTA was a licensee rather than an “owner of a particular copy” of 
Release 14, and it was not entitled to resell its Release 14 copies to Vernor 
under the first sale doctrine. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). Therefore, Vernor did not 
receive title to the copies from CTA and accordingly could not pass 
ownership on to others. Both CTA’s and Vernor’s sales infringed Autodesk’s 
exclusive right to distribute copies of its work. Id. § 106(3). 
Because Vernor was not an owner, his customers are also not owners 
of Release 14 copies. Therefore, when they install Release 14 on their 
computers, the copies of the software that they make during installation 
infringe Autodesk’s exclusive reproduction right because they too are not 
entitled to the benefit of the essential step defense.13 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), 
117(a)(1). 
Although unnecessary to our resolution of the case, we address the 
legislative history in order to address the arguments raised by the parties 
and amici. That legislative history supports our conclusion that licensees 
such as CTA are not entitled to claim the first sale doctrine. The House 
Report for § 109 underscores Congress’ view that the first sale doctrine is 
available only to a person who has acquired a copy via an “outright sale”. 
H.R.Rep. No. 94–1476, at 79 (1976). The report also asserts that the first 
sale doctrine does not “apply to someone who merely possesses a copy or 
phonorecord without having acquired ownership of it.” Id. 
Our conclusion that those who rightfully possess, but do not own, a 
copy of copyrighted software are not entitled to claim the essential step 
defense is also supported by the legislative history. Congress enacted § 117 
following a report from the National Commission on New Technological 
Uses of Copyrighted Works (“CONTU”) proposing Copyright Act 
amendments. CONTU’s proposed version of § 117 was identical to the 
version that Congress enacted with one exception. CONTU’s version 
provided, “[I]t is not an infringement for the rightful possessor of a copy of 
a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or 
adaptation of that program. . . .” Id. Without explanation, Congress 
substituted “owner” for “rightful possessor.” This modification suggests 
that more than rightful possession is required for § 117 to apply—i.e., that 
Congress did not intend licensees subject to significant transfer and use 
restrictions to receive the benefit of the essential step defense. 
* * * 
                                                 
13 It may seem intuitive that every lawful user of a copyrighted software program, whether 
they own their copies or are merely licensed to use them, should be entitled to an “essential step 
defense” that provides that they do not infringe simply by using a computer program that they 
lawfully acquired. However, the Copyright Act confers this defense only on owners of software 
copies. See 17 U.S.C. § 117. In contrast, a licensee’s right to use the software, including the right 
to copy the software into RAM, is conferred by the terms of its license agreement. 
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V. 
Although our holding today is controlled by our precedent, we 
recognize the significant policy considerations raised by the parties and 
amici on both sides of this appeal. 
Autodesk, the Software & Information Industry Association (“SIIA”), 
and the Motion Picture Association of America (“MPAA”) have presented 
policy arguments that favor our result. For instance, Autodesk argues in 
favor of judicial enforcement of software license agreements that restrict 
transfers of copies of the work. Autodesk contends that this (1) allows for 
tiered pricing for different software markets, such as reduced pricing for 
students or educational institutions; (2) increases software companies’ 
sales; (3) lowers prices for all consumers by spreading costs among a large 
number of purchasers; and (4) reduces the incidence of piracy by allowing 
copyright owners to bring infringement actions against unauthorized 
resellers. SIIA argues that a license can exist even where a customer (1) 
receives his copy of the work after making a single payment and (2) can 
indefinitely possess a software copy, because it is the software code and 
associated rights that are valuable rather than the inexpensive discs on 
which the code may be stored. Also, the MPAA argues that a customer’s 
ability to possess a copyrighted work indefinitely should not compel a 
finding of a first sale, because there is often no practically feasible way for 
a consumer to return a copy to the copyright owner. 
Vernor, eBay, and the American Library Association (“ALA”) have 
presented policy arguments against our decision. Vernor contends that our 
decision (1) does not vindicate the law’s aversion to restraints on alienation 
of personal property; (2) may force everyone purchasing copyrighted 
property to trace the chain of title to ensure that a first sale occurred; and 
(3) ignores the economic realities of the relevant transactions, in which the 
copyright owner permanently released software copies into the stream of 
commerce without expectation of return in exchange for upfront payment 
of the full software price. eBay contends that a broad view of the first sale 
doctrine is necessary to facilitate the creation of secondary markets for 
copyrighted works, which contributes to the public good by (1) giving 
consumers additional opportunities to purchase and sell copyrighted 
works, often at below-retail prices; (2) allowing consumers to obtain copies 
of works after a copyright owner has ceased distribution; and (3) allowing 
the proliferation of businesses. 
The ALA contends that the first sale doctrine facilitates the 
availability of copyrighted works after their commercial lifespan, by inter 
alia enabling the existence of libraries, used bookstores, and hand-to-hand 
exchanges of copyrighted materials. The ALA further contends that judicial 
enforcement of software license agreements, which are often contracts of 
adhesion, could eliminate the software resale market, require used 
computer sellers to delete legitimate software prior to sale, and increase 
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prices for consumers by reducing price competition for software vendors. It 
contends that Autodesk’s position (1) undermines 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2), 
which permits non-profit libraries to lend software for non-commercial 
purposes, and (2) would hamper efforts by non-profits to collect and 
preserve out-of-print software. The ALA fears that the software industry’s 
licensing practices could be adopted by other copyright owners, including 
book publishers, record labels, and movie studios. 
These are serious contentions on both sides, but they do not alter our 
conclusion that our precedent from Wise through the MAI trio requires the 
result we reach. Congress is free, of course, to modify the first sale doctrine 
and the essential step defense if it deems these or other policy 
considerations to require a different approach. 
* * * 
b. Importing Copies 
KIRTSAENG V. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. 
568 U.S. 519, 133 S.Ct. 1351 (2013). 
JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Section 106 of the Copyright Act grants “the owner of copyright under 
this title” certain “exclusive rights,” including the right “to distribute copies 
. . . of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of 
ownership.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). These rights are qualified, however, by the 
application of various limitations set forth in the next several sections of 
the Act, §§ 107 through 122. Those sections, typically entitled “Limitations 
on exclusive rights,” include, for example, the principle of “fair use” (§ 107), 
permission for limited library archival reproduction (§ 108), and the 
doctrine at issue here, the “first sale” doctrine (§ 109). 
Section 109(a) sets forth the “first sale” doctrine as follows: 
“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3) [the section that 
grants the owner exclusive distribution rights], the owner of a 
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title . . . 
is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or 
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.” 
(Emphasis added.) 
Thus, even though § 106(3) forbids distribution of a copy of, say, the 
copyrighted novel Herzog without the copyright owner’s permission, 
§ 109(a) adds that, once a copy of Herzog has been lawfully sold (or its 
ownership otherwise lawfully transferred), the buyer of that copy and 
subsequent owners are free to dispose of it as they wish. In copyright 
jargon, the “first sale” has “exhausted” the copyright owner’s § 106(3) 
exclusive distribution right. 
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What, however, if the copy of Herzog was printed abroad and then 
initially sold with the copyright owner’s permission? Does the “first sale” 
doctrine still apply? Is the buyer, like the buyer of a domestically 
manufactured copy, free to bring the copy into the United States and 
dispose of it as he or she wishes? 
To put the matter technically, an “importation” provision, § 602(a)(1), 
says that 
“[i]mportation into the United States, without the authority of the 
owner of copyright under this title, of copies . . . of a work that 
have been acquired outside the United States is an infringement 
of the exclusive right to distribute copies . . . under, Netcom does 
not maintain an archive of files for its users. Thus, it cannot be 
said to be “supplying a product.” In contrast to some of its larger 
competitors, Netcom does not create or control the content of the 
information available to its subscribers; it merely provides access 
to the Internet, whose content is controlled by no single entity. 
Although the Internet consists of many different computers 
networked together, some of which may contain infringing files, it 
does not make sense to hold the operator of each computer liable 
as an infringer merely because his or her computer is linked to a 
computer with an infringing file. It would be especially 
inappropriate to hold liable a service that acts more like a conduit, 
in other words, one that does not itself keep an archive of files for 
more than a short duration. Finding such a service liable would 
involve an unreasonably broad construction of public distribution 
and display rights. No purpose would be served by holding liable 
those who have no ability to control the information to which their 
subscribers have access, even though they might be in some sense 
helping to achieve the Internet’s automatic “public distribution” 
and the users’ “public” display of files. . . .” 
17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1) (2006 ed., Supp. V) (emphasis added). 
Thus § 602(a)(1) makes clear that importing a copy without permission 
violates the owner’s exclusive distribution right. But in doing so, § 602(a)(1) 
refers explicitly to the § 106(3) exclusive distribution right. As we have just 
said, § 106 is by its terms “[s]ubject to” the various doctrines and principles 
contained in §§ 107 through 122, including § 109(a)’s “first sale” limitation. 
Do those same modifications apply—in particular, does the “first sale” 
modification apply—when considering whether § 602(a)(1) prohibits 
importing a copy? 
In Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 
U.S. 135, 145 (1998), we held that § 602(a)(1)’s reference to § 106(3)’s 
exclusive distribution right incorporates the later subsections’ limitations, 
including, in particular, the “first sale” doctrine of § 109. Thus, it might 
seem that, § 602(a)(1) notwithstanding, one who buys a copy abroad can 
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freely import that copy into the United States and dispose of it, just as he 
could had he bought the copy in the United States. 
But Quality King considered an instance in which the copy, though 
purchased abroad, was initially manufactured in the United States (and 
then sent abroad and sold). This case is like Quality King but for one 
important fact. The copies at issue here were manufactured abroad. That 
fact is important because § 109(a) says that the “first sale” doctrine applies 
to “a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title.” And 
we must decide here whether the five words, “lawfully made under this 
title,” make a critical legal difference. 
Putting section numbers to the side, we ask whether the “first sale” 
doctrine applies to protect a buyer or other lawful owner of a copy (of a 
copyrighted work) lawfully manufactured abroad. Can that buyer bring 
that copy into the United States (and sell it or give it away) without 
obtaining permission to do so from the copyright owner? Can, for example, 
someone who purchases, say at a used bookstore, a book printed abroad 
subsequently resell it without the copyright owner’s permission? 
In our view, the answers to these questions are, yes. We hold that the 




* * * 
* * * [T]here are two essentially equivalent versions of a Wiley 
textbook, each version manufactured and sold with Wiley’s permission: (1) 
an American version printed and sold in the United States, and (2) a 
foreign version manufactured and sold abroad. And Wiley makes certain 
that copies of the second version state that they are not to be taken (without 
permission) into the United States. 
Petitioner, Supap Kirtsaeng, a citizen of Thailand, moved to the 
United States in 1997 to study mathematics at Cornell University. He paid 
for his education with the help of a Thai Government scholarship which 
required him to teach in Thailand for 10 years on his return. Kirtsaeng 
successfully completed his undergraduate courses at Cornell, successfully 
completed a Ph.D. program in mathematics at the University of Southern 
California, and then, as promised, returned to Thailand to teach. While he 
was studying in the United States, Kirtsaeng asked his friends and family 
in Thailand to buy copies of foreign edition English-language textbooks at 
Thai book shops, where they sold at low prices, and mail them to him in 
the United States. Kirtsaeng would then sell them, reimburse his family 
and friends, and keep the profit. 
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B 
In 2008 Wiley brought this federal lawsuit against Kirtsaeng for 
copyright infringement. Wiley claimed that Kirtsaeng’s unauthorized 
importation of its books and his later resale of those books amounted to an 
infringement of Wiley’s § 106(3) exclusive right to distribute as well as 
§ 602’s related import prohibition. Kirtsaeng replied that the books he had 
acquired were “ ‘lawfully made’ ” and that he had acquired them 
legitimately. Thus, in his view, § 109(a)’s “first sale” doctrine permitted 
him to resell or otherwise dispose of the books without the copyright 
owner’s further permission. 
* * * 
II 
We must decide whether the words “lawfully made under this title” 
restrict the scope of § 109(a)’s “first sale” doctrine geographically. The 
Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, Wiley, and the Solicitor General (as 
amicus) all read those words as imposing a form of geographical limitation. 
The Second Circuit held that they limit the “first sale” doctrine to 
particular copies “made in territories in which the Copyright Act is law,” 
which (the Circuit says) are copies “manufactured domestically,” not 
“outside of the United States.” * * * And the Ninth Circuit has held that 
those words limit the “first sale” doctrine’s applicability (1) to copies 
lawfully made in the United States, and (2) to copies lawfully made outside 
the United States but initially sold in the United States with the copyright 
owner’s permission. Denbicare U.S.A. Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 
1143, 1149–1150 (1996). 
Under any of these geographical interpretations, § 109(a)’s “first sale” 
doctrine would not apply to the Wiley Asia books at issue here. And, despite 
an American copyright owner’s permission to make copies abroad, one who 
buys a copy of any such book or other copyrighted work—whether at a retail 
store, over the Internet, or at a library sale—could not resell (or otherwise 
dispose of) that particular copy without further permission. 
Kirtsaeng, however, reads the words “lawfully made under this title” 
as imposing a non-geographical limitation. He says that they mean made 
“in accordance with” or “in compliance with” the Copyright Act. In that 
case, § 109(a)’s “first sale” doctrine would apply to copyrighted works as 
long as their manufacture met the requirements of American copyright 
law. In particular, the doctrine would apply where, as here, copies are 
manufactured abroad with the permission of the copyright owner. 
In our view, § 109(a)’s language, its context, and the common-law 
history of the “first sale” doctrine, taken together, favor a non-geographical 
interpretation. We also doubt that Congress would have intended to create 
the practical copyright-related harms with which a geographical 
interpretation would threaten ordinary scholarly, artistic, commercial, and 
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consumer activities. We consequently conclude that Kirtsaeng’s 
nongeographical reading is the better reading of the Act. 
A 
The language of § 109(a) read literally favors Kirtsaeng’s 
nongeographical interpretation, namely, that “lawfully made under this 
title” means made “in accordance with” or “in compliance with” the 
Copyright Act. The language of § 109(a) says nothing about geography. The 
word “under” can mean “[i]n accordance with.” 18 OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 950 (2d ed.1989). And a nongeographical interpretation 
provides each word of the five-word phrase with a distinct purpose. The 
first two words of the phrase, “lawfully made,” suggest an effort to 
distinguish those copies that were made lawfully from those that were not, 
and the last three words, “under this title,” set forth the standard of 
“lawful[ness].” Thus, the nongeographical reading is simple, it promotes a 
traditional copyright objective (combatting piracy), and it makes word-by-
word linguistic sense. 
The geographical interpretation, however, bristles with linguistic 
difficulties. It gives the word “lawfully” little, if any, linguistic work to do. 
(How could a book be unlawfully “made under this title”?) It imports 
geography into a statutory provision that says nothing explicitly about it. 
And it is far more complex than may at first appear. 
To read the clause geographically, Wiley, like the Second Circuit and 
the Solicitor General, must first emphasize the word “under.” Indeed, 
Wiley reads “under this title” to mean “in conformance with the Copyright 
Act where the Copyright Act is applicable.” Wiley must then take a second 
step, arguing that the Act “is applicable” only in the United States. And the 
Solicitor General must do the same. 
One difficulty is that neither “under” nor any other word in the phrase 
means “where.” See, e.g., 18 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra, at 
947–952 (definition of “under”). It might mean “subject to,” but as this 
Court has repeatedly acknowledged, the word evades a uniform, consistent 
meaning. 
A far more serious difficulty arises out of the uncertainty and 
complexity surrounding the second step’s effort to read the necessary 
geographical limitation into the word “applicable” (or the equivalent). 
Where, precisely, is the Copyright Act “applicable”? The Act does not 
instantly protect an American copyright holder from unauthorized piracy 
taking place abroad. But that fact does not mean the Act is inapplicable to 
copies made abroad. * * * 
The appropriateness of this linguistic usage is underscored by the fact 
that § 104 of the Act itself says that works “subject to protection under this 
title” include unpublished works “without regard to the nationality or 
domicile of the author,” and works “first published” in any one of the nearly 
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180 nations that have signed a copyright treaty with the United States. 
Thus, ordinary English permits us to say that the Act “applies” to an Irish 
manuscript lying in its author’s Dublin desk drawer as well as to an 
original recording of a ballet performance first made in Japan and now on 
display in a Kyoto art gallery. 
The Ninth Circuit’s geographical interpretation produces still greater 
linguistic difficulty. As we said, that Circuit interprets the “first sale” 
doctrine to cover both (1) copies manufactured in the United States and (2) 
copies manufactured abroad but first sold in the United States with the 
American copyright owner’s permission. Denbicare U.S.A., 84 F.3d, at 
1149–1150. 
We can understand why the Ninth Circuit may have thought it 
necessary to add the second part of its definition. As we shall later describe, 
without some such qualification a copyright holder could prevent a buyer 
from domestically reselling or even giving away copies of a video game 
made in Japan, a film made in Germany, or a dress (with a design 
copyright) made in China, even if the copyright holder has granted 
permission for the foreign manufacture, importation, and an initial 
domestic sale of the copy. A publisher such as Wiley would be free to print 
its books abroad, allow their importation and sale within the United States, 
but prohibit students from later selling their used texts at a campus 
bookstore. We see no way, however, to reconcile this half-geographical/half-
nongeographical interpretation with the language of the phrase, “lawfully 
made under this title.” As a matter of English, it would seem that those 
five words either do cover copies lawfully made abroad or they do not. 
In sum, we believe that geographical interpretations create more 
linguistic problems than they resolve. And considerations of simplicity and 
coherence tip the purely linguistic balance in Kirtsaeng’s, nongeographical, 
favor. 
B 
Both historical and contemporary statutory context indicate that 
Congress, when writing the present version of § 109(a), did not have 
geography in mind. In respect to history, we compare § 109(a)’s present 
language with the language of its immediate predecessor. That predecessor 
said: 
“[N]othing in this Act shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or 
restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the 
possession of which has been lawfully obtained.” 
Copyright Act of 1909, § 41, 35 Stat. 1084 (emphasis added). The 
predecessor says nothing about geography (and Wiley does not argue that 
it does). So we ask whether Congress, in changing its language implicitly 
introduced a geographical limitation that previously was lacking. 
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A comparison of language indicates that it did not. The predecessor 
says that the “first sale” doctrine protects “the transfer of any copy the 
possession of which has been lawfully obtained.” The present version says 
that “the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under 
this title is entitled to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that 
copy or phonorecord.” What does this change in language accomplish? 
The language of the former version referred to those who are not 
owners of a copy, but mere possessors who “lawfully obtained” a copy. The 
present version covers only those who are owners of a “lawfully made” copy. 
Whom does the change leave out? Who might have lawfully obtained a copy 
of a copyrighted work but not owned that copy? One answer is owners of 
movie theaters, who during the 1970’s (and before) often leased films from 
movie distributors or filmmakers. Because the theater owners had 
“lawfully obtained” their copies, the earlier version could be read as 
allowing them to sell that copy, i.e., it might have given them “first sale” 
protection. Because the theater owners were lessees, not owners, of their 
copies, the change in language makes clear that they (like bailees and other 
lessees) cannot take advantage of the “first sale” doctrine. * * * 
This objective perfectly well explains the new language of the present 
version, including the five words here at issue. Section 109(a) now makes 
clear that a lessee of a copy will not receive “first sale” protection but one 
who owns a copy will receive “first sale” protection, provided, of course, that 
the copy was “lawfully made ” and not pirated. The new language also takes 
into account that a copy may be “lawfully made under this title” when the 
copy, say of a phonorecord, comes into its owner’s possession through use 
of a compulsory license, which “this title” provides for elsewhere, namely, 
in § 115. * * * 
Other provisions of the present statute also support a nongeographical 
interpretation. For one thing, the statute phases out the “manufacturing 
clause,” a clause that appeared in earlier statutes and had limited 
importation of many copies (of copyrighted works) printed outside the 
United States. § 601, 90 Stat. 2588 (“Prior to July 1, 1982 . . . the 
importation into or public distribution in the United States of copies of a 
work consisting preponderantly of nondramatic literary material . . . is 
prohibited unless the portions consisting of such material have been 
manufactured in the United States or Canada”). The phasing out of this 
clause sought to equalize treatment of copies manufactured in America and 
copies manufactured abroad. 
The “equal treatment” principle, however, is difficult to square with a 
geographical interpretation of the “first sale” clause that would grant the 
holder of an American copyright (perhaps a foreign national) permanent 
control over the American distribution chain (sales, resales, gifts, and other 
distribution) in respect to copies printed abroad but not in respect to copies 
printed in America. And it is particularly difficult to believe that Congress 
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would have sought this unequal treatment while saying nothing about it 
and while, in a related clause (the manufacturing phase-out), seeking the 
opposite kind of policy goal. * * * 
Finally, we normally presume that the words “lawfully made under 
this title” carry the same meaning when they appear in different but 
related sections. But doing so here produces surprising consequences. 
Consider: 
(1) Section 109(c) says that, despite the copyright owner’s 
exclusive right “to display” a copyrighted work (provided in 
§ 106(5)), the owner of a particular copy “lawfully made under this 
title” may publicly display it without further authorization. To 
interpret these words geographically would mean that one who 
buys a copyrighted work of art, a poster, or even a bumper sticker, 
in Canada, in Europe, in Asia, could not display it in America 
without the copyright owner’s further authorization. 
(2) Section 109(e) specifically provides that the owner of a 
particular copy of a copyrighted video arcade game “lawfully made 
under this title” may “publicly perform or display that game in 
coin-operated equipment” without the authorization of the 
copyright owner. To interpret these words geographically means 
that an arcade owner could not (“without the authority of the 
copyright owner”) perform or display arcade games (whether new 
or used) originally made in Japan. 
(3) Section 110(1) says that a teacher, without the copyright 
owner’s authorization, is allowed to perform or display a 
copyrighted work (say, an audiovisual work) “in the course of face-
to-face teaching activities”—unless the teacher knowingly used “a 
copy that was not lawfully made under this title.” To interpret 
these words geographically would mean that the teacher could not 
(without further authorization) use a copy of a film during class if 
the copy was lawfully made in Canada, Mexico, Europe, Africa, or 
Asia. 
(4) In its introductory sentence, § 106 provides the Act’s basic 
exclusive rights to an “owner of a copyright under this title.” The 
last three words cannot support a geographic interpretation. 
Wiley basically accepts the first three readings, but argues that 
Congress intended the restrictive consequences. And it argues that context 
simply requires that the words of the fourth example receive a different 
interpretation. Leaving the fourth example to the side, we shall explain in 
Part II-D why we find it unlikely that Congress would have intended these, 
and other related consequences. 
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C 
A relevant canon of statutory interpretation favors a nongeographical 
reading. “[W]hen a statute covers an issue previously governed by the 
common law,” we must presume that “Congress intended to retain the 
substance of the common law.” Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 319 n. 
13 (2010). 
The “first sale” doctrine is a common-law doctrine with an impeccable 
historic pedigree. In the early 17th century Lord Coke explained the 
common law’s refusal to permit restraints on the alienation of chattels. 
Referring to Littleton, who wrote in the 15th century, Lord Coke wrote: 
“[If] a man be possessed of . . . a horse, or of any other chattell . . . 
and give or sell his whole interest . . . therein upon condition that 
the Donee or Vendee shall not alien[ate] the same, the [condition] 
is voi[d], because his whole interest . . . is out of him, so as he hath 
no possibilit[y] of a Reverter, and it is against Trade and Traffi[c], 
and bargaining and contracting betwee[n] man and man: and it is 
within the reason of our Author that it should ouster him of all 
power given to him.” 
1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 360, p. 223 (1628). 
A law that permits a copyright holder to control the resale or other 
disposition of a chattel once sold is similarly “against Trade and Traffi[c], 
and bargaining and contracting.” Id. 
With these last few words, Coke emphasizes the importance of leaving 
buyers of goods free to compete with each other when reselling or otherwise 
disposing of those goods. American law too has generally thought that 
competition, including freedom to resell, can work to the advantage of the 
consumer. 
The “first sale” doctrine also frees courts from the administrative 
burden of trying to enforce restrictions upon difficult-to-trace, readily 
movable goods. And it avoids the selective enforcement inherent in any 
such effort. Thus, it is not surprising that for at least a century the “first 
sale” doctrine has played an important role in American copyright law. See 
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908); Copyright Act of 1909, 
§ 41, 35 Stat. 1084. 
The common-law doctrine makes no geographical distinctions; nor can 
we find any in Bobbs-Merrill (where this Court first applied the “first sale” 
doctrine) or in § 109(a)’s predecessor provision, which Congress enacted a 
year later. Rather, as the Solicitor General acknowledges, “a 
straightforward application of Bobbs-Merrill” would not preclude the “first 
sale” defense from applying to authorized copies made overseas. And we 
can find no language, context, purpose, or history that would rebut a 
“straightforward application” of that doctrine here. 
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* * * 
D 
Associations of libraries, used-book dealers, technology companies, 
consumer-goods retailers, and museums point to various ways in which a 
geographical interpretation would fail to further basic constitutional 
copyright objectives, in particular “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.” U.S. CONST., ART. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
The American Library Association tells us that library collections 
contain at least 200 million books published abroad (presumably, many 
were first published in one of the nearly 180 copyright-treaty nations and 
enjoy American copyright protection under 17 U.S.C. § 104; that many 
others were first published in the United States but printed abroad because 
of lower costs; and that a geographical interpretation will likely require the 
libraries to obtain permission (or at least create significant uncertainty) 
before circulating or otherwise distributing these books. 
How, the American Library Association asks, are the libraries to 
obtain permission to distribute these millions of books? * * * Are the 
libraries to stop circulating or distributing or displaying the millions of 
books in their collections that were printed abroad? 
Used-book dealers tell us that, from the time when Benjamin Franklin 
and Thomas Jefferson built commercial and personal libraries of foreign 
books, American readers have bought used books published and printed 
abroad. The dealers say that they have “operat[ed]. . . for centuries” under 
the assumption that the “first sale” doctrine applies. But under a 
geographical interpretation a contemporary tourist who buys, say, at 
Shakespeare and Co. (in Paris), a dozen copies of a foreign book for 
American friends might find that she had violated the copyright law. The 
used-book dealers cannot easily predict what the foreign copyright holder 
may think about a reader’s effort to sell a used copy of a novel. And they 
believe that a geographical interpretation will injure a large portion of the 
used-book business. 
Technology companies tell us that “automobiles, microwaves, 
calculators, mobile phones, tablets, and personal computers” contain 
copyrightable software programs or packaging. Many of these items are 
made abroad with the American copyright holder’s permission and then 
sold and imported (with that permission) to the United States. A 
geographical interpretation would prevent the resale of, say, a car, without 
the permission of the holder of each copyright on each piece of copyrighted 
automobile software. Yet there is no reason to believe that foreign auto 
manufacturers regularly obtain this kind of permission from their software 
component suppliers, and Wiley did not indicate to the contrary when 
asked. Without that permission a foreign car owner could not sell his or her 
used car. 
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Retailers tell us that over $2.3 trillion worth of foreign goods were 
imported in 2011. American retailers buy many of these goods after a first 
sale abroad. And, many of these items bear, carry, or contain copyrighted 
“packaging, logos, labels, and product inserts and instructions for [the use 
of] everyday packaged goods from floor cleaners and health and beauty 
products to breakfast cereals.” The retailers add that American sales of 
more traditional copyrighted works, “such as books, recorded music, motion 
pictures, and magazines” likely amount to over $220 billion. A geographical 
interpretation would subject many, if not all, of them to the disruptive 
impact of the threat of infringement suits. 
Art museum directors ask us to consider their efforts to display 
foreign-produced works by, say, Cy Twombly, Rene Magritte, Henri 
Matisse, Pablo Picasso, and others. A geographical interpretation, they 
say, would require the museums to obtain permission from the copyright 
owners before they could display the work—even if the copyright owner has 
already sold or donated the work to a foreign museum. What are the 
museums to do, they ask, if the artist retained the copyright, if the artist 
cannot be found, or if a group of heirs is arguing about who owns which 
copyright? 
* * * 
Thus, we believe that the practical problems that petitioner and his 
amici have described are too serious, too extensive, and too likely to come 
about for us to dismiss them as insignificant—particularly in light of the 
ever-growing importance of foreign trade to America. The upshot is that 
copyright-related consequences along with language, context, and 
interpretive canons argue strongly against a geographical interpretation of 
§ 109(a). 
* * * 
* * * Wiley and the dissent claim that a nongeographical 
interpretation will make it difficult, perhaps impossible, for publishers 
(and other copyright holders) to divide foreign and domestic markets. We 
concede that is so. A publisher may find it more difficult to charge different 
prices for the same book in different geographic markets. But we do not see 
how these facts help Wiley, for we can find no basic principle of copyright 
law that suggests that publishers are especially entitled to such rights. 
* * * 
To the contrary, Congress enacted a copyright law that (through the 
“first sale” doctrine) limits copyright holders’ ability to divide domestic 
markets. And that limitation is consistent with antitrust laws that 
ordinarily forbid market divisions. Whether copyright owners should, or 
should not, have more than ordinary commercial power to divide 
international markets is a matter for Congress to decide. We do no more 
here than try to determine what decision Congress has taken. 
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* * * 
For these reasons we conclude that the considerations supporting 
Kirtsaeng’s nongeographical interpretation of the words “lawfully made 
under this title” are the more persuasive. The judgment of the Court of 
Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE KAGAN, with whom JUSTICE ALITO joins, concurring. 
I concur fully in the Court’s opinion. Neither the text nor the history 
of 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) supports removing first-sale protection from every 
copy of a protected work manufactured abroad. I recognize, however, that 
the combination of today’s decision and Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. 
L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998), constricts the scope of 
§ 602(a)(1)’s ban on unauthorized importation. I write to suggest that any 
problems associated with that limitation come not from our reading of 
§ 109(a) here, but from Quality King’s holding that § 109(a) limits 
§ 602(a)(1). * * * In now holding that copies “lawfully made under this title” 
include copies manufactured abroad, we unavoidably diminish § 602(a)(1)’s 
scope—indeed, limit it to a fairly esoteric set of applications. 
But if Congress views the shrinking of § 602(a)(1) as a problem, it 
should recognize Quality King—not our decision today—as the culprit. 
Here, after all, we merely construe § 109(a); Quality King is the decision 
holding that § 109(a) limits § 602(a)(1). Had we come out the opposite way 
in that case, § 602(a)(1) would allow a copyright owner to restrict the 
importation of copies irrespective of the first-sale doctrine.1 That result 
would enable the copyright owner to divide international markets in the 
way John Wiley claims Congress intended when enacting § 602(a)(1). But 
it would do so without imposing downstream liability on those who 
purchase and resell in the United States copies that happen to have been 
manufactured abroad. In other words, that outcome would target 
unauthorized importers alone, and not the “libraries, used-book dealers, 
technology companies, consumer-goods retailers, and museums” with 
whom the Court today is rightly concerned. Assuming Congress adopted 
§ 602(a)(1) to permit market segmentation, I suspect that is how Congress 
thought the provision would work—not by removing first-sale protection 
from every copy manufactured abroad (as John Wiley urges us to do here), 
                                                 
1 Although Quality King concluded that the statute’s text foreclosed that outcome, the 
Solicitor General offered a cogent argument to the contrary. He reasoned that § 109(a) does not 
limit § 602(a)(1) because the former authorizes owners only to “sell or “dispose” of copies—not to 
import them: The Act’s first-sale provision and its importation ban thus regulate separate, non-
overlapping spheres of conduct. That reading remains the Government’s preferred way of 
construing the statute. 
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but by enabling the copyright holder to control imports even when the first-
sale doctrine applies (as Quality King now prevents).2 
At bottom, John Wiley (together with the dissent) asks us to 
misconstrue § 109(a) in order to restore § 602(a)(1) to its purportedly 
rightful function of enabling copyright holders to segment international 
markets. I think John Wiley may have a point about what § 602(a)(1) was 
designed to do; that gives me pause about Quality King’s holding that the 
first-sale doctrine limits the importation ban’s scope. But the Court today 
correctly declines the invitation to save § 602(a)(1) from Quality King by 
destroying the first-sale protection that § 109(a) gives to every owner of a 
copy manufactured abroad. That would swap one (possible) mistake for a 
much worse one, and make our reading of the statute only less reflective of 
Congressional intent. If Congress thinks copyright owners need greater 
power to restrict importation and thus divide markets, a ready solution is 
at hand—not the one John Wiley offers in this case, but the one the Court 
rejected in Quality King. 
JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE KENNEDY joins, and with 
whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins except as to Parts III and V-B-1, dissenting. 
“In the interpretation of statutes, the function of the courts is easily 
stated. It is to construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of 
Congress.” United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 
542 (1940). Instead of adhering to the Legislature’s design, the Court today 
adopts an interpretation of the Copyright Act at odds with Congress’ aim 
to protect copyright owners against the unauthorized importation of low-
priced, foreign-made copies of their copyrighted works. * * * 
To justify a holding that shrinks to insignificance copyright protection 
against the unauthorized importation of foreign-made copies, the Court 
identifies several “practical problems.” The Court’s parade of horribles, 
however, is largely imaginary. Congress’ objective in enacting 17 U.S.C. 
§ 602(a)(1)’s importation prohibition can be honored without generating 
the absurd consequences hypothesized in the Court’s opinion. I dissent 
from the Court’s embrace of “international exhaustion,” and would affirm 
the sound judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
* * * 
II 
The text of the Copyright Act demonstrates that Congress intended to 
provide copyright owners with a potent remedy against the importation of 
foreign-made copies of their copyrighted works. As the Court recognizes 
this case turns on the meaning of the phrase “lawfully made under this 
title” in § 109(a). In my view, that phrase is most sensibly read as referring 
                                                 
2 * * * I can see no reason why Congress would have conditioned a copyright owner’s power 
to divide markets on outsourcing its manufacturing to a foreign country. 
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to instances in which a copy’s creation is governed by, and conducted in 
compliance with, Title 17 of the U.S. Code. * * * 
Section 109(a), properly read, affords Kirtsaeng no defense against 
Wiley’s claim of copyright infringement. The Copyright Act, it has been 
observed time and again, does not apply extraterritorially. The printing of 
Wiley’s foreign-manufactured textbooks therefore was not governed by 
Title 17. The textbooks thus were not “lawfully made under [Title 17],” the 
crucial precondition for application of § 109(a). And if § 109(a) does not 
apply, there is no dispute that Kirtsaeng’s conduct constituted copyright 
infringement under § 602(a)(1). 
The Court’s point of departure is similar to mine. According to the 
Court, the phrase “ ‘lawfully made under this title’ means made ‘in 
accordance with’ or ‘in compliance with’ the Copyright Act.” But the Court 
overlooks that, according to the very dictionaries it cites, the word “under” 
commonly signals a relationship of subjection, where one thing is governed 
or regulated by another. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1525 (6th 
ed.1990) (“under “frequently” means “inferior” or “subordinate” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); 18 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 950 (2d 
ed.1989) (“under” means, among other things, “[i]n accordance with (some 
regulative power or principle)” (emphasis added)). Only by disregarding 
this established meaning of “under” can the Court arrive at the conclusion 
that Wiley’s foreign-manufactured textbooks were “lawfully made under” 
U.S. copyright law, even though that law did not govern their creation. * * * 
* * * 
III 
The history of § 602(a)(1) reinforces the conclusion I draw from the text 
of the relevant provisions: § 109(a) does not apply to copies manufactured 
abroad. 
* * * 
The current text of § 602(a)(1) was finally enacted into law in 1976. 
The House and Senate Committee Reports on the 1976 Act demonstrate 
that Congress understood, as did the Copyright Office, just what that text 
meant. Both Reports state: 
“Section 602 [deals] with two separate situations: importation of 
‘piratical’ articles (that is, copies or phonorecords made without 
any authorization of the copyright owner), and unauthorized 
importation of copies or phonorecords that were lawfully made. 
The general approach of section 602 is to make unauthorized 
importation an act of infringement in both cases, but to permit the 
Bureau of Customs to prohibit importation only of ‘piratical’ 
articles.” 
S. REP. NO. 94–473, p. 151 (1975). 
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In sum, the legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 is hardly 
“inconclusive.” To the contrary, it confirms what the plain text of the Act 
conveys: Congress intended § 602(a)(1) to provide copyright owners with a 
remedy against the unauthorized importation of foreign-made copies of 
their works, even if those copies were made and sold abroad with the 
copyright owner’s authorization. 
* * * 
V 
I turn now to the Court’s justifications for a decision difficult to 
reconcile with the Copyright Act’s text and history. 
* * * 
B 
The Court sees many “horribles” following from a holding that the 
§ 109(a) phrase “lawfully made under this title” does not encompass 
foreign-made copies. If § 109(a) excluded foreign-made copies, the Court 
fears, then copyright owners could exercise perpetual control over the 
downstream distribution or public display of such copies. A ruling in 
Wiley’s favor, the Court asserts, would shutter libraries, put used-book 
dealers out of business, cripple art museums, and prevent the resale of a 
wide range of consumer goods, from cars to calculators. Copyright law and 
precedent, however, erect barriers to the anticipated horribles. 
1 
* * * 
Under the logic of Bobbs-Merrill, the sale of a foreign-manufactured 
copy in the United States carried out with the copyright owner’s 
authorization would exhaust the copyright owner’s right to “vend” that 
copy. The copy could thenceforth be resold, lent out, or otherwise 
redistributed without further authorization from the copyright owner. 
Although § 106(3) uses the word “distribute” rather than “vend,” there is 
no reason to think Congress intended the word “distribute” to bear a 
meaning different from the construction the Court gave to the word “vend” 
in Bobbs-Merrill. Thus, in accord with Bobbs-Merrill, the first authorized 
distribution of a foreign-made copy in the United States exhausts the 
copyright owner’s distribution right under § 106(3). After such an 
authorized distribution, a library may lend, or a used-book dealer may 
resell, the foreign-made copy without seeking the copyright owner’s 
permission. 
For example, if Wiley, rather than Kirtsaeng, had imported into the 
United States and then sold the foreign-made textbooks at issue in this 
case, Wiley’s § 106(3) distribution right would have been exhausted under 
the rationale of Bobbs-Merrill. Purchasers of the textbooks would thus be 
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free to dispose of the books as they wished without first gaining a license 
from Wiley. 
* * * 
2 
Other statutory prescriptions provide further protection against the 
absurd consequences imagined by the Court. For example, § 602(a)(3)(C) 
permits “an organization operated for scholarly, educational, or religious 
purposes” to import, without the copyright owner’s authorization, up to five 
foreign-made copies of a non-audiovisual work—notably, a book—for 
“library lending or archival purposes.” 
* * * 
Limiting § 109(c) to U.S.-made works, however, does not bar art 
museums from lawfully displaying works made in other countries. 
Museums can, of course, seek the copyright owner’s permission to display 
a work. Furthermore, the sale of a work of art to a U.S. museum may carry 
with it an implied license to publicly display the work. Displaying a work 
of art as part of a museum exhibition might also qualify as a “fair use” 
under 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
The Court worries about the resale of foreign-made consumer goods 
“contain[ing] copyrightable software programs or packaging.” For example, 
the Court observes that a car might be programmed with diverse forms of 
software, the copyrights to which might be owned by individuals or entities 
other than the manufacturer of the car. Must a car owner, the Court asks, 
obtain permission from all of these various copyright owners before 
reselling her car? 
Although this question strays far from the one presented in this case 
and briefed by the parties, principles of fair use and implied license (to the 
extent that express licenses do not exist) would likely permit the car to be 
resold without the copyright owners’ authorization.25 
* * * 
 
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS V. PATTON 
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit 
Oct. 17, 2014.  
769 F.3d 1232 
 
                                                 
25 Principles of fair use and implied license may also allow a U.S. tourist “who buys a 
copyrighted work of art, a poster, or . . . a bumper sticker” abroad to publicly “display it in America 
without the copyright owner’s further authorization.” (The tourist could lawfully bring the work of 
art, poster, or bumper sticker into the United States under 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(3)(B), which provides 
that § 602(a)(1)’s importation ban does not apply to “importation . . . by any person arriving from 
outside the United States . . . with respect to copies . . . forming part of such person’s personal 
baggage.”). * * * 
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TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge: 
 
Three publishing houses, Cambridge University Press, Oxford University 
Press, and Sage Publications, Inc. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) allege that 
members of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia and 
officials at Georgia State University (“GSU”) (collectively, “Defendants”) 
infringed Plaintiffs’ copyrights by maintaining a policy which allows GSU 
professors to make digital copies of excerpts of Plaintiffs’ books available to 
students without paying Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs alleged seventy-four 
individual instances of infringement, which took place during three 
academic terms in 2009. The District Court issued an order finding that 
Plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of infringement in twenty-
six instances, that the fair use defense applied in forty-three instances, and 
that Defendants had infringed Plaintiffs’ copyrights in the remaining five 
instances. 
 
 Finding that GSU’s policy caused the five instances of infringement, the 
District Court granted declaratory and injunctive relief to Plaintiffs. 
Nevertheless, the District Court found that Defendants were the prevailing 
party and awarded them costs and attorneys’ fees. Because we find that 
the District Court’s fair use analysis was in part erroneous, we reverse the 
District Court’s judgment; vacate the injunction, declaratory relief, and 






Like many recent issues in copyright law, this is a case in which 
technological advances have created a new, more efficient means of 
delivery for copyrighted works, causing copyright owners and consumers 
to struggle to define the appropriate boundaries of copyright protection in 
the new digital marketplace. These boundaries must be drawn carefully in 
order to assure that copyright law serves its intended purpose, which is to 
promote the creation of new works for the public good by providing authors 
and other creators with an economic incentive to create. See Twentieth 
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156, 95 S.Ct. 2040, 2044, 45 
L.Ed.2d 84 (1975). If copyright’s utilitarian goal is to be met, we must be 
careful not to place overbroad restrictions on the use of copyrighted works, 
because to do so would prevent would-be authors from effectively building 
on the ideas of others. Some unpaid use of copyrighted materials must be 
allowed in order to prevent copyright from functioning as a straightjacket 
that stifles the very creative activity it seeks to foster. If we allow too much 
unpaid copying, however, we risk extinguishing the economic incentive to 
create that copyright is intended to provide. 
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*** Here, we are called upon to determine whether the unpaid copying of 
scholarly works by a university for use by students—facilitated by the 
development of systems for digital delivery over the Internet—should be 
excused under the doctrine of fair use. 
 
Plaintiffs are three publishing houses that specialize in academic works. 
Plaintiff Cambridge University Press (“Cambridge”) is the not-for-profit 
publishing house of the University of Cambridge in England, having an 
American branch headquartered in New York City. Plaintiff Oxford 
University Press, Inc. (“Oxford”) is a not-for-profit United States 
corporation associated with Oxford University in England and 
headquartered in New York City. Plaintiff Sage Publications, Inc. (“Sage”) 
is a for-profit Delaware corporation, headquartered in Sherman Oaks, 
California.  
 
Plaintiffs do not publish the large, general textbooks commonly used in 
entry-level university courses. Rather, Plaintiffs publish advanced 
scholarly works, which might be used in upper-level undergraduate and 
graduate courses. Cambridge and Oxford publish scholarly books and 
journals on niche subject areas. Their works involved in this case include 
research-based monographs, which are “small, single author books which 
give in-depth analysis of a narrow topic,” Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 
863 F.Supp.2d 1190, 1212 (N.D.Ga.2012) (footnote omitted), instructional 
books, trade books, and other works on academic topics. Sage primarily 
publishes books on the social sciences. All three plaintiffs publish, in 
addition to works by a single author, “edited books” which feature the 
contributions of multiple authors. Id. 
 
Plaintiffs market their books to professors who teach at universities and 
colleges. Cambridge and Oxford regularly send complimentary copies of 
their publications to professors. Sage provides trial copies upon request. 
Plaintiffs intend that professors use Plaintiffs’ publications in their work 
and assign them as required reading so that students will purchase them. 
Rather than assigning whole books, some professors assign or suggest 
excerpts from Plaintiffs’ books as part of the curriculum for their courses. 
Professors might do this by putting the work on reserve at the university 
library so that students can visit the library to read an assigned excerpt. 
Or, professors might prepare a bound, photocopied, paper “coursepack” 
containing excerpts from several works for a particular course. Often, a 
third-party copy shop assembles these coursepacks, performing the copying 
and binding, obtaining the necessary licenses from publishers, and 
charging students a fee for the finished coursepack. In recent years, 
however, universities—following the trend with regard to distribution of 
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many forms of media the world over—have increasingly abandoned paper 
coursepacks in favor of digital distribution of excerpts over the Internet. 
GSU is a public university in Atlanta, Georgia. It is part of the University 
System of Georgia, and is overseen by the Board of Regents of the 
University System of Georgia. GSU maintains two on-campus systems 
known as “ERes” and “uLearn” for digital distribution of course materials 
to students. 
 
ERes (short for “E–Reserves”) is an “electronic reserve system” hosted on 
servers maintained by GSU and managed by GSU’s library staff. Since 
2004, GSU has used ERes to allow GSU students to access course 
materials—including course syllabi, class notes, sample exams, and 
excerpts from books and journals—on the Internet via a web browser. In 
order to place an excerpt from a book or journal on ERes, a professor must 
either provide a personal copy of the work to the GSU library staff or 
indicate that the GSU library owns a copy. A member of the library staff 
then scans the excerpt to convert it to a digital format and posts the 
scanned copy to ERes. GSU students are given access to an ERes website 
specific to the courses in which they are enrolled. On each course-specific 
ERes website, students find their reading assignments listed by title. The 
scanned excerpts are accessible via hyperlink. When a student clicks a link 
for a particular assignment, the student receives a digital copy of a scanned 
excerpt that the student may view, print, save to his or her computer, and 
potentially keep indefinitely. ERes course websites are password-protected 
in order to limit access to the students in the particular course. Once a 
course ends, students no longer have access to the ERes website for that 
course. 
 
uLearn is a “course management system” hosted on servers maintained by 
the Board of Regents. Like ERes, uLearn provides course-specific webpages 
through which professors may make course material available, including 
digital copies of excerpts from books, which students in the course may 
view, print, or save. The most significant difference between the ERes and 
uLearn systems is that uLearn allows professors to upload digital copies of 
reading material directly to their course websites while ERes forces 
professors to rely on GSU library personnel to upload reading material for 
them. 
 
ERes and uLearn have been popular at GSU. For example, during the 
Spring 2009 term, paper coursepacks were offered for only about fifteen 
courses, while instructors in hundreds of courses made readings available 
on ERes. Thus, the excerpts from larger works that make up some portion 
of course readings at GSU, and which were once distributed to students via 
a paper coursepack purchased at the university bookstore, are now largely 
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distributed to students via digital download on the Internet, that the 
students pay for only indirectly via tuition and fees. 
  
There exists a well-established system for the licensing of excerpts of 
copyrighted works. Copyright Clearance Center (“CCC”) is a not-for-profit 
corporation with headquarters in Danvers, Massachusetts. CCC licenses 
excerpts from copyrighted works for a fee, acting on behalf of publishers 
who choose to make their works available through CCC. These licenses are 
called “permissions.” All three Plaintiffs offer excerpt-specific permissions 
to photocopy or digitally reproduce portions of their works, which may be 
obtained directly from Plaintiffs or through CCC. Permissions are not, 
however, available for licensed copying of excerpts from all of Plaintiffs’ 
works. 
 
CCC offers a variety of permissions services to various categories of users, 
including corporate, educational, and institutional users. One such service, 
the Academic Permissions Service (“APS”), licenses educational users to 
make print copies on a per-use basis. CCC also offers an electronic course 
content service (“ECCS”) for licensing of digital excerpts by educational 
users on a per-use basis, that—in 2008, the year for which evidence on the 
question was presented—offered only a small percentage of the works that 
were available through APS. ECCS is designed for electronic reserve 
systems such as ERes and uLearn. Software is available that would allow 
GSU library personnel to place an order with CCC for a permission to 
provide students with a digital copy of an excerpt via ERes. CCC also offers 
an Academic Repertory License Service (“ARLS”) which affords subscribers 
access to excerpts from a set group of about nine million titles, 
approximately 17 percent of which are available in digital format. Sage 
participates in ARLS and did so in 2009, Oxford participated in 2009 with 
regard to journals but not books, and Cambridge does not participate. GSU 
did not and does not subscribe to this program. 
 
When the GSU bookstore assembles and sells a paper coursepack 
containing excerpts from copyrighted works, GSU pays permissions fees 
for use of the excerpts. The central issue in this case is under what 
circumstances GSU must pay permissions fees to post a digital copy of an 




On April 15, 2008, Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Plaintiffs alleged 
that hundreds of GSU professors have made thousands of copyrighted 
works—including works owned or controlled by Plaintiffs—available on 
GSU’s electronic reserve systems without obtaining permissions from 
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copyright holders, and that GSU’s administration facilitated, encouraged, 
and induced this practice. Plaintiffs sued Defendants in their official 
capacities as GSU officials, claiming (1) direct copyright infringement 
caused by the officials “scanning, copying, displaying, and distributing 
Plaintiffs’ copyrighted material;” (2) contributory copyright infringement 
caused by the officials’ “facilitating, encouraging, and inducing librarians 
and professors to scan, copy, display, and distribute Plaintiffs’ copyrighted 
material” and “students to view, download, copy and further distribute 
[Plaintiffs’] copyrighted material;” and (3) vicarious copyright infringement 
caused by the officials’ inducing GSU employees and students to copy 
Plaintiffs’ copyrighted material, profiting from this practice, and failing to 
stop it despite having the right and ability to do so. Plaintiffs sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs supported their allegations 
with numerous examples of GSU professors posting excerpts of Plaintiffs’ 
works on GSU’s electronic reserve systems. Defendants filed an Answer, 
denying Plaintiffs’ allegations of infringement; claiming sovereign 
immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity based on Defendants’ 
status as state officials; and asserting a defense of fair use because “any 
alleged use of copyrighted materials was for the purpose of teaching, 




In late December 2008, the University System of Georgia convened a Select 
Committee on Copyright to review GSU’s then-existing copyright policy, 
which was called the “Regents’ Guide to Understanding Copyright & 
Educational Fair Use.” On February 17, 2009, the Select Committee 
announced a new copyright policy for GSU (the “2009 Policy”), which went 
into effect the same day. Under the 2009 Policy, a revised version of which 
remains in effect today, GSU professors who wish to post an excerpt of a 
copyrighted work on ERes or uLearn for distribution to their students must 
first determine whether they believe that doing so would be fair use. In 
order to make this determination, professors must fill out a “Fair Use 
Checklist” for each excerpt. 
 
The Checklist allows GSU professors to perform a version of the analysis a 
court might perform should the professor claim fair use in a subsequent 
copyright infringement suit. As described above, see supra part I.A, the fair 
use analysis involves a consideration of whether allowing the unpaid use 
in a given case would be equitable and serve the objectives of copyright in 
light of four statutory factors, see 17 U.S.C. § 107. For each factor, the 
Checklist provides several criteria that purportedly weigh either for or 
against a finding of fair use, each with a corresponding checkbox. The 
Checklist instructs professors to check each criterion that applies, and then 
add up the checks to determine whether the factor weighs in favor of or 
CH. 1  127 
  
against a finding of fair use. After making this tally, the Checklist explains 
that “[w]here the factors favoring fair use outnumber those against it, 
reliance on fair use is justified. Where fewer than half the factors favor fair 
use, instructors should seek permission from the rights holder.” Thus, 
under the 2009 Policy, a GSU professor may post an excerpt of a 
copyrighted work on ERes or uLearn without obtaining a permission from 
the copyright holder if the professor first decides that doing so would be 
protected by the doctrine of fair use, according to the criteria set forth in 
the Checklist. 
 
After completing an initial round of discovery, both parties moved for 
summary judgment on February 26, 2010. Plaintiffs alleged that the 2009 
Policy had failed to curb the alleged infringement of their copyrighted 
works, and argued that they were entitled to summary judgment on all 
claims. Plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to an injunction based on 
the alleged infringements listed in their First Amended Complaint, that 
had occurred prior to enactment of the 2009 Policy, and added allegations 
regarding new instances of infringement, which also occurred prior to 
enactment of the 2009 Policy. Plaintiffs also argued that injunctive relief 
was appropriate as to Defendants under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 
S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), which permits prospective injunctive relief 
against state officers in their official capacities. 
 






As an initial matter, we must dispose of Defendants’ contention that they 
are immune from suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. Because this 
argument is outside the scope of Plaintiffs’ brief and was not raised by 
Defendants on cross-appeal, we find that the argument is not properly 
raised. As we have previously explained, “a party who has not appealed 
may not bring an argument in opposition to a judgment or attack the 
judgment in any respect, or hitch a ride on his adversary’s notice of appeal 
to enlarge his rights under the judgment or diminish those of the opposing 
party.” Lawhorn v. Allen, 519 F.3d 1272, 1286 n. 20 (11th Cir.2008) 
(citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted). An argument that the 
District Court’s ruling must be vacated because suit is barred by Eleventh 
Amendment immunity is not excepted from this rule. Majette v. O’Connor, 
811 F.2d 1416, 1419 n. 3 (11th Cir.1987). Accordingly, we decline to address 
Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment argument. 
 
B. 




How much unpaid use should be allowed is the bailiwick of the fair use 
doctrine. To further the purpose of copyright, we must provide for some fair 
use taking of copyrighted material. This may be viewed as a transaction 
cost, incidental to the business of authorship. But if we set this transaction 
cost too high by allowing too much taking, we run the risk of eliminating 
the economic incentive for the creation of original works that is at the core 
of  copyright and—by driving creators out of the market—killing the 
proverbial goose that laid the golden egg. 
 
Thus, the proper scope of the fair use doctrine in a given case boils down to 
an evidentiary question. As a conceptual matter, in making fair use 
determinations, we must conjure up a hypothetical perfect market for the 
work in question, consisting of the whole universe of those who might buy 
it, in which everyone involved has perfect knowledge of the value of the 
work to its author and to potential buyers, and excluding for the moment 
any potential fair uses of the work. Then, keeping in mind the purposes 
animating copyright law—the fostering of learning and the creation of new 
works—we must determine how much of that value the implied licensee-
fair users can capture before the value of the remaining market is so 
diminished that it no longer makes economic sense for the author—or a 
subsequent holder of the copyright—to propagate the work in the first 
place. 
 
In most instances, licensors (authors and copyright holders) and licensees 
(both paying licensees, and implied-by-law fair use licensees) will 
independently perform some version of this analysis in order to reach a 
mutually equitable arrangement. Ideally, a copyright holder will sell his or 
her works to buyers who pay the price that the market will bear and will 
routinely tolerate secondary uses which do not adversely impact that 
market. However, in the event of a disagreement, the copyright holder can 
file an infringement suit and the secondary user may invoke the fair use 
defense. In so doing, the parties essentially turn to a court to make a 
determination for them as to the appropriate boundaries of the secondary 
user’s implied license.  
 
The fair use doctrine, as codified by Congress, furnishes judges with a 
laboratory within which to work to answer this question. *** 
 
In drafting § 107, Congress “resisted pressures from special interest groups 
to create presumptive categories of fair use, but structured the provision 
as an affirmative defense requiring a case-by-case analysis.” Harper & 
Row, 471 U.S. at 561, 105 S.Ct. at 2231 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong., 
1st Sess., 37 (1967)). Accordingly, the fair use inquiry is a flexible one. The 
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four statutory factors provide courts with tools to determine—through a 
weighing of the four factors in light of the facts of a given case—whether a 
finding of fair use is warranted in that particular instance. 
 
* * * Furthermore, because fair use is an affirmative defense, its proponent 
bears the burden of proof in demonstrating that it applies. See Campbell, 
510 U.S. at 590, 114 S.Ct. at 1177; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561, 105 




Before we turn to the District Court’s analysis of each of the four fair use 
factors, we must first address the District Court’s overarching fair use 
methodology. Plaintiffs make two broad arguments that the District 
Court’s methodology was flawed, only one of which is persuasive.  
 
Plaintiffs contend that the District Court erred by performing a work-by-
work analysis that focused on whether the use of each individual work was 
fair use rather than on the broader context of ongoing practices at GSU. 
We disagree. Fair use must be determined on a case-by-case basis, by 
applying the four factors to each work at issue. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 
577, 114 S.Ct. at 1170. Were we to accept Plaintiffs’ argument, the District 
Court would have no principled method of determining whether a nebulous 
cloud of infringements purportedly caused by GSU’s “ongoing practices” 
should be excused by the defense of fair use. Thus, we find that the District 
Court’s work-by-work approach—in which the District Court considered 
whether the fair use defense excused a representative sample of instances 
of alleged infringement in order to determine the need for injunctive 
relief—was the proper one. 
 
Plaintiffs also argue that the District Court erred in giving each of the four 
factors equal weight, essentially taking a mechanical “add up the factors” 
approach, finding fair use if three factors weighed in favor of fair use and 
one against and vice versa, and only performing further analysis in case of 
a “tie.” We agree that the District Court’s arithmetic approach was 
improper. 
 
Congress, in the Copyright Act, spoke neither to the relative weight courts 
should attach to each of the four factors nor to precisely how the factors 
ought to be balanced. However, the Supreme Court has explained that “the 
four statutory factors [may not] be treated in isolation, one from another. 
All are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the 
purposes of copyright.” Id. at 578, 114 S.Ct. at 1170–71. In keeping with 
this approach, a given factor may be more or less important in determining 
whether a particular use should be considered fair under the specific 
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circumstances of the case. See id. at 586, 114 S.Ct. at 1175 (noting that the 
second factor is generally not important in determining whether a finding 
of fair use is justified in the case of a parody). As such, the four factors “do 
not mechanistically resolve fair use issues.” Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 588, 
105 S.Ct. at 2245 (Brennan, J., dissenting). “Because [fair use] is not a 
mechanical determination, a party need not ‘shut-out’ her opponent on the 
four factor tally to prevail.” Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 
740 (2d Cir.1991). Accordingly, we find that the District Court erred in 
giving each of the four factors equal weight, and in treating the four factors 
as a simple mathematical formula. As we will explain, because of the 
circumstances of this case, some of the factors weigh more heavily on the 




We now turn to the District Court’s analysis of each individual fair use 
factor. Although we have found that the District Court’s method for 
weighing the four factors against one another was erroneous, this does not 
mean that the District Court’s reasoning under each of the four factors is 
also necessarily flawed. Rather, we must determine the correct analysis 
under each factor and then ascertain whether the District Court properly 
applied that analysis.  
 
Plaintiffs argue that the District Court erred in its application of each of 
the four fair use factors. Plaintiffs’ argument centers on a comparison of 
the circumstances of the instant case to those of the so-called “coursepack 
cases,” in which courts rejected a defense of fair use for commercial 
copyshops that assembled paper coursepacks containing unlicensed 
excerpts of copyrighted works for use in university courses. 
 
In Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., publishing houses sued 
Kinko’s, a commercial copyshop, alleging that Kinko’s infringed the 
publishers’ copyrights when it copied excerpts from the publishers’ books, 
without permission and without payment of a license fee, and sold the 
copies for profit in bound, paper coursepacks to students for use in college 
courses. 758 F.Supp. 1522, 1526 (S.D.N.Y.1991). The District Court 
rejected Kinko’s claim that its use of the excerpts was fair use, and granted 
injunctive relief to the publishers.  
 
Similarly, in Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, 
Inc., the Sixth Circuit upheld the District Court’s ruling that Michigan 
Document Services, a commercial copyshop, was not entitled to a fair use 
defense when it reproduced substantial portions of copyrighted academic 
works and sold the copies in bound, paper coursepacks to students for use 
in courses at the University of Michigan, without obtaining permission 
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from the copyright holder. 99 F.3d 1381, 1383 (6th Cir.1996) (en banc). The 
Sixth Circuit held that injunctive relief was therefore warranted.  
  
In essence, Plaintiffs argue that the coursepack cases should have guided 
the District Court’s analysis in this case, because GSU cannot alter the fair 
use calculus simply by choosing to distribute course readings in an 
electronic rather than paper format. In making this argument, Plaintiffs 
invoke the “media neutrality” principle, which “mandates that the ‘transfer 
of a work between media does not alter the character of that work for 
copyright purposes.’ ” See Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc., 533 F.3d 
1244, 1257 (11th Cir.2008) (en banc) (quoting N.Y. Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, 
533 U.S. 483, 502, 121 S.Ct. 2381, 2392, 150 L.Ed.2d 500 (2001)).  
 
Plaintiffs’ reliance on the media neutrality doctrine is misplaced. Congress 
established that doctrine to ensure that works created with new 
technologies, perhaps not in existence at the time of the Copyright Act of 
1976, would qualify for copyright protection. See id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 
102(a) ( “Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of authorship 
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
developed....” (emphasis added))); see also H.R.Rep. No. 94–1476, at 52 
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665 (“This broad language 
is intended to avoid the artificial and largely unjustifiable distinctions ... 
under which statutory copyrightability in certain cases has been made to 
depend upon the form or medium in which the work is fixed.”). The media 
neutrality doctrine concerns copyrightability and does not dictate the 
result in a fair use inquiry. Congress would not have intended this doctrine 
to effectively displace the flexible work-by-work fair use analysis in favor 
of a one dimensional analysis as to whether the case involves a transfer of 
a work between media.  
 
Likewise, because the fair use analysis is highly fact-specific and must be 
performed on a work-by-work basis, see Cariou, 714 F.3d at 694, the 
coursepack cases provide guidance but do not dictate the results here, 
which must be based upon a careful consideration of the circumstances of 




The first fair use factor is “the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes.” 17 U.S.C. § 107(1). The inquiry under the first factor has several 
facets, including (1) the extent to which the use is a “transformative” rather 
than merely superseding use of the original work and (2) whether the use 
is for a nonprofit educational purpose, as opposed to a commercial purpose 
“Before illumining these facets, however, we observe that the Supreme 
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Court has cautioned against the use of the facets to create ‘hard evidentiary 
presumption [s]’ or ‘categories of presumptively fair use.’ ” Id. (alteration 
in original) (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584, 114 S.Ct. at 1174 (“[T]he 
mere fact that a use is educational and not for profit does not insulate it 
from a finding of infringement, any more than the commercial character of 
a use bars a finding of fairness.”)). 
 
Our initial inquiry under the first factor asks whether Defendants’ use is 
transformative, i.e., “whether the new work merely supersede [s] the 
objects of the original creation, or instead adds something new, with a 
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new 
expression, meaning, or message.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, 114 S.Ct. at 
1171 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted). 
For example, a parody transforms a work by appropriating elements of the 
work for purposes of comment or criticism, and thus “reflects 
transformative value because it ‘can provide social benefit, by shedding 
light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one.’ ” Suntrust 
Bank, 268 F.3d at 1271 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, 114 S.Ct. at 
1171). A nontransformative use, on the other hand, is one which serves the 
same “overall function” as the original work. 
 
Even verbatim copying “may be transformative so long as the copy serves 
a different function than the original work.” Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 
Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir.2007) (finding a search engine’s copying 
of website images in order to create an Internet search index 
transformative because the original works “serve[d] an entertainment, 
aesthetic, or informative function, [whereas the] search engine transforms 
the image into a pointer directing a user to a source of information”); A.V. 
v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 640 (4th Cir.2009) (finding use of 
student papers in an online plagiarism detection database transformative 
because the database used the papers not for their original purpose as 
schoolwork, but rather to automatically detect plagiarism in the works of 
other student authors); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 
448 F.3d 605, 609 (2d Cir.2006) (finding use by publishers of concert posters 
reproduced in full, although in reduced size, in a biography of a musical 
group transformative because the use was for historical and educational 
purposes, rather than advertising and informational purposes). 
 
Allowing would-be fair users latitude for transformative uses furthers “the 
goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts.” See Campbell, 510 U.S. 
at 579, 114 S.Ct. at 1171. This is because transformative works possess a 
comparatively large share of the novelty copyright seeks to foster. At the 
same time, transformative uses are less likely, generally speaking, to 
negatively impact the original creator’s bottom line, because they do not “ 
‘merely supersede the objects of the original creation’ ” and therefore are 
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less likely to “ ‘supplant’ the market for the copyrighted work [by] ‘fulfilling 
demand for the original.’ ” See Peter Letterese & Assocs., 533 F.3d at 1310 
(alteration omitted) (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, 588, 114 S.Ct. at 
1171, 1176). 
 
Here, Defendants’ use of excerpts of Plaintiffs’ works is not transformative. 
The excerpts of Plaintiffs’ works posted on GSU’s electronic reserve system 
are verbatim copies of portions of the original books which have merely 
been converted into a digital format. Although a professor may arrange 
these excerpts into a particular order or combination for use in a college 
course, this does not imbue the excerpts themselves with any more than a 
de minimis amount of new meaning. See Princeton University Press, 99 
F.3d at 1389 (“[I]f you make verbatim copies of 95 pages of a 316–page book, 
you have not transformed the 95 pages very much—even if you juxtapose 
them to excerpts from other works.”). 
 
Nor do Defendants use the excerpts for anything other than the same 
intrinsic purpose—or at least one of the purposes—served by Plaintiffs’ 
works: reading material for students in university courses. Although an 
electronic reserve system may facilitate easy access to excerpts of Plaintiffs’ 
works, it does nothing to transform those works. But see Authors Guild, 
Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir.2014) (holding that universities’ 
systematic digitization of copyrighted books was transformative because 
the digital copies were used to create a searchable database which supplied 
users with lists of page numbers and not with copies of the original works, 
and so the copies served a different purpose than the original works). 
Rather, Defendants’ use of excerpts of Plaintiffs’ works “supersede[s] the 
objects of the original creation.” See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, 114 S.Ct. 
at 1171 (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). Were this 
element by itself dispositive, we would be compelled to find that the first 
factor weighs against a finding of fair use. 
 
However, we must also consider under the first factor whether Defendants’ 
use is for a nonprofit educational purpose, as opposed to a commercial 
purpose. “[T]he commercial or non-transformative uses of a work are to be 
regarded as ‘separate factor[s] that tend[ ] to weigh against a finding of fair 
use,’ and ‘the force of that tendency will vary with the context.’ ” Peter 
Letterese & Assocs., 533 F.3d at 1309 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585, 114 S.Ct. at 1174). Indeed, the Supreme Court 
has recognized in dicta that nonprofit educational use may weigh in favor 
of a finding of fair use under the first factor, even when nontransformative. 
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 n. 11, 114 S.Ct. at 1171 n. 11 (“The obvious 
statutory exception to this focus on transformative uses is the straight 
reproduction of multiple copies for classroom distribution.”). 
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Because “copyright has always been used to promote learning,” Suntrust 
Bank, 268 F.3d at 1261, allowing some leeway for educational fair use 
furthers the purpose of copyright by providing students and teachers with 
a means to lawfully access works in order to further their learning in 
circumstances where it would be unreasonable to require permission. But, 
as always, care must be taken not to allow too much educational use, lest 
we undermine the goals of copyright by enervating the incentive for 
authors to create the works upon which students and teachers depend. 
 
In the coursepack cases, Princeton University Press, 99 F.3d at 1389, and 
Basic Books, 758 F.Supp. at 1531–32, the first factor weighed against a 
finding of fair use when the nontransformative, educational use in question 
was performed by a for-profit copyshop, and was therefore commercial. In 
a more recent case, a district court refused to allow a commercial copyshop 
to sidestep the outcome of the coursepack cases by requiring its student 
customers to perform the photocopying themselves (for a fee) when 
assembling paper coursepacks from master copies held by the copyshop. 
Blackwell Publ’g, Inc. v. Excel Research Grp., LLC, 661 F.Supp.2d 786, 794 
(E.D.Mich.2009). In all three instances, the court refused to allow the 
defendants, who were engaged in commercial operations, to stand in the 
shoes of students and professors in claiming that their making of multiple 
copies of scholarly works was for nonprofit educational purposes. 
 
However, in both of the coursepack cases, the courts expressly declined to 
conclude that the copying would fall outside the boundaries of fair use if 
conducted by professors, students, or academic institutions. See Princeton 
University Press, 99 F.3d at 1389 (“As to the proposition that it would be 
fair use for the students or professors to make their own copies, the issue 
is by no means free from doubt. We need not decide this question, however, 
for the fact is that the copying complained of here was performed on a 
profit-making basis by a commercial enterprise.”); Basic Books, 758 
F.Supp. at 1536 n. 13 (“Expressly, the decision of this court does not 
consider copying performed by students, libraries, nor on-campus 
copyshops, whether conducted for-profit or not.”). In Blackwell Publishing, 
the District Court noted that, conversely, “the fact that students do the 
copying does not ipso facto mean that a commercial use cannot be found.” 
661 F.Supp.2d at 793. 
 
Furthermore, where we previously held that the first factor weighed 
against a finding of fair use in a case involving use that was 
nontransformative but educational, the use in question was commercial. 
Peter Letterese & Assocs., 533 F.3d at 1309–12 (finding that the first factor 
weighed against a finding of fair use in a case involving the verbatim use 
of copyrighted material in an instructional coursepack for use by the 
Church of Scientology, where defendants charged a fee or obtained a 
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promissory note in exchange for the coursepacks and hence the use was for 
commercial purposes). 
 
Thus, the question becomes whether Defendants’ use of Plaintiffs’ works is 
truly a nonprofit educational use under § 107(1), and if so, whether this 
places sufficient weight on the first factor scales to justify a finding that 
this factor favors fair use despite the nontransformativeness of Defendants’ 
use. 
 
GSU is a nonprofit educational institution. While this is relevant, our 
inquiry does not end there: we must consider not only the nature of the 
user, but the use itself. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 
913, 921–22 (2d Cir.1994) (“[A] court’s focus should be on the use of the 
copyrighted material and not simply on the user, [although] it is overly 
simplistic to suggest that the ‘purpose and character of the use’ can be fully 
discerned without considering the nature and objectives of the user.”). 
 
Defendants’ use of Plaintiffs’ works in the teaching of university courses is 
clearly for educational purposes. Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear that 
use by a nonprofit entity for educational purposes is always a “nonprofit” 
use as contemplated by § 107(1). The Supreme Court has explained that 
“[t]he crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive 
of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from 
exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary 
price.” Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562, 105 S.Ct. at 2231. Plaintiffs point 
to several cases in which courts have found that educational use of 
copyrighted works by a nonprofit entity (or an individual associated with 
such an entity) was commercial even though the secondary user was not 
selling the items in question, in which “profit” took the form of an indirect 
economic benefit or a nonmonetary, professional benefit. See, e.g., Soc’y of 
Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29, 61 (1st 
Cir.2012), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1315, 185 L.Ed.2d 195 
(2013) (finding that the first factor weighed against fair use where an 
archbishop used copyrighted translations of a religious text on his website; 
although the use was educational, the archbishop profited from the use, in 
part, in the form of enhanced professional reputation); Worldwide Church 
of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th 
Cir.2000) (finding the first factor weighed against fair use where a religious 
organization distributed copies of a copyrighted book for use in its religious 
observance; the use was nontransformative, and although the use was 
educational, the organization profited indirectly by using the work to 
attract new members who would tithe ten percent of their income); 
Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1324 (2d Cir.1989) (finding that 
the first factor weighed against fair use where a professor claimed an 
assistant’s paper as his own work and copied it for use in his class, under 
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the professor’s name, because the professor profited from the use by 
enhancing his professional reputation and gaining a valuable authorship 
credit). 
 
Under this line of reasoning, Defendants’ educational use of Plaintiffs’ 
works is a for-profit use despite GSU’s status as a nonprofit educational 
institution, and despite the fact that GSU does not directly sell access to 
Plaintiffs’ works on Eres and uLearn. Defendants “exploited” Plaintiffs’ 
copyrighted material for use in university courses without “paying the 
customary price”—a licensing fee. Defendants profited from the use of 
excerpts of Plaintiffs’ works—however indirectly—because GSU collects 
money from students in the form of tuition and fees (which students pay in 
part for access to ERes and uLearn) and reduces its costs by avoiding fees 
it might have otherwise paid for the excerpts. 
 
 However, this reasoning is somewhat circular, and hence of limited 
usefulness to our fair use inquiry. Of course, any unlicensed use of 
copyrighted material profits the user in the sense that the user does not 
pay a potential licensing fee, allowing the user to keep his or her money. If 
this analysis were persuasive, no use could qualify as “nonprofit” under the 
first factor. Moreover, if the use is a fair use, then the copyright owner is 
not entitled to charge for the use, and there is no “customary price” to be 
paid in the first place. 
 
 Accordingly, evaluating the indirect profit GSU gained by refusing to pay 
to license Plaintiffs’ works provides little useful guidance under the first 
factor. Simply put, the greater the amount of a work taken by the secondary 
user (or the more valuable the portion taken), the more the user “profits” 
by not paying for the use. Thus, the concern we have identified with profit 
in this sense is better dealt with under the third factor, which directs us to 
consider the amount of the original work that the secondary user 
appropriated, and the substantiality of the portion used. 
 
 Defendants’ use of Plaintiffs’ works does not provide GSU with a 
noneconomic but measurable professional benefit, such as an enhanced 
reputation. Contra Soc’y of Holy Transfiguration Monastery, 689 F.3d at 
61. Although GSU students are likely pleased with the convenience of ERes 
and uLearn, there is no evidence that the presence of excerpts of Plaintiffs’ 
works on these electronic reserve systems enhances GSU’s reputation in 
any meaningful sense. There is no evidence that GSU gains any other 
measurable, indirect benefit by distributing Plaintiffs’ works to students, 
such as a valuable authorship credit either. Contra Weissmann, 868 F.2d 
at 1324.  
 
Ultimately, we agree with the Second Circuit’s assessment that 
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[t]he commercial/nonprofit dichotomy concerns the unfairness that arises 
when a secondary user makes unauthorized use of copyrighted material to 
capture significant revenues as a direct consequence of copying the original 
work. 
 
Consistent with these principles, courts will not sustain a claimed defense 
of fair use when the secondary use can fairly be characterized as a form of 
“commercial exploitation,” i.e., when the copier directly and exclusively 
acquires conspicuous financial rewards from its use of the copyrighted 
material. Conversely, courts are more willing to find a secondary use fair 
when it produces a value that benefits the broader public interest. The 
greater the private economic rewards reaped by the secondary user (to the 
exclusion of broader public benefits), the more likely the first factor will 
favor the copyright holder and the less likely the use will be considered fair. 
Texaco, 60 F.3d at 922 (2d Cir.1994) (citations omitted).  
 
Although GSU certainly benefits from its use of Plaintiffs’ works by being 
able to provide the works conveniently to students, and profits in the sense 
that it avoids paying licensing fees, Defendants’ use is not fairly 
characterized as “commercial exploitation.” Even if Defendants’ use profits 
GSU in some sense, we are not convinced that this type of benefit is 
indicative of “commercial” use. There is no evidence that Defendants 
capture significant revenues as a direct consequence of copying Plaintiffs’ 
works. At the same time, the use provides a broader public benefit-
furthering the education of students at a public university.  
 
Thus, we find that Defendants’ use of Plaintiffs’ works is of the nonprofit 
educational nature that Congress intended the fair use defense to allow 
under certain circumstances. Furthermore, we find this sufficiently 
weighty that the first factor favors a finding of fair use despite the 
nontransformative nature of the use. 
 
The text of the fair use statute highlights the importance Congress placed 
on educational use. The preamble to the statute provides that fair uses may 
include “teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research” and the first factor singles out “nonprofit 
educational purposes.” 17 U.S.C. § 107. The legislative history of § 107 
further demonstrates that Congress singled out educational purposes for 
special consideration. In the years leading up to passage of the Copyright 
Act of 1976 (which introduced § 107), Congress devoted considerable 
attention to working out the proper scope of the fair use defense as applied 
to copying for educational and classroom purposes, going so far as to 
include in a final report the Classroom Guidelines developed by 
representatives of educator, author, and publisher groups at the urging of 
Congress. See H.R.Rep. No. 2237, at 59–66 (1966); S.Rep. No. 93–983, at 
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116–19 (1974); S.Rep. No. 94–473, at 63–65 (1975); H.R.Rep. No. 94–1476, 
at 66–70 (1976). 
 
Notably, early drafts of § 107 did not include the parenthetical “including 
multiple copies for classroom use” or the specific direction to consider 
“whether [the] use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes.” See S. 3008, H.R. 11947, H.R. 12354, 88th Cong. (1st Sess.1964); 
S. 1006, H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835, 89th Cong. (1st 
Sess.1965); S. 597, H.R. 2512, H.R. 5650, 90th Cong. (1st Sess.1967). This 
language was not inserted until one month before the passage of the 
Copyright Act of 1976. See S. 22, 94th Cong. (2d Sess.1976). 
 
In sum, Congress devoted extensive effort to ensure that fair use would 
allow for educational copying under the proper circumstances and was 
sufficiently determined to achieve this goal that it amended the text of the 
statute at the eleventh hour in order to expressly state it. Furthermore, as 
described above, allowing latitude for educational fair use promotes the 
goals of copyright. Thus, we are persuaded that, despite the recent focus on 
transformativeness under the first factor, use for teaching purposes by a 
nonprofit, educational institution such as Defendants’ favors a finding of 
fair use under the first factor, despite the nontransformative nature of the 
use. 
 
Accordingly, we find that the District Court did not err in holding that the 
first factor favors a finding of fair use. Nevertheless, because Defendants’ 
use of Plaintiffs’ works is nontransformative, the threat of market 
substitution is significant. We note that insofar as the first factor is 
concerned with uses that supplant demand for the original, this factor is 
“closely related” to “[t]he fourth fair use factor, the effect on the potential 
market for the work.” See   Pac. & S. Co., 744 F.2d at 1496. We will thus 





The second fair use factor, “the nature of the copyrighted work,” 17 U.S.C. 
§ 107(2), “calls for recognition that some works are closer to the core of 
intended copyright protection than others, with the consequence that fair 
use is more difficult to establish when the former works are copied,” 
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586, 114 S.Ct. at 1175. The inquiry under the second 
factor generally focuses on two criteria. First, because works that are 
highly creative are closer to the core of copyright—that is, such works 
contain the most originality and inventiveness—the law affords such works 
maximal protection, and hence it is less likely that use of such works will 
be fair use.. In contrast, “[t]he law generally recognizes a greater need to 
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disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy,” and so it is 
more likely that the use of a factual or informational work will be fair use. 
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563, 105 S.Ct. at 2232; see also Stewart v. 
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237, 110 S.Ct. 1750, 1769, 109 L.Ed.2d 184 (1990). 
Second, because an “author’s right to control the first public appearance of 
his expression weighs against such use of the work before its release,” use 
of an unpublished work is less likely to be fair use. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 
at 564, 105 S.Ct. at 2232. Because all of Plaintiffs’ works in question here 
are published, we will focus on the creative/factual distinction.  
 
A paradigmatic example of a creative work, the use of which will disfavor 
fair use under the second factor, is “[a] motion picture based on a fictional 
short story.” Abend, 495 U.S. at 238, 110 S.Ct. at 1769. On the factual end 
of the spectrum, secondary use of a “bare factual compilation[ ]” favors fair 
use under the second factor. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586, 114 S.Ct. at 1175 
(citing Feist, 499 U.S. at 348–51, 111 S.Ct. at 1289–91). However, “[e]ven 
within the field of fact[ual] works, there are gradations as to the relative 
proportion of fact and fancy. One may move from sparsely embellished 
maps and directories to elegantly written biography.” Harper & Row, 471 
U.S. at 563, 105 S.Ct. at 2232 (quoting Robert A. Gorman, Fact or Fancy? 
The Implications for Copyright, 29 J. Copyright Soc’y 560, 561 (1982)). 
 
The coursepack cases—which involved copying of academic works similar 
to those involved here—reached opposite conclusions as to the effect of the 
second factor. Compare Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1389 (“[T]he 
excerpts copied for the coursepacks contained creative material, or 
‘expression;’ it was certainly not telephone book listings that the 
defendants were reproducing. This factor ... cuts against a finding of fair 
use.”), with Basic Books, 758 F.Supp. at 1533 (“The books infringed in suit 
were factual in nature. This factor weighs in favor of defendant.”). 
 
Nevertheless, relevant precedent indicates the proper approach. In Harper 
& Row, a publisher holding exclusive rights to President Ford’s 
unpublished memoirs sued The Nation magazine after The Nation 
published portions of the memoirs. 471 U.S. at 543, 105 S.Ct. at 2221–22. 
Although it focused on the unpublished nature of the memoir, the Court 
held that the second factor disfavored fair use in part because “The Nation 
did not stop at isolated phrases and instead excerpted subjective 
descriptions and portraits of public figures whose power lies in the author’s 
individualized expression. Such use, focusing on the most expressive 
elements of the work, exceeds that necessary to disseminate the facts.” Id. 
at 563–64, 105 S.Ct. at 2232. 
 
In Peter Letterese & Associates, the holder of the copyright on a book about 
sales techniques sued several entities associated with the Church of 
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Scientology after the entities used portions of the book in materials 
prepared for Church training courses. 533 F.3d at 1294–96. We held that 
the second factor was neutral—i.e., did not weigh for or against fair use—
in part because, although the book 
 
[fell] roughly under the rubric of a factual work[,] ... [it] 
contain[ed] a significant “proportion of fact and fancy,” and 
not merely in the subjective selection and arrangement of 
sales techniques; [the author] utilize[d] original expression 
that surpasses the bare facts necessary to communicate the 
underlying technique. Although the techniques are 
presented by way of personal anecdote, it is hard to believe 
that such anecdotes feature actual persons and actual 
retellings of past events and conversations, as opposed to 
composite characters and experiences served with a healthy 
dose of fiction. 
 
Id. at 1312–13.  
 
*** 
 Here, the District Court held that “[b]ecause all of the excerpts are 
informational and educational in nature and none are fictional, fair use 
factor two weighs in favor of Defendants.” Cambridge Univ. Press, 863 
F.Supp.2d at 1242. We disagree. 
 
The District Court found that “[s]ome of the books [at issue] are not merely 
descriptive; they contain material of an evaluative nature, giving the 
authors’ perspectives and opinions.” Id. at 1226. Such material might 
involve “subjective descriptions [that rely on] the author’s individualized 
expression,” Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563, 105 S.Ct. at 2232, may 
“surpass[ ] the bare facts necessary to communicate the underlying” 
information, Peter Letterese & Assocs., 533 F.3d at 1312, or may be 
“derived from [the author’s] own experiences,” Rowley, 695 F.2d at 1176. 
Although there appears to be no evidence that any of the non-fiction works 
in question here are “served with a healthy dose of fiction,” neither are all 
of the works mere “factual compilation[s].” Peter Letterese & Assocs., 533 
F.3d at 1312–13.  
 
Defendants argue that GSU professors chose the excerpts of Plaintiffs’ 
works for their factual content, not for any expressive content the works 
may contain, noting that several professors testified that if the use of a 
particular excerpt was not a fair use, they would have found another 
source. Of course, other professors testified that they chose particular 
excerpts because of the author’s interpretative originality and significance. 
Regardless of whether GSU faculty chose the excerpts for their expressive 
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or factual content, the excerpts were copied wholesale—facts, ideas, and 
original expression alike. Which aspect the secondary user was interested 
in is irrelevant to the disposition of the second factor. 
 
Accordingly, we find that the District Court erred in holding that the 
second factor favored fair use in every instance. Where the excerpts of 
Plaintiffs’ works contained evaluative, analytical, or subjectively 
descriptive material that surpasses the bare facts necessary to 
communicate information, or derives from the author’s experiences or 
opinions, the District Court should have held that the second factor was 
neutral, or even weighed against fair use in cases of excerpts that were 
dominated by such material. That being said, the second fair use factor is 




The third fair use factor is “the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 107(3). 
“[T]his third factor examines whether defendants have ‘helped themselves 
overmuch’ of the copyrighted work in light of the purpose and character of 
the use.” Peter Letterese & Assocs., 533 F.3d at 1314 (quoting Campbell, 
510 U.S. at 587, 114 S.Ct. at 1175). Thus, this factor is intertwined with 
the first factor. 
 
“[T]his factor is [also] intertwined with the fourth factor and partly 
functions as a heuristic to determine the impact on the market for the 
original.” Id. (footnote omitted). As we have explained, 
 
A book reviewer who copies snippets of a book is likely to increase the 
demand for the book, but “were a book reviewer to quote the entire book in 
his review, or so much of the book as to make the review a substitute for 
the book itself, he would be cutting into the publisher’s market, and the 
defense of fair use would fail.” Id. (quoting Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 
F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir.2002)). Thus, “[t]he inquiry is whether the amount 
taken is reasonable in light of the purpose of the use and the likelihood of 
market substitution.” Id. at 1314 n. 30 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588, 
114 S.Ct. at 1176). 
 
In making this determination, we must consider “not only ... the quantity 
of the materials used, but ... their quality and importance, too.” Campbell, 
510 U.S. at 587, 114 S.Ct. at 1175; see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565, 
105 S.Ct. at 2233 (holding that the third factor disfavored fair use because 
the defendant copied a qualitatively substantial portion of the original 
work—“the most interesting and moving parts of the entire manuscript” or 
“the heart of the book”—even though the defendants copied only 
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approximately 300 words out of the 200,000 words in the plaintiffs’ work 
(quotation marks omitted)).  
 
Here, the District Court found that the third factor favored fair use in 
instances where Defendants copied no more than 10 percent of a work, or 
one chapter in case of a book with ten or more chapters. Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 863 F.Supp.2d at 1243. The District Court’s blanket 10 percent-or-
one-chapter benchmark was improper. The fair use analysis must be 
performed on a case-by-case/work-by-work basis. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 
577, 114 S.Ct. at 1170; see supra discussion accompanying note 20. We 
must avoid “hard evidentiary presumption[s] ... and ‘eschew[ ] a rigid, 
bright-line approach to fair use.’ ” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584–85, 114 S.Ct. 
at 1174 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 449 n. 31, 104 S.Ct. at 792 n. 31). By 
holding that the third factor favored fair use whenever the amount of 
copying fell within a 10 percent-or-one-chapter baseline, the District Court 
abdicated its duty to analyze the third factor for each instance of alleged 
infringement individually. 
 
Defendants argue that the District Court’s 10 percent-or-one-chapter 
baseline served as a starting point only. However, this “starting point” in 
fact served as a substantive safe harbor in the third factor analysis, an 
approach which is incompatible with the prescribed work-by-work 
analysis. Even if we consider the baseline as a starting point only, 
application of the same non-statutory starting point to each instance of 
infringement is not a feature of a proper work-by-work analysis under the 
third fair use factor. 
 
Defendants also argue that the District Court’s 10 percent-or-one-chapter 
approach is supported by the record. Defendants’ explain that a CCC white 
paper, Using Electronic Reserves: Guidelines and Best Practices for 
Copyright Compliance (2011), identifies “best practices” for electronic 
reserves, stating that electronic reserve materials should be limited to 
“small excerpts” and that “[m]ost experts advise using a single article or ... 
chapter of a copyrighted work....” See Defendants’ Trial Ex. 906, at 2. 
However, even if we accept that the 10 percent-or-one-chapter approach 
represents a general industry “best practice” for electronic reserves, this is 
not relevant to an individualized fair use analysis. 
 
Plaintiffs offer four additional critiques of the District Court’s analysis 
under the third factor. First, Plaintiffs argue that the District Court erred 
in focusing its inquiry on whether the amount copied suited GSU’s 
pedagogical purposes. ***. Thus, we find that the District Court properly 
took into account whether the amount copied suited GSU’s pedagogical 
purposes. 
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Second, Plaintiffs argue that the District Court erred in measuring the 
amount taken based on the length of the entire book even where the copied 
material was an independently authored chapter in an edited volume. 
Rather, Plaintiffs contend, the relevant “work” in the case of an edited 
volume is the chapter copied, not the entire book; to conclude otherwise 
would create the anomalous result that a work bound with other works in 
an edited volume would enjoy less copyright protection than if the same 
work were published in a journal. See Texaco, 60 F.3d at 926 (treating 
individual articles in a journal as discrete works of authorship for purposes 
of third factor analysis). 
 
As noted earlier, the District Court declined to consider this argument 
because Plaintiffs raised it late in the proceedings. The decision whether to 
hear an argument raised late in litigation is squarely within the discretion 
of the District Court. *** 
 
Third, Plaintiffs argue that the copying permitted by the District Court 
exceeds the amounts outlined in the Classroom Guidelines. We note that 
the Classroom Guidelines, although part of the legislative history of the 
Copyright Act, do not carry force of law. In any case, to treat the Classroom 
Guidelines as indicative of what is allowable would be to create the type of 
“hard evidentiary presumption” that the Supreme Court has cautioned 
against, because fair use must operate as a “ ‘sensitive balancing of 
interests.’ ” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584, 114 S.Ct. at 1174 (quoting Sony, 
464 U.S. at 455, n. 40, 104 S.Ct. at 795, n. 40). As discussed, the fair use 
analysis must be performed on a work-by-work basis, and so we must not 
give undue weight to the amounts of copying set forth in the Classroom 
Guidelines.  
 
Furthermore, although Plaintiffs characterize the amounts set forth in the 
Classroom Guidelines as “limits,” the Classroom Guidelines were intended 
to suggest a minimum, not maximum, amount of allowable educational 
copying that might be fair use, and were not intended to limit fair use in 
any way: 
 
The purpose of the [Classroom] [G]uidelines is to state the minimum and 
not the maximum standards of educational fair use.... 
Moreover, the following statement of guidelines is not intended to limit the 
types of copying permitted under the standards of fair use under judicial 
decision and which are stated in Section 107 of the Copyright Revision Bill. 
H.R.Rep. No. 94–1476, at 68 (1976), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5681. 
Thus, while the Classroom Guidelines may be seen to represent Congress’ 
tentative view of the permissible amount of educational copying in 1976, 
we are not persuaded by the Plaintiffs’ argument that the Classroom 
Guidelines should control the analysis under factor three in this case.  
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Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the District Court allowed excessive taking 
as a percentage of the entire book compared to the amounts held to be “over 
the line” in the coursepack cases. *** 
 
We first note that the coursepack cases are not binding authority on this 
Court. Furthermore, because the four factors must be “weighed together” 
and not “treated in isolation,” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578, 114 S.Ct. at 1171, 
it is appropriate for the District Court to take the educational purpose of 
the use into consideration when analyzing how much copying is 
permissible under the third factor. This must be done on a work-by-work 
basis in a case such as this. While this type of analysis necessarily 
precludes hard-and-fast evidentiary presumptions, the wholesale 
reproduction of an entire work will not generally be considered fair unless 
the use is highly transformative.  
 
Accordingly, we find that the District Court properly considered whether 
the individual instances of alleged infringement were excessive in relation 
to Defendants’ pedagogical purpose, properly measured the amounts taken 
in all cases based on the length of the entire book, and properly declined to 
tie its analysis under the third factor to the Classroom Guidelines or to the 
coursepack cases. However, we find that the District Court erred in 
applying a 10 percent-or-one-chapter safe harbor in it analysis of the 
individual instances of alleged infringement. The District Court should 
have analyzed each instance of alleged copying individually, considering 
the quantity and the quality of the material taken—including whether the 
material taken constituted the heart of the work—and whether that taking 
was excessive in light of the educational purpose of the use and the threat 




The fourth fair use factor is “the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). “We must consider 
two inquiries: (1) ‘the extent of the market harm caused by the particular 
actions of the alleged infringer,’ and (2) ‘whether unrestricted and 
widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant [ ] would result 
in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market.’ ” Peter 
Letterese & Assocs., 533 F.3d at 1315 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590, 114 S.Ct. at 1177 (quotation marks omitted)). 
The adverse impact we are “primarily concerned [with] is that of market 
substitution.” Id.; see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568, 105 S.Ct. at 2235 
(explaining that the fourth factor is concerned with “use that supplants any 
part of the normal market for a copyrighted work” (quoting S.Rep. No. 94–
473, at 65 (1975))). Furthermore, “[m]arket harm is a matter of degree, and 
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the importance of [the fourth] factor will vary, not only with the amount of 
harm, but also with the relative strength of the showing on the other 
factors.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 n. 21, 114 S.Ct. at 1177 n. 21. Because 
Defendants’ use is nontransformative and fulfills the educational purposes 
that Plaintiffs, at least in part, market their works for, the threat of market 
substitution here is great and thus the fourth factor looms large in the 
overall fair use analysis.  
 
The central question under the fourth factor is not whether Defendants’ 
use of Plaintiffs’ works caused Plaintiffs to lose some potential revenue. 
Rather, it is whether Defendants’ use—taking into account the damage 
that might occur if “everybody did it”—would cause substantial economic 
harm such that allowing it would frustrate the purposes of copyright by 
materially impairing Defendants’ incentive to publish the work. See 
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566–67, 105 S.Ct. at 2234 (“Fair use, when 
properly applied, is limited to copying by others which does not materially 
impair the marketability of the work which is copied.” (emphasis added) 
(quotation marks omitted)). 
 
We agree with the District Court that the small excerpts Defendants used 
do not substitute for the full books from which they were drawn. “Plaintiffs 
offered no trial testimony or evidence showing that they lost any book sales 
in or after 2009 on account of any actions by anyone at Georgia State.” 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 863 F.Supp.2d at 1217. Thus, the District Court 
did not err in finding that “Defendants’ use of small excerpts did not affect 
Plaintiffs’ actual or potential sales of books.” Id. at 1236. 
 
However, CCC’s various programs for academic permissions—and 
Plaintiffs’ own permissions programs—constitute a workable market 
through which universities like GSU may purchase licenses to use excerpts 
of Plaintiffs’ works. Plaintiffs contend that, by failing to purchase digital 
permissions to use excerpts of Plaintiffs’ works on ERes and uLearn, 
Defendants caused substantial harm to the market for licenses, and that 
widespread adoption of this practice would cause substantial harm to the 
potential market. Plaintiffs also argue that, even if a license for a digital 
excerpt of a work was unavailable, this should not weigh in favor of fair use 
because the copyright owner is not obliged to accommodate prospective 
users. 
 
Defendants argue that, because permissions income for academic books 
represents a miniscule percentage of Plaintiffs’ overall revenue, 
Defendants’ practices have not caused substantial harm to the market for 
Plaintiffs works, and would not do so even if widely adopted. Defendants 
further argue that unavailability of licensing opportunities for particular 
works should weigh in favor of fair use. 
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We note that it is not determinative that programs exist through which 
universities may license excerpts of Plaintiffs’ works. In other words, the 
fact that Plaintiffs have made paying easier does not automatically dictate 
a right to payment. “[A] copyright holder can always assert some degree of 
adverse [effect] on its potential licensing revenues as a consequence of the 
secondary use at issue simply because the copyright holder has not been 
paid a fee to permit that particular use.” Texaco, 60 F.3d at 929 n. 17 
(citations omitted). The goal of copyright is to stimulate the creation of new 
works, not to furnish copyright holders with control over all markets. 
Accordingly, the ability to license does not demand a finding against fair 
use. 
 
Nevertheless, “it is sensible that a particular unauthorized use should be 
considered ‘more fair’ when there is no ready market or means to pay for 
the use, while such an unauthorized use should be considered ‘less fair’ 
when there is a ready market or means to pay for the use. The vice of 
circular reasoning arises only if the availability of payment is conclusive 
against fair use.” Id. at 931. Put simply, absent evidence to the contrary, if 
a copyright holder has not made a license available to use a particular work 
in a particular manner, the inference is that the author or publisher did 
not think that there would be enough such use to bother making a license 
available. In such a case, there is little damage to the publisher’s market 
when someone makes use of the work in that way without obtaining a 
license, and hence the fourth factor should generally weigh in favor of fair 
use. This is true of Plaintiffs’ works for which no license for a digital excerpt 
was available. 
 
Plaintiffs argue that even though a use is less fair when licensing is readily 
available, it does not follow that a use becomes more fair if, for a legitimate 
reason, the copyright holder has not offered to license the work. Plaintiffs 
cite several cases which have found that the fourth factor weighs against 
fair use even though the copyright holder was not actively marketing the 
work in question because the secondary use negatively impacted the 
potential market for the work. We note that our own precedent also 
supports this theory in some circumstances. See Pac. & S. Co., 744 F.2d at 
1496 (finding harm to the potential market for plaintiff’s news broadcasts 
where a defendant videotaped the broadcasts and sold tapes to the subjects 
of the news reports because “[c]opyrights protect owners who immediately 
market a work no more stringently than owners who delay before entering 
the market” and so “[t]he fact that [the plaintiff] does not actively market 
copies of the news programs does not matter, for Section 107 looks to the 
‘potential market’ in analyzing the effects of an alleged infringement”). 
However, this reasoning need not dictate the result in this case, which 
concerns not the market for Plaintiffs’ original works themselves or for 
CH. 1  147 
  
derivative works based upon those works, but rather a market for licenses 
to use Plaintiffs’ works in a particular way. As previously explained, 
licensing poses a particular threat that the fair use analysis will become 
circular, and Plaintiffs may not head off a defense of fair use by 
complaining that every potential licensing opportunity represents a 
potential market for purposes of the fourth fair use factor. 
 
An analogy is helpful. A publisher acts like a securities underwriter. A 
publisher determines the value of a work, which is set by the anticipated 
demand for the work. Thus, the greater the demand for the work—the 
greater the market—the more the publisher will pay the author of the work 
up front, and the more the publisher will endeavor to make the work widely 
available. If a publisher makes licenses available for some uses but not for 
others, this indicates that the publisher has likely made a reasoned 
decision not to enter the licensing market for those uses, which implies that 
the value of that market is minimal. 
 
With regard to the works for which digital permissions were unavailable, 
Plaintiffs choose to enter those works into some markets—print copies of 
the whole work, or perhaps licenses for paper copies of excerpts—but not 
the digital permission market. This tells us that Plaintiffs likely 
anticipated that there would be little to no demand for digital excerpts of 
the excluded works and thus saw the value of that market as de minimis 
or zero. If the market for digital excerpts were in fact de minimis or zero, 
then neither Defendants’ particular use nor a widespread use of similar 
kind would be likely to cause significant market harm. Of course, if 
publishers choose to participate in the market the calculation will change. 
In its individual analysis under the fourth factor of each of the forty-eight 
works for which it found Plaintiffs had made a prima facie case of 
infringement, the District Court performed a sufficiently nuanced review 
of the evidence regarding license availability. Where the evidence showed 
that there was a ready market for digital excerpts of a work in 2009, the 
time of the purported infringements, the District Court found that there 
was small—due to the amount of money involved—but actual damage to 
the value of Plaintiffs’ copyright. The District Court also properly took into 
account that widespread use of similar unlicensed excerpts could cause 
substantial harm to the potential market. Thus, where there was a license 
for digital excerpts available, the District Court generally held that the 
fourth factor weighed against a finding of fair use. In close cases, the 
District Court went further and examined the amount of permissions 
income a work had generated in order to determine how much this 
particular revenue source contributed to the value of the copyright in the 
work, noting that where there is no significant demand for excerpts, the 
likelihood of repetitive unpaid use is diminished. Where there was no 
evidence in the record to show that a license for digital excerpts was 
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available—as was the case for seventeen works published by Oxford and 
Cambridge—the District Court held that the fourth factor weighted in 
favor of fair use. We find that the District Court’s analysis under the fourth 
factor was correct, and that the District Court properly took license 
availability into account in determining whether the fourth factor weighted 
for or against fair use. 
 
Plaintiffs argue that the District Court erred by placing the burden on 
Plaintiffs to show that digital licenses for the particular works in question 
were reasonably available through CCC in 2009. Cognizant that fair use is 
an affirmative defense, the District Court kept the overall burden on 
Defendants to show that “no substantial damage was caused to the 
potential market for or the value of Plaintiffs’ works” in order to prevail on 
the question of whether the fourth factor should favor fair use. Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 863 F.Supp.2d at 1237. However, the District Court found that 
because Plaintiffs were “advocates of the theory that the availability of 
licenses shifts the factor four fair use analysis in their favor ... it is 
appropriate for them to be called upon to show that CCC provided in 2009 
reasonably efficient, reasonably priced, convenient access to the particular 
excerpts which are in question in this case.” Id. Plaintiffs argue that this 
amounted to relieving the Defendants of their burden of proof on the fourth 
factor. 
 
We disagree. Fair use is an affirmative defense, and the evidentiary burden 
on all four of its factors rests on the alleged infringer. See Campbell, 510 
U.S. at 590, 114 S.Ct. at 1177. However, Plaintiffs—as publishers—can 
reasonably be expected to have the evidence as to availability of licenses 
for their own works. It is therefore reasonable to place on Plaintiffs the 
burden of going forward with the evidence on this question. 
 
*** This is reasonable, because if a license was available during the 
relevant time period, Plaintiffs can rebut the presumption of no market by 
going forward with evidence of license availability. If there is evidence of a 
potential, future market, Plaintiffs can rebut the presumption by going 
forward with that. Then, Defendants—retaining the overall burden of 
persuasion on the fourth factor—must demonstrate that their use does not 
materially impair the existing or potential market in order to prevail. 
Although the District Court did not articulate its approach to the 
evidentiary burden on license availability in exactly this manner, the 
District Court did essentially what we have described. The District Court 
required Plaintiffs to put on evidence as to the availability of digital 
permissions in 2009, and Plaintiffs provided such evidence for some of the 
works in question but not for others. For those seventeen works for which 
Plaintiffs presented no evidence that digital permissions were available, 
the District Court—noting that, because access was limited to particular 
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classes, it was unlikely that Defendants’ use would result in exposure of 
the works to the general public and so there was little risk of widespread 
market substitution for excerpts of the works—held that there was no 
harm to the actual or potential market. For those works for which Plaintiffs 
demonstrated that digital permissions were available, the District Court 
considered the evidence demonstrating that the actual harm to the value 
of Plaintiffs’ copyright was minor (because the fees Defendants would have 
paid for a small number of licenses for the works in question amounted to 
a relatively small amount), but reasonably concluded that widespread 
conduct of the sort engaged in by Defendants would cause substantial 
harm. Thus, although the District Court required Plaintiffs to go forward 
with evidence of license availability, the District Court properly kept the 
ultimate burden of persuasion on Defendants on the question of market 
harm under the fourth factor. Accordingly, the District Court did not 
engage in improper burden shifting. 
 
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the District Court erred in finding that digital 
licenses for many of the works in question were unavailable in 2009. 
Plaintiffs point to the joint exhibit enumerating the allegations of 
infringement which were to be the basis of the trial, filed on March 15, 
2011. Plaintiffs note that this document identified what it would have cost 
in 2009 to license each of the works at issue through CCC. Defendants, 
however, argue that the joint exhibit merely depicts what the permission 
fee for each work might have been using the standard per-page rates 
charged by CCC for each publisher. The District Court accepted this 
argument, noting that “[t]he fact that a license to copy an excerpt of an 
individual work would have cost a particular amount is not a substitute for 
evidence that the license was actually available.” 
 
Given the evidence in the record, it was reasonable for the District Court 
to find that a lack of direct evidence of availability indicated that licenses 
were unavailable. Cambridge’s representative testified that Cambridge 
does not allow excerpts of certain categories of books to be licensed through 
CCC, including reference and language books (as several of the works at 
issue here are). Representatives of Oxford, Cambridge, and CCC testified, 
but did not explain whether digital licenses for excerpts were available in 
2009 for the books at issue in this case.37 The District Court also noted 
that the record shows that Cambridge and Oxford have been reluctant to 
make digital excerpts available. Thus, the District Court’s findings of fact 
regarding license availability are not clearly erroneous. 
 
The District Court engaged in a careful investigation of the evidence in the 
record, properly considered the availability of digital permissions in 2009, 
and appropriately placed the burden of going forward with the evidence on 
this issue on Plaintiffs. Accordingly, we find that the District Court did not 
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err in its application of the fourth factor. However, because Defendants’ 
copying was nontransformative and the threat of market substitution was 
therefore serious, the District Court erred by not affording the fourth factor 




The District Court enumerated two additional, purportedly non-statutory 
considerations which it held favored fair use: (1) that “[l]imited unpaid 
copying of excerpts will not deter academic authors from creating new 
academic works,” and (2) that “[t]he slight limitation of permissions income 
caused by the fair use authorized by this Order will not appreciably 
diminish Plaintiffs’ ability to publish scholarly works and will promote the 
spread of knowledge.” Id. at 1240. Although it is within the District Court’s 
discretion to go beyond the considerations set forth in the four factors, see 
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549, 105 S.Ct. at 2225 (explaining that the four 
statutory fair use factors are nonexclusive), the District Court’s 
supplemental considerations are not actually supplemental, and as such 
should have instead been considered within the existing statutory 
framework.  
 
The District Court’s first additional consideration was more properly 
considered under the first fair use factor—“the purpose and character of 
the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes.” 17 U.S.C. § 107(1). Nonprofit educational 
uses are more likely to be fair because they promote the ultimate aims of 
copyright—the creation and dissemination of knowledge. Both of these 
aims must be kept in mind when evaluating a claim of fair use. Thus, 
whether the limited unpaid copying of excerpts will deter academic authors 
from creating is relevant. Nevertheless, it is the publishers—not academic 
authors—that are the holders of the copyrights at issue here. Publishers—
not authors—are claiming infringement. Thus, when determining whether 
Defendants’ unpaid copying should be excused under the doctrine of fair 
use in this case, we are primarily concerned with the effect of Defendants’ 
copying on Plaintiffs’ incentive to publish, not on academic authors’ 
incentive to write.  
 
The District Court’s second additional consideration may be divided into 
two findings. First, the District Court found that a slight diminution of 
Plaintiffs’ permissions income caused by Defendants’ fair use would not 
appreciably harm Plaintiffs’ ability to publish scholarly works. However, 
this consideration is adequately dealt with under the fourth factor, which, 
as we have explained, asks whether the market harm caused by 
Defendants’ unpaid copying will materially impair Plaintiffs’ incentive to 
publish. 
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Second, the District Court found that that “it is consistent with the 
principles of copyright to apply the fair use doctrine in a way that promotes 
the dissemination of knowledge, and not simply its creation,” and treated 
this as a basis to allow the slight diminution of Plaintiffs’ permissions 
income caused by Defendants’ unpaid copying. Cambridge Univ. Press, 863 
F.Supp.2d at 1241. We agree with the proposition that applying fair use in 
a manner which promotes the dissemination of knowledge is consistent 
with the goals of copyright. See Golan v. Holder, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 
873, 888, 181 L.Ed.2d 835 (2012) (explaining that the Progress of Science, 
which Congress is empowered to promote pursuant to the Copyright 
Clause, “refers broadly to the creation and spread of knowledge and 
learning” (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted)). However, all 
unpaid copying could be said to promote the spread of knowledge, so this 
principal is not particularly helpful in “separating the fair use sheep from 
the infringing goats.” See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586, 114 S.Ct. at 1175. To 
the extent that it is relevant here, this consideration is more neatly dealt 
with under the first factor, which teaches that educational uses—which 
certainly promote the dissemination of knowledge—are more likely to be 
fair. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the District Court erred by separating the 
following considerations from its analysis of the first and fourth factors: (1) 
whether limited unpaid copying of excerpts will deter authors from 
creating new academic works, and (2) whether the slight limitation of 
permissions income caused by Defendants’ use would promote the spread 
of knowledge and would not appreciably diminish Plaintiffs’ ability to 




In sum, we hold that the District Court did not err in performing a work-
by-work analysis of individual instances of alleged infringement in order 
to determine the need for injunctive relief. However, the District Court did 
err by giving each of the four fair use factors equal weight, and by treating 
the four factors mechanistically. The District Court should have 
undertaken a holistic analysis which carefully balanced the four factors in 
the manner we have explained. 
 
The District Court did not err in holding that the first factor—the purpose 
and character of the use—favors fair use. Although Defendants’ use was 
nontransformative, it was also for nonprofit educational purposes, which 
are favored under the fair use statute. However, the District Court did err 
in holding that the second fair use factor—the nature of the copyrighted 
work—favors fair use in every case. Though this factor is of comparatively 
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little weight in this case, particularly because the works at issue are 
neither fictional nor unpublished, where the excerpt in question contained 
evaluative, analytical, or subjectively descriptive material that surpasses 
the bare facts, or derive from the author’s own experiences or opinions, the 
District Court should have held that the second factor was neutral or even 
weighed against fair use where such material dominated.  
 
With regard to the third factor—the amount used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole—the District Court erred in setting a 10 
percent-or-one-chapter benchmark. The District Court should have 
performed this analysis on a work-by-work basis, taking into account 
whether the amount taken—qualitatively and quantitatively—was 
reasonable in light of the pedagogical purpose of the use and the threat of 
market substitution. However, the District Court appropriately measured 
the amount copied based on the length of the entire book in all cases, 
declined to give much weight to the Classroom Guidelines, and found that 
the Defendants’ educational purpose may increase the amount of 
permissible copying. 
 
With regard to the fourth factor—the effect of Defendants’ use on the 
market for the original—the District Court did not err. However, because 
Defendants’ unpaid copying was nontransformative and they used 
Plaintiffs’ works for one of the purposes for which they are marketed, the 
threat of market substitution is severe. Therefore, the District Court 
should have afforded the fourth fair use factor more significant weight in 
its overall fair use analysis. Finally, the District Court erred by separating 
two considerations from its analysis of the first and fourth fair use factors, 
as described above supra part III.D.5. 
 
*** 
Accordingly, we REVERSE the judgment of the District Court. We 
VACATE the injunction, declaratory relief, and award of fees and costs to 





THE AUTHORS GUILD V. GOOGLE, INC. 
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit 
Oct. 16, 2015 
804 F.3d 202 
 
LEVAL, Circuit Judge: 
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This copyright dispute tests the boundaries of fair use. Plaintiffs, who are 
authors of published books under copyright, sued Google, Inc. (“Google”) for 
copyright infringement in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York (Chin, J.). They appeal from the grant of summary 
judgment in Google’s favor. Through its Library Project and its Google Books 
project, acting without permission of rights holders, Google has made digital 
copies of tens of millions of books, including Plaintiffs’, that were submitted to 
it for that purpose by major libraries. Google has scanned the digital copies 
and established a publicly available search function. An Internet user can use 
this function to search without charge to determine whether the book contains 
a specified word or term and also see “snippets” of text containing the searched-
for terms. In addition, Google has allowed the participating libraries to 
download and retain digital copies of the books they submit, under agreements 
which commit the libraries not to use their digital copies in violation of the 
copyright laws. These activities of Google are alleged to constitute 
infringement of Plaintiffs’ copyrights. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and 
declaratory relief as well as damages. 
  
Google defended on the ground that its actions constitute “fair use,” which, 
under 17 U.S.C. § 107, is “not an infringement.” The district court agreed.  
Plaintiffs brought this appeal. 
  
Plaintiffs contend the district court’s ruling was flawed in several respects. 
They argue: (1) Google’s digital copying of entire books, allowing users through 
the snippet function to read portions, is not a “transformative use” within the 
meaning of Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–585, 114 
S.Ct. 1164, 127 L.Ed.2d 500 (1994), and provides a substitute for Plaintiffs’ 
works; (2) notwithstanding that Google provides public access to the search 
and snippet functions without charge and without advertising, its ultimate 
commercial profit motivation and its derivation of revenue from its dominance 
of the world-wide Internet search market to which the books project 
contributes, preclude a finding of fair use; (3) even if Google’s copying and 
revelations of text do not infringe plaintiffs’ books, they infringe Plaintiffs’ 
derivative rights in search functions, depriving Plaintiffs of revenues or other 
benefits they would gain from licensed search markets; (4) Google’s storage of 
digital copies exposes Plaintiffs to the risk that hackers will make their books 
freely (or cheaply) available on the Internet, destroying the value of their 
copyrights; and (5) Google’s distribution of digital copies to participant 
libraries is not a transformative use, and it subjects Plaintiffs to the risk of loss 
of copyright revenues through access allowed by libraries. We reject these 
arguments and conclude that the district court correctly sustained Google’s fair 
use defense. 
  
Google’s making of a digital copy to provide a search function is a 
transformative use, which augments public knowledge by making available 
information about Plaintiffs’ books without providing the public with a 
substantial substitute for matter protected by the Plaintiffs’ copyright 
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interests in the original works or derivatives of them. The same is true, at least 
under present conditions, of Google’s provision of the snippet function. 
Plaintiffs’ contention that Google has usurped their opportunity to access paid 
and unpaid licensing markets for substantially the same functions that Google 
provides fails, in part because the licensing markets in fact involve very 
different functions than those that Google provides, and in part because an 
author’s derivative rights do not include an exclusive right to supply 
information (of the sort provided by Google) about her works. Google’s profit 
motivation does not in these circumstances justify denial of fair use. Google’s 
program does not, at this time and on the record before us, expose Plaintiffs to 
an unreasonable risk of loss of copyright value through incursions of hackers. 
Finally, Google’s provision of digital copies to participating libraries, 
authorizing them to make non-infringing uses, is non-infringing, and the mere 
speculative possibility that the libraries might allow use of their copies in an 
infringing manner does not make Google a contributory infringer. Plaintiffs 
have failed to show a material issue of fact in dispute. 
  
We affirm the judgment. 
BACKGROUND 
I. Plaintiffs 
The author-plaintiffs are Jim Bouton, author of Ball Four; Betty Miles, author 
of The Trouble with Thirteen; and Joseph Goulden, author of The 
Superlawyers: The Small and Powerful World of the Great Washington Law 
Firms. Each of them has a legal or beneficial ownership in the copyright for his 
or her book. Their books have been scanned without their permission by 
Google, which made them available to Internet users for search and snippet 
view on Google’s website. 
   II. Google Books and the Google Library Project 
Google’s Library Project, which began in 2004, involves bi-lateral agreements 
between Google and a number of the world’s major research libraries. Under 
these agreements, the participating libraries select books from their collections 
to submit to Google for inclusion in the project. Google makes a digital scan of 
each book, extracts a machine-readable text, and creates an index of the 
machine-readable text of each book. Google retains the original scanned image 
of each book, in part so as to improve the accuracy of the machine-readable 
texts and indices as image-to-text conversion technologies improve. 
  
Since 2004, Google has scanned, rendered machine-readable, and indexed 
more than 20 million books, including both copyrighted works and works in 
the public domain. The vast majority of the books are non-fiction, and most are 
out of print. All of the digital information created by Google in the process is 
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stored on servers protected by the same security systems Google uses to shield 
its own confidential information. 
  
The digital corpus created by the scanning of these millions of books enables 
the Google Books search engine. Members of the public who access the Google 
Books website can enter search words or terms of their own choice, receiving 
in response a list of all books in the database in which those terms appear, as 
well as the number of times the term appears in each book. A brief description 
of each book, entitled “About the Book,” gives some rudimentary additional 
information, including a list of the words and terms that appear with most 
frequency in the book. It sometimes provides links to buy the book online and 
identifies libraries where the book can be founThe search tool permits a 
researcher to identify those books, out of millions, that do, as well as those that 
do not, use the terms selected by the researcher. Google notes that this 
identifying information instantaneously supplied would otherwise not be 
obtainable in lifetimes of searching. 
  
No advertising is displayed to a user of the search function. Nor does Google 
receive payment by reason of the searcher’s use of Google’s link to purchase 
the book. 
  
The search engine also makes possible new forms of research, known as “text 
mining” and “data mining.” Google’s “ngrams” research tool draws on the 
Google Library Project corpus to furnish statistical information to Internet 
users about the frequency of word and phrase usage over centuries. This tool 
permits users to discern fluctuations of interest in a particular subject over 
time and space by showing increases and decreases in the frequency of 
reference and usage in different periods and different linguistic regions. It also 
allows researchers to comb over the tens of millions of books Google has 
scanned in order to examine “word frequencies, syntactic patterns, and 
thematic markers” and to derive information on how nomenclature, linguistic 
usage, and literary style have changed over time. The district court gave as an 
example “track[ing] the frequency of references to the United States as a single 
entity (‘the United States is’) versus references to the United States in the 
plural (‘the United States are’) and how that usage has changed over time.” 
  
The Google Books search function also allows the user a limited viewing of text. 
In addition to telling the number of times the word or term selected by the 
searcher appears in the book, the search function will display a maximum of 
three “snippets” containing it. A snippet is a horizontal segment comprising 
ordinarily an eighth of a page. Each page of a conventionally formatted book 
in the Google Books database is divided into eight non-overlapping horizontal 
segments, each such horizontal segment being a snippet. (Thus, for such a book 
with 24 lines to a page, each snippet is comprised of three lines of text.) Each 
search for a particular word or term within a book will reveal the same three 
snippets, regardless of the number of computers from which the search is 
launched. Only the first usage of the term on a given page is displayed. Thus, 
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if the top snippet of a page contains two (or more) words for which the user 
searches, and Google’s program is fixed to reveal that particular snippet in 
response to a search for either term, the second search will duplicate the 
snippet already revealed by the first search, rather than moving to reveal a 
different snippet containing the word because the first snippet was already 
revealed. Google’s program does not allow a searcher to increase the number 
of snippets revealed by repeated entry of the same search term or by entering 
searches from different computers. A searcher can view more than three 
snippets of a book by entering additional searches for different terms. 
However, Google makes permanently unavailable for snippet view one snippet 
on each page and one complete page out of every ten—a process Google calls 
“blacklisting.” 
  
Google also disables snippet view entirely for types of books for which a single 
snippet is likely to satisfy the searcher’s present need for the book, such as 
dictionaries, cookbooks, and books of short poems. Finally, since 2005, Google 
will exclude any book altogether from snippet view at the request of the rights 
holder by the submission of an online form. 
  
Under its contracts with the participating libraries, Google allows each library 
to download copies—of both the digital image and machine-readable versions—
of the books that library submitted to Google for scanning (but not of books 
submitted by other libraries). This is done by giving each participating library 
access to the Google Return Interface (“GRIN”). The agreements between 
Google and the libraries, although not in all respects uniform, require the 
libraries to abide by copyright law in utilizing the digital copies they download 
and to take precautions to prevent dissemination of their digital copies to the 
public at large. Through the GRIN facility, participant libraries have 
downloaded at least 2.7 million digital copies of their own volumes. 
  
 
     III. Procedural History 
Plaintiffs brought this suit on September 20, 2005, as a putative class action 
on behalf of similarly situated, rights-owning authors. After several years of 
negotiation, the parties reached a proposed settlement that would have 
resolved the claims on a class-wide basis. The proposed settlement allowed 
Google to make substantially more extensive use of its scans of copyrighted 
books than contemplated under the present judgment, and provided that 
Google would make payments to the rights holders in return. On March 22, 
2011, however, the district court rejected the proposed settlement as unfair to 
the class members who relied on the named plaintiffs to represent their 
interests. 
  
On October 14, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a fourth amended class action complaint, 
which is the operative complaint for this appeal. The district court certified a 
class on May 31, 2012. Google appealed from the certification, and moved in 
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the district court for summary judgment on its fair use defense. Plaintiffs cross-
moved in the district court for summary judgment. On the appeal from the 
class certification, our court—questioning whether it was reasonable to infer 
that the putative class of authors favored the relief sought by the named 
plaintiffs—provisionally vacated that class certification without addressing 
the merits of the issue, concluding instead that “resolution of Google’s fair use 
defense in the first instance will necessarily inform and perhaps moot our 
analysis of many class certification issues.” Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 
721 F.3d 132, 134 (2d Cir.2013). 
  
On November 14, 2013, the district court granted Google’s motion for summary 
judgment, concluding that the uses made by Google of copyrighted books were 
fair uses, protected by § 107. Upon consideration of the four statutory factors 
of § 107, the district court found that Google’s uses were transformative, that 
its display of copyrighted material was properly limited, and that the Google 
Books program did not impermissibly serve as a market substitute for the 
original works. The court entered judgment initially on November 27, 2013, 
followed by an amended judgment on December 10, 2013, dismissing Plaintiffs’ 
claims with prejudice. Plaintiffs filed timely notice of appeal. 
  
DISCUSSION 
I. The Law of Fair Use 
The ultimate goal of copyright is to expand public knowledge and 
understanding, which copyright seeks to achieve by giving potential creators 
exclusive control over copying of their works, thus giving them a financial 
incentive to create informative, intellectually enriching works for public 
consumption. This objective is clearly reflected in the Constitution’s 
empowerment of Congress “To promote the Progress of Science ... by securing 
for limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings.” U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). Thus, while authors 
are undoubtedly important intended beneficiaries of copyright, the ultimate, 
primary intended beneficiary is the public, whose access to knowledge 
copyright seeks to advance by providing rewards for authorship. 
  
For nearly three hundred years, since shortly after the birth of copyright in 
England in 1710, courts have recognized that, in certain circumstances, giving 
authors absolute control over all copying from their works would tend in some 
circumstances to limit, rather than expand, public knowledge. In the words of 
Lord Ellenborough, “[W]hile I shall think myself bound to secure every man in 
the enjoyment of his copy-right, one must not put manacles upon science.” Cary 
v. Kearsley, 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 681, 4 Esp. 168, 170 (1802). Courts thus 
developed the doctrine, eventually named fair use, which permits 
unauthorized copying in some circumstances, so as to further “copyright’s very 
purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’ ” Campbell v. 
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Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575, 114 S.Ct. 1164, 127 L.Ed.2d 500 
(1994) (quoting U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8). Although well established in the 
common law development of copyright, fair use was not recognized in the terms 
of our statute until the adoption of § 107 in the Copyright Act of 1976. 17 U.S.C. 




The Campbell Court undertook a comprehensive analysis of fair use’s 
requirements, discussing every segment of § 107. Beginning with the examples 
of purposes set forth in the statute’s preamble, the Court made clear that they 
are “illustrative and not limitative” and “provide only general guidance about 
the sorts of copying that courts and Congress most commonly ha[ve] found to 
be fair uses.” 510 U.S. at 577–578, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). The statute “calls for case-by-case analysis” and “is not to 
be simplified with bright-line rules.” Id. at 577, 114 S.Ct. 1164. Section 107’s 
four factors are not to “be treated in isolation, one from another. All are to be 
explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of 
copyright.” Id. at 578, 114 S.Ct. 1164. Each factor thus stands as part of a 
multifaceted assessment of the crucial question: how to define the boundary 
limit of the original author’s exclusive rights in order to best serve the overall 
objectives of the copyright law to expand public learning while protecting the 
incentives of authors to create for the public good. 
  
At the same time, the Supreme Court has made clear that some of the statute’s 
four listed factors are more significant than others. The Court observed in 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises that the fourth factor, 
which assesses the harm the secondary use can cause to the market for, or the 
value of, the copyright for the original, “is undoubtedly the single most 
important element of fair use.” 471 U.S. 539, 566, 105 S.Ct. 2218, 85 L.Ed.2d 
588 (1985) (citing MELVILLE B. NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
13.05[A], at 13–76 (1984)). This is consistent with the fact that the copyright 
is a commercial right, intended to protect the ability of authors to profit from 
the exclusive right to merchandise their own work. 
  
In Campbell, the Court stressed also the importance of the first factor, the 
“purpose and character of the secondary use.” 17 U.S.C. § 107(1). The more the 
appropriator is using the copied material for new, transformative purposes, the 
more it serves copyright’s goal of enriching public knowledge and the less likely 
it is that the appropriation will serve as a substitute for the original or its 
plausible derivatives, shrinking the protected market opportunities of the 
copyrighted work. 510 U.S. at 591, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (noting that, when the 
secondary use is transformative, “market substitution is at least less certain, 
and market harm may not be so readily inferred.”). 
  
With this background, we proceed to discuss each of the statutory factors, as 
illuminated by Campbell and subsequent case law, in relation to the issues 
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here in dispute. 
II. The Search and Snippet View Functions 
A. Factor One 
 
(1) Transformative purpose. Campbell ‘s explanation of the first factor’s inquiry 
into the “purpose and character” of the secondary use focuses on whether the 
new work, “in Justice Story’s words, ... merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the 
original creation, ... or instead adds something new, with a further purpose.... 
[I]t asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is 
‘transformative.’ ” 510 U.S. at 578–579, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (citations omitted). 
While recognizing that a transformative use is “not absolutely necessary for a 
finding of fair use,” the opinion further explains that the “goal of copyright, to 
promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of 
transformative works” and that “[s]uch works thus lie at the heart of the fair 
use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright.” 
Id. at 579, 114 S.Ct. 1164. In other words, transformative uses tend to favor a 
fair use finding because a transformative use is one that communicates 
something new and different from the original or expands its utility, thus 
serving copyright’s overall objective of contributing to public knowledge. 
  
The word “transformative” cannot be taken too literally as a sufficient key to 
understanding the elements of fair use. It is rather a suggestive symbol for a 
complex thought, and does not mean that any and all changes made to an 
author’s original text will necessarily support a finding of fair use. The 
Supreme Court’s discussion in Campbell gave important guidance on assessing 
when a transformative use tends to support a conclusion of fair use. The 
defendant in that case defended on the ground that its work was a parody of 
the original and that parody is a time-honored category of fair use. Explaining 
why parody makes a stronger, or in any event more obvious, claim of fair use 
than satire, the Court stated, 
[T]he heart of any parodist’s claim to quote from existing 
material ... is the use of ... a prior author’s composition to 
... comment[ ] on that author’s works.... If, on the contrary, 
the commentary has no critical bearing on the substance 
or style of the original composition, which the alleged 
infringer merely uses to get attention or to avoid the 
drudgery in working up something fresh, the claim to 
fairness in borrowing from another’s work diminishes 
accordingly (if it does not vanish).... Parody needs to mimic 
an original to make its point, and so has some claim to use 
the creation of its victim’s ... imagination, whereas satire 
can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification 
for the very act of borrowing. 
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Id. at 580–81, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (emphasis added). In other words, the would-be 
fair user of another’s work must have justification for the taking. A secondary 
author is not necessarily at liberty to make wholesale takings of the original 
author’s expression merely because of how well the original author’s expression 
would convey the secondary author’s different message. Among the best 
recognized justifications for copying from another’s work is to provide comment 
on it or criticism of it. A taking from another author’s work for the purpose of 
making points that have no bearing on the original may well be fair use, but 
the taker would need to show a justification. This part of the Supreme Court’s 
discussion is significant in assessing Google’s claim of fair use because, as 
discussed extensively below, Google’s claim of transformative purpose for 
copying from the works of others is to provide otherwise unavailable 
information about the originals. 
  
A further complication that can result from oversimplified reliance on whether 
the copying involves transformation is that the word “transform” also plays a 
role in defining “derivative works,” over which the original rights holder 
retains exclusive control. Section 106 of the Act specifies the “exclusive right[ 
]” of the copyright owner “(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the 
copyrighted work.” See 17 U.S.C. § 106. The statute defines derivative works 
largely by example, rather than explanation. The examples include 
“translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion 
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement, 
condensation,” to which list the statute adds “any other form in which a work 
may be ... transformed.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). As we noted in 
Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, “[p]aradigmatic examples of derivative 
works include the translation of a novel into another language, the adaptation 
of a novel into a movie or play, or the recasting of a novel as an e-book or an 
audiobook.” 755 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir.2014). While such changes can be described 
as transformations, they do not involve the kind of transformative purpose that 
favors a fair use finding. The statutory definition suggests that derivative 
works generally involve transformations in the nature of changes of form. 17 
U.S.C. § 101. By contrast, copying from an original for the purpose of criticism 
or commentary on the original or provision of information about it, tends most 
clearly to satisfy Campbell ‘s notion of the “transformative” purpose involved 
in the analysis of Factor One. 
  
With these considerations in mind, we first consider whether Google’s search 
and snippet views functions satisfy the first fair use factor with respect to 
Plaintiffs’ rights in their books. (The question whether these functions might 
infringe upon Plaintiffs’ derivative rights is discussed in the next Part.) 
  
(2) Search Function. We have no difficulty concluding that Google’s making of 
a digital copy of Plaintiffs’ books for the purpose of enabling a search for 
identification of books containing a term of interest to the searcher involves a 
highly transformative purpose, in the sense intended by Campbell. Our court’s 
exemplary discussion in HathiTrust informs our ruling. That case involved a 
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dispute that is closely related, although not identical, to this one. Authors 
brought claims of copyright infringement against HathiTrust, an entity formed 
by libraries participating in the Google Library Project to pool the digital copies 
of their books created for them by Google. The suit challenged various usages 
HathiTrust made of the digital copies. Among the challenged uses was 
HathiTrust’s offer to its patrons of “full-text searches,” which, very much like 
the search offered by Google Books to Internet users, permitted patrons of the 
libraries to locate in which of the digitized books specific words or phrases 
appeared. 755 F.3d at 98. (HathiTrust’s search facility did not include the 
snippet view function, or any other display of text.) We concluded that both the 
making of the digital copies and the use of those copies to offer the search tool 
were fair uses. Id. at 105. 
  
Notwithstanding that the libraries had downloaded and stored complete 
digital copies of entire books, we noted that such copying was essential to 
permit searchers to identify and locate the books in which words or phrases of 
interest to them appeared. Id. at 97. We concluded “that the creation of a full-
text searchable database is a quintessentially transformative use ... [as] the 
result of a word search is different in purpose, character, expression, meaning, 
and message from the page (and the book) from which it is drawn.” Id. We cited 
A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 639–40 (4th 
Cir.2009), Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th 
Cir.2007), and Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir.2003) as 
examples of cases in which courts had similarly found the creation of complete 
digital copies of copyrighted works to be transformative fair uses when the 
copies “served a different function from the original.” HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 
97. 
  
As with HathiTrust (and iParadigms ), the purpose of Google’s copying of the 
original copyrighted books is to make available significant information about 
those books, permitting a searcher to identify those that contain a word or term 
of interest, as well as those that do not include reference to it. In addition, 
through the ngrams tool, Google allows readers to learn the frequency of usage 
of selected words in the aggregate corpus of published books in different 
historical periods. We have no doubt that the purpose of this copying is the sort 
of transformative purpose described in Campbell as strongly favoring 
satisfaction of the first factor. 
  
We recognize that our case differs from HathiTrust in two potentially 
significant respects. First, HathiTrust did not “display to the user any text 
from the underlying copyrighted work,” 755 F.3d at 91, whereas Google Books 
provides the searcher with snippets containing the word that is the subject of 
the search. Second, HathiTrust was a nonprofit educational entity, while 
Google is a profit-motivated commercial corporation. We discuss those 
differences below. 
  
(3) Snippet View. Plaintiffs correctly point out that this case is significantly 
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different from HathiTrust in that the Google Books search function allows 
searchers to read snippets from the book searched, whereas HathiTrust did not 
allow searchers to view any part of the book. Snippet view adds important 
value to the basic transformative search function, which tells only whether and 
how often the searched term appears in the book. Merely knowing that a term 
of interest appears in a book does not necessarily tell the searcher whether she 
needs to obtain the book, because it does not reveal whether the term is 
discussed in a manner or context falling within the scope of the searcher’s 
interest. For example, a searcher seeking books that explore Einstein’s 
theories, who finds that a particular book includes 39 usages of “Einstein,” will 
nonetheless conclude she can skip that book if the snippets reveal that the book 
speaks of “Einstein” because that is the name of the author’s cat. In contrast, 
the snippet will tell the searcher that this is a book she needs to obtain if the 
snippet shows that the author is engaging with Einstein’s theories. 
  
Google’s division of the page into tiny snippets is designed to show the searcher 
just enough context surrounding the searched term to help her evaluate 
whether the book falls within the scope of her interest (without revealing so 
much as to threaten the author’s copyright interests). Snippet view thus adds 
importantly to the highly transformative purpose of identifying books of 
interest to the searcher. With respect to the first factor test, it favors a finding 
of fair use (unless the value of its transformative purpose is overcome by its 
providing text in a manner that offers a competing substitute for Plaintiffs’ 
books, which we discuss under factors three and four below). 
  
(4) Google’s Commercial Motivation. Plaintiffs also contend that Google’s 
commercial motivation weighs in their favor under the first factor. Google’s 
commercial motivation distinguishes this case from HathiTrust, as the 
defendant in that case was a non-profit entity founded by, and acting as the 
representative of, libraries. Although Google has no revenues flowing directly 
from its operation of the Google Books functions, Plaintiffs stress that Google 
is profit-motivated and seeks to use its dominance of book search to fortify its 
overall dominance of the Internet search market, and that thereby Google 
indirectly reaps profits from the Google Books functions. 
  
For these arguments Plaintiffs rely primarily on two sources. First is 
Congress’s specification in spelling out the first fair use factor in the text of § 
107 that consideration of the “purpose and character of the [secondary] use” 
should “include[e] whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes.” Second is the Supreme Court’s assertion in 
dictum in Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc, that 
“every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively ... unfair.” 464 
U.S. 417, 451, 104 S.Ct. 774, 78 L.Ed.2d 574 (1984). If that were the extent of 
precedential authority on the relevance of commercial motivation, Plaintiffs’ 
arguments would muster impressive support. However, while the commercial 
motivation of the secondary use can undoubtedly weigh against a finding of 
fair use in some circumstances, the Supreme Court, our court, and others have 
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eventually recognized that the Sony dictum was enormously overstated. 
  
The Sixth Circuit took the Sony dictum at its word in Acuff–Rose Music, Inc. v. 
Campbell, concluding that, because the defendant rap music group’s spoof of 
the plaintiff’s ballad was done for profit, it could not be fair use. 972 F.2d 1429, 
1436–1437 (6th Cir.1992). The Supreme Court reversed on this very point, 
observing that “Congress could not have intended” such a broad presumption 
against commercial fair uses, as “nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the 
preamble paragraph of § 107 ... are generally conducted for profit in this 
country.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted). The Court emphasized Congress’s statement in the 
House Report to the effect that the commercial or nonprofit character of a work 
is “not conclusive” but merely “a fact to be ‘weighed along with other[s] in fair 
use decisions.’ ” Id. at 585, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 94–1476, at 
66 (1976)). In explaining the first fair use factor, the Court clarified that “the 
more transformative the [secondary] work, the less will be the significance of 
other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.” 
Id. at 579, 114 S.Ct. 1164. 
  
Our court has since repeatedly rejected the contention that commercial 
motivation should outweigh a convincing transformative purpose and absence 
of significant substitutive competition with the original. See Cariou v. Prince, 
714 F.3d 694, 708 (2d Cir.2013), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 618, 187 
L.Ed.2d 411 (2013) (“The commercial/nonprofit dichotomy concerns the 
unfairness that arises when a secondary user makes unauthorized use of 
copyrighted material to capture significant revenues as a direct consequence 
of copying the original work. This factor must be applied with caution because, 
as the Supreme Court has recognized, Congress could not have intended a rule 
that commercial uses are presumptively unfair. Instead, the more 
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, 
like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”) (internal 
quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. 
v. Carol Pub. Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141–42 (2d Cir.1998) ( “We ... do not give 
much weight to the fact that the secondary use was for commercial gain. The 
more critical inquiry under the first factor and in fair use analysis generally is 
whether the allegedly infringing work merely supersedes the original work or 
instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, 
altering the first with new meaning or message, in other words whether and 
to what extent the new work is transformative.”) (internal quotation marks, 
citations, and alterations omitted). 
  
While we recognize that in some circumstances, a commercial motivation on 
the part of the secondary user will weigh against her, especially, as the 
Supreme Court suggested, when a persuasive transformative purpose is 
lacking, Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, 114 S.Ct. 1164, we see no reason in this 
case why Google’s overall profit motivation should prevail as a reason for 
denying fair use over its highly convincing transformative purpose, together 
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with the absence of significant substitutive competition, as reasons for 
granting fair use. Many of the most universally accepted forms of fair use, such 
as news reporting and commentary, quotation in historical or analytic books, 
reviews of books, and performances, as well as parody, are all normally done 
commercially for profit. 
B. Factor Two 
The second fair use factor directs consideration of the “nature of the 
copyrighted work.” While the “transformative purpose” inquiry discussed 
above is conventionally treated as a part of first factor analysis, it inevitably 
involves the second factor as well. One cannot assess whether the copying work 
has an objective that differs from the original without considering both works, 
and their respective objectives. 
  
The second factor has rarely played a significant role in the determination of a 
fair use dispute. See WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE § 4.1 (2015). 
The Supreme Court in Harper & Row made a passing observation in dictum 
that, “[t]he law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual 
works than works of fiction or fantasy.” 471 U.S. 539, 563, 105 S.Ct. 2218 
(1985). Courts have sometimes speculated that this might mean that a finding 
of fair use is more favored when the copying is of factual works than when 
copying is from works of fiction. However, while the copyright does not protect 
facts or ideas set forth in a work, it does protect that author’s manner of 
expressing those facts and ideas. At least unless a persuasive fair use 
justification is involved, authors of factual works, like authors of fiction, should 
be entitled to copyright protection of their protected expression. The mere fact 
that the original is a factual work therefore should not imply that others may 
freely copy it. Those who report the news undoubtedly create factual works. It 
cannot seriously be argued that, for that reason, others may freely copy and re-
disseminate news reports. 
  
In considering the second factor in HathiTrust, we concluded that it was “not 
dispositive,” 755 F.3d at 98, commenting that courts have hardly ever found 
that the second factor in isolation played a large role in explaining a fair use 
decision. The same is true here. While each of the three Plaintiffs’ books in this 
case is factual, we do not consider that as a boost to Google’s claim of fair use. 
If one (or all) of the plaintiff works were fiction, we do not think that would 
change in any way our appraisal. Nothing in this case influences us one way 
or the other with respect to the second factor considered in isolation. To the 
extent that the “nature” of the original copyrighted work necessarily combines 
with the “purpose and character” of the secondary work to permit assessment 
of whether the secondary work uses the original in a “transformative” manner, 
as the term is used in Campbell, the second factor favors fair use not because 
Plaintiffs’ works are factual, but because the secondary use transformatively 
provides valuable information about the original, rather than replicating 
protected expression in a manner that provides a meaningful substitute for the 
original. 
CH. 1  165 
  
 
C. Factor Three 
The third statutory factor instructs us to consider “the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole.” The clear implication of the third factor is that a finding of fair use is 
more likely when small amounts, or less important passages, are copied than 
when the copying is extensive, or encompasses the most important parts of the 
original. The obvious reason for this lies in the relationship between the third 
and the fourth factors. The larger the amount, or the more important the part, 
of the original that is copied, the greater the likelihood that the secondary work 
might serve as an effectively competing substitute for the original, and might 
therefore diminish the original rights holder’s sales and profits. 
  
(1) Search Function. The Google Books program has made a digital copy of the 
entirety of each of Plaintiffs’ books. Notwithstanding the reasonable 
implication of Factor Three that fair use is more likely to be favored by the 
copying of smaller, rather than larger, portions of the original, courts have 
rejected any categorical rule that a copying of the entirety cannot be a fair use. 
Complete unchanged copying has repeatedly been found justified as fair use 
when the copying was reasonably appropriate to achieve the copier’s 
transformative purpose and was done in such a manner that it did not offer a 
competing substitute for the original. The Supreme Court said in Campbell 
that “the extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and character 
of the use” and characterized the relevant questions as whether “the amount 
and substantiality of the portion used ... are reasonable in relation to the 
purpose of the copying,” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586–587, 114 S.Ct. 1164, noting 
that the answer to that question will be affected by “the degree to which the 
[copying work] may serve as a market substitute for the original or potentially 
licensed derivatives,” id. at 587–588, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (finding that, in the case 
of a parodic song, “how much ... is reasonable will depend, say, on the extent to 
which the song’s overriding purpose and character is to parody the original or, 
in contrast, the likelihood that the parody may serve as a market substitute 
for the original”). 
  
In HathiTrust, our court concluded in its discussion of the third factor that 
“[b]ecause it was reasonably necessary for the [HathiTrust Digital Library] to 
make use of the entirety of the works in order to enable the full-text search 
function, we do not believe the copying was excessive.” 755 F.3d at 98. As with 
HathiTrust, not only is the copying of the totality of the original reasonably 
appropriate to Google’s transformative purpose, it is literally necessary to 
achieve that purpose. If Google copied less than the totality of the originals, its 
search function could not advise searchers reliably whether their searched 
term appears in a book (or how many times). 
  
While Google makes an unauthorized digital copy of the entire book, it does not 
reveal that digital copy to the public. The copy is made to enable the search 
166  CH.  1 
  
functions to reveal limited, important information about the books. With 
respect to the search function, Google satisfies the third factor test, as 
illuminated by the Supreme Court in Campbell. 
  
(2) Snippet View. Google’s provision of snippet view makes our third factor 
inquiry different from that inquiry in HathiTrust. What matters in such cases 
is not so much “the amount and substantiality of the portion used” in making 
a copy, but rather the amount and substantiality of what is thereby made 
accessible to a public for which it may serve as a competing substitute. In 
HathiTrust, notwithstanding the defendant’s full-text copying, the search 
function revealed virtually nothing of the text of the originals to the public. 
Here, through the snippet view, more is revealed to searchers than in 
HathiTrust. 
  
Without doubt, enabling searchers to see portions of the copied texts could have 
determinative effect on the fair use analysis. The larger the quantity of the 
copyrighted text the searcher can see and the more control the searcher can 
exercise over what part of the text she sees, the greater the likelihood that 
those revelations could serve her as an effective, free substitute for the 
purchase of the plaintiff’s book. We nonetheless conclude that, at least as 
presently structured by Google, the snippet view does not reveal matter that 
offers the marketplace a significantly competing substitute for the copyrighted 
work. 
  
Google has constructed the snippet feature in a manner that substantially 
protects against its serving as an effectively competing substitute for Plaintiffs’ 
books. In the Background section of this opinion, we describe a variety of 
limitations Google imposes on the snippet function. These include the small 
size of the snippets (normally one eighth of a page), the blacklisting of one 
snippet per page and of one page in every ten, the fact that no more than three 
snippets are shown—and no more than one per page—for each term searched, 
and the fact that the same snippets are shown for a searched term no matter 
how many times, or from how many different computers, the term is searched. 
In addition, Google does not provide snippet view for types of books, such as 
dictionaries and cookbooks, for which viewing a small segment is likely to 
satisfy the searcher’s need. The result of these restrictions is, so far as the 
record demonstrates, that a searcher cannot succeed, even after long extended 
effort to multiply what can be revealed, in revealing through a snippet search 
what could usefully serve as a competing substitute for the original. 
  
The blacklisting, which permanently blocks about 22% of a book’s text from 
snippet view, is by no means the most important of the obstacles Google has 
designed. While it is true that the blacklisting of 22% leaves 78% of a book 
theoretically accessible to a searcher, it does not follow that any large part of 
that 78% is in fact accessible. The other restrictions built into the program 
work together to ensure that, even after protracted effort over a substantial 
period of time, only small and randomly scattered portions of a book will be 
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accessible. In an effort to show what large portions of text searchers can read 
through persistently augmented snippet searches, Plaintiffs’ counsel employed 
researchers over a period of weeks to do multiple word searches on Plaintiffs’ 
books. In no case were they able to access as much as 16% of the text, and the 
snippets collected were usually not sequential but scattered randomly 
throughout the book. Because Google’s snippets are arbitrarily and uniformly 
divided by lines of text, and not by complete sentences, paragraphs, or any 
measure dictated by content, a searcher would have great difficulty 
constructing a search so as to provide any extensive information about the 
book’s use of that term. As snippet view never reveals more than one snippet 
per page in response to repeated searches for the same term, it is at least 
difficult, and often impossible, for a searcher to gain access to more than a 
single snippet’s worth of an extended, continuous discussion of the term. 
  
The fact that Plaintiffs’ searchers managed to reveal nearly 16% of the text of 
Plaintiffs’ books overstates the degree to which snippet view can provide a 
meaningful substitute. At least as important as the percentage of words of a 
book that are revealed is the manner and order in which they are revealed. 
Even if the search function revealed 100% of the words of the copyrighted book, 
this would be of little substitutive value if the words were revealed in 
alphabetical order, or any order other than the order they follow in the original 
book. It cannot be said that a revelation is “substantial” in the sense intended 
by the statute’s third factor if the revelation is in a form that communicates 
little of the sense of the original. The fragmentary and scattered nature of the 
snippets revealed, even after a determined, assiduous, time-consuming search, 
results in a revelation that is not “substantial,” even if it includes an aggregate 
16% of the text of the book. If snippet view could be used to reveal a coherent 
block amounting to 16% of a book, that would raise a very different question 
beyond the scope of our inquiry. 
D. Factor Four 
The fourth fair use factor, “the effect of the [copying] use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work,” focuses on whether the copy 
brings to the marketplace a competing substitute for the original, or its 
derivative, so as to deprive the rights holder of significant revenues because of 
the likelihood that potential purchasers may opt to acquire the copy in 
preference to the original. Because copyright is a commercial doctrine whose 
objective is to stimulate creativity among potential authors by enabling them 
to earn money from their creations, the fourth factor is of great importance in 
making a fair use assessment. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566, 105 S.Ct. 
2218 (describing the fourth factor as “undoubtedly the single most important 
element of fair use”). 
  
Campbell stressed the close linkage between the first and fourth factors, in 
that the more the copying is done to achieve a purpose that differs from the 
purpose of the original, the less likely it is that the copy will serve as a 
satisfactory substitute for the original. 510 U.S. at 591, 114 S.Ct. 1164. 
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Consistent with that observation, the HathiTrust court found that the fourth 
factor favored the defendant and supported a finding of fair use because the 
ability to search the text of the book to determine whether it includes selected 
words “does not serve as a substitute for the books that are being searched.” 
755 F.3d at 100. 
  
However, Campbell ‘s observation as to the likelihood of a secondary use 
serving as an effective substitute goes only so far. Even if the purpose of the 
copying is for a valuably transformative purpose, such copying might 
nonetheless harm the value of the copyrighted original if done in a manner 
that results in widespread revelation of sufficiently significant portions of the 
original as to make available a significantly competing substitute. The 
question for us is whether snippet view, notwithstanding its transformative 
purpose, does that. We conclude that, at least as snippet view is presently 
constructed, it does not. 
  
Especially in view of the fact that the normal purchase price of a book is 
relatively low in relation to the cost of manpower needed to secure an arbitrary 
assortment of randomly scattered snippets, we conclude that the snippet 
function does not give searchers access to effectively competing substitutes. 
Snippet view, at best and after a large commitment of manpower, produces 
discontinuous, tiny fragments, amounting in the aggregate to no more than 
16% of a book. This does not threaten the rights holders with any significant 
harm to the value of their copyrights or diminish their harvest of copyright 
revenue. 
  
We recognize that the snippet function can cause some loss of sales. There are 
surely instances in which a searcher’s need for access to a text will be satisfied 
by the snippet view, resulting in either the loss of a sale to that searcher, or 
reduction of demand on libraries for that title, which might have resulted in 
libraries purchasing additional copies. But the possibility, or even the 
probability or certainty, of some loss of sales does not suffice to make the copy 
an effectively competing substitute that would tilt the weighty fourth factor in 
favor of the rights holder in the original. There must be a meaningful or 
significant effect “upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.” 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). 
  
Furthermore, the type of loss of sale envisioned above will generally occur in 
relation to interests that are not protected by the copyright. A snippet’s 
capacity to satisfy a searcher’s need for access to a copyrighted book will at 
times be because the snippet conveys a historical fact that the searcher needs 
to ascertain. For example, a student writing a paper on Franklin D. Roosevelt 
might need to learn the year Roosevelt was stricken with polio. By entering 
“Roosevelt polio” in a Google Books search, the student would be taken to 
(among numerous sites) a snippet from page 31 of Richard Thayer Goldberg’s 
The Making of Franklin D. Roosevelt (1981), telling that the polio attack 
occurred in 1921. This would satisfy the searcher’s need for the book, 
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eliminating any need to purchase it or acquire it from a library. But what the 
searcher derived from the snippet was a historical fact. Author Goldberg’s 
copyright does not extend to the facts communicated by his book. It protects 
only the author’s manner of expression. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir.1980) (“A grant of copyright in a published work 
secures for its author a limited monopoly over the expression it contains.”) 
(emphasis added). Google would be entitled, without infringement of 
Goldberg’s copyright, to answer the student’s query about the year Roosevelt 
was afflicted, taking the information from Goldberg’s book. The fact that, in 
the case of the student’s snippet search, the information came embedded in 
three lines of Goldberg’s writing, which were superfluous to the searcher’s 
needs, would not change the taking of an unprotected fact into a copyright 
infringement. 
  
Even if the snippet reveals some authorial expression, because of the brevity 
of a single snippet and the cumbersome, disjointed, and incomplete nature of 
the aggregation of snippets made available through snippet view, we think it 
would be a rare case in which the searcher’s interest in the protected aspect of 
the author’s work would be satisfied by what is available from snippet view, 
and rarer still—because of the cumbersome, disjointed, and incomplete nature 
of the aggregation of snippets made available through snippet view—that 
snippet view could provide a significant substitute for the purchase of the 
author’s book. 
  
Accordingly, considering the four fair use factors in light of the goals of 
copyright, we conclude that Google’s making of a complete digital copy of 
Plaintiffs’ works for the purpose of providing the public with its search and 
snippet view functions (at least as snippet view is presently designed) is a fair 
use and does not infringe Plaintiffs’ copyrights in their books. 
  
* * *  
In sum, we conclude that: (1) Google’s unauthorized digitizing of copyright-
protected works, creation of a search functionality, and display of snippets from 
those works are non-infringing fair uses. The purpose of the copying is highly 
transformative, the public display of text is limited, and the revelations do not 
provide a significant market substitute for the protected aspects of the 
originals. Google’s commercial nature and profit motivation do not justify 
denial of fair use. (2) Google’s provision of digitized copies to the libraries that 
supplied the books, on the understanding that the libraries will use the copies 
in a manner consistent with the copyright law, also does not constitute 
infringement. Nor, on this record, is Google a contributory infringer. 
 
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 
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3. OTHER LIMITATIONS: 
17 U.S.C. § 110 (Public performance and display) 
17 U.S.C. § 108 (Libraries and Archives) 
17 U.S.C. § 115 (Compulsory Licensing of Musical Works) 
17 U.S.C. § 120 (Architectural Works) 
17 U.S.C. § 112 (Ephemeral Recordings) 
17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 113(a)–(c), 116, 118–19, 121–22 (Various other limits) 
 
C.  MORAL RIGHTS 
MASSACHUSETTS MUSEUM OF 
CONTEMPORARY ART V. BUCHEL 
593 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2010). 
LIPEZ, CIRCUIT JUDGE. 
As one observer has noted, this case, which raises important and 
unsettled legal issues under the Visual Artists Rights Act (“VARA”), may 
well serve as “the ultimate how-not-to guide in the complicated world of 
installation art.” Geoff Edgers, Dismantled, The Boston Globe, Oct. 21, 
2007, at 1N. Artist Christoph Büchel conceived of an ambitious, football-
field-sized art installation entitled “Training Ground for Democracy,” 
which was to be exhibited at the Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary 
Art (“MASS MoCA,” or “the Museum”). Unfortunately, the parties never 
memorialized the terms of their relationship or their understanding of the 
intellectual property issues involved in the installation in a written 
agreement. Even more unfortunately, the project was never completed. 
Numerous conflicts and a steadily deteriorating relationship between the 
artist and the Museum prevented the completion of “Training Ground for 
Democracy” in its final form. 
In the wake of this failed endeavor, the Museum went to federal court 
seeking a declaration that it was “entitled to present to the public the 
materials and partial constructions” it had collected for “Training Ground 
for Democracy.” Büchel responded with several counterclaims under VARA 
and the Copyright Act, seeking an injunction that would prevent MASS 
MoCA from displaying the unfinished installation and damages for the 
Museum’s alleged violations of his rights under both VARA and the general 
Copyright Act. 
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court assumed 
that VARA applies to unfinished works of art, but it nonetheless ruled for 
the Museum in all respects because, even granting VARA’s applicability, it 
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found no genuine issues of material fact. Massachusetts Museum of 
Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 565 F.Supp.2d 245 
(D.Mass.2008). Büchel appeals. Because we find that, if VARA applies, 
genuine issues of material fact would foreclose summary judgment on one 
of Büchel’s VARA claims—that MASS MoCA violated his right of artistic 
integrity by modifying the installation—we cannot assume that VARA 
applies to unfinished works but instead must decide its applicability. We 
conclude that the statute does apply to such works. 
* * * 
B. Factual Background 
* * * [T]he key conflict between MASS MoCA and the artist involved 
Büchel’s dissatisfaction with the way in which the Museum was 
implementing his instructions and procuring the items necessary for the 
installation. Büchel himself was not present in North Adams for the first 
several months of work on the project. Instead, he conducted much of his 
work on the installation throughout the fall of 2006 remotely, by providing 
Museum personnel with detailed instructions as to the particular materials 
he required and their placement within the exhibition space. [Büchel 
returned in October, 2006, to complete the installation, but he was 
dissatisfied with the Museum’s progress. He departed again in December. 
During this time there were numerous disputes between the parties, and 
their relationship deteriorated.] 
* * * 
As the vitriolic exchanges between the parties continued, and 
negotiations over the project’s eventual completion became hopeless, 
“Training Ground” languished in its unfinished state. It became clear that 
Büchel would not complete the installation. On May 22, 2007, MASS MoCA 
announced the cancellation of “Training Ground,” and contemporaneously 
publicized the opening of a new exhibit entitled “Made at MASS MoCA,” 
which was to be “a documentary project exploring the issues raised in the 
course of complex collaborative projects between artists and institutions.” 
The press release noted that this lawsuit had been filed the previous day; 
it also highlighted the Museum’s desire to use its “other experiences 
working with artists” to “provide [its] audience with thought-provoking 
insights into the complexities of the art-making process.” The release 
further explained that, due to “space constraints imposed by the materials 
assembled for Training Ground for Democracy,” the exhibition would be 
presented in the Museum’s “only remaining available gallery space”; 
therefore, in order to enter the exhibit, visitors would have to pass through 
Building 5, “housing the materials and unfinished fabrications that were 
to have comprised elements of Training Ground for Democracy.” The 
Museum represented that “[r]easonable steps [had] been taken to control 
and restrict the view of these materials, pending a court ruling.” 
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When “Made at MASS MoCA” opened, many in the art world disagreed 
with the Museum’s handling of its dispute with Büchel, though the parties 
have different views on whether the Museum’s actions ultimately 
tarnished the artist’s reputation. Moreover, the parties differ on whether 
the “reasonable steps . . . taken to control and restrict the view of the[ ] 
materials”—the placement of yellow tarpaulins over the unfinished work—
actually concealed all of the individual components and vital design 
elements of “Training Ground,” or whether the tarpaulins simply “hid[ ] an 
elephant behind a napkin,” effectively inviting individuals to peek behind 
the cloth coverings and view the unfinished work. See Charles Giuliano, 
Christoph Buchel’s Tarp Art at Mass MoCA: Crap Under Wrap (July 31, 
2007). 
* * * 
[Both Büchel and MASS MoCA asked the district court for declaratory 
judgments of their respective rights in the exhibit.] The court ruled in favor 
of the Museum, noting that nothing in VARA prevented MASS MoCA from 
showing the incomplete project. Therefore, MASS MoCA was “entitled to 
present” the unfinished installation to the public as long as it posted a 
disclaimer that would “inform anyone viewing the exhibit that the 
materials assembled in Building 5 constitute an unfinished project that 
[did] not carry out the installation’s original intent.” The court 
correspondingly denied the artist’s request for injunctive relief barring 
public display of the unfinished installation, ruling that he had failed to 
prove a likelihood of success on the merits of his VARA claim. 
II. 
Passed in 1990, the Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A, was 
an amendment to the Copyright Act that protects the “moral rights” of 
certain visual artists in the works they create, consistent with Article 6 bis 
of the Berne Convention. Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 
128, 133 (1st Cir.2006); Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 83 (2d 
Cir.1995) (citing H.R.Rep. No. 101–514, at 5 (1990) (“House Report”)). The 
“rubric of moral rights encompasses many varieties of rights,” but the two 
most widely recognized are attribution and integrity. Id. at 81. We will 
discuss both of these in detail below, but note briefly now that the right of 
attribution protects the author’s right to be identified as the author of his 
work and also protects against the use of his name in connection with 
works created by others. The right of integrity “allows the author to prevent 
any deforming or mutilating changes to his work.” Id. Although these 
moral rights “exist independent[ly] of the economic rights” granted to all 
authors under the Copyright Act, they are part of the same statutory 
framework. 
* * * 
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B. VARA 
Beyond the Copyright Act’s protections of certain economic rights, 
VARA provides additional and independent protections to authors of works 
of visual art. A work of visual art is defined to include “a painting, drawing, 
print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy” or in a limited edition. 17 
U.S.C. § 101. The definition specifically excludes a number of works that 
are otherwise copyrightable, including motion pictures and other 
audiovisual works, books, posters, periodicals, works made for hire, and 
merchandising, advertising, promotional, or packaging materials. Id. 
VARA provides that, in addition to the exclusive rights provided by 
section 106 of the Copyright Act, but subject to certain limitations, the 
author of a work of visual art 
(1) shall have the right— 
(A) to claim authorship of that work, and 
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any 
work of visual art which he or she did not create; 
(2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as 
the author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, 
mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be 
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation; and 
(3) subject to the limitations set forth in section 113(d), shall 
have the right— 
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other 
modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or 
her honor or reputation, and any intentional distortion, 
mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that 
right, and 
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized 
stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction 
of that work is a violation of that right. 
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a). 
VARA’s passage reflected Congress’s belief that the art covered by the 
Act “meet[s] a special societal need, and [its] protection and preservation 
serve an important public interest.” House Report at 5–6. To encourage the 
creation of such art, VARA protects the “moral rights” of its creators. These 
are “rights of a spiritual, non-economic and personal nature” that exist 
“independently of an artist’s copyright in his or her work” and “spring from 
a belief that an artist in the process of creation injects his spirit into the 
work and that the artist’s personality, as well as the integrity of the work, 
should therefore be protected and preserved.” Carter, 71 F.3d at 81. The 
recognition of moral rights fosters a “ ‘climate of artistic worth and honor 
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that encourages the author in the arduous act of creation.’ ” Id. at 83 
(quoting House Report at 6). Although an artist may not transfer his VARA 
rights (as they are considered an extension of his personality), he may 
waive those rights by “expressly agree[ing] to such waiver in a written 
instrument.” 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1). Also, “[a]ll remedies available under 
copyright law, other than criminal remedies, are available in an action for 
infringement of moral rights.” Carter, 71 F.3d at 83 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 506); 
see also 17 U.S.C. § 501(a). 
More specifically, by guaranteeing the moral rights of “attribution” 
and “integrity,” VARA “ ‘protects both the reputations of certain visual 
artists and the works of art they create.’ ” Carter, 71 F.3d at 83 (quoting 
House Report at 6). Before discussing the precise contours of these rights, 
we consider whether, as a threshold matter, the indisputably unfinished 
“Training Ground for Democracy” was a “work of visual art” within the 
meaning of VARA. 
C. Does VARA Apply to Unfinished Works of Art? 
* * * 
The text of VARA itself does not state when an artistic project becomes 
a work of visual art subject to its protections. However, VARA is part of the 
Copyright Act, and that Act’s definition section, which defines “work of 
visual art,” specifies that its definitions, unless otherwise provided, control 
throughout Title 17. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. That general definitional section 
of the Copyright Act states that a work is “created” when it “is fixed in a 
copy . . . for the first time.” Further, “where a work is prepared over a period 
of time, the portion of it that has been fixed at any particular time 
constitutes the work as of that time.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). A 
work is “fixed” when it has been formed, “by or under the authority of the 
author,” in a way that is “sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more 
than transitory duration.” Id. 
Not surprisingly, based on section 101’s general definitions, courts 
have held that the Copyright Act’s protections extend to unfinished works. 
* * * 
Reading VARA in accordance with the definitions in section 101, it too 
must be read to protect unfinished, but “fixed,” works of art that, if 
completed, would qualify for protection under the statute. To conclude 
otherwise would be “contrary to the rule that provisions of a single act 
should be construed in as harmonious a fashion as possible.” United States 
v. Maravilla, 907 F.2d 216, 231 (1st Cir.1990). At least one circuit has 
previously assumed VARA’s applicability to unfinished works. See Carter, 
71 F.3d at 83–88 (discussing VARA claims stemming from an unfinished, 
walk-through sculpture being installed in the lobby of a building). 
* * * 
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III. 
Given Büchel’s right to protection under VARA for his artistic 
investment in a partially completed artwork, we must now assess the 
district court’s ruling that Büchel failed to raise a genuine issue of material 
fact with respect to any of his claims. * * * 
A. The Scope of VARA’s Integrity and Attribution Right 
1. The Right of Integrity 
VARA’s right of integrity, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A), 
provides that an artist shall have the right “to prevent any intentional 
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of [his or her] work which 
would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and [that] any 
intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work is a 
violation of that right.” It thus allows artists to protect their works against 
intentional modifications that would be prejudicial to their honor or 
reputations. 
There is arguably some uncertainty about the plaintiff’s burden of 
proof in a case such as this because the second part of section (a)(3)(A)—
stating that “any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of th[e] 
work is a violation” of the right of integrity—does not explicitly require a 
showing of prejudice when the alteration already has occurred and 
damages, rather than injunctive relief, would be the appropriate remedy. 
* * * [W]e have found no case law discussing a possible difference in the 
showing required for injunctive relief and damages for right-of-integrity 
claims. 
Some courts, however, have assumed without analysis that the 
prejudice showing is necessary for both injunctive relief and damages. See, 
e.g., Hanrahan v. Ramirez, No. 2:97–CV–7470, 1998 WL 34369997, at *3 
(C.D.Cal. June 3, 1998) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)); Carter v. Helmsley-
Spear, Inc., 861 F.Supp. 303, 329–30 (S.D.N.Y.1994), aff’d in part, vacated 
in part, and rev’d in part by Carter, 71 F.3d at 77. At least one commentator 
likewise accepts, without discussion, that the damages remedy requires a 
showing of prejudice. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER, 3–8D NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 8D.06[C][1] (noting that “an intentional and prejudicial 
mutilation is an integrity violation, remediable through not only an 
injunction, but damages as well”). Interestingly, Nimmer raises, and 
dismisses, a different imprecision in section (a)(3)(A): 
The statutory language—“distortion, mutilation, or other 
modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her 
honor or reputation”—is susceptible of a reading whereby the 
requisite prejudice applies only to “modification,” not to the 
antecedents of “distortion” or “mutilation.” Though not without 
ambiguity, the better view under the Berne Convention, from 
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which this language is drawn, is that prejudice applies in all three 
instances. 
Id. 
We agree with Nimmer’s view of the provision, including the 
application of the prejudice requirement to a claim for damages, and 
consider that construction soundly grounded in VARA’s legislative history. 
Under the heading “Purpose of the Legislation,” the House Report notes 
that the right of integrity “allows artists to protect their works against 
modifications and destructions that are prejudicial to their honor or 
reputations.” House Report at 6. The Report also notes that the rights 
provided by VARA are “analogous to those protected by Article 6bis of the 
Berne Convention,” id., which in turn describes the right of integrity as 
applicable to “certain modifications and other derogatory actions” that 
would be prejudicial to the artist’s honor or reputation.14 Given the stated 
purpose of the legislation and the similar depiction of the integrity right in 
the Berne Convention, we conclude that Congress intended the prejudice 
requirement to apply to the right of integrity whether the remedy sought 
is injunctive relief or damages. 
Although VARA does not define the terms “prejudicial,” “honor,” or 
“reputation,” the House Report recommended that the prejudice inquiry 
“focus on the artistic or professional honor or reputation of the individual 
as embodied in the work that is protected,” and “examine the way in which 
a work has been modified and the professional reputation of the author of 
the work.” House Report at 15. Relying on dictionary definitions of 
prejudice, honor and reputation, the district court in Carter concluded that 
it should “consider whether [the proposed] alteration would cause injury or 
damage to plaintiffs’ good name, public esteem, or reputation in the artistic 
community.” 861 F.Supp. at 323. We think this a useful approach, but 
emphasize that the focus is on the artist’s reputation in relation to the 
altered work of art; the artist need not have public stature beyond the 
context of the creation at issue. See House Report at 15 (“[A]n author need 
not prove a pre-existing standing in the artistic community.”). 
2. The Right of Attribution 
VARA’s right of attribution grants the author of a work of visual art 
the right, in part, (1) “to claim authorship of that work”; (2) “to prevent the 
use of his or her name as the author of any work of visual art which he or 
                                                 
14 Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, which is titled “Moral Rights,” includes a heading 
that lists among those rights “to object to certain modifications and other derogatory actions.” The 
provision itself states, in relevant part: 
(1) Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said 
rights, the author shall have the right . . . to object to any distortion, mutilation or other 
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be 
prejudicial to his honor or reputation. 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6 bis, Sept. 9, 1986, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 99–27, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30. 
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she did not create”; and (3) “to prevent the use of his or her name as the 
author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or 
other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her 
honor or reputation.” 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1),(2). The right “ensures that 
artists are correctly identified with the works of art they create, and that 
they are not identified with works created by others.” House Report at 6. 
In addition, if a work of visual art has been distorted or modified (and, 
unlike the integrity right, the original distortion or modification need not 
be intentional), associating the author’s name with the distorted work 
against his wishes would violate his right of attribution. 
The right of attribution under VARA thus gives an artist a claim for 
injunctive relief to, inter alia, assert or disclaim authorship of a work. 
Whether VARA entitles an artist to damages for violation of the right of 
attribution is a separate question. We find the answer in the difference 
between the statutory language on the right of integrity and the language 
on the right of attribution. Subsection (a)(3) of section 106A, which codifies 
the right of integrity, is further divided into two subsections: (A) confers 
the right to protect the work against intentional alterations that would be 
prejudicial to honor or reputation, and (B) confers the right to protect a 
work of “recognized stature” from destruction.16 Although both subsections 
are framed as rights “to prevent” certain conduct, they both also contain an 
additional clause stating that the occurrence of that conduct is, at least in 
certain circumstances, “a violation of th[e] right” to prevent the conduct 
from happening. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (“any intentional distortion, 
mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that right”); id. at 
§ 106(a)(3)(B) (“any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that 
work is a violation of that right”). 
No such “violation” clause is included in the sections codifying the 
right of attribution. See NIMMER, supra, at § 8D.06[B][1] (“The statute does 
not make any provision to redress violation of any of the foregoing three 
attribution rights.”). The legislative history sheds no light on this 
difference, but Nimmer speculates as follows: 
Perhaps the implication is that whereas an integrity violation 
could give rise to a monetary recovery, failure to attribute is 
remediable solely through injunction. If that conclusion were 
intended, Congress certainly could have expressed its intent less 
obliquely. 
Id. We agree with Nimmer’s surmise that VARA does not provide a 
damages remedy for an attribution violation. Where the statutory language 
is framed as a right “to prevent” conduct, it does not necessarily follow that 
                                                 
16 Section 106A(a)(3) states that the author of a work of visual art shall have the right “(A) 
to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which would 
be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation” and the right “(B) to prevent any destruction of a 
work of recognized stature.” 
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a plaintiff is entitled to damages once the conduct occurs. The question is 
whether “doing” the act the artist has a right to prevent also triggers a 
damages remedy, and the statutory language indicates that Congress 
answered that question for the attribution right differently from the 
integrity right. 
It is also noteworthy that Congress crafted a damages remedy for the 
destruction of a work of recognized stature that is narrower than the right 
to prevent destruction of such works. While an artist may “prevent any 
destruction of a work of recognized stature,” only an “intentional or grossly 
negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that right.” 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106A(a)(3)(B) (emphasis added). This narrowing further indicates that 
Congress did not intend a damages remedy to arise automatically from the 
right to prevent conduct. In failing to provide a damages remedy for any 
type of violation of the moral right of attribution, Congress may have 
concluded that artists could obtain adequate relief for the harms of false 
attribution by resorting to the Copyright Act and other traditional claims. 
B. Büchel’s VARA Claims 
With this legal framework in mind, we turn to the record before the 
district court. By dismantling “Training Ground,” the Museum prevented 
the further use of Büchel’s name in connection with the work, eliminating 
any basis for injunctive relief, and we therefore do not address the 
attribution claim in our VARA analysis. We thus consider the evidence in 
the light most favorable to Büchel in determining whether there are 
genuine issues of material fact regarding the alleged violations of his right 
of integrity. 
* * * 
Büchel alleges that MASS MoCA violated his right to integrity in three 
distinct ways: first, by continuing to work on the installation without his 
authorization, particularly in early 2007, and by then exhibiting the 
distorted artwork to the public; second, by using tarpaulins to “partially 
cover[ ]”—and thus modify and distort—the installation, and allowing 
Museum visitors to see it in that condition; and third, merely by showing 
Büchel’s work in its unfinished state, which he claims was a distortion. 
Büchel asserts that these actions caused prejudice to his honor or 
reputation. 
As we shall explain, we conclude that summary judgment was 
improperly granted to MASS MoCA because material disputes of fact exist 
concerning the first of Büchel’s integrity claims—i.e., that MASS MoCA 
modified “Training Ground” over his objections, to his detriment. We 
further conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence to allow a jury 
to find that MASS MoCA’s actions caused prejudice to Büchel’s honor or 
reputation. The other integrity claims, however, are unavailing. 
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1. Continuing Work on “Training Ground” 
* * * 
Both in his deposition and in his affidavit, Büchel described ways in 
which he felt the Museum had knowingly disregarded his specific 
instructions. * * * Indeed, even the Museum, in its August 31, 2007 
memorandum of law in support of its motion for summary judgment, 
admitted that the installation “[m]aterials as they now stand reflect 
significant aesthetic and design choices by MASS MoCA personnel, 
including with respect to the layout of the [m]aterials, and with respect to 
the selection and procurement of pre-existing buildings and vehicles that 
have been modified and incorporated into the [m]aterials.” (Emphasis 
added.) 
MASS MoCA argues that the evidence, taken in its entirety, does not 
add up to a triable issue with respect to a violation of Büchel’s right of 
integrity, but shows only that Museum personnel were attempting to carry 
out Büchel’s vision based on his instructions. * * * 
As we have noted, a jury may well accept the Museum’s depiction of 
its intention and its actions. At this juncture, however, the record must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to Büchel. The evidence we have 
described would permit a jury to find that the Museum forged ahead with 
the installation in the first half of 2007 knowing that the continuing 
construction in Büchel’s absence would frustrate—and likely contradict—
Büchel’s artistic vision. We thus conclude that a jury issue exists as to 
whether these actions effected an intentional distortion or other 
modification of “Training Ground” that subjected MASS MoCA to liability 
under VARA. 
The record also contains evidence from which a jury could conclude 
that the Museum’s alterations had a detrimental impact on Büchel’s honor 
or reputation. An article in the Boston Globe reported that, in February, 
Museum officials had shown the unfinished project to a group of Museum 
directors and curators who were attending an arts conference in the area. 
Another journalist reported on observing the unfinished (and still 
untarped) work. [Another report indicated that the work was shown to 
several elected officials.] 
Although the commentary generated by these visits is not all negative, 
there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the changes to “Training 
Ground” caused prejudice to Büchel. The New York Times noted that the 
exhibition would “certainly give people unfamiliar with his obsessive, 
history-driven aesthetic an inaccurate sense of his art, and this is indeed a 
form of damage.” A critic for the Boston Globe similarly observed that 
“many people are going to judge [Büchel] and his work on the basis of this 
experience.” One viewer, writing in Commentary magazine, observed that 
“I am not sure that it suffers from being enveiled.” A review published in 
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Berkshire Fine Arts—subtitled “Crap Under Wrap”—concluded that it 
would be a “huge mistake” to uncover the installation, which offered 
“virtually nothing of substance or interest.” 
The record thus shows that some viewers of the installation reacted 
unfavorably to the work in its allegedly modified and distorted form. A 
factfinder might conclude, of course, that it was Büchel’s underlying 
concept (notwithstanding its unfinished state) rather than MASS MoCA’s 
actions that elicited the negative reactions. However, a jury could also 
reasonably infer that the negative impressions resulted from the Museum’s 
unauthorized modifications to “Training Ground,” diminishing the quality 
of the work and thereby harming Büchel’s professional honor or reputation 
as a visual artist. 
* * * 
2. Showing “Training Ground” Covered with Tarpaulins 
Büchel also claims that MASS MoCA improperly modified and 
distorted “Training Ground” when it partially covered it with the yellow 
tarpaulins and displayed it in that condition. * * * 
Although the tarpaulins did prevent visitors to the Museum from 
seeing the entire unfinished installation, the record shows that a number 
of people were able to form an impression of “Training Ground” despite the 
partial covering. For example, according to one observer, 
[the tarps] don’t reach the floor, and they rise only about two feet 
above eye level, so they don’t cover much. You can easily crouch 
down to slip your head underneath or peek through the slits 
between the vinyl sheets. * * * 
Thomas Micchelli, Christoph Büchel Training Ground for Democracy, The 
Brooklyn Rail (September 2007). Another critic noted that the installation 
“under all the tarps is really kind of a conceptual peep show. It doesn’t take 
much effort or imagination to see most of the work. . . . Mass MoCA is 
hiding an elephant behind a napkin,” and called it a “wink, wink, wrap 
show.” Photographs in the record confirm that the covers did not obscure 
the general path and layout of the installation. Indeed, given the location 
of “Training Ground,” visitors to “Made at MASS MoCA” could not avoid 
seeing the unfinished “Training Ground” bedecked in tarpaulins. 
Nonetheless, although the installation unquestionably looked 
different with the tarpaulins partially covering it, we agree with the 
district court that the mere covering of the artwork by the Museum, its 
host, cannot reasonably be deemed an intentional act of distortion or 
modification of Büchel’s creation. To conclude otherwise would be to say 
that, even if all had gone well, the Museum would have been subject to a 
right-of-integrity claim if it had partially covered the work before its formal 
opening to prevent visitors from seeing it prematurely. 
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* * * 
3. Exhibiting “Training Ground” in Its Unfinished State 
Büchel maintains that, even aside from the alleged modifications to 
“Training Ground,” merely exhibiting the work of art in its unfinished 
state, without the artist’s consent, constitutes a distortion. We reject this 
claim. A separate moral right of disclosure (also known as the right of 
divulgation) protects an author’s authority to “prevent third parties from 
disclosing [his or her] work to the public without the author’s consent,” and 
is not covered by VARA. 
Although Büchel proffered an expert who opined that showing an 
unfinished work without the artist’s permission is inherently a distortion, 
we decline to interpret VARA to include such a claim where a separate 
moral right of disclosure is widely recognized in other jurisdictions and 
Congress explicitly limited the statute’s coverage to the rights of 
attribution and integrity. Any right Büchel possesses to withhold display 
of his artwork must be found outside VARA. * * * 
4. Summary of VARA Claims 
After careful review of the record, we are persuaded that a reasonable 
jury could find that Büchel is entitled to relief under VARA based on the 
Museum’s continuing work on “Training Ground” over his objections. 
Genuine disputes of material fact foreclose summary judgment for either 
Büchel or MASS MoCA on that claim. We find no merit, however, in 
Büchel’s claim that MASS MoCA intentionally modified or distorted 
“Training Ground” by covering it with tarpaulins, and we reject as outside 
the scope of the statute Büchel’s claim that the Museum violated VARA by 
displaying the installation over his objections. We affirm the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment for the Museum on Büchel’s right-of-
attribution claim, which became moot when MASS MoCA dismantled the 
installation in 2007. 
* * * 
V. 
We summarize our holdings: 
1. VARA’s protection of an artist’s moral rights extends to 
unfinished creations that are “works of art” within the meaning of the 
Copyright Act; 
2. The right of integrity under VARA protects artists from 
distortions, mutilations or modifications of their works that are 
prejudicial to their reputation or honor, and prejudice must be shown 
for both injunctive relief and damages; 
3. Büchel has adduced sufficient evidence to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether MASS MoCA violated his right of 
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integrity on one of his three asserted bases for liability, namely, by 
modifying “Training Ground” over his objections in a manner that 
harmed his honor or reputation. His right-of-integrity claims based on 
the yellow tarpaulins and the mere display of “Training Ground” lack 
merit; 
4. Büchel’s right-of-attribution claim is moot, as VARA provides 
only injunctive relief to protect the right of attribution and the 
installation no longer exists; 
* * * 
We thus remand the case for further proceedings on Büchel’s 
remaining right-of-integrity claim under VARA and his public display 
claim under section 106 of the Copyright Act. 
GILLIAM V. AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANIES, INC. 
538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). 
LUMBARD, CIRCUIT JUDGE. 
[Plaintiffs Gilliam et al., known as the “Monty Python” group, were the 
authors and copyright owners of certain television scripts which they 
licensed to BBC for production and public performance. The plaintiffs 
retained their copyright in the scripts, however, and the licensing 
agreement expressly reserved to them the right to object to any alterations 
of the recorded programs. BBC sublicensed the American television rights 
to Time-Warner. When Time-Warner granted broadcast rights to ABC, 
ABC edited the programs extensively in order to fit time constraints and 
insert commercials. After determining that the plaintiffs were likely to 
succeed on their claim that this unauthorized editing violated the plaintiffs’ 
exclusive right under 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) to create derivative works, the 
court of appeals addressed the plaintiffs’ claims under section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).] 
* * * 
Here, the appellants claim that the editing done for ABC mutilated the 
original work and that consequently the broadcast of those programs as the 
creation of Monty Python violated the Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a).10 This statute, the federal counterpart to state unfair 
competition laws, has been invoked to prevent misrepresentations that 
may injure plaintiff’s business or personal reputation, even where no 
                                                 
10 That statute provides in part: 
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or 
services, . . . a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation . . . 
and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce . . . shall be liable to a civil 
action by any person . . . who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of 
any such false description or representation. 
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registered trademark is concerned. It is sufficient to violate the Act that a 
representation of a product, although technically true, creates a false 
impression of the product’s origin. See Rich v. RCA Corp., 390 F. Supp. 530 
(S.D.N.Y.1975) (recent picture of plaintiff on cover of album containing 
songs recorded in distant past held to be a false representation that the 
songs were new). 
These cases cannot be distinguished from the situation in which a 
television network broadcasts a program properly designated as having 
been written and performed by a group, but which has been edited, without 
the writer’s consent, into a form that departs substantially from the 
original work. “To deform his work is to present him to the public as the 
creator of a work not his own, and thus makes him subject to criticism for 
work he has not done.” Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right, 53 HARV. L. 
REV. 554, 569 (1940). In such a case, it is the writer or performer, rather 
than the network, who suffers the consequences of the mutilation, for the 
public will have only the final product by which to evaluate the work. Thus, 
an allegation that a defendant has presented to the public a “garbled,” 
distorted version of plaintiff’s work seeks to redress the very rights sought 
to be protected by the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and should be 
recognized as stating a cause of action under that statute. During the 
hearing on the preliminary injunction, Judge Lasker viewed the edited 
version of the Monty Python program broadcast on December 26 and the 
original, unedited version. After hearing argument of this appeal, this 
panel also viewed and compared the two versions. We find that the 
truncated version at times omitted the climax of the skits to which 
appellants’ rare brand of humor was leading and at other times deleted 
essential elements in the schematic development of a story line. We 
therefore agree with Judge Lasker’s conclusion that the edited version 
broadcast by ABC impaired the integrity of appellants’ work and 
represented to the public as the product of appellants what was actually a 
mere caricature of their talents. We believe that a valid cause of action for 
such distortion exists and that therefore a preliminary injunction may 
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1. COPYRIGHT MISUSE 
LASERCOMB AMERICA, INC. V. REYNOLDS 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 
911 F.2d 970 (1990). 
SPROUSE, Circuit Judge: 
Appellants Larry Holliday and Job Reynolds appeal from a district 
court judgment holding them liable to appellee Lasercomb America, Inc., 
for copyright infringement and for fraud, based on appellants’ 
unauthorized copying and marketing of appellee’s software. We affirm in 
part, reverse in part, and remand for recomputation of damages. 
I 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Appellants and defendants below are Larry Holliday, president and 
sole shareholder of Holiday Steel Rule Die Corporation (Holiday Steel), and 
Job Reynolds, a computer programmer for that company. Appellee is 
Lasercomb America, Inc. (Lasercomb), the plaintiff below. Holiday Steel 
and Lasercomb were competitors in the manufacture of steel rule dies that 
are used to cut and score paper and cardboard for folding into boxes and 
cartons. Lasercomb developed a software program, Interact, which is the 
object of the dispute between the parties. Using this program, a designer 
creates a template of a cardboard cutout on a computer screen and the 
software directs the mechanized creation of the conforming steel rule die. 
In 1983, before Lasercomb was ready to market its Interact program 
generally, it licensed four prerelease copies to Holiday Steel which paid 
$35,000 for the first copy, $17,500 each for the next two copies, and $2,000 
for the fourth copy. Lasercomb informed Holiday Steel that it would charge 
$2,000 for each additional copy Holiday Steel cared to purchase. 
Apparently ambitious to create for itself an even better deal, Holiday Steel 
circumvented the protective devices Lasercomb had provided with the 
software and made three unauthorized copies of Interact which it used on 
its computer systems. Perhaps buoyed by its success in copying, Holiday 
Steel then created a software program called “PDS–1000,” which was 
almost entirely a direct copy of Interact, and marketed it as its own 
CAD/CAM die-making software. These infringing activities were 
accomplished by Job Reynolds at the direction of Larry Holliday. 
There is no question that defendants engaged in unauthorized copying, 
and the purposefulness of their unlawful action is manifest from their 
deceptive practices. For example, Lasercomb had asked Holiday Steel to 
use devices called “chronoguards” to prevent unauthorized access to 
Interact. Although defendants had deduced how to circumvent the 
chronoguards and had removed them from their computers, they 
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represented to Lasercomb that the chronoguards were in use. Another 
example of subterfuge is Reynolds’ attempt to modify the PDS–1000 
program output so it would present a different appearance than the output 
from Interact. 
When Lasercomb discovered Holiday Steel’s activities, it registered its 
copyright in Interact and filed this action against Holiday Steel, Holliday, 
and Reynolds on March 7, 1986. Lasercomb claimed copyright 
infringement, breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secret, false 
designation of origin, unfair competition, and fraud. Defendants filed a 
number of counterclaims. 
On March 24, 1986, the district court entered a preliminary injunction, 
enjoining defendants from marketing the PDS–1000 software. 
The procedural history of this case is complex, with various claims and 
defenses experiencing both death and resurrection on various pretrial 
motions and at the bench trial itself. For purposes of this appeal it suffices 
to say that, ultimately, all of the counterclaims were dismissed; 
Lasercomb’s claims of misappropriation of trade secret, false designation 
of origin, and unfair competition were dismissed as preempted by the 
Copyright Act; the court found the defendants liable to Lasercomb for 
copyright infringement, rejecting their affirmative defenses of misuse of 
copyright and lack of statutory copyright notice; and the court held for 
Lasercomb on its claims of breach of contract and fraud. 
The district court awarded Lasercomb $105,000 in actual damages for 
copyright infringement and for fraud–with Holiday Steel, Holliday, and 
Reynolds jointly and severally liable–plus $10,000 against Holliday and 
$5,000 against Reynolds as punitive damages on the fraud claim. All 
defendants were permanently enjoined from publishing and marketing the 
PDS-1000 software. 
Holliday and Reynolds raise several issues on appeal. They do not 
dispute that they copied Interact, but they contend that Lasercomb is 
barred from recovery for infringement by its concomitant culpability. They 
assert that, assuming Lasercomb had a perfected copyright, it 
impermissibly abused it. This assertion of the “misuse of copyright” defense 
is based on language in Lasercomb’s standard licensing agreement, 
restricting licensees from creating any of their own CAD/CAM die-making 
software. *** 
II 
MISUSE OF COPYRIGHT DEFENSE 
A successful defense of misuse of copyright bars a culpable plaintiff 
from prevailing on an action for infringement of the misused copyright. 
Here, appellants claim Lasercomb has misused its copyright by including 
in its standard licensing agreement clauses which prevent the licensee 
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from participating in any manner in the creation of computer-assisted die-
making software. The offending paragraphs read: 
D. Licensee agrees during the term of this Agreement that 
it will not permit or suffer its directors, officers and employees, 
directly or indirectly, to write, develop, produce or sell computer 
assisted die making software. 
E. Licensee agrees during the term of this Agreement and 
for one (1) year after the termination of this Agreement, that it 
will not write, develop, produce or sell or assist others in the 
writing, developing, producing or selling computer assisted die 
making software, directly or indirectly without Lasercomb’s prior 
written consent. Any such activity undertaken without 
Lasercomb’s written consent shall nullify any warranties or 
agreements of Lasercomb set forth herein. 
The “term of this Agreement” referred to in these clauses is ninety-nine 
years. Defendants were not themselves bound by the standard licensing 
agreement. Lasercomb had sent the agreement to Holiday Steel with a 
request that it be signed and returned. Larry Holliday, however, decided 
not to sign the document, and Lasercomb apparently overlooked the fact 
that the document had not been returned. Although defendants were not 
party to the restrictions of which they complain, they proved at trial that 
at least one Interact licensee had entered into the standard agreement, 
including the anticompetitive language. 
The district court rejected the copyright misuse defense for three 
reasons. First, it noted that defendants had not explicitly agreed to the 
contract clauses alleged to constitute copyright misuse. Second, it found 
“such a clause is reasonable in light of the delicate and sensitive area of 
computer software.” And, third, it questioned whether such a defense 
exists. We consider the district court’s reasoning in reverse order. 
A. Does a “Misuse of Copyright” Defense Exist? 
We agree with the district court that much uncertainty engulfs the 
“misuse of copyright” defense. 
We are persuaded, however, that a misuse of copyright defense is 
inherent in the law of copyright just as a misuse of patent defense is 
inherent in patent law. 
The misuse of a patent is a potential defense to suit for its 
infringement, and both the existence and parameters of that body of law 
are well established. E.g., United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum 
Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465, 77 S.Ct. 490, 494, 1 L.Ed.2d 465 (1957); see 
generally 8 E. Lipscomb, Lipscomb’s Walker on Patents §§ 28:32–28:36 (3d 
ed. 1989) [hereinafter Walker on Patents]; Calkins, Patent Law: The 
Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act and Noerr–Pennington 
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Doctrine on Misuse Defenses and Antitrust Counterclaims, 38 Drake 
L.Rev. 175 (1989) [hereinafter Calkins, Patent Law]. Although there is 
little case law on the subject, courts from time to time have intimated that 
the similarity of rationales underlying the law of patents and the law of 
copyrights argues for a defense to an infringement of copyright based on 
misuse of the copyright. E.g., United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 
44–51, 83 S.Ct. 97, 101–05, 9 L.Ed.2d 11 (1962); United States v. 
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 157–59, 68 S.Ct. 915, 929–30, 92 
L.Ed. 1260 (1948); Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 
F.2d 852, 865 & n. 27 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917, 100 S.Ct. 
1277, 63 L.Ed.2d 601 (1980). The origins of patent and copyright law in 
England, the treatment of these two aspects of intellectual property by the 
framers of our Constitution, and the later statutory and judicial 
development of patent and copyright law in this country persuade us that 
parallel public policies underlie the protection of both types of intellectual 
property rights. We think these parallel policies call for application of the 
misuse defense to copyright as well as patent law. 
1. Overview 
Because of the paucity of precedent in the copyright misuse area, some 
historical perspective of the elements underlying intellectual property law 
is helpful to our inquiry. Fortunately, respected treatise authors have 
captured well the essence of the relevant historical perspective. 
During the sixteenth century, it became common for the English 
Crown to grant “letters patent” which gave individuals exclusive rights to 
produce, import and/or sell given items within the kingdom. 1 Walker on 
Patents §§ 1:1–1:2. These monopolies were granted for such commonplace 
items as salt, vinegar, and calfskins, to name but a few. The practice of 
granting monopolies led to widespread abuses, such as shortages and 
inflated prices for items that would otherwise be easily and cheaply 
available. Consequently, Parliament passed the Statute of Monopolies 
(1623–24), prohibiting the creation of such monopolies by the Crown. Id. at 
§ 1.5. An exception was made, however, to permit a patent to be granted 
for a period of fourteen years to the creator of a new invention. 21 Jac., ch. 
3, § 6. 
The rationale for allowing patents for new inventions was and is to 
encourage their creation for the benefit of society. 1 Walker on Patents 
§ 1:6. The monopolies granted by the Crown had been odious because they 
restrained trade in articles that had previously been a part of the public 
domain. An invention, however, does not withdraw anything from public 
traffic; rather, it introduces something new. To encourage and reward 
inventors for increasing the inventory of useful objects, the government 
grants them, for a limited time, the right to exclude others from making 
and selling their inventions.  
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The development of copyright law in England likewise grew out of a 
differentiation by Parliament between a monopoly that restricts 
publication of works and a limited copyright that encourages the efforts of 
authors. In sixteenth-century England, the Crown granted to the 
Stationers’ Company the exclusive right to publish and print all published 
works (apparently to enable censorship of Protestant materials). In the 
early 1700s, the Stationer’s Company petitioned Parliament to recognize 
that these rights inured to it in perpetuity. Instead, Parliament passed the 
Statute of Anne (1709–10), the first known copyright legislation. A. 
Latman, The Copyright Law: Howell’s Copyright Law Revised and the 
1976 Act 2–3 (5th ed. 1979) [hereinafter Howell’s Copyright Law]; R. 
Bowker, Copyright: Its History and Its Law 21–23 (1912). That statute 
gave authors the sole right of publication for up to twenty-eight years. 
Thus, the English statutory treatment of copyright was similar to that 
of patent in that it granted the creator a monopoly for a limited time only. 
It is significant, we think, that the framers of our Constitution 
continued the English development of intellectual property law and 
considered in tandem those property rights protectable by copyrights and 
those protectable by patents. In giving Congress the power to create 
copyright and patent laws, the framers combined the two concepts in one 
clause, stating a unitary purpose—to promote progress. Article I, section 8, 
clause 8 of the United States Constitution provides: 
[The Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries. 
This clause was adopted without debate, and material explaining the 
intention of the framers is limited. However, a comment in The Federalist 
papers indicates the public policy behind the grant of copyright and patent 
powers is essentially the same: 
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright 
of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a 
right of common law. The right to useful inventions seems with 
equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully 
coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals. 
The Federalist, No. 43 at 279 (J. Madison) (Mod.Lib. ed. 1941).13 
                                                 
13 The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals observed that the patent/copyright clause was 
unusual in stating the reason the power had been granted, and commented: 
Its inclusion doubtlessly was due to the fact that those who formulated the Constitution were 
familiar with the long struggle over monopolies so prominent in English history, where exclusive 
rights to engage even in ordinary business activities were granted so frequently by the Crown for 
the financial benefits accruing to the Crown only. It was desired that in this country any 
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Supreme Court comment has likewise equated the public policies of 
copyright and patent. For example, in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219, 
74 S.Ct. 460, 471, 98 L.Ed. 630 (1953), the Supreme Court stated: 
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress 
to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that 
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best 
way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and 
inventors in “Science and useful Arts.” Sacrificial days devoted to 
such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the 
services rendered. 
The philosophy behind copyright, parallel to that discussed above for 
patent, is that the public benefits from the efforts of authors to introduce 
new ideas and knowledge into the public domain. To encourage such 
efforts, society grants authors exclusive rights in their works for a limited 
time. 
2. The Misuse of Patent Defense 
Although a patent misuse defense was recognized by the courts as 
early as 1917, most commentators point to Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. 
Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488, 62 S.Ct. 402, 86 L.Ed. 363 (1942), as the 
foundational patent misuse case. In that case, the plaintiff Morton Salt 
brought suit on the basis that the defendant had infringed Morton’s patent 
in a salt-depositing machine. 
*** 
Since Morton Salt, the courts have recognized patent misuse as a valid 
defense and have applied it in a number of cases in which patent owners 
have attempted to use their patents for price fixing, tie-ins, territorial 
restrictions, and so forth. See Calkins, Patent Law, at 187–89 n. 38, 8 
Walker on Patents §§ 28:32–28:36; W. Holmes, Intellectual Property and 
Antitrust Law § 1.07 (1989) [hereinafter Holmes, Intellectual Property]. 
The patent misuse defense also has been acknowledged by Congress in the 
1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 100–703, 102 Stat. 4676 (1988) 
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) & (5)), which limited but did not eliminate 
the defense. 
3. The “Misuse of Copyright” Defense 
Although the patent misuse defense has been generally recognized 
since Morton Salt, it has been much less certain whether an analogous 
copyright misuse defense exists. This uncertainty persists because no 
United States Supreme Court decision has firmly established a copyright 
misuse defense in a manner analogous to the establishment of the patent 
                                                 
Government grant of a monopoly for even a limited time should be limited to those things which 
serve in the promotion of science and the useful arts. 
In Re Shao Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380 (C.C.P.A.1951). 
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misuse defense by Morton Salt. The few courts considering the issue have 
split on whether the defense should be recognized, see Holmes, Intellectual 
Property § 4.09 (collecting cases), and we have discovered only one case 
which has actually applied copyright misuse to bar an action for 
infringement. M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F.Supp. 843 
(D.Minn.1948), appeal dismissed, 177 F.2d 515 (8th Cir.1949). 
We are of the view, however, that since copyright and patent law serve 
parallel public interests, a “misuse” defense should apply to infringement 
actions brought to vindicate either right. As discussed above, the similarity 
of the policies underlying patent and copyright is great and historically has 
been consistently recognized. Both patent law and copyright law seek to 
increase the store of human knowledge and arts by rewarding inventors 
and authors with the exclusive rights to their works for a limited time. At 
the same time, the granted monopoly power does not extend to property 
not covered by the patent or copyright. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 492, 62 
S.Ct. at 405; Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 156–58, 68 S.Ct. at 928–29; 
cf. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101–04, 25 L.Ed. 841 (1880). 
Thus, we are persuaded that the rationale of Morton Salt in 
establishing the misuse defense applies to copyrights. ***  Having 
determined that “misuse of copyright” is a valid defense, analogous to the 
misuse of patent defense, our next task is to determine whether the defense 
should have been applied by the district court to bar Lasercomb’s 
infringement action against the defendants in this case. 
B. The District Court’s Finding that the Anticompetitive Clauses Are 
Reasonable 
In declining to recognize a misuse of copyright defense, the district 
court found “reasonable” Lasercomb’s attempt to protect its software 
copyright by using anticompetitive clauses in their licensing agreement. In 
briefly expressing its reasoning, the court referred to the “delicate and 
sensitive” nature of software. It also observed that Lasercomb’s president 
had testified that the noncompete language was negotiable. 
If, as it appears, the district court analogized from the “rule of reason” 
concept of antitrust law, we think its reliance on that principle was 
misplaced. Such reliance is, however, understandable. 
Both the presentation by appellants and the literature tend to 
intermingle antitrust and misuse defenses. E.g., Holmes, Intellectual 
Property, at § 4.09. A patent or copyright is often regarded as a limited 
monopoly—an exception to the general public policy against restraints of 
trade. Since antitrust law is the statutory embodiment of that public policy, 
there is an understandable association of antitrust law with the misuse 
defense. Certainly, an entity which uses its patent as the means of violating 
antitrust law is subject to a misuse of patent defense. However, Morton 
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Salt held that it is not necessary to prove an antitrust violation in order to 
successfully assert patent misuse: 
It is unnecessary to decide whether respondent has violated the 
Clayton Act, for we conclude that in any event the maintenance of 
the present suit to restrain petitioner’s manufacture or sale of the 
alleged infringing machines is contrary to public policy and that 
the district court rightly dismissed the complaint for want of 
equity. 
314 U.S. at 494, 62 S.Ct. at 406. See also Hensley Equip. Co. v. Esco Corp., 
383 F.2d 252, 261 & n. 19, amended on reh’g, 386 F.2d 442 (5th Cir.1967); 
8 Walker on Patents, at § 28:33. 
So while it is true that the attempted use of a copyright to violate 
antitrust law probably would give rise to a misuse of copyright defense, the 
converse is not necessarily true—a misuse need not be a violation of 
antitrust law in order to comprise an equitable defense to an infringement 
action. The question is not whether the copyright is being used in a manner 
violative of antitrust law (such as whether the licensing agreement is 
“reasonable”), but whether the copyright is being used in a manner 
violative of the public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright. 
Lasercomb undoubtedly has the right to protect against copying of the 
Interact code. Its standard licensing agreement, however, goes much 
further and essentially attempts to suppress any attempt by the licensee 
to independently implement the idea which Interact expresses. 
The agreement forbids the licensee to develop or assist in developing 
any kind of computer-assisted die-making software. If the licensee is a 
business, it is to prevent all its directors, officers and employees from 
assisting in any manner to develop computer-assisted die-making software. 
Although one or another licensee might succeed in negotiating out the 
noncompete provisions, this does not negate the fact that Lasercomb is 
attempting to use its copyright in a manner adverse to the public policy 
embodied in copyright law, and that it has succeeded in doing so with at 
least one licensee. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Cf. Berlenbach 
v. Anderson & Thompson Ski Co., 329 F.2d 782, 784–85 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 379 U.S. 830, 85 S.Ct. 60, 13 L.Ed.2d 39 (1964). 
The language employed in the Lasercomb agreement is extremely 
broad. Each time Lasercomb sells its Interact program to a company and 
obtains that company’s agreement to the noncompete language, the 
company is required to forego utilization of the creative abilities of all its 
officers, directors and employees in the area of CAD/CAM die-making 
software. Of yet greater concern, these creative abilities are withdrawn 
from the public. The period for which this anticompetitive restraint exists 
is ninety-nine years, which could be longer than the life of the copyright 
itself. 
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We previously have considered the effect of anticompetitive language 
in a licensing agreement in the context of patent misuse. Compton v. Metal 
Products, Inc., 453 F.2d 38 (4th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 968, 92 
S.Ct. 2414, 32 L.Ed.2d 667 (1972). Compton had invented and patented 
coal auguring equipment. He granted an exclusive license in the patents to 
Joy Manufacturing, and the license agreement included a provision that 
Compton would not “engage in any business or activity relating to the 
manufacture or sale of equipment of the type licensed hereunder” for as 
long as he was due royalties under the patents. Suit for infringement of the 
Compton patents was brought against Metal Products, and the district 
court granted injunctive relief and damages. On appeal we held that relief 
for the infringement was barred by the misuse defense, stating: 
The need of Joy to protect its investment does not outweigh the 
public’s right under our system to expect competition and the 
benefits which flow therefrom, and the total withdrawal of 
Compton from the mining machine business . . . everywhere in the 
world for a period of 20 years unreasonably lessens the 
competition which the public has a right to expect, and constitutes 
misuse of the patents. 
Id. at 45. Cf. Berlenbach, supra (applying misuse doctrine where license to 
sell patented ski bindings prohibited licensee from manufacturing or 
selling any competing ski binding). 
We think the anticompetitive language in Lasercomb’s licensing 
agreement is at least as egregious as that which led us to bar the 
infringement action in Compton, and therefore amounts to misuse of its 
copyright. Again, the analysis necessary to a finding of misuse is similar to 
but separate from the analysis necessary to a finding of antitrust violation. 
The misuse arises from Lasercomb’s attempt to use its copyright in a 
particular expression, the Interact software, to control competition in an 
area outside the copyright, i.e., the idea of computer-assisted die 
manufacture, regardless of whether such conduct amounts to an antitrust 
violation. 
C. The Effect of Appellants Not Being Party to the Anticompetitive 
Contract 
In its rejection of the copyright misuse defense, the district court 
emphasized that Holiday Steel was not explicitly party to a licensing 
agreement containing the offending language. 
However, again analogizing to patent misuse, the defense of copyright 
misuse is available even if the defendants themselves have not been 
injured by the misuse. In Morton Salt, the defendant was not a party to the 
license requirement that only Morton-produced salt tablets be used with 
Morton’s salt-depositing machine. Nevertheless, suit against defendant for 
infringement of Morton’s patent was barred on public policy grounds. 
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Similarly, in Compton, even though the defendant Metal Products was not 
a party to the license agreement that restrained competition by Compton, 
suit against Metal Products was barred because of the public interest in 
free competition. See also Hensley Equip. Co., 383 F.2d at 261; cf. 
Berlenbach, 329 F.2d at 784–85. 
Therefore, the fact that appellants here were not parties to one of 
Lasercomb’s standard license agreements is inapposite to their copyright 
misuse defense. The question is whether Lasercomb is using its copyright 
in a manner contrary to public policy, which question we have answered in 
the affirmative. 
In sum, we find that misuse of copyright is a valid defense, that 
Lasercomb’s anticompetitive clauses in its standard licensing agreement 
constitute misuse of copyright, and that the defense is available to 
appellants even though they were not parties to the standard licensing 
agreement. 
Holding that Lasercomb should have been barred by the defense of 
copyright misuse from suing for infringement of its copyright in the 
Interact program, we reverse the injunction and the award of damages for 
copyright infringement. * * * 
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 
 
ATARI GAMES CORP. V. NINTENDO OF AMERICA INC. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
975 F.2d 832 (1992) 
RADER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Nintendo of America Inc., and Nintendo Co., Ltd. sell the Nintendo 
Entertainment System (NES). Two of Nintendo’s competitors, Atari Games 
Corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Tengen, Inc., sued Nintendo for, 
among other things, unfair competition, Sherman Act violations, and patent 
infringement. Nintendo sued Atari for, among other things, unfair competition, 
patent infringement, copyright infringement, and trade secret violations. The 
United States District Court for the Northern District of California 
consolidated the two cases and preliminarily enjoined Atari from exploiting 
Nintendo’s copyrighted computer program. Because Nintendo has shown a 




Nintendo’s home video game system—the NES—includes a monitor, 
console, and controls. The console is a base unit into which a user inserts game 
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cartridges. These cartridges contain the various game programs for the NES. 
As dictated by the program on the cartridge, the console controls an image on 
a video monitor, often a television set. In response to this video display, the 
user interacts with the system by manipulating the controls. Thus, by 
operating the controls in response to the video image, an individual plays the 
game on the cartridge in the NES console. *** 
  
Nintendo designed a program—the 10NES—to prevent the NES from 
accepting unauthorized game cartridges. Both the NES console and authorized 
game cartridges contain microprocessors or chips programed with the 10NES. 
The console contains a “master chip” or “lock.” Authorized game cartridges 
contain a “slave chip” or “key.” When a user inserts an authorized cartridge 
into a console, the slave chip in effect unlocks the console; the console detects 
a coded message and accepts the game cartridge. When a user inserts an 
unauthorized cartridge, the console detects no unlocking message and refuses 
to operate the cartridge. Nintendo’s 10NES program thus controls access to the 
NES. 
  
Atari first attempted to analyze and replicate the NES security system in 
1986. Atari could not break the 10NES program code by monitoring the 
communication between the master and slave chips. Atari next tried to break 
the code by analyzing the chips themselves. Atari analysts chemically peeled 
layers from the NES chips to allow microscopic examination of the object code. 
Nonetheless, Atari still could not decipher the code sufficiently to replicate the 
NES security system. 
  
In December 1987, Atari became a Nintendo licensee. Atari paid Nintendo 
to gain access to the NES for its video games. The license terms, however, 
strictly controlled Atari’s access to Nintendo’s technology, including the 10NES 
program. Under the license, Nintendo would take Atari’s games, place them in 
cartridges containing the 10NES program, and resell them to Atari. Atari could 
then market the games to NES owners. Nintendo limited all licensees, 
including Atari, to five new NES games per year. The Nintendo license also 
prohibited Atari from licensing NES games to other home video game systems 
for two years from Atari’s first sale of the game. 
  
In early 1988, Atari’s attorney applied to the Copyright Office for a 
reproduction of the 10NES program. The application stated that Atari was a 
defendant in an infringement action and needed a copy of the program for that 
litigation. Atari falsely alleged that it was a present defendant in a case in the 
Northern District of California. Atari assured the “Library of Congress that 
the requested copy [would] be used only in connection with the specified 
litigation.” In fact, no suit existed between the parties until December 1988, 
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when Atari sued Nintendo for antitrust violations and unfair competition. 
Nintendo filed no infringement action against Atari until November 1989. 
  
After obtaining the 10NES source code from the Copyright Office, Atari 
again tried to read the object code from peeled chips. Through microscopic 
examination, Atari’s analysts transcribed the 10NES object code into a 
handwritten representation of zeros and ones. Atari used the information from 
the Copyright Office to correct errors in this transcription. The Copyright 
Office copy facilitated Atari’s replication of the 10NES object code. 
  
After deciphering the 10NES program, Atari developed its own program—
the Rabbit program—to unlock the NES. Atari’s Rabbit program generates 
signals indistinguishable from the 10NES program. The Rabbit uses a 
different microprocessor. The Rabbit chip, for instance, operates faster. Thus, 
to generate signals recognizable by the 10NES master chip, the Rabbit 
program must include pauses. Atari also programmed the Rabbit in a different 
language. Because Atari chose a different microprocessor and programming 
language, the line-by-line instructions of the 10NES and Rabbit programs 
vary. Nonetheless, as the district court found, the Rabbit program generates 
signals functionally indistinguishable from the 10NES program. The Rabbit 
gave Atari access to NES owners without Nintendo’s strict license conditions. 
  
Nintendo asked the district court to enjoin Atari’s alleged infringement of 
its 10NES copyright. Atari sought in a separate motion to enjoin Nintendo’s 
alleged antitrust violations and alleged misuse of its property rights. Nintendo 
prevailed on both motions. Atari appealed both rulings but subsequently 
moved to dismiss its appeal from the denial of its motion for a preliminary 
injunction. This court granted that motion. Atari asserts copyright misuse as 





*** Nintendo is likely to show that its 10NES program contains 
protectable expression. Atari’s efforts to reverse engineer the 10NES chip to 
learn the ideas in the program will not alone support a copyright infringement 
claim. To the extent, however, Nintendo is likely to show misappropriation and 
copying of the unauthorized Copyright Office copy, it is likely to succeed on the 
merits of its infringement claim. Alternatively, Nintendo is likely to prove 
substantial similarity between the Rabbit and 10NES programs sufficient to 
support its infringement claims. This record thus justifies the trial court’s 
imposition of a preliminary injunction. 
  




As a defense to copyright infringement, Atari asserts Nintendo has 
misused its copyright of the lockout program. Atari alleges Nintendo has 
conditioned the license of its copyrighted lockout program on the acceptance of 
contract provisions that give it control over the games developed by 
independent, third-party software developers. The standard license exclusivity 
provision Nintendo includes in its contracts provides: 
Exclusivity: LICENSEE agrees to sell the Licensed Products for use only 
in conjunction with the NES. For a period of two (2) years following the date of 
first sale by LICENSEE of any Licensed Products pertaining to any particular 
video game program developed by LICENSEE under this Agreement, 
LICENSEE will not adapt or offer such video game program or any derivatives 
of such video game program, for use in any: (a) other home video system; or, 
(b) home computer system.... 
  
The district court granted Nintendo’s motion for preliminary injunction in 
response to which Atari asserted the copyright misuse defense. Atari contends 
Nintendo’s copyright misuse should prevent copyright enforcement. The 
district court did not discuss copyright misuse in its order granting the 
preliminary injunction. However, on Atari’s earlier motion for summary 
judgment, the court held, as a matter of law, that Nintendo did not misuse its 
copyright: 
The record does not demonstrate, as a matter of law, that such restrictions 
restrain the creativity of Nintendo licensees and thereby thwart the intent of 
the patent and copyright laws. 
In its opinion, the district court raised questions about the origin of a 
copyright misuse defense. Once again, this court applies Ninth Circuit law. 
Sun Studs v. Applied Theory Assoc., 772 F.2d 1557, 1560–61 (Fed.Cir.1985). 
  
Several circuit courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have entertained 
defenses of copyright misuse. Lasercomb Am. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th 
Cir.1990); United Tel. Co. v. Johnson Publishing Co., 855 F.2d 604, 610–12 (8th 
Cir.1988); Supermarket of Homes v. San Fernando Valley Bd. of Realtors, 786 
F.2d 1400, 1408 (9th Cir.1986); F.E.L. Publications v. Catholic Bishop, 214 
U.S.P.Q. 409, 413 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859, 103 S.Ct. 131, 74 
L.Ed.2d 113 (1982); Edward B. Marks Music v. Colorado Magnetics, 497 F.2d 
285, 290 (10th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120, 95 S.Ct. 801, 42 L.Ed.2d 
819 (1975); Broadcast Music v. Moor–Law, 527 F.Supp. 758, 772 (D.Del.1981), 
aff’d without opinion, 691 F.2d 490 (3rd Cir.1982); Mitchell Bros. Film Group 
v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 865 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 
U.S. 917, 100 S.Ct. 1277, 63 L.Ed.2d 601 (1980). Only one circuit has sustained 
the defense. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 970. Although no Ninth Circuit case has 
applied the defense to prevent enforcement of a copyright infringement claim, 
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the Ninth Circuit suggests that, under the appropriate factual setting, 
copyright misuse may be a viable defense against a claim of copyright 
infringement. Supermarket of Homes, 786 F.2d at 1408; see also, Sega Enter., 
at 1399. 
  
Although it has yet to apply the copyright misuse defense, the United 
States Supreme Court has given at least tacit approval of the defense. United 
States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 83 S.Ct. 97, 9 L.Ed.2d 11 (1962). In Loew’s, 
the Court applied principles of patent misuse to a patentee’s unlawful tying 
arrangements and held that recovery for infringement should be denied. The 
Court then went on to apply, with reference to the copyrights, the same 
antitrust restrictions on tie-in of sales. Numerous cases suggest that the 
purpose and policy of patent misuse apply as well to copyright. See, e.g., Sony 
Corp., 464 U.S. at 439, 104 S.Ct. at 787; Loew’s, 371 U.S. at 44–51, 83 S.Ct. at 
101–05; United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 157–59, 68 S.Ct. 
915, 929–30, 92 L.Ed. 1260 (1948); Mitchell Bros., 604 F.2d at 865; Bellsouth, 
933 F.2d at 960–61. 
  
In the absence of any statutory entitlement to a copyright misuse defense, 
however, the defense is solely an equitable doctrine. Any party seeking 
equitable relief must come to the court with “clean hands.” Keystone Driller 
Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245, 54 S.Ct. 146, 147, 78 L.Ed. 
293 (1933). The Ninth Circuit has noted that the doctrine of unclean hands can 
also preclude the defense of copyright misuse. Supermarket of Homes, 786 F.2d 
at 1408. The district court states, “Atari lied to the Copyright Office in order to 
obtain the copyrighted 10NES program.” This record supports the district 
court’s conclusion and suggests that Atari’s unclean hands prevent it from 
invoking equity. Thus, even if the Ninth Circuit permits an equitable copyright 
misuse defense, Atari appears ineligible to invoke the defense. This court 
discerns no reversible error in the district court’s assessment of Nintendo’s 
likelihood of success on the merits of its copyright infringement claim. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The district court did not err by granting Nintendo’s request for a 
preliminary injunction. Nintendo is likely to prove that the 10NES program 
contains protected expression. Nintendo is also likely to prove that Atari made 
unauthorized verbatim copies of the 10NES program. On this record, the 
district court did not err in determining that Nintendo is likely to show 
successfully that Atari infringed the 10NES copyright by obtaining and 
copying the source code from the Copyright Office. Furthermore, Nintendo is 
likely to prove that Atari’s Rabbit program is substantially similar to the 
10NES program and that the similarities relate to protected expression. 
Nintendo is also likely to overcome Atari’s assertion of copyright misuse as a 
defense. Atari presents no arguments to rebut the presumption of irreparable 
harm that arises upon a showing of likelihood of success on the merits. 
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IN RE INDEPENDENT SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS 
ANTITRUST LITIGATION 
(CSU, L.L.C. V. XEROX CORPORATION) 
 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 
203 F.3d 1322 (2000). 
MAYER, Chief Judge. 
CSU, L.L.C. appeals the judgment of the United States District Court for 
the District of Kansas, dismissing on summary judgment CSU’s claims that 
Xerox’s refusal to sell patented parts and copyrighted manuals and to license 
copyrighted software violate the antitrust laws. Because we agree with the 
district court that CSU has not raised a genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that Xerox is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
Xerox manufactures, sells, and services high-volume copiers. Beginning 
in 1984, it established a policy of not selling parts unique to its series 10 copiers 
to independent service organizations (“ISOs”), including CSU, unless they 
were also end-users of the copiers. In 1987, the policy was expanded to include 
all new products as well as existing series 9 copiers. Enforcement of this policy 
was tightened in 1989, and Xerox cut off CSU’s direct purchase of restricted 
parts. Xerox also implemented an “on-site end-user verification” procedure to 
confirm that the parts ordered by certain ISOs or their customers were actually 
for their end-user use. Initially this procedure applied to only the six most 
successful ISOs, which included CSU. 
To maintain its existing business of servicing Xerox equipment, CSU used 
parts cannibalized from used Xerox equipment, parts obtained from other 
ISOs, and parts purchased through a limited number of its customers. For 
approximately one year, CSU also obtained parts from Rank Xerox, a majority-
owned European affiliate of Xerox, until Xerox forced Rank Xerox to stop 
selling parts to CSU and other ISOs. In 1994, Xerox settled an antitrust 
lawsuit with a class of ISOs by which it agreed to suspend its restrictive parts 
policy for six and one-half years and to license its diagnostic software for four 
and one-half years. CSU opted out of that settlement and filed this suit alleging 
that Xerox violated the Sherman Act by setting the prices on its patented parts 
much higher for ISOs than for end-users to force ISOs to raise their prices. 
This would eliminate ISOs in general and CSU in particular as competitors in 
the relevant service markets for high speed copiers and printers. 
Xerox counterclaimed for patent and copyright infringement and 
contested CSU’s antitrust claims as relying on injury solely caused by Xerox’s 
lawful refusal to sell or license patented parts and copyrighted software. Xerox 
also claimed that CSU could not assert a patent or copyright misuse defense to 
Xerox’s infringement counterclaims based on Xerox’s refusal to deal. 
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The district court granted summary judgment to Xerox dismissing CSU’s 
antitrust claims and holding that if a patent or copyright is lawfully acquired, 
the patent or copyright holder’s unilateral refusal to sell or license its patented 
invention or copyrighted expression is not unlawful exclusionary conduct 
under the antitrust laws, even if the refusal to deal impacts competition in 
more than one market. The court also held, in both the patent and copyright 
contexts, that the right holder’s intent in refusing to deal and any other alleged 
exclusionary acts committed by the right holder are irrelevant to antitrust law. 
This appeal followed. 
DISCUSSION 
The issue is whether the district court erred in granting Xerox’s motion 
for summary judgment on CSU’s antitrust claims. * * * 
As a general proposition, when reviewing a district court’s judgment 
involving federal antitrust law, we are guided by the law of the regional circuit 
in which that district court sits, in this case the Tenth Circuit. See 
Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068, 46 
USPQ2d 1097, 1104 (Fed.Cir.1998). We apply our own law, not regional circuit 
law, to resolve issues that clearly involve our exclusive jurisdiction. See Pro–
Mold & Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1574–75, 37 
USPQ2d 1626, 1631 (Fed.Cir.1996). “Whether conduct in procuring or 
enforcing a patent is sufficient to strip a patentee of its immunity from the 
antitrust laws is to be decided as a question of Federal Circuit law.” 
Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1068, 46 USPQ2d at 1104; see Midwest Indus., Inc. 
v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1360, 50 USPQ2d 1672, 1676 
(Fed.Cir.1999) (en banc in relevant part) (“Pro-Mold and Nobelpharma make 
clear that our responsibility as the tribunal having sole appellate responsibility 
for the development of patent law requires that we do more than simply apply 
our law to questions of substantive patent law. In order to fulfill our obligation 
of promoting uniformity in the field of patent law, it is equally important to 
apply our construction of patent law to the questions whether and to what 
extent patent law preempts or conflicts with other causes of action.”). The 
district court’s grant of summary judgment as to CSU’s antitrust claims arising 
from Xerox’s refusal to sell its patented parts is therefore reviewed as a matter 
of Federal Circuit law, while consideration of the antitrust claim based on 
Xerox’s refusal to sell or license its copyrighted manuals and software is under 
Tenth Circuit law. 
A. 
Intellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to violate the 
antitrust laws. See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1362, 52 
USPQ2d 1641, 1652 (Fed.Cir.1999). “But it is also correct that the antitrust 
laws do not negate the patentee’s right to exclude others from patent property.” 
Id. (citation omitted). “The commercial advantage gained by new technology 
and its statutory protection by patent do not convert the possessor thereof into 
a prohibited monopolist.” Abbott Lab. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1354, 21 
USPQ2d 1192, 1199 (Fed.Cir.1991). “The patent right must be ‘coupled with 
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violations of § 2’, and the elements of violation of 15 U.S.C. § 2 must be met.” 
Id. (citations omitted). “Determination of whether the patentee meets the 
Sherman Act elements of monopolization or attempt to monopolize is governed 
by the rules of application of the antitrust laws to market participants, with 
due consideration to the exclusivity that inheres in the patent grant.” Id. at 
1354–55, 952 F.2d 1346, 21 USPQ2d at 1199 (citations omitted). 
A patent alone does not demonstrate market power. See id. at 1355, 952 
F.2d 1346, 21 USPQ2d at 1199. The United States Department of Justice and 
Federal Trade Commission have issued guidance that, even where it exists, 
such “market power does not ‘impose on the intellectual property owner an 
obligation to license the use of that property to others.’ ” Intergraph, 195 F.3d 
at 1362, 52 USPQ2d at 1652 (citing United States Department of Justice and 
Federal Trade Comm’n Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual 
Property 4 (1995)). There is “no reported case in which a court ha[s] imposed 
antitrust liability for a unilateral refusal to sell or license a patent. . . .” Id. 
(citing Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1216, 44 
USPQ2d 1065, 1079 (9th Cir.1997)). The patentee’s right to exclude is further 
supported by section 271(d) of the Patent Act which states, in pertinent part, 
that “[n]o patent owner otherwise entitled to relief . . . shall be denied relief or 
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his 
having . . . (4) refused to license or use any rights to the patent . . .” 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(d) (1999) (emphasis added). 
The patentee’s right to exclude, however, is not without limit. As we 
recently observed in Glass Equipment Development Inc. v. Besten, Inc., a 
patent owner who brings suit to enforce the statutory right to exclude others 
from making, using, or selling the claimed invention is exempt from the 
antitrust laws, even though such a suit may have an anticompetitive effect, 
unless the infringement defendant proves one of two conditions. 174 F.3d 1337, 
1343, 50 USPQ2d 1300, 1304 (Fed.Cir.1999) (citing Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 
1068, 46 USPQ2d at 1104). First, he may prove that the asserted patent was 
obtained through knowing and willful fraud within the meaning of Walker 
Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 
177, 86 S.Ct. 347, 15 L.Ed.2d 247 (1965). See Glass Equip. Dev., 174 F.3d at 
1343. Or he may demonstrate that the infringement suit was a mere sham to 
cover what is actually no more than an attempt to interfere directly with the 
business relationships of a competitor. See id. (citing Eastern R.R. Presidents 
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144, 81 S.Ct. 523, 5 
L.Ed.2d 464 (1961)). Here, CSU makes no claim that Xerox obtained its patents 
through fraud in the Patent and Trademark Office; the Walker Process 
analysis is not implicated. 
“[I]rrespective of the patent applicant’s conduct before the [Patent and 
Trademark Office], an antitrust claim can also be based on [an] allegation that 
a suit is baseless; in order to prove that a suit was within Noerr’s ‘sham’ 
exception to immunity, [see Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144, 81 S.Ct. 523], an antitrust 
plaintiff must prove that the suit was both objectively baseless and subjectively 
motivated by a desire to impose collateral, anti-competitive injury rather than 
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to obtain a justifiable legal remedy.” Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071, 46 
USPQ2d at 1107 (citing Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia 
Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60–61, 113 S.Ct. 1920, 123 L.Ed.2d 611, 26 
USPQ2d 1641, 1646 (1993)). “Accordingly, if a suit is not objectively baseless, 
an antitrust defendant’s subjective motivation is immaterial.” Id. at 1072, 46 
USPQ2d at 1107. CSU has alleged that Xerox misused its patents but has not 
claimed that Xerox’s patent infringement counterclaims were shams. 
To support its argument that Xerox illegally sought to leverage its 
presumably legitimate dominance in the equipment and parts market into 
dominance in the service market, CSU relies on a footnote in Eastman Kodak 
Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 480 n. 29, 112 S.Ct. 2072, 
2089 n. 29, 119 L.Ed.2d 265 (1992), that “[t]he Court has held many times that 
power gained through some natural and legal advantage such as a patent, . . . 
can give rise to liability if ‘a seller exploits his dominant position in one market 
to expand his empire into the next.’ ” Notably, Kodak was a tying case when it 
came before the Supreme Court, and no patents had been asserted in defense 
of the antitrust claims against Kodak. Conversely, there are no claims in this 
case of illegally tying the sale of Xerox’s patented parts to unpatented products. 
Therefore, the issue was not resolved by the Kodak language cited by CSU. 
Properly viewed within the framework of a tying case, the footnote can be 
interpreted as restating the undisputed premise that the patent holder cannot 
use his statutory right to refuse to sell patented parts to gain a monopoly in a 
market beyond the scope of the patent. See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. 
Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576, 14 USPQ2d 1034, 1037 
(Fed.Cir.1990) (“[A] patent owner may not take the property right granted by 
a patent and use it to extend his power in the marketplace improperly, i.e. 
beyond the limits of what Congress intended to give in the patent laws.”). 
The cited language from Kodak does nothing to limit the right of the 
patentee to refuse to sell or license in markets within the scope of the statutory 
patent grant. In fact, we have expressly held that, absent exceptional 
circumstances, a patent may confer the right to exclude competition altogether 
in more than one antitrust market. See B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 124 
F.3d 1419, 1427 n. 4, 43 USPQ2d 1896, 1902 n. 4 (Fed.Cir.1997) (patentee had 
right to exclude competition in both the market for patented valves and the 
market for extension sets incorporating patented valves). 
CSU further relies on the Ninth Circuit’s holding on remand in Image 
Technical Services that “ ‘while exclusionary conduct can include a 
monopolist’s unilateral refusal to license a [patent] or to sell its patented . . . 
work, a monopolist’s ‘desire to exclude others from its [protected] work is a 
presumptively valid business justification for any immediate harm to 
consumers.’ ” 125 F.3d at 1218, 44 USPQ2d at 1081 (citing Data General Corp. 
v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187, 32 USPQ2d 1385, 1417 
(1st Cir.1994)). By that case, the Ninth Circuit adopted a rebuttable 
presumption that the exercise of the statutory right to exclude provides a valid 
business justification for consumer harm, but then excused as harmless the 
district court’s error in failing to give any instruction on the effect of 
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intellectual property rights on the application of the antitrust laws. See id. at 
1219–20, 44 USPQ2d at 1081. It concluded that the jury must have rejected 
the presumptively valid business justification as pretextual. See id. This logic 
requires an evaluation of the patentee’s subjective motivation for refusing to 
sell or license its patented products for pretext. We decline to follow Image 
Technical Services. 
We have held that “if a [patent infringement] suit is not objectively 
baseless, an antitrust defendant’s subjective motivation is immaterial.” 
Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1072, 46 USPQ2d at 1107. We see no more reason 
to inquire into the subjective motivation of Xerox in refusing to sell or license 
its patented works than we found in evaluating the subjective motivation of a 
patentee in bringing suit to enforce that same right. In the absence of any 
indication of illegal tying, fraud in the Patent and Trademark Office, or sham 
litigation, the patent holder may enforce the statutory right to exclude others 
from making, using, or selling the claimed invention free from liability under 
the antitrust laws. We therefore will not inquire into his subjective motivation 
for exerting his statutory rights, even though his refusal to sell or license his 
patented invention may have an anticompetitive effect, so long as that 
anticompetitive effect is not illegally extended beyond the statutory patent 
grant. See Glass Equip. Dev., 174 F.3d at 1343, 50 USPQ2d at 1304. It is the 
infringement defendant and not the patentee that bears the burden to show 
that one of these exceptional situations exists and, in the absence of such proof, 
we will not inquire into the patentee’s motivations for asserting his statutory 
right to exclude. Even in cases where the infringement defendant has met this 
burden, which CSU has not, he must then also prove the elements of the 
Sherman Act violation. 
We answer the threshold question of whether Xerox’s refusal to sell its 
patented parts exceeds the scope of the patent grant in the negative. Therefore, 
our inquiry is at an end. Xerox was under no obligation to sell or license its 
patented parts and did not violate the antitrust laws by refusing to do so. 
B. 
The Copyright Act expressly grants a copyright owner the exclusive right 
to distribute the protected work by “transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, 
or lending.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1996). “[T]he owner of the copyright, if [it] 
pleases, may refrain from vending or licensing and content [itself] with simply 
exercising the right to exclude others from using [its] property.” Data General, 
36 F.3d at 1186, 32 USPQ2d at 1416 (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 
123, 127, 52 S.Ct. 546, 547, 76 L.Ed. 1010 (1932)). 
The Supreme Court has made clear that the property right granted by 
copyright law cannot be used with impunity to extend power in the 
marketplace beyond what Congress intended. See United States v. Loew’s, 
Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 47–48, 83 S.Ct. 97, 103–04, 9 L.Ed.2d 11 (1962) (block 
booking of copyrighted motion pictures is illegal tying in violation of Sherman 
Act). The Court has not, however, directly addressed the antitrust implications 
of a unilateral refusal to sell or license copyrighted expression. 
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The Tenth Circuit has not addressed in any published opinion the extent 
to which the unilateral refusal to sell or license copyrighted expression can 
form the basis of a violation of the Sherman Act. We are therefore left to 
determine how that circuit would likely resolve the issue; the precedent of 
other circuits is instructive in that consideration. The Fourth Circuit has 
rejected a claim of illegal tying, supported only by evidence of a unilateral 
decision to license copyrighted diagnostic software to some but not to others. 
See Service & Training, Inc. v. Data General Corp., 963 F.2d 680, 686, 23 
USPQ2d 1102, 1106 (4th Cir.1992). In reaching this conclusion, the court 
recognized the copyright owner’s exclusive right to “sell, rent, lease, lend, or 
otherwise distribute copies of a copyrighted work,” id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 
106(3)), and concluded that “Section 1 of the Sherman Act does not entitle ‘a 
purchaser . . . to buy a product that the seller does not wish to offer for sale.’ ” 
Id. (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 24 n. 40, 104 S.Ct. 
1551, 80 L.Ed.2d 2 (1984)). 
Perhaps the most extensive analysis of the effect of a unilateral refusal to 
license copyrighted expression was conducted by the First Circuit in Data 
General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 32 USPQ2d 
1385. There, the court noted that the limited copyright monopoly is based on 
Congress’ empirical assumption that the right to “exclude others from using 
their works creates a system of incentives that promotes consumer welfare in 
the long term by encouraging investment in the creation of desirable artistic 
and functional works of expression. . . . We cannot require antitrust defendants 
to prove and reprove the merits of this legislative assumption in every case 
where a refusal to license a copyrighted work comes under attack.” Id. at 1186–
87, 36 F.3d 1147, 32 USPQ2d at 1416. The court went on to establish as a legal 
standard that “while exclusionary conduct can include a monopolist’s 
unilateral refusal to license a copyright, an author’s desire to exclude others 
from use of its copyrighted work is a presumptively valid business justification 
for any immediate harm to consumers.” See id. at 1187, 36 F.3d 1147, 32 
USPQ2d at 1417. The burden to overcome this presumption was firmly placed 
on the antitrust plaintiff. The court gave no weight to evidence showing 
knowledge that developing a proprietary position would help to maintain a 
monopoly in the service market in the face of contrary evidence of the 
defendant’s desire to develop state-of-the-art diagnostic software to enhance 
its service and consumer benefit. See id. at 1188–89, 36 F.3d 1147, 32 USPQ2d 
at 1418. 
As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit adopted a modified version of this 
Data General standard. Both courts agreed that the presumption could be 
rebutted by evidence that “the monopolist acquired the protection of the 
intellectual property laws in an unlawful manner.” Image Technical Servs., 
125 F.3d at 1219, 44 USPQ2d at 1082 (citing Data General, 36 F.3d at 1188, 
32 USPQ2d at 1418). The Ninth Circuit, however, extended the possible means 
of rebutting the presumption to include evidence that the defense and 
exploitation of the copyright grant was merely a pretextual business 
justification to mask anticompetitive conduct. See id. The hazards of this 
approach are evident in both the path taken and the outcome reached. The jury 
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in that case was instructed to examine each proffered business justification for 
pretext, and no weight was given to the intellectual property rights in the 
instructions. See id. at 1218, 1220 n. 12, 44 USPQ2d at 1082 n. 12. This 
permitted the jury to second guess the subjective motivation of the copyright 
holder in asserting its statutory rights to exclude under the copyright laws 
without properly weighing the presumption of legitimacy in asserting its rights 
under the copyright laws. While concluding that the failure to weigh the 
intellectual property rights was an abuse of discretion, the Ninth Circuit 
nevertheless held the error harmless because it thought the jury must have 
rejected the presumptive validity of asserting the copyrights as pretextual. See 
id. at 1219–20, 125 F.3d 1195, 44 USPQ2d at 1081–82. This is in reality a 
significant departure from the First Circuit’s central premise that rebutting 
the presumption would be an uphill battle and would only be appropriate in 
those rare cases in which imposing antitrust liability is unlikely to frustrate 
the objectives of the Copyright Act. See Data General, 36 F.3d at 1187 n. 64, 
1188, 32 USPQ2d at 1417 n. 64. 
We believe the First Circuit’s approach is more consistent with both the 
antitrust and the copyright laws and is the standard that would most likely be 
followed by the Tenth Circuit in considering the effect of Xerox’s unilateral 
right to refuse to license or sell copyrighted manuals and diagnostic software 
on liability under the antitrust laws. We therefore reject CSU’s invitation to 
examine Xerox’s subjective motivation in asserting its right to exclude under 
the copyright laws for pretext, in the absence of any evidence that the 
copyrights were obtained by unlawful means or were used to gain monopoly 
power beyond the statutory copyright granted by Congress. In the absence of 
such definitive rebuttal evidence, Xerox’s refusal to sell or license its 
copyrighted works was squarely within the rights granted by Congress to the 
copyright holder and did not constitute a violation of the antitrust laws. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, the judgment of the United States District Court for the 
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Eden Toys, Inc. (“Eden”) appeals from an order of the Southern District of 
New York granting summary judgment dismissing its claim against 
Florelee Undergarment Co., Inc. (“Florelee”) for copyright infringement. 
*** We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part. 
  
The subject of this case is the alleged copying of a drawing of the 
copyrighted fictional character Paddington Bear, the central figure in a 
series of children’s books written by Michael Bond.1 Paddington and 
Company, Limited (“Paddington”), a British corporation, holds all rights to 
these books, and to the characters therein. In 1975 Paddington entered into 
an agreement with Eden, an American corporation, granting Eden 
exclusive North American rights to produce and sell, and to sublicense the 
production and sale of, a number of Paddington products. This agreement 
was amended in 1980 to grant Eden the exclusive North American rights 
to produce and sublicense all Paddington products except books, tapes and 
records, stage plays, motion pictures, and radio and television productions. 
  
At some point between 1975 and 1977 Ivor Wood, the illustrator of the 
Paddington Bear books, drew a series of sketches (“the Ivor Wood 
sketches”) for the use of Eden and its sublicensees. There is evidence in the 
record that in July 1980 Eden obtained in its own name U.S. copyright 
registration certificate No. TXU 50–185 for these sketches as “derivative” 
works. Using the Ivor Wood sketches as a point of departure, the C.R. 
Gibson Company (“Gibson”), pursuant to a sublicense from Eden, produced 
a design for gift wrap that included seven drawings of Paddington Bear 
(“the Eden/Gibson drawings”). This gift wrap was first published in 
January 1978. In March 1980, Eden registered the gift wrap design with 
the Copyright Office as a derivative work. 
  
In November 1979, Eden discovered that Florelee was selling a nightshirt 
featuring a print of a bear later found by the district court to be “identical 
in almost all respects” to one of the Eden/Gibson drawings of Paddington 
Bear. The nightshirt bore the legend “© Fred Original.” After discovering 
a second nightshirt with the same apparent “knockoff” of the Eden/Gibson 
drawing Eden filed suit against Florelee in April 1980, alleging both that 
Florelee had violated Eden’s rights under the Copyright Act and that 
Florelee had made a “false designation of origin” or “false description” of its 
product, in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act by printing “© Fred 
Original” on its shirts. Following cross-motions for summary judgment, 
Judge Carter granted Florelee’s motion for summary judgment dismissing 
the copyright claim, and Eden’s motion for summary judgment enforcing 
the Lanham Act claim. 
  
Reprinted below are (1) a drawing from page 8 of The Great Big Paddington 
Book, copyrighted by Paddington; (2) the Ivor Wood sketch used as a model 
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by Gibson, and apparently copyrighted by Eden; (3) the Eden/Gibson 
drawing, copyrighted by Eden and infringed by Florelee, and (4) Florelee’s 




Drawing of original Paddington Bear, from pre-existing book copyrighted 




Ivor Wood sketch, apparently copyrighted by Eden. (See App. 165a-166a.) 














The Copyright Act authorizes only two types of claimants to sue for 
copyright infringement: (1) owners of copyrights, and (2) persons who have 
been granted exclusive licenses by owners of copyrights. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b). 
Within the first category are both those who hold copyrights on wholly new 
material, and those who hold copyrights on derivative works, based 
substantially on pre-existing materials. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a). 
  
In the present case, Eden claims to be the owner of the copyrights in certain 
derivative works—the Eden/Gibson drawing (No. 3 above) and the Ivor 
Wood sketch (No. 2 above), upon which No. 3 is based—and the exclusive 
licensee of certain rights under Paddington’s original copyrights. We 
discuss each of these in turn. Eden’s complaint is limited to claims based 
on its ownership of the Eden/Gibson copyrighted drawing (No. 3 above); by 
express or implied consent of the parties,  Eden’s claims as exclusive 
licensee of certain rights under the original copyrighted Paddington 
drawings (No. 1 above) were also considered by the court. Eden’s later 
CH. 1  207 
  
motion to add a claim based on its ownership of the Ivor Wood copyrighted 
drawings was denied but will be granted on remand. 
Eden’s Claims as Copyright Owner 
 
Assuming that, upon remand and amendment of the complaint to add its 
claim based upon the Ivor Wood copyrighted sketch (No. 2 above) derived 
from pre-existing Paddington Bear drawings (such as No. 1), Eden were 
found to be the owner of U.S. Copyright No. TXU 50–185, registered July 
22, 1980, which covers the Ivor Wood sketch, Eden would be entitled to 
copyright protection for any novel additions made by this work to the 
existing copyrighted drawings of Paddington. G. Ricordi & Co. v. 
Paramount Pictures, 189 F.2d 469, 471 (2d Cir.1951). The fact that Eden 
apparently did not register this copyright (or the Eden/Gibson copyright) 
until after Florelee’s alleged infringement does not preclude Eden from 
recovering for infringement of these copyrights occurring before the date of 
registration. See 17 U.S.C. § 411. However, Eden’s delay in registering the 
copyrights would preclude it from claiming either attorney’s fees or 
statutory damages. 17 U.S.C. § 412. 
  
Similarly, Eden’s copyrighted Eden/Gibson drawing (No. 3 above) 
registered on March 7, 1980, as No. VA 44–638 and the balance of its gift 
wrap design represent derivative works based on the copyrighted Ivor 
Wood sketches (including No. 2 above). 
  
The district court’s finding that Paddington rather than Eden holds the 
copyrights in the Ivor Wood sketch appears to be incorrect. The record 
contains a copy of an apparently valid U.S. Copyright Certificate, Reg. No. 
TXU 50–185, dated July 22, 1980, issued to Eden for “adaptation of designs 
and additional artistic work” based on “the copyrighted Paddington Bear 
series of books by Michael Bond, including ‘The Great Big Paddington 
Book.’” We therefore remand the issue to the district court for 
redetermination of ownership following amendment of the complaint to add 
the claim based on the copyrighted Ivor Wood sketch. In addition, the 
district court found or at least strongly implied that Eden’s copyright in the 
Eden/Gibson drawing was invalid because the changes made by Gibson to 
the pre-existing Ivor Wood sketch were too insignificant to qualify the 
drawing as an “original work” under the Copyright Act. In so finding, 
however, the district court applied a test that erroneously mingled the 
standard for sufficient originality and the test for infringement. The 
standard for sufficient originality is whether a work contains “some 
substantial, not merely trivial, originality.” L. Batlin & Sons, Inc. v. 
Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857, 97 
S.Ct. 156, 50 L.Ed.2d 135 (1976); Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 
512, 513 (2d Cir.1945). The standard for copyright infringement, by 
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contrast, is whether the defendant’s work is “substantially similar” to the 
plaintiff’s work. Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 654 F.2d 
204, 208 (2d Cir.1981). 
  
The difference between these two tests is not merely academic. A work 
which makes non-trivial contributions to an existing one may be 
copyrighted as a derivative work and yet, because it retains the “same 
aesthetic appeal” as the original work, render the holder liable for 
infringement of the original copyright if the derivative work were to be 
published without permission from the owner of the original copyright. An 
example is the second edition of a textbook, which is copyrightable even 
though it makes only minor revisions of or additions to the first edition. By 
its very nature a “derivative” work, which is copyrightable as such, borrows 
substantially from existing works, and is so defined. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 
IV 1980). Yet it is entitled to registration as a copyrighted work even 
though it would infringe the original copyrighted work if it were created 
without the permission of the owner of copyright in the underlying work. 
United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961, 965 n. 2 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 1040, 97 S.Ct. 737, 50 L.Ed.2d 751 (1977). 
  
In this case, the Eden/Gibson variations of the Ivor Wood sketch, although 
too minor to entitle the Eden/Gibson work to claim a different aesthetic 
appeal, are still original and substantial enough to deserve independent 
copyright protection. The numerous changes made by Gibson—the changed 
proportions of the hat, the elimination of individualized fingers and toes, 
the overall smoothing of lines—combine to give the Eden/Gibson drawing 
a different, cleaner “look” than the Ivor Wood sketch on which it is based. 
Such a contribution satisfies the minimal requirements of originality for 
registration under the Copyright Act. Durham Industries v. Tomy Corp., 
630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir.1980). Since the factual question here depends 
entirely on visual comparison of exhibits, we are in as good a position as 
the district court to judge the originality of the work in question. Taylor v. 
Lombard, 606 F.2d 371, 372 (2d Cir.1979); Jack Kahn Music Co. v. Baldwin 
Piano and Organ Co., 604 F.2d 755, 758 (2d Cir.1979). To the extent that 
the district court applied the proper test for originality, its finding of 
insufficient originality was erroneous. To the extent that the district court 
applied the Peter Pan Fabrics test for copyright infringement as the test 
for determining originality, the district court erred as a matter of law. The 
Ivor Wood variations (No. 2 above) from the original Paddington sketch 
(No. 1 above), while retaining the same aesthetic appeal as the original, are 
even more pronounced and substantial than Gibson’s contributions to the 
Ivor Wood sketch and hence clearly meet the requirements of the Copyright 
Act for originality entitling the owner to registration. Durham Industries 
v. Tomy Corp., supra, 630 F.2d at 910. 
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Thus, assuming that the district court upon remand finds that Eden holds 
a valid copyright in the Ivor Wood sketch, this case involves three 
successive tiers of valid copyrights in designs of the Paddington Bear. The 
first copyrighted tier (No. 1 above), belonging to Paddington, consists of a 
body of illustrations of Paddington Bear in the books or other publications 
copyrighted by Paddington. The second tier (No. 2 above) consists of the 
new contributions made by the Ivor Wood sketch to the existing body of 
Paddington Bear illustrations. Rights to these contributions are apparently 
owned by Eden, which claims to hold the copyright to that sketch. Finally, 
the third tier (No. 3 above) consists of the new contributions made by 
Gibson in transforming the Ivor Wood sketch into the Eden/Gibson 
drawing. Rights to these contributions are held by Eden, which copyrighted 
the Eden/Gibson drawing. 
  
Thus, whatever the outcome of the exclusive license issue discussed below, 
Eden appears to be entitled to recover for the cumulative contributions 
made by the Ivor Wood sketch and the Eden/Gibson drawing to the existing 
body of Paddington Bear illustrations. The remaining issue, whether 
Florelee infringed Eden’s copyrights, requires little discussion. As the 
district court noted, the Florelee print is “identical in almost all respects” 
to one of the validly copyrighted Eden/Gibson drawings and in view of the 
close resemblance of the Florelee print to the copyrighted Ivor Wood sketch 
the same observation applies with respect to Eden’s contention that 
Florelee infringed the Ivor Wood copyright. 
  
Assuming that Florelee infringed either or both of Eden’s copyrights in the 
derivative works, the fact that the Eden/Gibson drawing was printed on 
gift wrap while the Florelee design was printed on clothing is irrelevant. 
No one may copy another’s novel additions in a derivative work, even if the 
copier employs a medium different from that used by the holder of the 
derivative copyright. Davis v. E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co., 240 F.Supp. 
612 (S.D.N.Y.1965). 
  
Eden’s Claim as Exclusive Licensee 
Eden also sues for infringement as exclusive North American licensee for 
certain Paddington Bear products. An exclusive licensee of a right under a 
copyright is entitled to bring suits for infringement “of that particular 
right,” 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (Supp. IV 1980), without being required to join 
his licensor. 3 M. Nimmer, supra, § 12.02, at 12–24 (1981). The question, 
then, is whether Eden was the exclusive licensee of the right allegedly 
infringed by Florelee, i.e., the right to produce images of Paddington Bear 
on adult clothing. Florelee argues correctly that adult clothing was clearly 
not among the “licensed products” listed in the 1975 agreement between 
Eden and Paddington, and concludes from this fact that Eden was not the 
exclusive licensee of this right at the time the allegedly infringing garments 
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were sold in 1979. Eden responds that at that time Eden was operating 
under an informal understanding with Paddington, later formalized in the 
1980 amendment to the 1975 agreement, that gave Eden the exclusive 
North American rights to produce any Paddington Bear product except 
books, records, and a few other items not relevant here. 
  
Under the pre-1978 copyright law, exclusive licenses could be granted 
orally or by conduct. Id., § 10.03[B][1], at 10–37 (1980). Under the new 
Copyright Act, however, Eden’s claim of an informal grant of an exclusive 
license seemingly must fail in light of the statute of frauds provision of the 
new Act, which states that an exclusive license “is not valid unless an 
instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in 
writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed....” 17 U.S.C. § 
204(a) (Supp. IV 1980). However, since the purpose of the provision is to 
protect copyright holders from persons mistakenly or fraudulently claiming 
oral licenses, the “note or memorandum of the transfer” need not be made 
at the time when the license is initiated; the requirement is satisfied by the 
copyright owner’s later execution of a writing which confirms the 
agreement. See Dan-Dee Imports, Inc. v. Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp., 524 
F.Supp. 615, 618–19 (E.D.N.Y.1981). In this case, in which the copyright 
holder appears to have no dispute with its licensee on this matter, it would 
be anomalous to permit a third party infringer to invoke this provision 
against the licensee. 
  
Since the district court rejected as a matter of law the notion that 
Paddington could orally or through conduct grant an exclusive license to 
Eden, it made no findings on the issue of whether Paddington had in fact 
granted Eden such an informal license at any time during Florelee’s 
apparent infringement, and whether that understanding was ever 
committed to writing. We therefore remand for findings on this issue. 
  
If Paddington granted Eden an informal exclusive license to sell 
Paddington Bear products in the market in which Florelee sold—adult 
clothing—and that informal license was later confirmed in a writing signed 
by Paddington, Eden may sue in its own name, without joining Paddington, 
for infringement of any Paddington-owned copyrights in that market. 
Combined with Eden’s rights in the derivative work(s) discussed earlier, 
Eden would be entitled to sue for all damages caused by Florelee’s 
infringement of the Eden/Gibson version of Paddington Bear. 
  
If the district court finds that no such informal understanding existed, or 
that such an understanding was never memorialized, Paddington, which 
has expressed a willingness to be made a co-plaintiff in this lawsuit, should 
be joined as a plaintiff. The district court has the power to order the joinder 
of “any person having or claiming an interest in the copyright [at issue].” 
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17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (Supp. IV 1980). In this case, the exercise of that power 
would clearly be appropriate if Paddington in fact owns some of the rights 
apparently infringed by Florelee. The equities in this case lie heavily in 
favor of Eden, and it would be unjust to deny redress to Eden because of an 
easily remediable procedural defect.  *** 
 
The judgment of the district court dismissing Eden’s claim of copyright 
infringement is reversed and the copyright infringement aspects of the case 
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JON O. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge: 
 
This appeal primarily presents issues concerning the choice of law in 
international copyright cases and the substantive meaning of Russian 
copyright law as to the respective rights of newspaper reporters and 
newspaper publishers. The conflicts issue is which country’s law applies to 
issues of copyright ownership and to issues of infringement. The primary 
substantive issue under Russian copyright law is whether a newspaper 
publishing company has an interest sufficient to give it standing to sue for 
copying the text of individual articles appearing in its newspapers, or 
whether complaint about such copying may be made only by the reporters 
who authored the articles. Defendants-appellants Russian Kurier, Inc. 
(“Kurier”) and Oleg Pogrebnoy (collectively “the Kurier defendants”) appeal 
from the March 25, 1997, judgment of the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York (John G. Koeltl, Judge) enjoining them from copying 
articles that have appeared or will appear in publications of the plaintiffs-
appellees, mainly Russian newspapers and a Russian news agency, and 
awarding the appellees substantial damages for copyright infringement. 
  
On the conflicts issue, we conclude that, with respect to the Russian 
plaintiffs, Russian law determines the ownership and essential nature of 
the copyrights alleged to have been infringed and that United States law 
determines whether those copyrights have been infringed in the United 
States and, if so, what remedies are available. We also conclude that 
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Russian law, which explicitly excludes newspapers from a work-for-hire 
doctrine, vests exclusive ownership interests in newspaper articles in the 
journalists who wrote the articles, not in the newspaper employers who 
compile their writings. We further conclude that to the extent that Russian 
law accords newspaper publishers an interest distinct from the copyright 
of the newspaper reporters, the publishers’ interest, like the usual 
ownership interest in a compilation, extends to the publishers’ original 
selection and arrangement of the articles, and does not entitle the 
publishers to damages for copying the texts of articles contained in a 
newspaper compilation. We therefore reverse the judgment to the extent 
that it granted the newspapers relief for copying the texts of the articles. 
However, because one non-newspaper plaintiff-appellee is entitled to some 
injunctive relief and damages and other plaintiffs-appellees may be 
entitled to some, perhaps considerable, relief, we also remand for further 




The lawsuit concerns Kurier, a Russian language weekly newspaper with 
a circulation in the New York area of about 20,000. It is published in New 
York City by defendant Kurier. Defendant Pogrebnoy is president and sole 
shareholder of Kurier and editor-in-chief of Kurier. The plaintiffs include 
corporations that publish, daily or weekly, major Russian language 
newspapers in Russia and Russian language magazines in Russia or Israel; 
Itar–Tass Russian News Agency (“Itar–Tass”), formerly known as the 
Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS), a wire service and news 
gathering company centered in Moscow, functioning similarly to the 
Associated Press; and the Union of Journalists of Russia (“UJR”), the 
professional writers union of accredited print and broadcast journalists of 
the Russian Federation. 
  
The Kurier defendants do not dispute that Kurier has copied about 500 
articles that first appeared in the plaintiffs’ publications or were 
distributed by Itar–Tass. The copied material, though extensive, was a 
small percentage of the total number of articles published in Kurier.  The 
Kurier defendants also do not dispute how the copying occurred: articles 
from the plaintiffs’ publications, sometimes containing headlines, pictures, 
bylines, and graphics, in addition to text, were cut out, pasted on layout 
sheets, and sent to Kurier ‘s printer for photographic reproduction and 
printing in the pages of Kurier. 
  
Most significantly, the Kurier defendants also do not dispute that, with one 
exception, they had not obtained permission from any of the plaintiffs to 
copy the articles that appeared in Kurier. Pogrebnoy claimed at trial to 
have received permission from the publisher of one newspaper, but his 
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claim was rejected by the District Court at trial. *** 
  
Preliminary injunction ruling. After a hearing in May 1995, the District 
Court issued a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the Kurier defendants 
from copying the “works” of four plaintiff news organizations.  *** 
Preliminarily, the Court ruled that the request for a preliminary injunction 
concerned articles published after March 13, 1995, the date that Russia 
acceded to the Berne Convention. The Court then ruled that the copied 
works were “Berne Convention work[s],” 17 U.S.C. § 101, and that the 
plaintiffs’ rights were to be determined according to Russian copyright law.  
  
The Court noted that under Russian copyright law authors of newspaper 
articles retain the copyright in their articles unless there has been a 
contractual assignment to their employer or some specific provision of law 
provides that the author’s rights vest in the employer. Since the defendants 
alleged no claim of a contractual assignment, the Court next considered the 
provision of the 1993 Russian Federation Law on Copyright and 
Neighboring Rights (“Russian Copyright Law”) (World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) translation) concerning what the United 
States Copyrights Act calls “works made for hire,” 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). See 
Russian Copyright Law, Art. 14(2). That provision gives employers the 
exclusive right to “exploit” the “service-related work” produced by 
employees in the scope of their employment, absent some contractual 
arrangement. However, the Court noted, Article 14(4) specifies that 
subsection 2 does not apply to various categories of works, including 
newspapers. Accepting the view of plaintiffs’ expert, Professor Vratislav 
Pechota, Judge Koeltl therefore ruled that the Russian version of the work-
for-hire doctrine in Article 14(2), though exempting newspapers, applies to 
press agencies, like Itar–Tass. 
  
Turning to the rights of the newspapers, Judge Koeltl relied on Article 11, 
captioned “Copyright of Compiler of Collections and Other Works.” This 
Article contains two subsections. Article 11(1) specifies the rights of 
compilers generally: 
 
The author of a collection or any other composite work 
(compiler) shall enjoy copyright in the selection or 
arrangement of subject matter that he has made insofar as 
that selection or arrangement is the result of a creative 
effort of compilation. 
 
The compiler shall enjoy copyright subject to respect for the rights of the 
authors of each work included in the composite work. 
Each of the authors of the works included in the composite work shall have 
the right to exploit his own work independently of the composite work 
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Russian Copyright Law, Art. 11(1). Article 11(2), the interpretation of 
which is critical to this appeal, specifies the rights of compilers of those 
works that are excluded from the work-for-hire provision of Article 14(2): 
The exclusive right to exploit encyclopedias, encyclopedic dictionaries, 
collections of scientific works—published in either one or several 
installments—newspapers, reviews and other periodical publications shall 
belong to the editor1 thereof. The editor shall have the right to mention his 
name or to demand such mention whenever the said publications are 
exploited. 
  
The authors of the works included in the said publications shall retain the 
exclusive rights to exploit their works independently of the publication of 
the whole work. 
 
Id., Art. 11(2). In another translation of the Russian Copyright Law, which 
was in evidence at the trial, the last phrase of Article 11(2) was rendered 
“independently from the publication as a whole.” Russian Copyright Law, 
Art. 11(2) (Newton Davis translation). Because the parties’ experts focused 
on the phrase “as a whole” in the Davis translation of Article 11(2), we will 
rely on the Davis translation for the rendering of this key phrase of Article 
11(2), but all other references to the Russian Copyright Law will be to the 
WIPO translation. 
 
The District Court acknowledged, as the plaintiffs’ expert had stated, that 
considerable scholarly debate existed in Russia as to the nature of a 
publisher’s right “in a work as a whole.” Judge Koeltl accepted Professor 
Pechota’s view that the newspaper could prevent infringing activity 
“sufficient to interfere with the publisher’s interest in the integrity of the 
work.” Without endeavoring to determine what extent of copying would 
“interfere with” the “integrity of the work,” Judge Koeltl concluded that a 
preliminary injunction was warranted because what Kurier had copied was 
“the creative effort of the newspapers in the compilation of articles 
including numerous articles for the same issues, together with headlines 
and photographs.” The Court’s preliminary injunction opinion left it 
unclear whether at trial the plaintiffs could obtain damages only for 
copying the newspapers’ creative efforts as a compiler, such as the selection 
and arrangement of articles, the creation of headlines, and the layout of 
text and graphics, or also for copying the text of individual articles. 
  
Expert testimony at trial. [Extensive discussion of expert testimony 
omitted.] 
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Trial ruling. The District Court resolved the dispute among the experts by 
accepting Newcity’s interpretation of Russian copyright law. As he had 
previously ruled in granting the preliminary injunction, Judge Koeltl 
recognized that newspapers acquire no rights to individual articles by 
virtue of Article 14 since the Russian version of the work-for-hire doctrine 
is inapplicable to newspapers. Nevertheless, Judge Koeltl accepted 
Newcity’s view of Article 11, relying on both the movement of the phrase 
“as a whole” from the first paragraph of Article 11(2) to the second 
paragraph of Article 11(2), and the opinion of the Informational Disputes 
Chamber. He also reasoned that publishers have “the real economic 
incentive to prevent wholesale unauthorized copying,” and that, in the 
absence of assignments of rights to individual articles, widespread copying 
would occur if publishers could not prevent Kurier ‘s infringements. 
  
The District Court estimated Kurier ‘s profits during the relevant years at 
$2 million and found that 25 percent of these profits were attributable to 
the copied articles. The Court therefore awarded the plaintiffs $500,000 in 
actual damages against Kurier and Pogrebnoy. The Court also ruled that 
the plaintiffs were entitled to statutory damages with respect to 28 articles 
for which the plaintiffs had obtained United States copyright registrations. 
The Court found that the registered articles had originally appeared in 15 
different publications and concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to 15 
awards of statutory damages. The Court found the violations willful, see 
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), and set each statutory award at $2,700. However, to 
avoid duplicative recovery, the Court ruled that the actual and statutory 
damages could not be aggregated and afforded the plaintiffs their choice of 
whether to receive statutory damages (offsetting the statutory award from 
the actual damages award) or actual damages. *** 
 
Discussion 
I. Choice of Law 
The threshold issue concerns the choice of law for resolution of this dispute. 
That issue was not initially considered by the parties, all of whom turned 
directly to Russian law for resolution of the case. Believing that the 
conflicts issue merited consideration, we requested supplemental briefs 
from the parties and appointed Professor William F. Patry as Amicus 
Curiae. Prof. Patry has submitted an extremely helpful brief on the choice 
of law issue. 
  
Choice of law issues in international copyright cases have been largely 
ignored in the reported decisions and dealt with rather cursorily by most 
commentators. Examples pertinent to the pending appeal are those 
decisions involving a work created by the employee of a foreign corporation. 
Several courts have applied the United States work-for-hire doctrine, see 
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17 U.S.C. § 201(b), without explicit consideration of the conflicts issue. See, 
e.g., Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 551–53 (2d 
Cir.1984) (U.S. law applied to determine if statuettes crafted abroad were 
works for hire); Dae Han Video Productions, Inc. v. Kuk Dong Oriental 
Food, Inc., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1294 (D.Md.1990) (U.S. law applied to determine 
if scripts written abroad were works for hire); P & D International v. 
Halsey Publishing Co., 672 F.Supp. 1429, 1435–36 (S.D.Fla.1987) (U.S. 
work-for-hire law assumed to apply). Other courts have applied foreign 
law. See Frink America, Inc. v. Champion Road Machinery Ltd., 961 
F.Supp. 398 (N.D.N.Y.1997) (Canadian copyright law applied on issue of 
ownership); Greenwich Film Productions v. DRG Drugs Inc., 1992 WL 
279357 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1992) (French law applied to determine 
ownership of right to musical work commissioned in France for French 
film); Dae Han Video Production Inc. v. Doug San Chun, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1306, 1310 n. 6, 1990 WL 265976 (E.D.Va. June 18, 1990) (foreign law 
relied on to determine that alleged licensor lacks rights); see also Autoskill, 
Inc. v. National Educational Support Systems, Inc., 994 F.2d 1476, 1489 n. 
16 (10th Cir.1993) (U.S. work-for-hire law applied where claim that 
contrary Canadian law should apply was belatedly raised and for that 
reason not considered); Pepe (U.K.) Ltd. v. Grupo Pepe Ltda., 24 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1354, 1356 (S.D.Fla.1992) (congruent foreign and U.S. law both 
applied). In none of these cases, however, was the issue of choice of law 
explicitly adjudicated. The conflicts issue was identified but ruled not 
necessary to be resolved in Greenwich Film Productions S.A. v. D.R.G. 
Drugs, Inc., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1435, 1437–38 (S.D.N.Y.1992). 
  
The Nimmer treatise briefly (and perhaps optimistically) suggests that 
conflicts issues “have rarely proved troublesome in the law of copyright.” 
Nimmer on Copyright § 17.05 (1998) (“Nimmer”). Relying on the “national 
treatment” principle of the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright 
Convention (“U.C.C.”), Nimmer asserts, correctly in our view, that “an 
author who is a national of one of the member states of either Berne or the 
U.C.C., or one who first publishes his work in any such member state, is 
entitled to the same copyright protection in each other member state as 
such other state accords to its own nationals.” Id. Nimmer then somewhat 
overstates the national treatment principle: “The applicable law is the 
copyright law of the state in which the infringement occurred, not that of 
the state of which the author is a national, or in which the work is first 
published.” Id. The difficulty with this broad statement is that it subsumes 
under the phrase “applicable law” the law concerning two distinct issues—
ownership and substantive rights, i.e., scope of protection. Another 
commentator has also broadly stated the principle of national treatment, 
but described its application in a way that does not necessarily cover issues 
of ownership. “The principle of national treatment also means that both 
the question of whether the right exists and the question of the scope of the 
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right are to be answered in accordance with the law of the country where 
the protection is claimed.” S.M. Stewart, International Copyright and 
Neighboring Rights § 3.17 (2d ed. 1989). We agree with the view of the 
Amicus that the Convention’s principle of national treatment simply 
assures that if the law of the country of infringement applies to the scope 
of substantive copyright protection, that law will be applied uniformly to 
foreign and domestic authors. See Murray v. British Broadcasting Corp., 
906 F.Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y.1995), aff’d, 81 F.3d 287 (1996). 
  
Source of conflicts rules. Our analysis of the conflicts issue begins with 
consideration of the source of law for selecting a conflicts rule. Though 
Nimmer turns directly to the Berne Convention and the U.C.C., we think 
that step moves too quickly past the Berne Convention Implementation Act 
of 1988, 17 U.S.C. § 101. Section 4(a)(3) of the Act amends Title 17 to 
provide: “No right or interest in a work eligible for protection under this 
title may be claimed by virtue of ... the provisions of the Berne 
Convention.... Any rights in a work eligible for protection under this title 
that derive from this title ... shall not be expanded or reduced by virtue of 
... the provisions of the Berne Convention.” 17 U.S.C. § 104(c). 
  
We start our analysis with the Copyrights Act itself, which contains no 
provision relevant to the pending case concerning conflicts issues. We 
therefore fill the interstices of the Act by developing federal common law 
on the conflicts issue. See D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 
62 S.Ct. 676, 86 L.Ed. 956 (1942); id. at 472, 62 S.Ct. 676 (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“The law which we apply to this case consists of principles of 
established credit in jurisprudence, selected by us because they are 
appropriate to effectuate the policy of the governing Act.”). In doing so, we 
are entitled to consider and apply principles of private international law, 
which are “‘part of our law.’” Maxwell Communication Corp. v. Societe 
Generale, 93 F.3d 1036, 1047 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 
U.S. 113, 143 (1895)). 
  
The choice of law applicable to the pending case is not necessarily the same 
for all issues. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 222 (“The 
courts have long recognized that they are not bound to decide all issues 
under the local law of a single state.”). We consider first the law applicable 
to the issue of copyright ownership. 
  
Conflicts rule for issues of ownership. Copyright is a form of property, and 
the usual rule is that the interests of the parties in property are determined 
by the law of the state with “the most significant relationship” to the 
property and the parties. See id. The Restatement recognizes the 
applicability of this principle to intangibles such as “a literary idea.” Id. 
Since the works at issue were created by Russian nationals and first 
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published in Russia, Russian law is the appropriate source of law to 
determine issues of ownership of rights. That is the well-reasoned 
conclusion of the Amicus Curiae, Prof. Patry, and the parties in their 
supplemental briefs are in agreement on this point. In terms of the United 
States Copyrights Act and its reference to the Berne Convention, Russia is 
the “country of origin” of these works, see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of 
“country of origin” of Berne Convention work); Berne Convention, Art. 5(4), 
although “country of origin” might not always be the appropriate country 
for purposes of choice of law concerning ownership. 
  
To whatever extent we look to the Berne Convention itself as guidance in 
the development of federal common law on the conflicts issue, we find 
nothing to alter our conclusion. The Convention does not purport to settle 
issues of ownership, with one exception not relevant to this case. See Jane 
C. Ginsburg, Ownership of Electronic Rights and the Private International 
Law of Copyright, 22 Colum.–VLA J.L. & Arts 165, 167–68 (1998) (The 
Berne Convention “provides that the law of the country where protection 
is claimed defines what rights are protected, the scope of the protection, 
and the available remedies; the treaty does not supply a choice of law rule 
for determining ownership.”). 
  
Selection of Russian law to determine copyright ownership is, however, 
subject to one procedural qualification. Under United States law, an owner 
(including one determined according to foreign law) may sue for 
infringement in a United States court only if it meets the standing test of 
17 U.S.C. § 501(b), which accords standing only to the legal or beneficial 
owner of an “exclusive right.” 
  
Conflicts rule for infringement issues. On infringement issues, the 
governing conflicts principle is usually lex loci delicti, the doctrine 
generally applicable to torts. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 583 
(1953). We have implicitly adopted that approach to infringement claims, 
applying United States copyright law to a work that was unprotected in its 
country of origin. See Hasbro Bradley, Inc. v. Sparkle Toys, Inc., 780 F.2d 
189, 192–93 (2d Cir.1985). In the pending case, the place of the tort is 
plainly the United States. To whatever extent lex loci delicti is to be 
considered only one part of a broader “interest” approach, see Carbotrade 
S.p.A. v. Bureau Veritas, 99 F.3d 86, 89–90 (2d Cir.1996), United States 
law would still apply to infringement issues, since not only is this country 
the place of the tort, but also the defendant is a United States corporation. 
  
The division of issues, for conflicts purposes, between ownership and 
infringement issues will not always be as easily made as the above 
discussion implies. If the issue is the relatively straightforward one of 
which of two contending parties owns a copyright, the issue is 
CH. 1  219 
  
unquestionably an ownership issue, and the law of the country with the 
closest relationship to the work will apply to settle the ownership dispute. 
But in some cases, including the pending one, the issue is not simply who 
owns the copyright but also what is the nature of the ownership interest. 
Yet as a court considers the nature of an ownership interest, there is some 
risk that it will too readily shift the inquiry over to the issue of whether an 
alleged copy has infringed the asserted copyright. Whether a copy infringes 
depends in part on the scope of the interest of the copyright owner. 
Nevertheless, though the issues are related, the nature of a copyright 
interest is an issue distinct from the issue of whether the copyright has 
been infringed. See, e.g., Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 709–10 
(2d Cir.1991) (pointing out that although work survives summary 
judgment on issue of copyrightability of compilation, scope of protection 
against claim of infringement might be limited). The pending case is one 
that requires consideration not simply of who owns an interest, but, as to 
the newspapers, the nature of the interest that is owned. 
 
II. Determination of Ownership Rights Under Russian Law 
Since United States law permits suit only by owners of “an exclusive right 
under a copyright,” 17 U.S.C. § 501(b), we must first determine whether 
any of the plaintiffs own an exclusive right. That issue of ownership, as we 
have indicated, is to be determined by Russian law. 
  
Determination of a foreign country’s law is an issue of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 
44.1; Bassis v. Universal Line, S.A., 436 F.2d 64, 68 (2d Cir.1970). Even 
though the District Court heard live testimony from experts from both 
sides, that Court’s opportunity to assess the witnesses’ demeanor provides 
no basis for a reviewing court to defer to the trier’s ruling on the content of 
foreign law. In cases of this sort, it is not the credibility of the experts that 
is at issue, it is the persuasive force of the opinions they expressed. See 
Curley v. AMR Corp., 153 F.3d 5, 12 (2d Cir.1998) ( “[A]ppellate courts, as 
well as trial courts, may find and apply foreign law.”). 
  
Under Article 14 of the Russian Copyright Law, Itar–Tass is the owner of 
the copyright interests in the articles written by its employees. However, 
Article 14(4) excludes newspapers from the Russian version of the work-
for-hire doctrine. The newspaper plaintiffs, therefore, must locate their 
ownership rights, if any, in some other source of law. They rely on Article 
11. The District Court upheld their position, apparently recognizing in the 
newspaper publishers “exclusive” rights to the articles, even though, by 
virtue of Article 11(2), the reporters also retained “exclusive” rights to these 
articles. 
  
Having considered all of the views presented by the expert witnesses, we 
conclude that the defendants’ experts are far more persuasive as to the 
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meaning of Article 11. In the first place, once Article 14 of the Russian 
Copyright Law explicitly denies newspapers the benefit of a work-for-hire 
doctrine, which, if available, would accord them rights to individual articles 
written by their employees, it is highly unlikely that Article 11 would 
confer on newspapers the very right that Article 14 has denied them. 
Moreover, Article 11 has an entirely reasonable scope if confined, as its 
caption suggests, to defining the “Copyright of Compilers of Collections and 
Other Works.” That article accords compilers copyright “in the selection 
and arrangement of subject matter that he has made insofar as that 
selection or arrangement is the result of a creative effort of compilation.” 
Russian Copyright Law, Art. 11(1). Article 11(2) accords a publisher of 
compilations the right to exploit such works, including the right to insist 
on having their names mentioned, while expressly reserving to “authors of 
the works included” in compilations the “exclusive rights to exploit their 
works independently of the publication of the whole work.” Id. Art. 11(2). 
As the defendants’ experts testified, Article 11 lets authors of newspaper 
articles sue for infringement of their rights in the text of their articles, and 
lets newspaper publishers sue for wholesale copying of all of the newspaper 
or for copying any portions of the newspaper that embody their selection, 
arrangement, and presentation of articles (including headlines)—copying 
that infringes their ownership interest in the compilation. 
  
Newcity’s contrary interpretation, according publishers (and reporters) 
exclusive rights to the text of articles, draws entirely unwarranted 
significance from the shift of the phrase “as a whole” from the first to the 
second paragraph of Article 11(2). One would not expect drafters of the 
revised Article 11(2) to accomplish a major broadening of the rights of 
newspaper publishers simply by shifting the placement of this phrase. 
Moreover, the drafter of the revision testified that the shift was a matter 
of grammar, and not of any substance. Furthermore, Newcity’s 
interpretation rests on the untenable premise that both the publisher of a 
newspaper and the author of an article have exclusive rights to the same 
article. Under his interpretation, as he acknowledged, the publisher could 
grant a license to a third party to publish an article, the “exclusive” rights 
to which are held by the author. That unlikely result cannot be accepted in 
the absence of clear statutory language authorizing it. 
  
The opinion of the Informational Disputes Chamber is not a sufficient basis 
for upholding the plaintiffs’ interpretation. As the defendants’ experts 
pointed out, the bylaws of that body confine its authority to matters 
affecting free press issues, and explicitly preclude it from adjudicating 
issues arising under copyright law. Moreover, the opinion that the 
Chamber rendered does not necessarily support the plaintiffs’ position. In 
asserting that a newspaper may petition for redress “in defense of its 
rights,” the Chamber might have meant only that a newspaper can protect 
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its limited compilation rights in the selection and arrangement of articles 
even when only a small number of articles are copied. The opinion of the 
Chamber does not state that the newspaper has a protectable copyright 
interest in the text of each article. 
  
Nor can the District Court’s conclusion be supported by its observation that 
extensive copying of newspapers will ensue unless newspapers are 
permitted to secure redress for the copying of individual articles. In the 
first place, copying of articles may always be prevented at the behest of the 
authors of the articles or their assignees. Second, the newspapers may well 
be entitled to prevent copying of the protectable elements of their 
compilations. Lastly, even if authors lack sufficient economic incentive to 
bring individual suits, as the District Court apprehended, Russian 
copyright law authorizes the creation of organizations “for the collective 
administration of the economic rights of authors ... in cases where the 
individual exercise thereof is hampered by difficulties of a practical 
nature.” Russian Copyright Law, Art. 44(1). Indeed, UJR, the reporters’ 
organization, may well be able in this litigation to protect the rights of the 
reporters whose articles were copied by Kurier. 
  
Relief. Our disagreement with the District Court’s interpretation of Article 
11 does not mean, however, that the defendants may continue copying with 
impunity. In the first place, Itar–Tass, as a press agency, is within the 
scope of Article 14, and, unlike the excluded newspapers, enjoys the benefit 
of the Russian version of the work-for-hire doctrine. Itar–Tass is therefore 
entitled to injunctive relief to prevent unauthorized copying of its articles 
and to damages for such copying, and the judgment is affirmed as to this 
plaintiff. 
  
Furthermore, the newspaper plaintiffs, though not entitled to relief for the 
copying of the text of the articles they published, may well be entitled to 
injunctive relief and damages if they can show that Kurier infringed the 
publishers’ ownership interests in the newspaper compilations. Because 
the District Court upheld the newspapers’ right to relief for copying the 
text of the articles, it had no occasion to consider what relief the 
newspapers might be entitled to by reason of Kurier ‘s copying of the 
newspapers’ creative efforts in the selection, arrangement, or display of the 
articles. Since Kurier ‘s photocopying reproduced not only the text of 
articles but also headlines and graphic materials as they originally 
appeared in the plaintiffs’ publication, it is likely that on remand the 
newspaper plaintiffs will be able to obtain some form of injunctive relief 
and some damages. On these infringement issues, as we have indicated, 
United States law will apply. 
  
Finally, there remains for consideration what relief, if any, might be 
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awarded to UJR, acting on behalf of any of its members whose articles have 
been copied. In its opinion granting the newspapers a preliminary 
injunction, the District Court noted that the plaintiffs had not “established 
the union’s organizational standing to sue to enforce the rights of its 
members,” an issue the Court expected would be considered later in the 
lawsuit. In its ruling on the merits, the District Court ruled that the UJR 
had standing to sue on behalf of its members. However, the Court noted 
that UJR sought only injunctive relief and then ruled that since UJR 
declined to furnish a list of its members, the Court was unable to frame an 
injunction that would be narrowly tailored and sufficient to give the 
defendants notice of its scope. 
  
In view of our conclusion that the newspaper plaintiffs may not secure 
relief for the copying of the text of any articles as such, it will now become 
appropriate for the District Court on remand to revisit the issue of whether 
relief might be fashioned in favor of UJR on behalf of the authors. Despite 
UJR’s unwillingness to disclose its entire membership list, it might be 
possible to frame some form of injunctive relief that affords protection for 
those author-members that UJR is willing to identify. And UJR should now 
be given an opportunity to amend its prayer for relief to state whatever 
claim it might have to collect damages for the benefit of its member-authors 
whose rights have been infringed. Finally, the District Court should 
consider the appropriateness and feasibility of giving some form of notice 
(perhaps at the defendants’ expense) that is calculated to alert the authors 
of the infringed articles to their right to intervene in this lawsuit. Such 
notice might, for example, be addressed generally to the group of reporters 
currently employed at each of the plaintiff newspapers. 
  
In view of the reckless conduct of the defendants in the flagrant copying 
that infringed the rights of Itar–Tass, the rights of the authors, and very 
likely some aspects of the limited protectable rights of the newspapers, we 
will leave the injunction in force until such time as the District Court has 
had an opportunity, on remand, to modify the injunction consistent with 
this opinion and with such further rulings as the District Court may make 
in light of this opinion. 
 
Conclusion 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment to the extent that it granted relief to 
Itar–Tass, we reverse to the extent that the judgment granted relief to the 
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NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge: 
 
After R. Wayne Galloway began construction of his retirement home on 
Lake Wylie, near Charlotte, North Carolina, using architectural plans 
designed and copyrighted by Christopher Phelps & Associates, LLC 
(“Phelps & Associates”), without permission, Phelps & Associates 
commenced this action against Galloway for copyright infringement. 
Phelps & Associates sought damages, disgorgement of profits, and 
injunctive relief. A jury found that Galloway infringed Phelps & Associates’ 
copyright and awarded it $20,000 in damages, the fee that Phelps & 
Associates traditionally charged for such plans. The jury also found that 
Galloway had realized no profits to disgorge. The district court thereafter 
declined to enter an injunction, finding that the jury verdict had made 
Phelps & Associates “whole,” and entered judgment in favor of Phelps & 
Associates for $20,000. From that judgment, Phelps & Associates appeals, 
requesting a new trial on damages and the entry of an injunction 
prohibiting the future lease or sale of the infringing house and mandating 
the destruction or return of the infringing plans. 
  
*** 
We agree with Galloway’s contention that the court in the circumstances 
presented here did not abuse its discretion in refusing to enter a permanent 
injunction, as requested by Phelps & Associates, prohibiting Galloway from 
ever leasing or selling the house. Such an injunction would be overly broad 
and would unduly restrain the alienation of real property. Other injunctive 
relief, however, might be available in applying the general principles of 
equity, as required by eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 
126 S.Ct. 1837, 164 L.Ed.2d 641 (2006), which was decided after the district 
court’s order denying relief in this case. Accordingly, we vacate portions of 
the district court’s order denying injunctive relief and remand for the 
limited purpose of reconsidering other equitable relief, such as an order 






R. Wayne Galloway, in anticipation of retirement, planned to build his 
“dream home” on a lot that he owned on the North Carolina side of Lake 
Wylie, southwest of Charlotte, North Carolina. Displeased with the design 
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work done by an architect whom he had hired, Galloway went with his son-
in-law to view the designs of homes on Lake Norman, an expensive 
residential area about 30 miles north of Lake Wylie, where his son-in-law 
was working as an iron-work subcontractor. There, Galloway saw a 
French-country style house that he liked. His son-in-law approached the 
builder of the house, Simonini Builders, Inc., and asked the superintendent 
for a copy of the plans. The superintendent said that Galloway would have 
to speak with the owner, Mrs. Gina Bridgeford, because “she purchased the 
plans, they were actually drawn for her.” Galloway contacted Mrs. 
Bridgeford, who gave Galloway her consent for use of the plans “as long as 
you don’t build in our area.” As to her authority to give consent, Mrs. 
Bridgeford testified at trial, “I felt with all we had paid, we owned the plans 
at that time.” Galloway assured Mrs. Bridgeford that he would not build in 
the area, telling her that he planned to build on Lake Wylie about 30 miles 
away. With Mrs. Bridgeford’s permission, the superintendent at Simonini 
Builders gave Galloway a copy of the plans for “The Bridgeford Residence.” 
Each page of the plans included the copyright notice, in small print, of the 
designing architect as follows: 
 
© 2000 Copyright—Christopher Phelps & Assoc., L.L.C. These plans are 
protected under the federal copyright laws. The original purchaser of this 
plan is authorized to construct one and only one home using this plan. 
Modifications or reuse of this plan is prohibited. 
 
Galloway altered the plans only to cover the name and address of “The 
Bridgeford Residence” with the name and address of “The Galloway 
Residence,” and then he copied them for constructing his house. 
  
Phelps & Associates, which designed the Bridgeford Residence, is an 
architectural firm in Charlotte, North Carolina, that designs upscale 
custom houses. It created the design for the Bridgeford Residence as a 
variation of its earlier design—“The Bell and Brown Residence.” Bell and 
Brown had commissioned and paid Phelps & Associates for the earlier 
design, but ultimately decided not to build the house. Phelps & Associates 
modified the Bell and Brown design somewhat for the Bridgefords by 
moving a dormer window, changing the front entry and reconfiguring part 
of the floor plan, and removing the basement. The Bridgefords paid Phelps 
& Associates $20,000 for The Bridgeford Residence design, and the 
Bridgefords built their house on Lake Norman in accordance with that 
design. 
  
Acting as his own general contractor, Galloway began construction of his 
house in September 2001, using the Phelps & Associates plans for the 
Bridgeford Residence. During the course of construction, some of the 
subcontractors checked back with Phelps & Associates for clarification, 
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particularly with respect to the windows. Phelps & Associates did not then 
know that the construction was being pursued without permission. 
Galloway’s framing contractor, who had been asked to do some work for 
Galloway’s brother-in-law using pirated Phelps & Associates plans, 
surmised that Galloway did not have permission to use the plans and 
approached Galloway to warn him that he could “get in trouble 
constructing a copyright plan.” Galloway “shrugged his shoulders and said 
something to the effect: ‘They’ve got to find me, catch me first.’” 
  
Through rumors from subcontractors, Phelps & Associates learned in early 
2003 that Galloway was constructing a house using its designs. After 
confirming that fact, Phelps & Associates sent Galloway a cease and desist 
letter in July 2003. Upon receipt of the letter, Galloway stopped 
construction on his house, which was then over half completed. Thereafter, 
in August 2003, Phelps & Associates registered its plans for The Bridgeford 
Residence with the Copyright Office and then commenced this action 
against Galloway for copyright infringement. 
  
In its suit, Phelps & Associates sought compensatory damages, 
disgorgement of Galloway’s profits (claimed as the difference between the 
value of Galloway’s house and his provable expenses in constructing it), 
and injunctive relief. With respect to compensatory damages, Christopher 
Phelps, the principal of Phelps & Associates, testified at trial that if 
Galloway had come to him and asked Phelps & Associates to design “a 
house like the Bridgeford house,” Phelps & Associates would have charged 
Galloway $20,000—the same fee that it had charged Mrs. Bridgeford. 
Christopher Phelps made clear, however, that he would not have sold 
Galloway the actual Bridgeford Residence design, but something different, 
as Phelps & Associates prided itself on designing “custom homes.” With 
respect to Galloway’s profits, Phelps & Associates presented expert 
testimony that Galloway’s house would be worth $1.1 million when 
completed. With this estimated value, Galloway would have realized over 
$200,000 in profits if he were to sell the completed house. 
  
Galloway testified at trial that he would have made no profit in the house 
had he sold it—he had spent more on the house than it was worth. He 
estimated that if he completed the house, he would show a loss of about 
$160,000. He introduced into evidence his receipts and ledger of 
expenditures for construction to date totaling approximately $660,000, and 
he estimated that it would cost an additional $250,000 to $300,000 to 
complete the house. He estimated that upon completion, the house itself 
would be worth $758,000. He also introduced into evidence the 
Mecklenburg County tax assessment of his house when half-completed, 
which evaluated the house in that state at $408,100. 
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At the end of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Phelps & 
Associates, finding that Galloway had infringed Phelps & Associate’s 
architectural design copyright; awarding Phelps & Associates $20,000 in 
actual damages; and finding that Galloway had no profits to disgorge. 
Thereafter, Phelps & Associates requested injunctive relief from the court 
(1) ordering that the infringing copy of the plans be returned or destroyed; 
(2) enjoining completion of the house; and (3) permanently enjoining the 
lease or sale of the house. The court “in its discretion” denied all injunctive 
relief, finding that the $20,000 jury award made Phelps & Associates 
“whole.” Accordingly, the court entered judgment in favor of Phelps & 
Associates for $20,000 in damages. 
  
On appeal, Phelps & Associates *** argues that the district court’s refusal 
to enter an injunction was error as a matter of law because it had proved a 
past infringement and a likelihood of future infringement. 
  
Phelps & Associates did not obtain an injunction pending appeal, and, 
according to representations made at oral argument, Galloway has 
completed the construction of his house, where he now resides. Galloway 




After the jury returned its verdict, Phelps & Associates filed a motion 
under 17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 503(b) for injunctive relief (1) to prohibit the 
completion of the house; (2) to enjoin permanently the lease or sale of the 
house; and (3) to require the destruction or return of the infringing plans. 
The district court denied the motion and all of the relief requested, stating: 
After trial in this matter, the jury awarded the Plaintiff $20,000 in actual 
damages. The court finds that the Plaintiff has been made whole, and in 
its discretion, declines to order Defendant to destroy all copies of the plans 
at issue. Moreover, the court declines to enjoin further construction of the 
house, alteration of the house, or the future lease or sale of the house. 
Evidence at trial revealed that the house is substantially constructed and 
that only interior finish work remains to be done. Thus, there is no 
likelihood that completion of the house will result in further infringement. 
Taking into account equitable considerations, the court refuses to grant the 
relief requested by the Plaintiff. 
 
Phelps & Associates contends that in denying injunctive relief, the district 
court erred as a matter of law. It argues that the court denied injunctive 
relief simply because Phelps & Associates received damages and thereby 
had been made “whole.” It maintains that “the mere fact that a copyright 
owner may recover damages does not negate his right to injunctive relief.” 
See Lyons P’ship, LP v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 801 (4th 
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Cir.2001) (remanding for the entry of a permanent injunction and a 
determination of the amount of damages award). Phelps & Associates 
argues affirmatively that when copyright infringement has been proved 
and there is a threat of continuing infringement, the copyright holder is 
“entitled to an injunction.” Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 567 
(D.C.Cir.1990). Because Phelps & Associates says that it made that 
showing, it claims that it was entitled to injunctive relief. 
  
Insofar as Phelps & Associates suggests that it is entitled to injunctive 
relief, we reject the argument. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 
U.S. 388, 126 S.Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006). In eBay, the Supreme Court rejected 
any notion that “an injunction automatically follows a determination that 
a copyright has been infringed.” 126 S.Ct. at 1840 (reversing the Federal 
Circuit, which had articulated “a ‘general rule,’ unique to patent disputes, 
‘that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have 
been adjudged’ ”). The Supreme Court reaffirmed the traditional showing 
that a plaintiff must make to obtain a permanent injunction in any type of 
case, including a patent or copyright case: 
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; 
(2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are 
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance 
of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is 
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a 
permanent injunction. 
  
Id. at 1839. Moreover, the Court reiterated that even upon this showing, 
whether to grant the injunction still remains in the “equitable discretion” 
of the court. 
  
Rejecting Phelps & Associates’ claim to an automatic injunction or an 
“entitlement” to one, we now apply traditional equity principles to each of 
Phelps & Associates’ requests for injunctive relief to determine whether 
the district court abused its discretion. 
 
A 
Phelps & Associates’ first request, that Galloway be enjoined from 
completing the house, appears to be moot. At oral argument, the parties 
represented that the house had been completed. 
 
B 
Phelps & Associates’ second request for equitable relief, that Galloway be 
permanently enjoined from leasing or selling the completed house, is 
argued with the following syllogism: First, the completed house is an 
infringing copy of Phelps & Associates’ copyrighted work. See 17 U.S.C. § 
101. Second, as the copyright holder, Phelps & Associates has the exclusive 
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right to “distribute” its copyrighted work “by sale or other transfer of 
ownership.” See id. § 106(3). Therefore, Galloway may never lease or sell 
the house without infringing Phelps & Associates’ copyright. See id. § 
501(a). Because it is likely that Galloway will lease or sell the house, Phelps 
& Associates believes this lease or sale should be foreclosed by a permanent 
injunction. 
  
We agree with Phelps & Associates that Galloway will inevitably sell or 
transfer his house within the period during which Phelps & Associates still 
holds the copyright—i.e. 95 years, see 17 U.S.C. § 302(c)—and that such a 
sale could, absent this action, expose Galloway to further relief, see id. § 
106(3); id. § 501(a); cf. id. § 109(a) (permitting resale of “lawfully made” 
copies); 1 William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright § 3.111 (2007) (arguing that 
sale of a copyrighted structure is not a “distribution” under § 106(3)). But 
Phelps & Associates has requested relief for that inevitable transaction 
now in this action, as part of the panoply of remedies available under the 
Copyright Act, and therefore entitlement to that relief can be and is 
resolved in this action under the principles of eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1839. 
  
The first two eBay criteria for injunctive relief—irreparable injury and the 
inadequacy of monetary damages—have most likely been demonstrated. 
Irreparable injury often derives from the nature of copyright violations, 
which deprive the copyright holder of intangible exclusive rights. Damages 
at law will not remedy the continuing existence of Phelps & Associates’ 
design in the Galloway house. Moreover, while the calculation of future 
damages and profits for each future sale might be possible, any such effort 
would entail a substantial amount of speculation and guesswork that 
renders the effort difficult or impossible in this case. Accordingly, we 
conclude that Phelps & Associates most likely has satisfied the first two 
eBay factors. 
  
When considering the third and fourth factors, however—the balance of 
hardships and the public interest—Phelps & Associates’ showing has fallen 
short. 
  
First, Phelps & Associates has been fully and adequately compensated for 
the copying and use of its design as manifested in the single Galloway 
house, as described above in Part II. A sale of the house would not be a 
second copy or manifestation of the design, but merely a transfer of the 
structure in which the design was first copied. An injunction against sale 
would but slightly benefit Phelps & Associates’ legitimate entitlements 
because the infringing house would retain the same form and location, 
remaining a permanent nuisance to the copyright regardless of whether 
there is an injunction. An injunction against sale would neither undo the 
prior infringement, nor diminish the chances of future copying. At the same 
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time, a permanent injunction would impose a draconian burden on 
Galloway, effectively creating a lis pendens on the house and subjecting 
him to contempt proceedings simply for selling his own property. 
  
Second, a house or building, as an expression of the architect’s copyrighted 
plans, usually has a predominantly functional character. This functional 
character was the reason American copyright law, pre-Berne Convention, 
denied protection to constructed architectural works altogether. See 1 
Nimmer & Nimmer, supra, § 2.08[D][2][b], at 2–126 (“an architectural 
structure ordinarily constitutes a ‘useful article’.... For that reason, such 
structures remained unprotected by United States copyright law from 
passage of the current [Copyright] Act until enactment of an amendment, 
the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act”). This is the same 
reason that Congress manifested an expectation that injunctions will not 
be routinely issued against substantially completed houses whose designs 
violated architectural copyrights. H.R.Rep. No. 101–735, at 13–14 (1990), 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6944 (explaining that buildings “are 
the only form of copyrightable subject matter that is habitable”). Those 
considerations are at their strongest when the architectural structure is 
completed and inhabited by the infringer, as here. While Galloway 
infringed the copyright, he now is living in a “copy” of the architectural 
work. His interest in remaining there, with the same rights as other 
homeowners to alienate his property, is substantial and, in this case, 
trumps Phelps & Associates’ interests in any injunction prohibiting a lease 
or sale of the house. 
  
Third, an injunction against sale of the house would be overbroad, as it 
would encumber a great deal of property unrelated to the infringement. 
The materials and labor that went into the Galloway house, in addition to 
the swimming pool, the fence, and other non-infringing features, as well as 
the land underneath the house, would be restrained by the requested 
injunction. As such, the injunction would take on a fundamentally punitive 
character, which has not been countenanced in the Copyright Act’s 
remedies. See Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 931 
(7th Cir.2003) (noting that the Copyright Act does not authorize punitive 
damages). In a similar vein, the requested injunction would undermine an 
ancient reluctance by the courts to restrain the alienability of real property. 
See, e.g., Williams v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 651 F.2d 910, 919 n. 18 
(4th Cir.1981); Jiggets v. Davis, 28 Va. 368 (1829); Howard v. Earl of 
Shrewsbury, (1867) 2 Ch.App. 760. For these reasons, the public interest 
would be disserved by the entry of an injunction. 
  
Finally, ultimate discretion to grant any such injunctive relief rests with 
the district court, and for the reasons enumerated, we conclude that 
deference to the district court’s refusal is appropriate in the absence of any 
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showing that such refusal was otherwise an abuse of discretion. See eBay, 
126 S.Ct. at 1839. 
  
Thus, with respect to the Galloway house as one manifestation of the 
Phelps & Associates’ design, arising from a single infringing transaction, 
Phelps & Associates is limited to the other relief provided in this case. Upon 
satisfaction of that relief, Galloway will be entitled to peaceful ownership 
of the house, with good and marketable title. This is consistent with the 
result reached when a converter of property satisfies a judgment: if the 
judgment does not order return of the property, but rather other relief, the 
converter obtains good and marketable title to the property after satisfying 
the judgment. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A, cmt. (c) (“When 
the defendant satisfies the judgment in the action for conversion, title to 
the chattel passes to him, so that he is in effect required to buy it at a forced 
judicial sale”); Lovejoy v. Murray, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 1, 16–17, 18 L.Ed. 129 
(1866); Stirling v. Garritee, 18 Md. 468, 474 (1862) (“The measure of 
damages in trover, is the value of the goods at the time of conversion. The 
plaintiff obtaining this value, it operates as a transfer of title from the time 
of conversion”). The same policies of promoting clear property rights and 
finality apply in the case of copyright actions involving single copies of 
completed structures. Indeed, they are perhaps stronger, as we are 
promoting the alienability of real property. 
  
Phelps & Associates relies upon Sony Corporation of America v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 446 n. 28, 104 S.Ct. 774, 78 L.Ed.2d 574 
(1984), to argue that the refusal to issue an injunction against future leases 
and sales of the Galloway house amounts to a judicially-created compulsory 
license, which is disfavored. The reliance on Sony, however, is misplaced. 
The remedies under the Copyright Act do not resemble a license because 
the Copyright Act remedies are far broader than simply requiring a 
defendant to make license payments. Under the Copyright Act, a copyright 
holder is entitled to both actual damages—the market price of the license—
and disgorgement of the infringer’s profits, which might be immensely 
greater than the price of a license. See 17 U.S.C. § 504. Moreover, the 
infringer takes the risk that the district court will order, in its discretion, 
the destruction or other disposition of the infringing article. See id. § 
503(b). In the garden-variety piracy case, such orders are routinely issued. 
See, e.g., Loud Records, LLC v. Lambright, Civ. No. 1:05–0171, 2006 WL 
2038655, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38016 (S.D.W.Va., March 30, 2006); 
Graduate Mgmt. Admission Council v. Raju, 267 F.Supp.2d 505 
(E.D.Va.2003); Microsoft Corp. v. Grey Computer, 910 F.Supp. 1077 
(D.Md.1995). Given the risks attendant to infringement, denying an 
injunction is not equivalent to a compulsory license. See Walker v. Forbes, 
Inc., 28 F.3d 409, 412 (4th Cir.1994) (“By stripping the infringer not only 
of the licensing fee but also of the profit generated as a result of the use of 
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the infringed item, the law makes clear that there is no gain to be made 
from taking someone else’s intellectual property without their consent”). 
While granting an injunction to destroy an infringing article might be 
usual with respect to personal property, especially in the garden-variety 
music or movie piracy case, refusing to order destruction or the 
inalienability of property is also consistent with the Copyright Act’s 
remedial scheme and does not amount to a compelled license. 
  
For all of these reasons, we affirm the district court’s order denying an 
injunction against the future lease or sale of Galloway’s house. 
C 
Finally, Phelps & Associates contends that the district court erred as a 
matter of law in refusing to grant injunctive relief to require the return or 
destruction of the infringing plans. See 17 U.S.C. § 503(b). 
  
Again, any relief granted in equity is at the discretion of the district court, 
and a petitioner cannot claim that it was entitled to injunctive relief. See 
eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1839. Nonetheless, the district court, without the benefit 
of eBay, may have denied equitable relief categorically, rather than basing 
its analysis on the traditional principles of equity. 
  
In denying Phelps & Associates’ motion for an injunction, the district court 
stated: 
 
The court finds that the Plaintiff has been made whole, and 
in its discretion, declines to order Defendant to destroy all 
copies of the plans at issue. 
 
Being made whole in the circumstances of this case, however, could only 
have referred to the jury award of damages for the cost of a license and its 
finding that Galloway realized no profits for disgorgement. It could not 
have related to other questions, such as the existence of infringing plans or 
future acts of infringement. 
  
To explain its ruling, the court stated only, 
Evidence at trial revealed that the house is substantially constructed and 
that only interior finish work remains to be done. Thus, there is no 
likelihood that completion of the house will result in further infringement. 
It does not follow, however, that because the plans were not needed to 
complete the house, they should not therefore be returned or destroyed, as 
authorized by 17 U.S.C. § 503(b). The risk of future infringement includes 
the possible use of plans to build another house, publication of the plans, 
or other violations of the exclusive rights conferred by 17 U.S.C. § 106. See 
Serv. & Training, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 963 F.2d 680, 690 (4th Cir.1992) 
(affirming the entry of a preliminary injunction against further 
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unauthorized use and copying of copyrighted software). 
  
When Phelps & Associates requested the return or destruction of the 
infringing plans, the district court was obligated to consider the traditional 
factors for equitable relief. Yet it appears that the court did not do so. At 
most, it stated without explanation that it declined “in its discretion ... to 
order defendant to destroy all copies of the plans at issue.” Considering the 
court’s ruling in the context of the admonitions given in eBay, we cannot 
conclude that the district court properly performed its equitable functions. 
See eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1839. Therefore, we vacate that portion of its order 
as an abuse of discretion. 
  
In sum, while we affirm the jury’s verdict and the district court’s order 
refusing to enjoin the future leasing or sale of Galloway’s house, we remand 
this case for further consideration, in light of eBay, of Phelps & Associates’ 
request for injunctive relief with respect to the return or destruction of the 
infringing plans. 
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CHAPTER 5 




A. FAIR USE AND HOME VIDEO 
 
 
SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA V. UNIVERSAL 
CITY STUDIOS, INC. 
Supreme Court of the United States, 1984. 
464 U.S. 417, 104 S.Ct. 774, 78 L.Ed.2d 574. 
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
IV 
* * * 
A. Authorized Time-Shifting. 
[The Court noted the District Court’s finding that a considerable 
number of copyright owners of television programs—sports leagues, 
religious broadcasters, and educational communication agencies—wished 
to have home video tape recorders (VTRs, as they were then called) 
available for viewers to use to tape their programs for viewing at a later 
time.] . . . Although the District Court made these statements in the 
context of considering the propriety of injunctive relief, the statements 
constitute a finding that the evidence concerning “sports, religious, 
educational and other programming” was sufficient to establish a 
significant quantity of broadcasting whose copying is now authorized, and 
a significant potential for future authorized copying. That finding is amply 
supported by the record. 
* * * 
If there are millions of owners of VTRs who make copies of televised 
sports events, religious broadcasts, and educational programs such as 
Mister Rogers’ Neighborhood, and if the proprietors of those programs 
welcome the practice, the business of supplying the equipment that makes 
such copying feasible should not be stifled simply because the equipment 
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is used by some individuals to make unauthorized reproductions of 
respondents’ works. The respondents do not represent a class composed of 
all copyright holders. Yet a finding of contributory infringement would 
inevitably frustrate the interests of broadcasters in reaching the portion of 
their audience that is available only through time-shifting. 
Of course, the fact that other copyright holders may welcome the 
practice of time-shifting does not mean that respondents should be deemed 
to have granted a license to copy their programs. Third-party conduct 
would be wholly irrelevant in an action for direct infringement of 
respondents’ copyrights. But in an action for contributory infringement 
against the seller of copying equipment, the copyright holder may not 
prevail unless the relief that he seeks affects only his programs, or unless 
he speaks for virtually all copyright holders with an interest in the 
outcome. In this case, the record makes it perfectly clear that there are 
many important producers of national and local television programs who 
find nothing objectionable about the enlargement in the size of the 
television audience that results from the practice of time-shifting for 
private home use. The seller of the equipment that expands those 
producers’ audiences cannot be a contributory infringer if, as is true in this 
case, it has had no direct involvement with any infringing activity. 
B. Unauthorized Time-Shifting. 
Even unauthorized uses of a copyrighted work are not necessarily 
infringing. An unlicensed use of the copyright is not an infringement unless 
it conflicts with one of the specific exclusive rights conferred by the 
copyright statute. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 
at 154–155 (1975). Moreover, the definition of exclusive rights in § 106 of 
the present Act is prefaced by the words “subject to sections 107 through 
118.” Those sections describe a variety of uses of copyrighted material that 
“are not infringements of copyright” “notwithstanding the provisions of 
section 106.” The most pertinent in this case is § 107, the legislative 
endorsement of the doctrine of “fair use.” 
That section identifies various factors that enable a court to apply an 
“equitable rule of reason” analysis to particular claims of infringement. 
Although not conclusive, the first factor requires that “the commercial or 
nonprofit character of an activity” be weighed in any fair use decision. If 
the Betamax were used to make copies for a commercial or profit-making 
purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair. The contrary 
presumption is appropriate here, however, because the District Court’s 
findings plainly establish that time-shifting for private home use must be 
characterized as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity. Moreover, when one 
considers the nature of a televised copyrighted audiovisual work, and that 
time-shifting merely enables a viewer to see such a work which he had been 
invited to witness in its entirety free of charge, the fact that the entire work 
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is reproduced, see § 107(3), does not have its ordinary effect of militating 
against a finding of fair use. 
This is not, however, the end of the inquiry because Congress has also 
directed us to consider “the effect of the use upon the potential market for 
or value of the copyrighted work.” § 107(4). The purpose of copyright is to 
create incentives for creative effort. Even copying for noncommercial 
purposes may impair the copyright holder’s ability to obtain the rewards 
that Congress intended him to have. But a use that has no demonstrable 
effect upon the potential market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work 
need not be prohibited in order to protect the author’s incentive to create. 
The prohibition of such noncommercial uses would merely inhibit access to 
ideas without any countervailing benefit. 
Thus, although every commercial use of copyrighted material is 
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs 
to the owner of the copyright, noncommercial uses are a different matter. 
A challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof 
either that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should become 
widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the 
copyrighted work. Actual present harm need not be shown; such a 
requirement would leave the copyright holder with no defense against 
predictable damage. Nor is it necessary to show with certainty that future 
harm will result. What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the 
evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists. If the 
intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood may be presumed. But 
if it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated. 
In this case, respondents failed to carry their burden with regard to 
home time-shifting. The District Court described respondents’ evidence as 
follows: 
“Plaintiffs’ experts admitted at several points in the trial that the time-
shifting without librarying would result in ‘not a great deal of harm.’ 
Plaintiffs’ greatest concern about time-shifting is with ‘a point of important 
philosophy that transcends even commercial judgment.’ They fear that 
with any Betamax usage, ‘invisible boundaries’ are passed: ‘the copyright 
owner has lost control over his program.’ ” 
* * * 
There was no need for the District Court to say much about past harm. 
“Plaintiffs have admitted that no actual harm to their copyrights has 
occurred to date.” 
On the question of potential future harm from time-shifting, the 
District Court offered a more detailed analysis of the evidence. It rejected 
respondents’ “fear that persons ‘watching’ the original telecast of a program 
will not be measured in the live audience and the ratings and revenues will 
decrease,” by observing that current measurement technology allows the 
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Betamax audience to be reflected. It rejected respondents’ prediction “that 
live television or movie audiences will decrease as more people watch 
Betamax tapes as an alternative,” with the observation that “[there] is no 
factual basis for [the underlying] assumption.” It rejected respondents’ 
“fear that time-shifting will reduce audiences for telecast reruns,” and 
concluded instead that “given current market practices, this should aid 
plaintiffs rather than harm them.” And it declared that respondents’ 
suggestion that “theater or film rental exhibition of a program will suffer 
because of time-shift recording of that program” “lacks merit.” 
* * * 
The District Court’s conclusions are buttressed by the fact that to the 
extent time-shifting expands public access to freely broadcast television 
programs, it yields societal benefits. In Community Television of Southern 
California v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498, 508 (1983), we acknowledged the 
public interest in making television broadcasting more available. 
Concededly, that interest is not unlimited. But it supports an 
interpretation of the concept of “fair use” that requires the copyright holder 
to demonstrate some likelihood of harm before he may condemn a private 
act of time-shifting as a violation of federal law. 
When these factors are all weighed in the “equitable rule of reason” 
balance, we must conclude that this record amply supports the District 
Court’s conclusion that home time-shifting is fair use. In light of the 
findings of the District Court regarding the state of the empirical data, it 
is clear that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the statute as 
presently written bars such conduct. 
In summary, the record and findings of the District Court lead us to 
two conclusions. First, Sony demonstrated a significant likelihood that 
substantial numbers of copyright holders who license their works for 
broadcast on free television would not object to having their broadcasts 
time-shifted by private viewers. And second, respondents failed to 
demonstrate that time-shifting would cause any likelihood of nominal 
harm to the potential market for, or the value of, their copyrighted works. 
The Betamax is, therefore, capable of substantial noninfringing uses. 
Sony’s sale of such equipment to the general public does not constitute 
contributory infringement of respondents’ copyrights. 
V 
“The direction of Art. I is that Congress shall have the power to 
promote the progress of science and the useful arts. When, as here, the 
Constitution is permissive, the sign of how far Congress has chosen to go 
can come only from Congress.” Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 
406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972). 
One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that the elected 
representatives of the millions of people who watch television every day 
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have made it unlawful to copy a program for later viewing at home, or have 
enacted a flat prohibition against the sale of machines that make such 
copying possible. 
It may well be that Congress will take a fresh look at this new 
technology, just as it so often has examined other innovations in the past. 
But it is not our job to apply laws that have not yet been written. Applying 
the copyright statute, as it now reads, to the facts as they have been 
developed in this case, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be 
reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
——— 
Justice Blackmun’s dissent disagreed with the majority on almost 
every analytical point. For example, rather than focusing on the personal 
and noncommercial character of home videotaping, the dissent emphasized 
its lack of creative value: 
The intent of § 107(1) is to encourage users to engage in activities 
the primary benefit of which accrues to others. Time-shifting 
involves no such humanitarian impulse. It is likewise something 
of a mischaracterization of time-shifting to describe it as 
noncommercial in the sense that that term is used in the statute. 
As one commentator has observed, time-shifting is noncommercial 
in the same sense that stealing jewelry and wearing it—instead 
of reselling it—is noncommercial. Purely consumptive uses are 
certainly not what the fair use doctrine was designed to protect, 
and the awkwardness of applying the statutory language to time-
shifting only makes clearer that fair use was designed to protect 
only uses that are productive. 
464 U.S. at 496. Because home copying amounted to personal consumption 
rather than social production, greater weight had to be given to the risk of 
harm to the studio copyright owners. 
The Studios have identified a number of ways in which VTR 
recording could damage their copyrights. VTR recording could 
reduce their ability to market their works in movie theaters and 
through the rental or sale of prerecorded videotapes or videodiscs; 
it also could reduce their rerun audience, and consequently the 
license fees available to them for repeated showings. Moreover, 
advertisers may be willing to pay for only “live” viewing 
audiences, if they believe VTR viewers will delete commercials or 
if rating services are unable to measure VTR use; if this is the 
case, VTR recording could reduce the license fees the Studios are 
able to charge even for first-run showings. Library-building may 
raise the potential for each of the types of harm identified by the 
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Studios, and time-shifting may raise the potential for substantial 
harm as well.35 
The Studios introduced expert testimony that both time-shifting 
and librarying would tend to decrease their revenue from 
copyrighted works. The District Court’s findings also show 
substantial library-building and avoidance of commercials. Both 
sides submitted surveys showing that the average Betamax user 
owns between 25 and 32 tapes. The Studios’ survey showed that 
at least 40% of users had more than 10 tapes in a “library”; Sony’s 
survey showed that more than 40% of users planned to view their 
tapes more than once; and both sides’ surveys showed that 
commercials were avoided at least 25% of the time. 
464 U.S. at 483. Nor was the fact that the studio copyright owners had 
licensed a “free” over-the-air television broadcast a reason for denying 
them protection against copying and replaying that broadcast. 
Although a television broadcast may be free to the viewer, this 
fact is equally irrelevant; a book borrowed from the public library 
may not be copied any more freely than a book that is purchased. 
464 U.S. at 480. 
The development of the VTR has created a new market for the 
works produced by the Studios. That market consists of those 
persons who desire to view television programs at times other 
than when they are broadcast, and who therefore purchase VTR 
recorders to enable them to time-shift. Because time-shifting of 
the Studios’ copyrighted works involves the copying of them, 
however, the Studios are entitled to share in the benefits of that 
new market. Those benefits currently go to Sony through 
Betamax sales. Respondents therefore can show harm from VTR 
use simply by showing that the value of their copyrights would 
increase if they were compensated for the copies that are used in 
the new market. The existence of this effect is self-evident. 
464 U.S. at 497–98. Nor was the dissent persuaded by the majority’s 
argument that classifying videotaping as illegal copying rather than as fair 
use would actually harm some program owners who wanted home viewers 
to be able to tape their shows and view them at times when they could. 
Such reasoning . . . simply confuses the question of liability with 
the difficulty of fashioning an appropriate remedy. It may be that 
an injunction prohibiting the sale of VTRs would harm the 
                                                 
35 A VTR owner who has taped a favorite movie for repeated viewing will be less likely to 
rent or buy a tape containing a movie, watch a televised rerun, or pay to see the movie at a theater. 
Both library-builders and time-shifters may avoid commercials; the library-builder may use the 
pause control to record without them, and all users may fast-forward through commercials on 
playback. 
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interests of copyright holders who have no objection to others 
making copies of their programs. But such concerns should and 
would be taken into account in fashioning an appropriate remedy 
once liability has been found. Remedies may well be available that 
would not interfere with authorized time-shifting at all. The Court 
of Appeals mentioned the possibility of a royalty payment that 
would allow VTR sales and time-shifting to continue unabated, 
and the parties may be able to devise other narrowly tailored 
remedies. Sony may be able, for example, to build a VTR that 
enables broadcasters to scramble the signal of individual 
programs and “jam” the unauthorized recording of them. Even 
were an appropriate remedy not available at this time, the Court 
should not misconstrue copyright holders’ rights in a manner that 
prevents enforcement of them when, through development of 
better techniques, an appropriate remedy becomes available. 
464 U.S. at 494. Justice Blackmun, however, was not able to persuade a 
fifth Justice to subscribe to this alternative analysis of the fair use issue. 
NEWER TECHNOLOGIES 
 
CARTOON NETWORK, LP V. CSC HOLDINGS, INC. 
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 2008. 
536 F.3d 121. 
WALKER, CIRCUIT JUDGE. 
Defendant-Appellant Cablevision Systems Corporation (“Cablevision”) 
wants to market a new “Remote Storage” Digital Video Recorder system 
(“RS-DVR”), using a technology akin to both traditional, set-top digital 
video recorders, like TiVo (“DVRs”), and the video-on-demand (“VOD”) 
services provided by many cable companies. Plaintiffs-Appellees produce 
copyrighted movies and television programs that they provide to 
Cablevision pursuant to numerous licensing agreements. They contend 
that Cablevision, through the operation of its RS-DVR system as proposed, 
would directly infringe their copyrights both by making unauthorized 
reproductions, and by engaging in public performances, of their 
copyrighted works. The material facts are not in dispute. Because we 
conclude that Cablevision would not directly infringe plaintiffs’ rights 
under the Copyright Act by offering its RS-DVR system to consumers, we 
reverse the district court’s award of summary judgment to plaintiffs, and 
we vacate its injunction against Cablevision. 
BACKGROUND 
Today’s television viewers increasingly use digital video recorders 
(“DVRs”) instead of video cassette recorders (“VCRs”) to record television 
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programs and play them back later at their convenience. DVRs generally 
store recorded programming on an internal hard drive rather than a 
cassette. But, as this case demonstrates, the generic term “DVR” actually 
refers to a growing number of different devices and systems. Companies 
like TiVo sell a stand-alone DVR device that is typically connected to a 
user’s cable box and television much like a VCR. Many cable companies 
also lease to their subscribers “set-top storage DVRs,” which combine many 
of the functions of a standard cable box and a stand-alone DVR in a single 
device. 
In March 2006, Cablevision, an operator of cable television systems, 
announced the advent of its new “Remote Storage DVR System.” As 
designed, the RS-DVR allows Cablevision customers who do not have a 
stand-alone DVR to record cable programming on central hard drives 
housed and maintained by Cablevision at a “remote” location. RS-DVR 
customers may then receive playback of those programs through their 
home television sets, using only a remote control and a standard cable box 
equipped with the RS-DVR software. Cablevision notified its content 
providers, including plaintiffs, of its plans to offer RS-DVR, but it did not 
seek any license from them to operate or sell the RS-DVR. 
Plaintiffs, which hold the copyrights to numerous movies and 
television programs, sued Cablevision for declaratory and injunctive relief. 
They alleged that Cablevision’s proposed operation of the RS-DVR would 
directly infringe their exclusive rights to both reproduce and publicly 
perform their copyrighted works. Critically for our analysis here, plaintiffs 
alleged theories only of direct infringement, not contributory infringement, 
and defendants waived any defense based on fair use. 
* * * 
“Section 106 of the Copyright Act grants copyright holders a bundle of 
exclusive rights. . . .” Id. at 607–08. This case implicates two of those rights: 
the right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies,” and the right “to 
perform the copyrighted work publicly.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (4). As 
discussed above, the district court found that Cablevision infringed the 
first right by 1) buffering the data from its programming stream and 2) 
copying content onto the Arroyo Server hard disks to enable playback of a 
program requested by an RS-DVR customer. In addition, the district court 
found that Cablevision would infringe the public performance right by 
transmitting a program to an RS-DVR customer in response to that 
customer’s playback request. We address each of these three allegedly 
infringing acts in turn. 
I. The Buffer Data 
It is undisputed that Cablevision, not any customer or other entity, 
takes the content from one stream of programming, after the split, and 
stores it, one small piece at a time, in the BMR buffer and the primary 
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ingest buffer. As a result, the information is buffered before any customer 
requests a recording, and would be buffered even if no such request were 
made. The question is whether, by buffering the data that make up a given 
work, Cablevision “reproduce[s]” that work “in copies,” 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), 
and thereby infringes the copyright holder’s reproduction right. 
“Copies,” as defined in the Copyright Act, “are material objects . . . in 
which a work is fixed by any method . . . and from which the work can be 
. . . reproduced.” Id. § 101. The Act also provides that a work is “ ‘fixed’ in 
a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment . . . is sufficiently 
permanent or stable to permit it to be . . . reproduced . . . for a period of 
more than transitory duration.” Id. (emphasis added). We believe that this 
language plainly imposes two distinct but related requirements: the work 
must be embodied in a medium, i.e., placed in a medium such that it can 
be perceived, reproduced, etc., from that medium (the “embodiment 
requirement”), and it must remain thus embodied “for a period of more 
than transitory duration” (the “duration requirement”). See 2 Melville B. 
Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 8.02[B][3], at 8–32 
(2007). Unless both requirements are met, the work is not “fixed” in the 
buffer, and, as a result, the buffer data is not a “copy” of the original work 
whose data is buffered. 
The district court mistakenly limited its analysis primarily to the 
embodiment requirement. As a result of this error, once it determined that 
the buffer data was “[c]learly . . . capable of being reproduced,” i.e., that the 
work was embodied in the buffer, the district court concluded that the work 
was therefore “fixed” in the buffer, and that a copy had thus been made. 
Cablevision I, 478 F.Supp.2d at 621–22. In doing so, it relied on a line of 
cases beginning with MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc., 991 F.2d 
511 (9th Cir.1993). It also relied on the United States Copyright Office’s 
2001 report on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which states, in 
essence, that an embodiment is fixed “[u]nless a reproduction manifests 
itself so fleetingly that it cannot be copied.” U.S. Copyright Office, DMCA 
Section 104 Report 111 (Aug.2001) (“DMCA Report”) (emphasis added), 
available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec–104–
report–vol–1.pdf. 
* * * 
Cablevision does not seriously dispute that copyrighted works are 
“embodied” in the buffer. Data in the BMR buffer can be reformatted and 
transmitted to the other components of the RS-DVR system. Data in the 
primary ingest buffer can be copied onto the Arroyo hard disks if a user has 
requested a recording of that data. Thus, a work’s “embodiment” in either 
buffer “is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, 
reproduced,” (as in the case of the ingest buffer) “or otherwise 
communicated” (as in the BMR buffer). 17 U.S.C. § 101. The result might 
be different if only a single second of a much longer work was placed in the 
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buffer in isolation. In such a situation, it might be reasonable to conclude 
that only a minuscule portion of a work, rather than “a work” was embodied 
in the buffer. Here, however, where every second of an entire work is 
placed, one second at a time, in the buffer, we conclude that the work is 
embodied in the buffer. 
Does any such embodiment last “for a period of more than transitory 
duration”? Id. No bit of data remains in any buffer for more than a fleeting 
1.2 seconds. And unlike the data in cases like MAI *130 Systems, which 
remained embodied in the computer’s RAM memory until the user turned 
the computer off, each bit of data here is rapidly and automatically 
overwritten as soon as it is processed. While our inquiry is necessarily fact-
specific, and other factors not present here may alter the duration analysis 
significantly, these facts strongly suggest that the works in this case are 
embodied in the buffer for only a “transitory” period, thus failing the 
duration requirement. 
Against this evidence, plaintiffs argue only that the duration is not 
transitory because the data persist “long enough for Cablevision to make 
reproductions from them.” Br. of Pls.-Appellees the Cartoon Network et al. 
at 51. As we have explained above, however, this reasoning impermissibly 
reads the duration language out of the statute, and we reject it. Given that 
the data reside in no buffer for more than 1.2 seconds before being 
automatically overwritten, and in the absence of compelling arguments to 
the contrary, we believe that the copyrighted works here are not 
“embodied” in the buffers for a period of more than transitory duration, and 
are therefore not “fixed” in the buffers. Accordingly, the acts of buffering in 
the operation of the RS-DVR do not create copies, as the Copyright Act 
defines that term. Our resolution of this issue renders it unnecessary for 
us to determine whether any copies produced by buffering data would be 
de minimis, and we express no opinion on that question. 
II. Direct Liability for Creating the Playback Copies 
In most copyright disputes, the allegedly infringing act and the 
identity of the infringer are never in doubt. These cases turn on whether 
the conduct in question does, in fact, infringe the plaintiff’s copyright. In 
this case, however, the core of the dispute is over the authorship of the 
infringing conduct. After an RS-DVR subscriber selects a program to 
record, and that program airs, a copy of the program—a copyrighted 
work—resides on the hard disks of Cablevision’s Arroyo Server, its creation 
unauthorized by the copyright holder. The question is who made this copy. 
If it is Cablevision, plaintiffs’ theory of direct infringement succeeds; if it is 
the customer, plaintiffs’ theory fails because Cablevision would then face, 
at most, secondary liability, a theory of liability expressly disavowed by 
plaintiffs. 
Few cases examine the line between direct and contributory liability. 
Both parties cite a line of cases beginning with Religious Technology Center 
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v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, 907 F.Supp. 1361 
(N.D.Cal.1995). In Netcom, a third-party customer of the defendant 
Internet service provider (“ISP”) posted a copyrighted work that was 
automatically reproduced by the defendant’s computer. The district court 
refused to impose direct liability on the ISP, reasoning that “[a]lthough 
copyright is a strict liability statute, there should still be some element of 
volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant’s system is merely 
used to create a copy by a third party.” Id. at 1370. Recently, the Fourth 
Circuit endorsed the Netcom decision, noting that 
to establish direct liability under . . . the Act, something more 
must be shown than mere ownership of a machine used by others 
to make illegal copies. There must be actual infringing conduct 
with a nexus sufficiently close and causal to the illegal copying 
that one could conclude that the machine owner himself 
trespassed on the exclusive domain of the copyright owner.” 
CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir.2004). 
Here, the district court pigeon-holed the conclusions reached in 
Netcom and its progeny as “premised on the unique attributes of the 
Internet.” Cablevision I, 478 F.Supp.2d at 620. While the Netcom court was 
plainly concerned with a theory of direct liability that would effectively 
“hold the entire Internet liable” for the conduct of a single user, 907 F.Supp. 
at 1372, its reasoning and conclusions, consistent with precedents of this 
court and the Supreme Court, and with the text of the Copyright Act, 
transcend the Internet. Like the Fourth Circuit, we reject the contention 
that “the Netcom decision was driven by expedience and that its holding is 
inconsistent with the established law of copyright,” CoStar, 373 F.3d at 
549, and we find it “a particularly rational interpretation of § 106,” id. at 
551, rather than a special-purpose rule applicable only to ISPs. 
When there is a dispute as to the author of an allegedly infringing 
instance of reproduction, Netcom and its progeny direct our attention to the 
volitional conduct that causes the copy to be made. There are only two 
instances of volitional conduct in this case: Cablevision’s conduct in 
designing, housing, and maintaining a system that exists only to produce 
a copy, and a customer’s conduct in ordering that system to produce a copy 
of a specific program. In the case of a VCR, it seems clear—and we know of 
no case holding otherwise—that the operator of the VCR, the person who 
actually presses the button to make the recording, supplies the necessary 
element of volition, not the person who manufactures, maintains, or, if 
distinct from the operator, owns the machine. We do not believe that an 
RS-DVR customer is sufficiently distinguishable from a VCR user to 
impose liability as a direct infringer on a different party for copies that are 
made automatically upon that customer’s command. 
The district court emphasized the fact that copying is “instrumental” 
rather than “incidental” to the function of the RS-DVR system. Cablevision 
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I, 478 F.Supp.2d at 620. While that may distinguish the RS-DVR from the 
ISPs in Netcom and CoStar, it does not distinguish the RS-DVR from a 
VCR, a photocopier, or even a typical copy shop. And the parties do not 
seem to contest that a company that merely makes photocopiers available 
to the public on its premises, without more, is not subject to liability for 
direct infringement for reproductions made by customers using those 
copiers. They only dispute whether Cablevision is similarly situated to such 
a proprietor. 
The district court found Cablevision analogous to a copy shop that 
makes course packs for college professors. In the leading case involving 
such a shop, for example, “[t]he professor [gave] the copyshop the materials 
of which the coursepack [was] to be made up, and the copyshop [did] the 
rest.” Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1384 
(6th Cir.1996) (en banc). There did not appear to be any serious dispute in 
that case that the shop itself was directly liable for reproducing copyrighted 
works. The district court here found that Cablevision, like this copy shop, 
would be “doing” the copying, albeit “at the customer’s behest.” Cablevision 
I, 478 F.Supp.2d at 620. 
But because volitional conduct is an important element of direct 
liability, the district court’s analogy is flawed. In determining who actually 
“makes” a copy, a significant difference exists between making a request to 
a human employee, who then volitionally operates the copying system to 
make the copy, and issuing a command directly to a system, which 
automatically obeys commands and engages in no volitional conduct. In 
cases like Princeton University Press, the defendants operated a copying 
device and sold the product they made using that device. See 99 F.3d at 
1383 (“The corporate defendant . . . is a commercial copyshop that 
reproduced substantial segments of copyrighted works of scholarship, 
bound the copies into ‘coursepacks,’ and sold the coursepacks to 
students. . . .”). Here, by selling access to a system that automatically 
produces copies on command, Cablevision more closely resembles a store 
proprietor who charges customers to use a photocopier on his premises, and 
it seems incorrect to say, without more, that such a proprietor “makes” any 
copies when his machines are actually operated by his customers. See 
Netcom, 907 F.Supp. at 1369. Some courts have held to the contrary, but 
they do not explicitly explain why, and we find them unpersuasive. See, 
e.g., Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Elec. Distribs., Inc., 360 F.Supp. 821, 823 
(E.D.N.Y.1973) (concluding that, “regardless” of whether customers or 
defendants’ employees operated the tape-copying machines at defendants’ 
stores, defendant had actively infringed copyrights). 
The district court also emphasized Cablevision’s “unfettered discretion 
in selecting the programming that it would make available for recording.” 
Cablevision I, 478 F.Supp.2d at 620. This conduct is indeed more proximate 
to the creation of illegal copying than, say, operating an ISP or opening a 
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copy shop, where all copied content was supplied by the customers 
themselves or other third parties. Nonetheless, we do not think it 
sufficiently proximate to the copying to displace the customer as the person 
who “makes” the copies when determining liability under the Copyright 
Act. Cablevision, we note, also has subscribers who use home VCRs or 
DVRs (like TiVo), and has significant control over the content recorded by 
these customers. But this control is limited to the channels of programming 
available to a customer and not to the programs themselves. Cablevision 
has no control over what programs are made available on individual 
channels or when those programs will air, if at all. In this respect, 
Cablevision possesses far less control over recordable content than it does 
in the VOD context, where it actively selects and makes available 
beforehand the individual programs available for viewing. For these 
reasons, we are not inclined to say that Cablevision, rather than the user, 
“does” the copying produced by the RS-DVR system. As a result, we find 
that the district court erred in concluding that Cablevision, rather than its 
RS-DVR customers, makes the copies carried out by the RS-DVR system. 
Our refusal to find Cablevision directly liable on these facts is 
buttressed by the existence and contours of the Supreme Court’s doctrine 
of contributory liability in the copyright context. After all, the purpose of 
any causation-based liability doctrine is to identify the actor (or actors) 
whose “conduct has been so significant and important a cause that [he or 
she] should be legally responsible.” W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and 
Keeton on Torts § 42, at 273 (5th ed.1984). But here, to the extent that we 
may construe the boundaries of direct liability more narrowly, the doctrine 
of contributory liability stands ready to provide adequate protection to 
copyrighted works. 
Most of the facts found dispositive by the district court—e.g., 
Cablevision’s “continuing relationship” with its RS-DVR customers, its 
control over recordable content, and the “instrumental[ity]” of copying to 
the RS-DVR system, Cablevision I, 478 F.Supp.2d at 618–20—seem to us 
more relevant to the question of contributory liability. In Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the lack of an “ongoing 
relationship” between Sony and its VCR customers supported the Court’s 
conclusion that it should not impose contributory liability on Sony for any 
infringing copying done by Sony VCR owners. 464 U.S. 417, 437–38, 104 
S.Ct. 774, 78 L.Ed.2d 574 (1984). The Sony Court did deem it “just” to 
impose liability on a party in a “position to control” the infringing uses of 
another, but as a contributory, not direct, infringer. Id. at 437, 104 S.Ct. 
774. And asking whether copying copyrighted material is only “incidental” 
to a given technology is akin to asking whether that technology has 
“commercially significant noninfringing uses,” another inquiry the Sony 
Court found relevant to whether imposing contributory liability was just. 
Id. at 442, 104 S.Ct. 774. 
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The Supreme Court’s desire to maintain a meaningful distinction 
between direct and contributory copyright infringement is consistent with 
congressional intent. The Patent Act, unlike the Copyright Act, expressly 
provides that someone who “actively induces infringement of a patent” is 
“liable as an infringer,” 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), just like someone who commits 
the underlying infringing act by “us[ing]” a patented invention without 
authorization, id. § 271(a). In contrast, someone who merely “sells . . . a 
material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process” faces only 
liability as a “contributory infringer.” Id. § 271(c). If Congress had meant 
to assign direct liability to both the person who actually commits a 
copyright-infringing act and any person who actively induces that 
infringement, the Patent Act tells us that it knew how to draft a statute 
that would have this effect. Because Congress did not do so, the Sony Court 
concluded that “[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable 
for infringement committed by another.” 464 U.S. at 434, 104 S.Ct. 774. 
Furthermore, in cases like Sony, the Supreme Court has strongly signaled 
its intent to use the doctrine of contributory infringement, not direct 
infringement, to “identify[ ] the circumstances in which it is just to hold 
one individual accountable for the actions of another.” Id. at 435, 104 S.Ct. 
774. Thus, although Sony warns us that “the lines between direct 
infringement, contributory infringement, and vicarious liability are not 
clearly drawn,” id. at 435 n. 17, 104 S.Ct. 774 (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted), that decision does not absolve us of our duty to 
discern where that line falls in cases, like this one, that require us to decide 
the question. 
The district court apparently concluded that Cablevision’s operation of 
the RS-DVR system would contribute in such a major way to the copying 
done by another that it made sense to say that Cablevision was a direct 
infringer, and thus, in effect, was “doing” the relevant copying. There are 
certainly other cases, not binding on us, that follow this approach. See, e.g., 
Playboy Enters. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F.Supp. 503, 513 (N.D.Ohio 
1997) (noting that defendant ISP’s encouragement of its users to copy 
protected files was “crucial” to finding that it was a direct infringer). We 
need not decide today whether one’s contribution to the creation of an 
infringing copy may be so great that it warrants holding that party directly 
liable for the infringement, even though another party has actually made 
the copy. We conclude only that on the facts of this case, copies produced 
by the RS-DVR system are “made” by the RS-DVR customer, and 
Cablevision’s contribution to this reproduction by providing the system 
does not warrant the imposition of direct liability. Therefore, Cablevision 
is entitled to summary judgment on this point, and the district court erred 
in awarding summary judgment to plaintiffs. 
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III. Transmission of RS-DVR Playback 
Plaintiffs’ final theory is that Cablevision will violate the Copyright 
Act by engaging in unauthorized public performances of their works 
through the playback of the RS-DVR copies. The Act grants a copyright 
owner the exclusive right, “in the case of . . . motion pictures and other 
audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly.” 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106(4). Section 101, the definitional section of the Act, explains that 
[t]o perform or display a work “publicly” means (1) to perform or 
display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a 
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a 
family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or (2) to transmit 
or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to 
a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any 
device or process, whether the members of the public capable of 
receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place 
or in separate places and at the same time or at different times. 
Id. § 101. 
The parties agree that this case does not implicate clause (1). 
Accordingly, we ask whether these facts satisfy the second, “transmit 
clause” of the public performance definition: Does Cablevision “transmit 
. . . a performance . . . of the work . . . to the public”? Id. No one disputes 
that the RS-DVR playback results in the transmission of a performance of 
a work—the transmission from the Arroyo Server to the customer’s 
television set. Cablevision contends that (1) the RS-DVR customer, rather 
than Cablevision, does the transmitting and thus the performing and 
(2) the transmission is not “to the public” under the transmit clause. 
As to Cablevision’s first argument, we note that our conclusion in Part 
II that the customer, not Cablevision, “does” the copying does not dictate a 
parallel conclusion that the customer, and not Cablevision, “performs” the 
copyrighted work. The definitions that delineate the contours of the 
reproduction and public performance rights vary in significant ways. For 
example, the statute defines the verb “perform” and the noun “copies,” but 
not the verbs “reproduce” or “copy.” Id. We need not address Cablevision’s 
first argument further because, even if we assume that Cablevision makes 
the transmission when an RS-DVR playback occurs, we find that the RS-
DVR playback, as described here, does not involve the transmission of a 
performance “to the public.” 
The statute itself does not expressly define the term “performance” or 
the phrase “to the public.” It does explain that a transmission may be “to 
the public . . . whether the members of the public capable of receiving the 
performance . . . receive it in the same place or in separate places and at 
the same time or at different times.” Id. This plain language instructs us 
that, in determining whether a transmission is “to the public,” it is of no 
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moment that the potential recipients of the transmission are in different 
places, or that they may receive the transmission at different times. The 
implication from this same language, however, is that it is relevant, in 
determining whether a transmission is made to the public, to discern who 
is “capable of receiving” the performance being transmitted. The fact that 
the statute says “capable of receiving the performance,” instead of “capable 
of receiving the transmission,” underscores the fact that a transmission of 
a performance is itself a performance. Cf. Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty 
Co., 283 U.S. 191, 197–98, 51 S.Ct. 410, 75 L.Ed. 971 (1931). 
The legislative history of the transmit clause supports this 
interpretation. The House Report on the 1976 Copyright Act states that 
[u]nder the bill, as under the present law, a performance made 
available by transmission to the public at large is “public” even 
though the recipients are not gathered in a single place, and even 
if there is no proof that any of the potential recipients was 
operating his receiving apparatus at the time of the transmission. 
The same principles apply whenever the potential recipients of the 
transmission represent a limited segment of the public, such as 
the occupants of hotel rooms or the subscribers of a cable 
television service. 
H.R.Rep. No. 94–1476, at 64–65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5678 (emphases added). 
Plaintiffs also reference a 1967 House Report, issued nearly a decade 
before the Act we are interpreting, stating that the same principles apply 
where the transmission is “capable of reaching different recipients at 
different times, as in the case of sounds or images stored in an information 
system and capable of being performed or displayed at the initiative of 
individual members of the public.” H.R.Rep. No. 90–83, at 29 (1967) 
(emphases added). We question how much deference this report deserves. 
But we need not belabor the point here, as the 1967 report is consistent 
with both legislative history contemporaneous with the Act’s passage and 
our own interpretation of the statute’s plain meaning. 
From the foregoing, it is evident that the transmit clause directs us to 
examine who precisely is “capable of receiving” a particular transmission 
of a performance. Cablevision argues that, because each RS-DVR 
transmission is made using a single unique copy of a work, made by an 
individual subscriber, one that can be decoded exclusively by that 
subscriber’s cable box, only one subscriber is capable of receiving any given 
RS-DVR transmission. This argument accords with the language of the 
transmit clause, which, as described above, directs us to consider the 
potential audience of a given transmission. We are unpersuaded by the 
district court’s reasoning and the plaintiffs’ arguments that we should 
consider a larger potential audience in determining whether a 
transmission is “to the public.” 
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The district court, in deciding whether the RS-DVR playback of a 
program to a particular customer is “to the public,” apparently considered 
all of Cablevision’s customers who subscribe to the channel airing that 
program and all of Cablevision’s RS-DVR subscribers who request a copy 
of that program. Thus, it concluded that the RS-DVR playbacks constituted 
public performances because “Cablevision would transmit the same 
program to members of the public, who may receive the performance at 
different times, depending on whether they view the program in real time 
or at a later time as an RS-DVR playback.” Cablevision I, 478 F.Supp.2d at 
623 (emphasis added). In essence, the district court suggested that, in 
considering whether a transmission is “to the public,” we consider not the 
potential audience of a particular transmission, but the potential audience 
of the underlying work (i.e., “the program”) whose content is being 
transmitted. 
We cannot reconcile the district court’s approach with the language of 
the transmit clause. That clause speaks of people capable of receiving a 
particular “transmission” or “performance,” and not of the potential 
audience of a particular “work.” Indeed, such an approach would render 
the “to the public” language surplusage. Doubtless the potential audience 
for every copyrighted audiovisual work is the general public. As a result, 
any transmission of the content of a copyrighted work would constitute a 
public performance under the district court’s interpretation. But the 
transmit clause obviously contemplates the existence of non-public 
transmissions; if it did not, Congress would have stopped drafting that 
clause after “performance.” 
On appeal, plaintiffs offer a slight variation of this interpretation. 
They argue that both in its real-time cablecast and via the RS-DVR 
playback, Cablevision is in fact transmitting the “same performance” of a 
given work: the performance of the work that occurs when the 
programming service supplying Cablevision’s content transmits that 
content to Cablevision and the service’s other licensees. See Br. of Pls.-
Appellees Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. et al. at 27 (“Fox Br.”) (“The 
critical factor . . . is that the same performance is transmitted to different 
subscribers at different times . . . . more specifically, the performance of 
that program by HBO or another programming service.” (third emphasis 
added)). 
Thus, according to plaintiffs, when Congress says that to perform a 
work publicly means to transmit . . . a performance . . . to the public, they 
really meant “transmit . . . the ‘original performance’ . . . to the public.” The 
implication of this theory is that to determine whether a given 
transmission of a performance is “to the public,” we would consider not only 
the potential audience of that transmission, but also the potential audience 
of any transmission of the same underlying “original” performance. 
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Like the district court’s interpretation, this view obviates any 
possibility of a purely private transmission. Furthermore, it makes 
Cablevision’s liability depend, in part, on the actions of legal strangers. 
Assume that HBO transmits a copyrighted work to both Cablevision and 
Comcast. Cablevision merely retransmits the work from one Cablevision 
facility to another, while Comcast retransmits the program to its 
subscribers. Under plaintiffs’ interpretation, Cablevision would still be 
transmitting the performance to the public, solely because Comcast has 
transmitted the same underlying performance to the public. Similarly, a 
hapless customer who records a program in his den and later transmits the 
recording to a television in his bedroom would be liable for publicly 
performing the work simply because some other party had once 
transmitted the same underlying performance to the public. 
We do not believe Congress intended such odd results. Although the 
transmit clause is not a model of clarity, we believe that when Congress 
speaks of transmitting a performance to the public, it refers to the 
performance created by the act of transmission. Thus, HBO transmits its 
own performance of a work when it transmits to Cablevision, and 
Cablevision transmits its own performance of the same work when it 
retransmits the feed from HBO. 
Furthermore, we believe it would be inconsistent with our own 
transmit clause jurisprudence to consider the potential audience of an 
upstream transmission by a third party when determining whether a 
defendant’s own subsequent transmission of a performance is “to the 
public.” In National Football League v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture (NFL), 
211 F.3d 10 (2000), we examined the transmit clause in the context of 
satellite television provider PrimeTime, which captured protected content 
in the United States from the NFL, transmitted it from the United States 
to a satellite (“the uplink”), and then transmitted it from the satellite to 
subscribers in both the United States and Canada (“the downlink”). 
PrimeTime had a license to transmit to its U.S. customers, but not its 
Canadian customers. It argued that although the downlink transmission 
to its Canadian subscribers was a public performance, it could not be held 
liable for that act because it occurred entirely outside of the United States 
and therefore was not subject to the strictures of the Copyright Act. It also 
argued that the uplink transmission was not a public performance because 
it was a transmission to a single satellite. See id. at 12. 
The NFL court did not question the first assumption, but it flatly 
rejected the second on a specific and germane ground: 
We believe the most logical interpretation of the Copyright Act is to 
hold that a public performance or display includes each step in the process 
by which a protected work wends its way to its audience. Under that 
analysis, it is clear that PrimeTime’s uplink transmission of signals 
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captured in the United States is a step in the process by which NFL’s 
protected work wends its way to a public audience. 
Id. at 13 (emphasis added) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
Thus, while the uplink transmission that took place in the United States 
was not, in itself, “to the public,” the NFL court deemed it so because it 
ultimately resulted in an undisputed public performance. Notably, the NFL 
court did not base its decision on the fact that an upstream transmission 
by another party (the NFL) might have been to the public. Nor did the court 
base its decision on the fact that Primetime simultaneously transmitted a 
performance of the work to the public in the United States. Because NFL 
directs us to look downstream, rather than upstream or laterally, to 
determine whether any link in a chain of transmissions made by a party 
constitutes a public performance, we reject plaintiffs’ contention that we 
examine the potential recipients of the content provider’s initial 
transmission to determine who is capable of receiving the RS-DVR 
playback transmission. 
Plaintiffs also rely on NFL for the proposition that Cablevision 
publicly performs a work when it splits its programming stream and 
transmits the second stream to the RS-DVR system. Because NFL only 
supports that conclusion if we determine that the final transmission in the 
chain (i.e., the RS-DVR playback transmission) is “to the public,” plaintiffs’ 
reliance on NFL is misplaced. NFL dealt with a chain of transmissions 
whose final link was undisputedly a public performance. It therefore does 
not guide our current inquiry. 
In sum, none of the arguments advanced by plaintiffs or the district 
court alters our conclusion that, under the transmit clause, we must 
examine the potential audience of a given transmission by an alleged 
infringer to determine whether that transmission is “to the public.” And 
because the RS-DVR system, as designed, only makes transmissions to one 
subscriber using a copy made by that subscriber, we believe that the 
universe of people capable of receiving an RS-DVR transmission is the 
single subscriber whose self-made copy is used to create that transmission. 
Plaintiffs contend that it is “wholly irrelevant, in determining the 
existence of a public performance, whether ‘unique’ copies of the same work 
are used to make the transmissions.” Fox Br. at 27. But plaintiffs cite no 
authority for this contention. And our analysis of the transmit clause 
suggests that, in general, any factor that limits the potential audience of a 
transmission is relevant. 
Furthermore, no transmission of an audiovisual work can be made, we 
assume, without using a copy of that work: to transmit a performance of a 
movie, for example, the transmitter generally must obtain a copy of that 
movie. As a result, in the context of movies, television programs, and other 
audiovisual works, the right of reproduction can reinforce and protect the 
right of public performance. If the owner of a copyright believes he is 
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injured by a particular transmission of a performance of his work, he may 
be able to seek redress not only for the infringing transmission, but also for 
the underlying copying that facilitated the transmission. Given this 
interplay between the various rights in this context, it seems quite 
consistent with the Act to treat a transmission made using Copy A as 
distinct from one made using Copy B, just as we would treat a transmission 
made by Cablevision as distinct from an otherwise identical transmission 
made by Comcast. Both factors—the identity of the transmitter and the 
source material of the transmission—limit the potential audience of a 
transmission in this case and are therefore germane in determining 
whether that transmission is made “to the public.” 
Indeed, we believe that Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Redd 
Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir.1984), relied on by both plaintiffs and the 
district court, supports our decision to accord significance to the existence 
and use of distinct copies in our transmit clause analysis. In that case, 
defendant operated a video rental store, Maxwell’s, which also housed a 
number of small private booths containing seats and a television. Patrons 
would select a film, enter the booth, and close the door. An employee would 
then load a copy of the requested movie into a bank of VCRs at the front of 
the store and push play, thereby transmitting the content of the tape to the 
television in the viewing booth. See id. at 156–57. 
The Third Circuit found that defendants’ conduct constituted a public 
performance under both clauses of the statutory definition. In concluding 
that Maxwell’s violated the transmit clause, that court explicitly relied on 
the fact that defendants showed the same copy of a work seriatim to its 
clientele, and it quoted a treatise emphasizing the same fact: 
Professor Nimmer’s examination of this definition is particularly 
pertinent: “if the same copy . . . of a given work is repeatedly played (i.e., 
‘performed’) by different members of the public, albeit at different times, 
this constitutes a ‘public’ performance.” 2 M. Nimmer, § 8.14[C][3], at 8–
142 (emphasis in original). . . . Although Maxwell’s has only one copy of 
each film, it shows each copy repeatedly to different members of the public. 
This constitutes a public performance. 
Id. at 159 (first omission in original). 
Unfortunately, neither the Redd Horne court nor Prof. Nimmer 
explicitly explains why the use of a distinct copy affects the transmit clause 
inquiry. But our independent analysis confirms the soundness of their 
intuition: the use of a unique copy may limit the potential audience of a 
transmission and is therefore relevant to whether that transmission is 
made “to the public.” Plaintiffs’ unsupported arguments to the contrary are 
unavailing. 
Given that each RS-DVR transmission is made to a given subscriber 
using a copy made by that subscriber, we conclude that such a transmission 
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is not “to the public,” without analyzing the contours of that phrase in great 
detail. No authority cited by the parties or the district court persuades us 
to the contrary. 
In addition to Redd Horne, the district court also cited and analyzed 
On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, 777 F.Supp. 
787 (N.D.Cal.1991), in its transmit clause analysis. In that case, defendant 
On Command developed and sold “a system for the electronic delivery of 
movie video tapes,” which it sold to hotels. Id. at 788. The hub of the system 
was a bank of video cassette players, each containing a copy of a particular 
movie. From his room, a hotel guest could select a movie via remote control 
from a list on his television. The corresponding cassette player would start, 
and its output would be transmitted to that guest’s room. During this 
playback, the movie selected was unavailable to other guests. See id. The 
court concluded that the transmissions made by this system were made to 
the public “because the relationship between the transmitter of the 
performance, On Command, and the audience, hotel guests, is a 
commercial, ‘public’ one regardless of where the viewing takes place.” Id. 
at 790. 
Thus, according to the On Command court, any commercial 
transmission is a transmission “to the public.” We find this interpretation 
untenable, as it completely rewrites the language of the statutory 
definition. If Congress had wished to make all commercial transmissions 
public performances, the transmit clause would read: “to perform a work 
publicly means . . . to transmit a performance for commercial purposes.” In 
addition, this interpretation overlooks, as Congress did not, the possibility 
that even non-commercial transmissions to the public may diminish the 
value of a copyright. Finally, like Redd Horne, On Command is factually 
distinguishable, as successive transmissions to different viewers in that 
case could be made using a single copy of a given work. Thus, at the 
moment of transmission, any of the hotel’s guests was capable of receiving 
a transmission made using a single copy of a given movie. As a result, the 
district court in this case erred in relying on On Command. 
Plaintiffs also rely on Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Products, Inc., 
930 F.2d 277 (3d Cir.1991), in which the Third Circuit interpreted § 106(3) 
of the Copyright Act, which gives the copyright holder the exclusive right 
“to distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the public,” 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106(3) (emphasis added). The court concluded that “even one person can 
be the public for the purposes of section 106(3).” Ford, 930 F.2d at 299 
(emphasis added). Commentators have criticized the Ford court for 
divesting the phrase “to the public” of “all meaning whatsoever,” 2 Nimmer 
& Nimmer, supra, § 8.11[A], at 8–149, and the decision does appear to have 
that result. Whether this result was justified in the context of the 
distribution right is not for us to decide in this case. We merely note that 
we find no compelling reason, in the context of the transmit clause and the 
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public performance right, to interpret the phrase “to the public” out of 
existence. 
In sum, we find that the transmit clause directs us to identify the 
potential audience of a given transmission, i.e., the persons “capable of 
receiving” it, to determine whether that transmission is made “to the 
public.” Because each RS-DVR playback transmission is made to a single 
subscriber using a single unique copy produced by that subscriber, we 
conclude that such transmissions are not performances “to the public,” and 
therefore do not infringe any exclusive right of public performance. We base 
this decision on the application of undisputed facts; thus, Cablevision is 
entitled to summary judgment on this point. 
This holding, we must emphasize, does not generally permit content 
delivery networks to avoid all copyright liability by making copies of each 
item of content and associating one unique copy with each subscriber to the 
network, or by giving their subscribers the capacity to make their own 
individual copies. We do not address whether such a network operator 
would be able to escape any other form of copyright liability, such as 
liability for unauthorized reproductions or liability for contributory 
infringement. 
In sum, because we find, on undisputed facts, that Cablevision’s 
proposed RS-DVR system would not directly infringe plaintiffs’ exclusive 
rights to reproduce and publicly perform their copyrighted works, we grant 
summary judgment in favor of Cablevision with respect to both rights. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s award of summary judgment 
to the plaintiffs is REVERSED and the district court’s injunction against 
Cablevision is VACATED. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
——— 
 
A & M RECORDS, ET AL. V. NAPSTER 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 2001. 
239 F.3d 1004. 
BEEZER, CIRCUIT JUDGE. 
[After walking through the basic doctrinal issues of whether Napster 
users were engaging in copyright infringement or fair use, the Circuit then 
turned to Napster’s principal defense of the legality of its registered users’ 
actions.] 
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5. Identified Uses 
Napster maintains that its identified uses of sampling and space-
shifting were wrongly excluded as fair uses by the district court. 
a. Sampling 
Napster contends that its users download MP3 files to “sample” the 
music in order to decide whether to purchase the recording. Napster argues 
that the district court: (1) erred in concluding that sampling is a 
commercial use because it conflated a noncommercial use with a personal 
use; (2) erred in determining that sampling adversely affects the market 
for plaintiffs copyrighted music, a requirement if the use is noncommercial; 
and (3) erroneously concluded that sampling is not a fair use because it 
determined that samplers may also engage in other infringing activity. 
The district court determined that sampling remains a commercial use 
even if some users eventually purchase the music. We find no error in the 
district court’s determination. Plaintiffs have established that they are 
likely to succeed in proving that even authorized temporary downloading 
of individual songs for sampling purposes is commercial in nature. The 
record supports a finding that free promotional downloads are highly 
regulated by the record company plaintiffs and that the companies collect 
royalties for song samples available on retail Internet sites. Evidence relied 
on by the district court demonstrates that the free downloads provided by 
the record companies consist of thirty-to-sixty second samples or are full 
songs programmed to “time out,” that is, exist only for a short time on the 
downloader’s computer. In comparison, Napster users download a full, free 
and permanent copy of the recording. The determination by the district 
court as to the commercial purpose and character of sampling is not clearly 
erroneous. 
The district court further found that both the market for audio CDs 
and market for online distribution are adversely affected by Napster’s 
service. As stated in our discussion of the district court’s general fair use 
analysis: the court did not abuse its discretion when it found that, overall, 
Napster has an adverse impact on the audio CD and digital download 
markets. Contrary to Napster’s assertion that the district court failed to 
specifically address the market impact of sampling, the district court 
determined that “even if the type of sampling supposedly done on Napster 
were a non-commercial use, plaintiffs have demonstrated a substantial 
likelihood that it would adversely affect the potential market for their 
copyrighted works if it became widespread.” Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 
914. The record supports the district court’s preliminary determinations 
that: (1) the more music that sampling users download, the less likely they 
are to eventually purchase the recordings on audio CD; and (2) even if the 
audio CD market is not harmed, Napster has adverse effects on the 
developing digital download market. 
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Napster further argues that the district court erred in rejecting its 
evidence that the users’ downloading of “samples” increases or tends to 
increase audio CD sales. The district court, however, correctly noted that 
“any potential enhancement of plaintiffs’ sales . . . would not tip the fair 
use analysis conclusively in favor of defendant.” Id. at 914. We agree that 
increased sales of copyrighted material attributable to unauthorized use 
should not deprive the copyright holder of the right to license the material. 
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 n.21 (“Even favorable evidence, without 
more, is no guarantee of fairness. Judge Leval gives the example of the film 
producer’s appropriation of a composer’s previously unknown song that 
turns the song into a commercial success; the boon to the song does not 
make the film’s simple copying fair.”). Nor does positive impact in one 
market, here the audio CD market, deprive the copyright holder of the right 
to develop identified alternative markets, here the digital download 
market. 
We find no error in the district court’s factual findings or abuse of 
discretion in the court’s conclusion that plaintiffs will likely prevail in 
establishing that sampling does not constitute a fair use. 
b. Space-Shifting 
Napster also maintains that space-shifting is a fair use. Space-shifting 
occurs when a Napster user downloads MP3 music files in order to listen 
to music he already owns on audio CD. Napster asserts that we have 
already held that space-shifting of musical compositions and sound 
recordings is a fair use. See Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond 
Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Rio [a portable 
MP3 player] merely makes copies in order to render portable, or ‘space-
shift,’ those files that already reside on a user’s hard drive. Such copying is 
a paradigmatic noncommercial personal use.”). See also generally Sony, 
464 U.S. at 423 (holding that “time-shifting,” where a video tape recorder 
owner records a television show for later viewing, is a fair use). 
We conclude that the district court did not err when it refused to apply 
the “shifting” analyses of Sony and Diamond. Both Diamond and Sony are 
inapposite because the methods of shifting in these cases did not also 
simultaneously involve distribution of the copyrighted material to the 
general public; the time or space-shifting of copyrighted material exposed 
the material only to the original user. In Diamond, for example, the 
copyrighted music was transferred from the user’s computer hard drive to 
the user’s portable MP3 player. So too Sony, where “the majority of VCR 
purchasers did not distribute taped television broadcasts, but merely 
enjoyed them at home.” Napster, 114 F. Supp.2d at 913. Conversely, it is 
obvious that once a user lists a copy of music he already owns on the 
Napster system in order to access the music from another location, the song 
becomes “available to millions of other individuals,” not just the original 
CD owner. See UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp.2d at 351–52 (finding space-
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shifting of MP3 files not a fair use even when previous ownership is 
demonstrated before a download is allowed). 
* * * 
(The Circuit then turned to the question of whether Napster was itself 
liable for contributing to the infringement by its users.) 
IV 
A. Knowledge 
Contributory liability requires that the secondary infringer “know or 
have reason to know” of direct infringement. The district court found that 
Napster had both actual and constructive knowledge that its users 
exchanged copyrighted music. The district court also concluded that the 
law does not require knowledge of “specific acts of infringement” and 
rejected Napster’s contention that because the company cannot distinguish 
infringing from noninfringing files, it does not “know” of the direct 
infringement. 
It is apparent from the record that Napster has knowledge, both actual 
and constructive, of direct infringement. Napster claims that it is 
nevertheless protected from contributory liability by the teaching of Sony 
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). We disagree. We 
observe that Napster’s actual, specific knowledge of direct infringement 
renders Sony’s holding of limited assistance to Napster. We are compelled 
to make a clear distinction between the architecture of the Napster system 
and Napster’s conduct in relation to the operational capacity of the system. 
We are bound to follow Sony, and will not impute the requisite level of 
knowledge to Napster merely because peer-to-peer file sharing technology 
may be used to infringe plaintiffs’ copyrights. See 464 U.S. at 436 (rejecting 
argument that merely supplying the “ ‘means’ to accomplish an infringing 
activity” leads to imposition of liability). We depart from the reasoning of 
the district court that Napster failed to demonstrate that its system is 
capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses. The district court 
improperly confined the use analysis to current uses, ignoring the system’s 
capabilities. See generally Sony, 464 U.S. at 442–43 (framing inquiry as 
whether the video tape recorder is “capable of commercially significant 
noninfringing uses”). Consequently, the district court placed undue weight 
on the proportion of current infringing use as compared to current and 
future noninfringing use. Nonetheless, whether we might arrive at a 
different result is not the issue here. The instant appeal occurs at an early 
point in the proceedings and “the fully developed factual record may be 
materially different from that initially before the district court. . . .” 
Regardless of the number of Napster’s infringing versus noninfringing 
uses, the evidentiary record here supported the district court’s finding that 
plaintiffs would likely prevail in establishing that Napster knew or had 
reason to know of its users’ infringement of plaintiffs’ copyrights. 
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* * * 
We agree that if a computer system operator learns of specific 
infringing material available on his system and fails to purge such material 
from the system, the operator knows of and contributes to direct 
infringement. Conversely, absent any specific information which identifies 
infringing activity, a computer system operator cannot be liable for 
contributory infringement merely because the structure of the system 
allows for the exchange of copyrighted material. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 436, 
442–43. To enjoin simply because a computer network allows for infringing 
use would, in our opinion, violate Sony and potentially restrict activity 
unrelated to infringing use. 
We nevertheless conclude that sufficient knowledge exists to impose 
contributory liability when linked to demonstrated infringing use of the 
Napster system. The record supports the district court’s finding that 
Napster has actual knowledge that specific infringing material is available 
using its system, that it could block access to the system by suppliers of the 
infringing material, and that it failed to remove the material. 
B. Material Contribution 
Under the facts as found by the district court, Napster materially 
contributes to the infringing activity. Relying on Fonovisa v. Cherry 
Auction, 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996), the district court concluded that 
“without the support services defendant provides, Napster users could not 
find and download the music they want with the ease of which defendant 
boasts.” Napster, 114 F. Supp.2d at 919–20 (“Napster is an integrated 
service designed to enable users to locate and download MP3 music files.”). 
We agree that Napster provides “the site and facilities” for direct 
infringement. The district court correctly applied the reasoning in 
Fonovisa, and properly found that Napster materially contributes to direct 
infringement. 
V 
We turn to the question whether Napster engages in vicarious 
copyright infringement. Vicarious copyright liability is an “outgrowth” of 
respondeat superior. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262. In the context of copyright 
law, vicarious liability extends beyond an employer/employee relationship 
to cases in which a defendant “has the right and ability to supervise the 
infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such 
activities.” 
Before moving into this discussion, we note that Sony’s “staple article 
of commerce” analysis has no application to Napster’s potential liability for 
vicarious copyright infringement. The issues of Sony’s liability under the 
“doctrines of ‘direct infringement’ and ‘vicarious liability’ ” were not before 
the Supreme Court, although the Court recognized that the “lines between 
direct infringement, contributory infringement, and vicarious liability are 
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not clearly drawn.” Consequently, when the Sony Court used the term 
“vicarious liability,” it did so broadly and outside of a technical analysis of 
the doctrine of vicarious copyright infringement. Id. at 435 (“Vicarious 
liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the concept of 
contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of 
identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual 
accountable for the actions of another.”). 
A. Financial Benefit 
The district court determined that plaintiffs had demonstrated they 
would likely succeed in establishing that Napster has a direct financial 
interest in the infringing activity. We agree. Financial benefit exists where 
the availability of infringing material “acts as a ‘draw’ for customers.” 
Ample evidence supports the district court’s finding that Napster’s future 
revenue is directly dependent upon “increases in userbase.” More users 
register with the Napster system as the “quality and quantity of available 
music increases.” We conclude that the district court did not err in 
determining that Napster financially benefits from the availability of 
protected works on its system. 
B. Supervision 
The district court determined that Napster has the right and ability to 
supervise its users’ conduct. We agree in part. The ability to block 
infringers’ access to a particular environment for any reason whatsoever is 
evidence of the right and ability to supervise. Here, plaintiffs have 
demonstrated that Napster retains the right to control access to its system. 
Napster has an express reservation of rights policy, stating on its website 
that it expressly reserves the “right to refuse service and terminate 
accounts in [its] discretion, including, but not limited to, if Napster believes 
that user conduct violates applicable law . . . or for any reason in Napster’s 
sole discretion, with or without cause.” 
To escape imposition of vicarious liability, the reserved right to police 
must be exercised to its fullest extent. Turning a blind eye to detectable 
acts of infringement for the sake of profit gives rise to liability . . . The 
district court correctly determined that Napster had the right and ability 
to police its system and failed to exercise that right to prevent the exchange 
of copyrighted material. The district court, however, failed to recognize that 
the boundaries of the premises that Napster “controls and patrols” are 
limited. Put differently, Napster’s reserved “right and ability” to police is 
cabined by the system’s current architecture. As shown by the record, the 
Napster system does not “read” the content of indexed files, other than to 
check that they are in the proper MP3 format. 
Napster, however, has the ability to locate infringing material listed 
on its search indices, and the right to terminate users’ access to the system. 
The file name indices, therefore, are within the “premises” that Napster 
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has the ability to police. We recognize that the files are user-named and 
may not match copyrighted material exactly (for example, the artist or song 
could be spelled wrong). For Napster to function effectively, however, file 
names must reasonably or roughly correspond to the material contained in 
the files, otherwise no user could ever locate any desired music. As a 
practical matter, Napster, its users and the record company plaintiffs have 
equal access to infringing material by employing Napster’s “search 
function.” 
Our review of the record requires us to accept the district court’s 
conclusion that plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the 
merits of the vicarious copyright infringement claim. Napster’s failure to 
police the system’s “premises,” combined with a showing that Napster 
financially benefits from the continuing availability of infringing files on 
its system, leads to the imposition of vicarious liability. 
VIII 
[The one change of consequence in the Circuit Court ruling related to 
the nature of the interim injunctive relief to be granted the music industry 
against this Napster service.] 
The district court correctly recognized that a preliminary injunction 
against Napster’s participation in copyright infringement is not only 
warranted but required. We believe, however, that the scope of the 
injunction needs modification in light of our opinion. Specifically, we 
reiterate that contributory liability may potentially be imposed only to the 
extent that Napster: (1) receives reasonable knowledge of specific 
infringing files with copyrighted musical compositions and sound 
recordings; (2) knows or should know that such files are available on the 
Napster system; and (3) fails to act to prevent viral distribution of the 
works. The mere existence of the Napster system, absent actual notice and 
Napster’s demonstrated failure to remove the offending material, is 
insufficient to impose contributory liability. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442–43. 
Conversely, Napster may be vicariously liable when it fails to 
affirmatively use its ability to patrol its system and preclude access to 
potentially infringing files listed in its search index. Napster has both the 
ability to use its search function to identify infringing musical recordings 
and the right to bar participation of users who engage in the transmission 
of infringing files. 
The preliminary injunction which we stayed is overbroad because it 
places on Napster the entire burden of ensuring that no “copying, 
downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing” of plaintiffs’ works 
occur on the system. As stated, we place the burden on plaintiffs to provide 
notice to Napster of copyrighted works and files containing such works 
available on the Napster system before Napster has the duty to disable 
access to the offending content. Napster, however, also bears the burden of 
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policing the system within the limits of the system. Here, we recognize that 
this is not an exact science in that the files are user named. In crafting the 
injunction on remand, the district court should recognize that Napster’s 
system does not currently appear to allow Napster access to users’ MP3 
files. 
Based on our decision to remand, Napster’s additional arguments on 
appeal going to the scope of the injunction need not be addressed. We, 
however, briefly address Napster’s First Amendment argument so that it 
is not reasserted on remand. Napster contends that the present injunction 
violates the First Amendment because it is broader than necessary. The 
company asserts two distinct free speech rights: (1) its right to publish a 
“directory” (here, the search index) and (2) its users’ right to exchange 
information. We note that First Amendment concerns in copyright are 
allayed by the presence of the fair use doctrine. There was a preliminary 
determination here that Napster users are not fair users. Uses of 
copyrighted material that are not fair uses are rightfully enjoined. See Dr. 
Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1403 (9th Cir. 
1997) (rejecting defendants’ claim that injunction would constitute a prior 
restraint in violation of the First Amendment). 
Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Remanded. 
——— 
Eventually Napster was sold to one of the copyright plaintiffs, which 
then offered a new Internet service we will be reading about soon. RIAA 
members were also developing their own Internet music services. Three of 
the major labels, Warner Music, EMI, and BMG, combined with 
RealNetwork and AOL to create a new MusicNet, while the other two 
majors, Sony and Universal Music, did the same with their own new 
Pressplay (with EMI offering its songs on this service as well). After having 
developed what they considered to be safe technology and securing 
acceptable contracts from the music publishers who also had copyrights in 
the songs, these systems both started operating in 2001. For a fee of $10 a 
month, a subscriber had access to around 100,000 songs, but was entitled 
to stream or download just 100 songs, all of which would be extinguished 
after that month unless the service and fee was renewed. 
By the summer of 2001, Internet services emerged employing new 
software created by FastTrack: Kazaa, run by a FastTrack partner out of 
Amsterdam, MusicCity Morpheus (a branch of Streamcast Networks) 
based in Franklin, Tennessee, and Grokster, operated from Nevis Island in 
the Caribbean West Indies. These new services were more decentralized 
than Napster, which had required its users to log on to its own server 
containing a central directory of everyone who had available songs. By 
September 2001, more music files were being exchanged on the new 
FastTrack software than back in February 2001 on Napster. MusicCity 
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provided this service for free (as had Napster), but displayed 
advertisements on its webpages. 
Another potentially important difference between MusicCity and 
Napster was that the former provided access not only to music, but to 
movies, photo images, and documents. Thus, not only albums from Bob 
Dylan and ‘N Sync, but movies like Planet of the Apes and Legally Blonde 
were appearing on computers round the world a day or two after they had 
been released in American movie theaters. Movie “fans” would bring video 
cameras into the theater to tape the movie while they were watching it, 
and then compressing the film into their computers for distribution via 
MusicCity, Kazaa, and Grokster over the FastTrack software. By the fall 
of 2001, surveys found millions of exchanges of thousands of movies over 
the Internet, and these numbers were growing as higher-speed connections 
became available to exchange three-hour movies like The Lord of the Rings, 
or even an entire series of The Sopranos, rather than just a three-minute 
song. 
Thus, in October 2001, the MPAA and RIAA members filed suit 
against these file-sharing services. MGM v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 F. Supp. 2d 
1073 (C.D. Cal. 2003). According to the complaint, these “defendants have 
created a 21st Century piratical bazaar where the unlawful exchange of 
protected material takes place across the vast expanse of the Internet.” The 
defendants responded that their new service made it possible for people to 
learn about such public events as the “World Trade Center terrorist 
tragedy,” as well as for young musicians to share their new work; and that 
they had neither knowledge of any specific items people were seeking to 
exchange, nor any ability to control the illegal ones. 
METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER STUDIOS INC. V. 
GROKSTER, LTD. 
Supreme Court of the United States, 2005. 
545 U.S. 913, 125 S.Ct. 2764, 162 L.Ed.2d 781. 
JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question is under what circumstances the distributor of a product 
capable of both lawful and unlawful use is liable for acts of copyright 
infringement by third parties using the product. We hold that one who 
distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe 
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to 
foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third 
parties. 




Respondents, Grokster, Ltd., and StreamCast Networks, Inc., 
defendants in the trial court, distribute free software products that allow 
computer users to share electronic files through peer-to-peer networks, so 
called because users’ computers communicate directly with each other, not 
through central servers. The advantage of peer-to-peer networks over 
information networks of other types shows up in their substantial and 
growing popularity. Because they need no central computer server to 
mediate the exchange of information or files among users, the high-
bandwidth communications capacity for a server may be dispensed with, 
and the need for costly server storage space is eliminated. Since copies of a 
file (particularly a popular one) are available on many users’ computers, 
file requests and retrievals may be faster than on other types of networks, 
and since file exchanges do not travel through a server, communications 
can take place between any computers that remain connected to the 
network without risk that a glitch in the server will disable the network in 
its entirety. Given these benefits in security, cost, and efficiency, peer-to-
peer networks are employed to store and distribute electronic files by 
universities, government agencies, corporations, and libraries, among 
others. 
Other users of peer-to-peer networks include individual recipients of 
Grokster’s and StreamCast’s software, and although the networks that 
they enjoy through using the software can be used to share any type of 
digital file, they have prominently employed those networks in sharing 
copyrighted music and video files without authorization. A group of 
copyright holders (MGM for short, but including motion picture studios, 
recording companies, song-writers, and music publishers) sued Grokster 
and StreamCast for their users’ copyright infringements, alleging that they 
knowingly and intentionally distributed their software to enable users to 
reproduce and distribute the copyrighted works in violation of the 
Copyright Act. MGM sought damages and an injunction. 
Discovery during the litigation revealed the way the software worked, 
the business aims of each defendant company, and the predilections of the 
users. Grokster’s eponymous software employs what is known as 
FastTrack technology, a protocol developed by others and licensed to 
Grokster. StreamCast distributes a very similar product except that its 
software, called Morpheus, relies on what is known as Gnutella technology. 
A user who downloads and installs either software possesses the protocol 
to send requests for files directly to the computers of others using software 
compatible with FastTrack or Gnutella. On the FastTrack network opened 
by the Grokster software, the user’s request goes to a computer given an 
indexing capacity by the software and designated a supernode, or to some 
other computer with comparable power and capacity to collect temporary 
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indexes of the files available on the computers of users connected to it. The 
supernode (or indexing computer) searches its own index and may 
communicate the search request to other supernodes. If the file is found, 
the supernode discloses its location to the computer requesting it, and the 
requesting user can download the file directly from the computer located. 
The copied file is placed in a designated sharing folder on the requesting 
user’s computer, where it is available for other users to download in turn, 
along with any other file in that folder. 
In the Gnutella network made available by Morpheus, the process is 
mostly the same, except that in some versions of the Gnutella protocol 
there are no supernodes. In these versions, peer computers using the 
protocol communicate directly with each other. When a user enters a 
search request into the Morpheus software, it sends the request to 
computers connected with it, which in turn pass the request along to other 
connected peers. The search results are communicated to the requesting 
computer, and the user can download desired files directly from peers’ 
computers. As this description indicates, Grokster and StreamCast use no 
servers to intercept the content of the search requests or to mediate the file 
transfers conducted by users of the software, there being no central point 
through which the substance of the communications passes in either 
direction. 
Although Grokster and StreamCast do not therefore know when 
particular files are copied, a few searches using their software would show 
what is available on the networks the software reaches. MGM 
commissioned a statistician to conduct a systematic search, and his study 
showed that nearly 90% of the files available for download on the 
FastTrack system were copyrighted works.5 Grokster and StreamCast 
dispute this figure, raising methodological problems and arguing that free 
copying even of copyrighted works may be authorized by the rightholders. 
They also argue that potential noninfringing uses of their software are 
significant in kind, even if infrequent in practice. Some musical performers, 
for example, have gained new audiences by distributing their copyrighted 
works for free across peer-to-peer networks, and some distributors of 
unprotected content have used peer-to-peer networks to disseminate files, 
Shakespeare being an example. Indeed, StreamCast has given Morpheus 
users the opportunity to download the briefs in this very case, though their 
popularity has not been quantified. 
                                                 
5 By comparison, evidence introduced by the plaintiffs in A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 
Inc., 239 F. 3d 1004 (CA9 2001), showed that 87% of files available on the Napster filesharing 
network were copyrighted, id., at 1013. Among the key early scholarly treatments of these issues 
are Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World (Random 
House, 2001); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet, 24 Colum. VLA J. L. 
& the Arts 1 (2000); R. Anthony Reese, Copyright & Internet Music Transmissions: Existing Law, 
Major Controversies, Possible Solutions, 55 U. Miami L. Rev. 237 (2001). The major one now is the 
book by William Fisher, Promises to Keep: Technology Law and the Future of Entertainment 
(Stanford Univ. Press 2004). 
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As for quantification, the parties’ anecdotal and statistical evidence 
entered thus far to show the content available on the FastTrack and 
Gnutella networks does not say much about which files are actually 
downloaded by users, and no one can say how often the software is used to 
obtain copies of unprotected material. But MGM’s evidence gives reason to 
think that the vast majority of users’ downloads are acts of infringement, 
and because well over 100 million copies of the software in question are 
known to have been downloaded, and billions of files are shared across the 
FastTrack and Gnutella networks each month, the probable scope of 
copyright infringement is staggering. Grokster and StreamCast concede 
the infringement in most downloads, and it is uncontested that they are 
aware that users employ their software primarily to download copyrighted 
files, even if the decentralized FastTrack and Gnutella networks fail to 
reveal which files are being copied, and when. From time to time, moreover, 
the companies have learned about their users’ infringement directly, as 
from users who have sent e-mail to each company with questions about 
playing copyrighted movies they had downloaded, to whom the companies 
have responded with guidance. And MGM notified the companies of 8 
million copyrighted files that could be obtained using their software. 
Grokster and StreamCast are not, however, merely passive recipients of 
information about infringing use. The record is replete with evidence that 
from the moment Grokster and StreamCast began to distribute their free 
software, each one clearly voiced the objective that recipients use it to 
download copyrighted works, and each took active steps to encourage 
infringement. 
After the notorious file-sharing service, Napster, was sued by 
copyright holders for facilitation of copyright infringement. StreamCast 
gave away a software program of a kind known as OpenNap, designed as 
compatible with the Napster program and open to Napster users for 
downloading files from other Napster and OpenNap users’ computers. 
Evidence indicates that “[i]t was always [StreamCast’s] intent to use [its 
OpenNap network] to be able to capture email addresses of [its] initial 
target market so that [it] could promote [its] StreamCast Morpheus 
interface to them,” indeed, the OpenNap program was engineered “ ‘to 
leverage Napster’s 50 million user base.’ ” 
StreamCast monitored both the number of users downloading its 
OpenNap program and the number of music files they downloaded. It also 
used the resulting OpenNap network to distribute copies of the Morpheus 
software and to encourage users to adopt it. Internal company documents 
indicate that StreamCast hoped to attract large numbers of former Napster 
users if that company was shut down by court order or otherwise, and that 
StreamCast planned to be the next Napster. A kit developed by 
StreamCast to be delivered to advertisers, for example, contained press 
articles about StreamCast’s potential to capture former Napster users, and 
it introduced itself to some potential advertisers as a company “which is 
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similar to what Napster was.” It broadcast banner advertisements to users 
of other Napster-compatible software, urging them to adopt its OpenNap. 
An internal e-mail from a company executive stated: “ ‘We have put this 
network in place so that when Napster pulls the plug on their free service 
. . . or if the Court orders them shut down prior to that . . . we will be 
positioned to capture the flood of their 32 million users that will be actively 
looking for an alternative.’ ” 
Thus, StreamCast developed promotional materials to market its 
service as the best Napster alternative. One proposed advertisement read: 
“Napster Inc. has announced that it will soon begin charging you a fee. 
That’s if the courts don’t order it shut down first. What will you do to get 
around it?” 
Another proposed ad touted StreamCast’s software as the “#1 
alternative to Napster” and asked “[w]hen the lights went off at Napster 
. . . where did the users go?” StreamCast even planned to flaunt the illegal 
uses of its software; when it launched the OpenNap network, the chief 
technology officer of the company averred that “[t]he goal is to get in trouble 
with the law and get sued. It’s the best way to get in the new[s].” The 
evidence that Grokster sought to capture the market of former Napster 
users is sparser but revealing, for Grokster launched its own OpenNap 
system called Swaptor and inserted digital codes into its Web site so that 
computer users using Web search engines to look for “Napster” or “[f]ree 
filesharing” would be directed to the Grokster Web site, where they could 
download the Grokster software. And Grokster’s name is an apparent 
derivative of Napster. 
StreamCast’s executives monitored the number of songs by certain 
commercial artists available on their networks, and an internal 
communication indicates they aimed to have a larger number of 
copyrighted songs available on their networks than other file-sharing 
networks. The point, of course, would be to attract users of a mind to 
infringe, just as it would be with their promotional materials developed 
showing copyrighted songs as examples of the kinds of files available 
through Morpheus. Morpheus in fact allowed users to search specifically 
for “Top 40” songs, which were inevitably copyrighted. Similarly, Grokster 
sent users a newsletter promoting its ability to provide particular, popular 
copyrighted materials. 
In addition to this evidence of express promotion, marketing, and 
intent to promote further, the business models employed by Grokster and 
StreamCast confirm that their principal object was use of their software to 
download copyrighted works. Grokster and StreamCast receive no revenue 
from users, who obtain the software itself for nothing. Instead, both 
companies generate income by selling advertising space, and they stream 
the advertising to Grokster and Morpheus users while they are employing 
the programs. As the number of users of each program increases, 
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advertising opportunities become worth more. While there is doubtless 
some demand for free Shakespeare, the evidence shows that substantive 
volume is a function of free access to copyrighted work. Users seeking Top 
40 songs, for example, or the latest release by Modest Mouse, are certain 
to be far more numerous than those seeking a free Decameron, and 
Grokster and StreamCast translated that demand into dollars. Finally, 
there is no evidence that either company made an effort to filter 
copyrighted material from users’ downloads or otherwise impede the 
sharing of copyrighted files. Although Grokster appears to have sent e-
mails warning users about infringing content when it received threatening 
notice from the copyright holders, it never blocked anyone from continuing 
to use its software to share copyrighted files. StreamCast not only rejected 
another company’s offer of help to monitor infringement, but blocked the 
Internet Protocol addresses of entities it believed were trying to engage in 
such monitoring on its networks. 
B 
[Justice Souter noted the lower courts’ reading of Sony] as holding that 
distribution of a commercial product capable of substantial noninfringing 
uses could not give rise to contributory liability for infringement unless the 
distributor had actual knowledge of specific instances of infringement and 
failed to act on that knowledge. The fact that the software was capable of 
substantial noninfringing uses in the Ninth Circuit’s view meant that 
Grokster and StreamCast were not liable, because they had no such actual 
knowledge, owing to the decentralized architecture of their software. The 
court also held that Grokster and StreamCast did not materially contribute 
to their users’ infringement because it was the users themselves who 
searched for, retrieved, and stored the infringing files, with no involvement 
by the defendants beyond providing the software in the first place. 
* * * 
II 
A 
MGM and many of the amici fault the Court of Appeals’s holding for 
upsetting a sound balance between the respective values of supporting 
creative pursuits through copyright protection and promoting innovation 
in new communication technologies by limiting the incidence of liability for 
copyright infringement. The more artistic protection is favored, the more 
technological innovation may be discouraged; the administration of 
copyright law is an exercise in managing the trade-off. 
The tension between the two values is the subject of this case, with its 
claim that digital distribution of copyrighted material threatens copyright 
holders as never before, because every copy is identical to the original, 
copying is easy, and many people (especially the young) use file-sharing 
software to download copyrighted works. This very breadth of the 
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software’s use may well draw the public directly into the debate over 
copyright policy, and the indications are that the ease of copying songs or 
movies using software like Grokster’s and Napster’s is fostering disdain for 
copyright protection. As the case has been presented to us, these fears are 
said to be offset by the different concern that imposing liability, not only on 
infringers but on distributors of software based on its potential for unlawful 
use, could limit further development of beneficial technologies.8 
The argument for imposing indirect liability in this case is, however, a 
powerful one, given the number of infringing downloads that occur every 
day using StreamCast’s and Grokster’s software. When a widely shared 
service or product is used to commit infringement, it may be impossible to 
enforce rights in the protected work effectively against all direct infringers, 
the only practical alternative being to go against the distributor of the 
copying device for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or 
vicarious infringement. See In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F. 3d 
643, 645–646 (CA7 2003). 
One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging 
direct infringement, and infringes vicariously by profiting from direct 
infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it.9 
Although “[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for 
infringement committed by another,” Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 
464 U.S., at 434, these doctrines of secondary liability emerged from 
common law principles and are well established in the law. 
B 
* * * 
In sum, where an article is “good for nothing else” but infringement, 
there is no legitimate public interest in its unlicensed availability, and 
there is no injustice in presuming or imputing an intent to infringe. 
                                                 
8 The mutual exclusivity of these values should not be overstated, however. On the one hand 
technological innovators, including those writing filesharing computer programs, may wish for 
effective copyright protections for their work. See, e.g., Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 
679, 750 (2003). (StreamCast itself was urged by an associate to “get [its] technology written down 
and [its intellectual property] protected.”) On the other hand the widespread distribution of 
creative works through improved technologies may enable the synthesis of new works or generate 
audiences for emerging artists. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223–226 (2003) (STEVENS, 
J., dissenting); Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 Texas L. Rev. 1535, 1539–40, 
1562–64 (2005). 
9 We stated in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), 
that “ ‘the lines between direct infringement, contributory infringement and vicarious liability are 
not clearly drawn’ [R]easoned analysis of [the Sony plaintiffs’ contributory infringement claim] 
necessarily entails consideration of arguments and case law which may also be forwarded under 
the other labels, and indeed the parties . . . rely upon such arguments and authority in support of 
their respective positions on the issue of contributory infringement,”. In the present case MGM 
has argued a vicarious liability theory, which allows imposition of liability when the defendant 
profits directly from the infringement and has a right and ability to supervise the direct infringer, 
even if the defendant initially lacks knowledge of the infringement. Because we resolve the case 
based on an inducement theory, there is no need to analyze separately MGM’s vicarious liability 
theory. 
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Conversely, the doctrine absolves the equivocal conduct of selling an item 
with substantial lawful as well as unlawful uses, and limits liability to 
instances of more acute fault than the mere understanding that some of 
one’s products will be misused. It leaves breathing room for innovation and 
a vigorous commerce. 
The parties and many of the amici in this case think the key to 
resolving it is the Sony rule and, in particular, what it means for a product 
to be “capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses.” MGM 
advances the argument that granting summary judgment to Grokster and 
StreamCast as to their current activities gave too much weight to the value 
of innovative technology, and too little to the copyrights infringed by users 
of their software, given that 90% of works available on one of the networks 
was shown to be copyrighted. Assuming the remaining 10% to be its 
noninfringing use, MGM says this should not qualify as “substantial,” and 
the Court should quantify Sony to the extent of holding that a product used 
“principally” for infringement does not qualify. As mentioned before, 
Grokster and StreamCast reply by citing evidence that their software can 
be used to reproduce public domain works, and they point to copyright 
holders who actually encourage copying. Even if infringement is the 
principal practice with their software today, they argue, the noninfringing 
uses are significant and will grow. 
We agree with MGM that the Court of Appeals misapplied Sony, which 
it read as limiting secondary liability quite beyond the circumstances to 
which the case applied. Sony barred secondary liability based on 
presuming or imputing intent to cause infringement solely from the design 
or distribution of a product capable of substantial lawful use, which the 
distributor knows is in fact used for infringement. The Ninth Circuit has 
read Sony’s limitation to mean that whenever a product is capable of 
substantial lawful use, the producer can never be held contributorily liable 
for third parties’ infringing use of it; it read the rule as being this broad, 
even when an actual purpose to cause infringing use is shown by evidence 
independent of design and distribution of the product, unless the 
distributors had “specific knowledge of infringement at a time at which 
they contributed to the infringement, and failed to act upon that 
information.” Because the Circuit found the StreamCast and Grokster 
software capable of substantial lawful use, it concluded on the basis of its 
reading of Sony that neither company could be held liable, since there was 
no showing that their software, being without any central server, afforded 
them knowledge of specific unlawful uses. 
This view of Sony, however, was error, converting the case from one 
about liability resting on imputed intent to one about liability on any 
theory. Because Sony did not displace other theories of secondary liability, 
and because we find below that it was error to grant summary judgment to 
the companies on MGM’s inducement claim, we do not revisit Sony further, 
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as MGM requests, to add a more quantified description of the point of 
balance between protection and commerce when liability rests solely on 
distribution with knowledge that unlawful use will occur. It is enough to 
note that the Ninth Circuit’s judgment rested on an erroneous 
understanding of Sony and to leave further consideration of the Sony rule 
for a day when that may be required. 
C 
Sony’s rule limits imputing culpable intent as a matter of law from the 
characteristics or uses of a distributed product. But nothing in Sony 
requires courts to ignore evidence of intent if there is such evidence, and 
the case was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability derived 
from the common law. Thus, where evidence goes beyond a product’s 
characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put to infringing uses, and 
shows statements or actions directed to promoting infringement, Sony’s 
staple-article rule will not preclude liability. The classic case of direct 
evidence of unlawful purpose occurs when one induces commission of 
infringement by another, or “entic[es] or persuad[es] another” to infringe, 
Black’s Law Dictionary 790 (8th ed. 2004), as by advertising. Thus at 
common law a copyright or patent defendant who “not only expected but 
invoked [infringing use] by advertisement” was liable for infringement “on 
principles recognized in every part of the law.” 
The rule on inducement of infringement as developed in the early cases 
is no different today.11 Evidence of “active steps . . . taken to encourage 
direct infringement,” Oak Industries, Inc. v. Zenith Electronics Corp., 697 
F. Supp. 988, 992 (N.D.Ill.1988), such as advertising an infringing use or 
instructing how to engage in an infringing use, show an affirmative intent 
that the product be used to infringe, and a showing that infringement was 
encouraged overcomes the law’s reluctance to find liability when a 
defendant merely sells a commercial product suitable for some lawful use. 
Cf. W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on 
Law of Torts 37 (5th ed. 1984) (“There is a definite tendency to impose 
greater responsibility upon a defendant whose conduct was intended to do 
harm, or was morally wrong”). 
For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of 
patent law as a model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement 
rule, too, is a sensible one for copyright. We adopt it here, holding that one 
who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe 
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to 
foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third 
parties. We are, of course, mindful of the need to keep from trenching on 
regular commerce or discouraging the development of technologies with 
lawful and unlawful potential. Accordingly, just as Sony did not find 
                                                 
11 Inducement has been codified in patent law. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). 
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intentional inducement despite the knowledge of the VCR manufacturer 
that its device could be used to infringe, mere knowledge of infringing 
potential or of actual infringing uses would not be enough here to subject a 
distributor to liability. Nor would ordinary acts incident to product 
distribution, such as offering customers technical support or product 
updates, support liability in themselves. The inducement rule, instead, 
premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus 
does nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation 
having a lawful promise. 
III 
A 
The only apparent question about treating MGM’s evidence as 
sufficient to withstand summary judgment under the theory of inducement 
goes to the need on MGM’s part to adduce evidence that StreamCast and 
Grokster communicated an inducing message to their software users. The 
classic instance of inducement is by advertisement or solicitation that 
broadcasts a message designed to stimulate others to commit violations. 
MGM claims that such a message is shown here. It is undisputed that 
StreamCast beamed onto the computer screens of users of Napster-
compatible programs ads urging the adoption of its OpenNap program, 
which was designed, as its name implied, to invite the custom of patrons of 
Napster, then under attack in the courts for facilitating massive 
infringement. Those who accepted StreamCast’s OpenNap program were 
offered software to perform the same services, which a fact finder could 
conclude would readily have been understood in the Napster market as the 
ability to download copyrighted music files. Grokster distributed an 
electronic newsletter containing links to articles promoting its software’s 
ability to access popular copyrighted music. And anyone whose Napster or 
free file-sharing searches turned up a link to Grokster would have 
understood Grokster to be offering the same file-sharing ability as Napster, 
and to the same people who probably used Napster for infringing 
downloads; that would also have been the understanding of anyone offered 
Grokster’s suggestively named Swaptor software, its version of OpenNap. 
And both companies communicated a clear message by responding 
affirmatively to requests for help in locating and playing copyrighted 
materials. 
In StreamCast’s case, of course, the evidence just described was 
supplemented by other unequivocal indications of unlawful purpose in the 
internal communications and advertising designs aimed at Napster users 
(“When the lights went off at Napster . . . where did the users go?” App. 836 
(ellipsis in original)). Whether the messages were communicated is not to 
the point on this record. The function of the message in the theory of 
inducement is to prove by a defendant’s own statements that his unlawful 
purpose disqualifies him from claiming protection (and incidentally to 
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point to actual violators likely to be found among those who hear or read 
the message). Proving that a message was sent out, then, is the preeminent 
but not exclusive way of showing that active steps were taken with the 
purpose of bringing about infringing acts, and of showing that infringing 
acts took place by using the device distributed. Here, the summary 
judgment record is replete with other evidence that Grokster and 
StreamCast, unlike the manufacturer and distributor in Sony, acted with 
a purpose to cause copyright violations by use of software suitable for 
illegal use. 
Three features of this evidence of intent are particularly notable. First, 
each company showed itself to be aiming to satisfy a known source of 
demand for copyright infringement, the market comprising former Napster 
users. StreamCast’s internal documents made constant reference to 
Napster, it initially distributed its Morpheus software through an 
OpenNap program compatible with Napster, it advertised its OpenNap 
program to Napster users, and its Morpheus software functions as Napster 
did except that it could be used to distribute more kinds of files, including 
copyrighted movies and software programs. Grokster’s name is apparently 
derived from Napster, it too initially offered an OpenNap program, its 
software’s function is likewise comparable to Napster’s, and it attempted 
to divert queries for Napster onto its own Web site. Grokster and 
StreamCast’s efforts to supply services to former Napster users, deprived 
of a mechanism to copy and distribute what were overwhelmingly 
infringing files, indicate a principal, if not exclusive, intent on the part of 
each to bring about infringement. 
Second, this evidence of unlawful objective is given added significance 
by MGM’s showing that neither company attempted to develop filtering 
tools or other mechanisms to diminish the infringing activity using their 
software. While the Ninth Circuit treated the defendants’ failure to develop 
such tools as irrelevant because they lacked an independent duty to 
monitor their users’ activity, we think this evidence underscores Grokster’s 
and StreamCast’s intentional facilitation of their users’ infringement.12 
Third, there is a further complement to the direct evidence of unlawful 
objective. It is useful to recall that StreamCast and Grokster make money 
by selling advertising space, by directing ads to the screens of computers 
employing their software. As the record shows, the more the software is 
used, the more ads are sent out and the greater the advertising revenue 
becomes. Since the extent of the software’s use determines the gain to the 
                                                 
12 Of course, in the absence of other evidence of intent, a court would be unable to find 
contributory infringement liability merely based on a failure to take affirmative steps to prevent 
infringement, if the device otherwise was capable of substantial noninfringing uses. Such a holding 
would tread too close to the Sony safe harbor. 
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distributors, the commercial sense of their enterprise turns on high-volume 
use, which the record shows is infringing.13 
This evidence alone would not justify an inference of unlawful intent, 
but viewed in the context of the entire record its import is clear. 
The unlawful objective is unmistakable. 
B 
In addition to intent to bring about infringement and distribution of a 
device suitable for infringing use, the inducement theory of course requires 
evidence of actual infringement by recipients of the device, the software in 
this case. As the account of the facts indicates, there is evidence of 
infringement on a gigantic scale, and there is no serious issue of the 
adequacy of MGM’s showing on this point in order to survive the 
companies’ summary judgment requests. Although an exact calculation of 
infringing use, as a basis for a claim of damages, is subject to dispute, there 
is no question that the summary judgment evidence is at least adequate to 
entitle MGM to go forward with claims for damages and equitable relief. 
* * * 
In sum, this case is significantly different from Sony and reliance on 
that case to rule in favor of StreamCast and Grokster was error. Sony dealt 
with a claim of liability based solely on distributing a product with 
alternative lawful and unlawful uses, with knowledge that some users 
would follow the unlawful course. The case struck a balance between the 
interests of protection and innovation by holding that the product’s 
capability of substantial lawful employment should bar the imputation of 
fault and consequent secondary liability for the unlawful acts of others. 
MGM’s evidence in this case most obviously addresses a different basis of 
liability for distributing a product open to alternative uses. Here, evidence 
of the distributors’ words and deeds going beyond distribution as such 
shows a purpose to cause and profit from third-party acts of copyright 
infringement. If liability for inducing infringement is ultimately found, it 
will not be on the basis of presuming or imputing fault, but from inferring 
a patently illegal objective from statements and actions showing what that 
objective was. 
                                                 
13 Grokster and StreamCast contend that any theory of liability based on their conduct is not 
properly before this Court because the rulings in the trial and appellate courts dealt only with the 
present versions of their software, not “past acts . . . that allegedly encouraged infringement or 
assisted . . . known acts of infringement.” This contention misapprehends the basis for their 
potential liability. It is not only that encouraging a particular consumer to infringe a copyright can 
give rise to secondary liability for the infringement that results. Inducement liability goes beyond 
that, and the distribution of a product can itself give rise to liability where evidence shows that 
the distributor intended and encouraged the product to be used to infringe. In such a case, the 
culpable act is not merely the encouragement of infringement but also the distribution of the tool 
intended for infringing use. See Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers, 222 U.S. 55, 62–63 (1911); 
Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Productions, Inc., 902 F. 2d 829, 846 (CA11 1990); 
A & M Records, Inc. v. Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. 1449, 1456 (CD Cal. 1996). 
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There is substantial evidence in MGM’s favor on all elements of 
inducement, and summary judgment in favor of Grokster and StreamCast 
was error. On remand, reconsideration of MGM’s motion for summary 
judgment will be in order. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE KENNEDY 
join, concurring. 
* * * 
[Justice Ginsburg began this opinion by stating that while she fully 
concurred with Justice Souter vacating the lower court’s summary 
dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claim that Grokster and Streamcast could be 
liable “for actively inducing copyright infringement,” she also judged that 
the claim of “contributory copyright infringement” should be reinstated as 
at least potentially viable.] 
At bottom, however labeled, the question in this case is whether 
Grokster and StreamCast are liable for the direct infringing acts of others. 
Liability under our jurisprudence may be predicated on actively 
encouraging (or inducing) infringement through specific acts (as the 
Court’s opinion develops) or on distributing a product distributees use to 
infringe copyrights, if the product is not capable of “substantial” or 
“commercially significant” noninfringing uses. While the two categories 
overlap, they capture different culpable behavior. Long coexisting, both are 
now codified in patent law. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (active inducement 
liability), with § 271(c) (contributory liability for distribution of a product 
not “suitable for substantial noninfringing use”). 
* * * 
“The staple article of commerce doctrine” applied to copyright, the 
Sony Court stated, “must strike a balance between a copyright holder’s 
legitimate demand for effective—not merely symbolic—protection of the 
statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in 
substantially unrelated areas of commerce.” “Accordingly,” the Court held, 
“the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, 
does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used 
for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable 
of substantial noninfringing uses.” Thus, to resolve the Sony case, the 
Court explained, it had to determine “whether the Betamax is capable of 
commercially significant noninfringing uses.” 
To answer that question, the Court considered whether “a significant 
number of [potential uses of the Betamax were] noninfringing.” The Court 
homed in on one potential use—private, noncommercial time-shifting of 
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television programs in the home (i.e., recording a broad-cast TV program 
for later personal viewing). Time-shifting was noninfringing, the Court 
concluded, because in some cases trial testimony showed it was authorized 
by the copyright holder, and in others it qualified as legitimate fair use. 
Most purchasers used the Betamax principally to engage in time-shifting, 
a use that “plainly satisfie[d]” the Court’s standard. Thus, there was no 
need in Sony to “give precise content to the question of how much [actual 
or potential] use is commercially significant.”1 Further development was 
left for later days and cases. 
The Ninth Circuit went astray, I will endeavor to explain, when that 
court granted summary judgment to Grokster and StreamCast on the 
charge of contributory liability based on distribution of their software 
products. Relying on its earlier opinion in A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 
Inc., 239 F. 3d 1004 (CA9 2001), the Court of Appeals held that “if 
substantial noninfringing use was shown, the copyright owner would be 
required to show that the defendant had reasonable knowledge of specific 
infringing files.” “A careful examination of the record,” the court concluded, 
“indicates that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to noninfringing 
use.” The appeals court pointed to the band Wilco, which made one of its 
albums available for free downloading, to other recording artists who may 
have authorized free distribution of their music through the Internet, and 
to public domain literary works and films available through Grokster’s and 
StreamCast’s software. Although it acknowledged MGM’s assertion that 
“the vast majority of the software use is for copyright infringement,” the 
court concluded that Grokster’s and StreamCast’s proffered evidence met 
Sony’s requirement that “a product need only be capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses.” 
                                                 
1 Justice Breyer finds in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 
(1984), a “clear” rule permitting contributory liability for copyright infringement based on 
distribution of a product only when the product “will be used almost exclusively to infringe 
copyrights.” But cf. Sony, 464 U.S., at 442 (recognizing “copyright holder’s legitimate demand for 
effective—not merely symbolic—protection”). Sony, as I read it, contains no clear, near-exclusivity 
test. Nor have Courts of Appeals unanimously recognized Justice Breyer’s clear rule. Compare A 
& M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F. 3d 1004, 1021 (CA9 2001) (“[E]vidence of actual 
knowledge of specific acts of infringement is required to hold a computer system operator liable for 
contributory copyright infringement.”), with In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F. 3d 643, 
649–650 (CA7 2003) (“[W]hen a supplier is offering a product or service that has noninfringing as 
well as infringing uses, some estimate of the respective magnitudes of these uses is necessary for 
a finding of contributory infringement . . . But the balancing of costs and benefits is necessary only 
in a case in which substantial noninfringing uses, present or prospective, are demonstrated.”). See 
also Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Pub. Co., 158 F. 3d 693, 707 (CA2 1998) (“The Supreme 
Court applied [the Sony] test to prevent copyright holders from leveraging the copyrights in their 
original work to control distribution of . . . products that might be used incidentally for 
infringement, but that had substantial noninfringing uses . . . The same rationale applies here [to 
products] that have substantial, predominant and noninfringing uses as tools for research and 
citation.”). All Members of the Court agree, moreover, that “the Court of Appeals misapplied Sony,” 
at least to the extent it read that decision to limit “secondary liability” to a hardly-ever category, 
“quite beyond the circumstances to which the case applied.” 
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This case differs markedly from Sony. Here, there has been no finding 
of any fair use and little beyond anecdotal evidence of noninfringing uses. 
In finding the Grokster and StreamCast software products capable of 
substantial noninfringing uses, the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
appear to have relied largely on declarations submitted by the defendants. 
These declarations include assertions (some of them hearsay) that a 
number of copyright owners authorize distribution of their works on the 
Internet and that some public domain material is available through peer-
to-peer networks including those accessed through Grokster’s and 
StreamCast’s software. 
The District Court declared it “undisputed that there are substantial 
noninfringing uses for Defendants’ software,” thus obviating the need for 
further proceedings. This conclusion appears to rest almost entirely on the 
collection of declarations submitted by Grokster and StreamCast. Review 
of these declarations reveals mostly anecdotal evidence, sometimes 
obtained second-hand, of authorized copyrighted works or public domain 
works available online and shared through peer-to-peer networks, and 
general statements about the benefits of peer-to-peer technology. [Here, 
Justice Ginsburg mentioned various examples cited, including not only the 
Bible and the Declaration of Independence but also the “search on 
Morpheus for President Bush’s speeches.”] These declarations do not 
support summary judgment in the face of evidence, proffered by MGM, of 
overwhelming use of Grokster’s and StreamCast’s software for 
infringement.3 
Even if the absolute number of noninfringing files copied using the 
Grokster and StreamCast software is large, it does not follow that the 
products are therefore put to substantial noninfringing uses and are thus 
immune from liability. The number of noninfringing copies may be 
reflective of, and dwarfed by, the huge total volume of files shared. Further, 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals did not sharply distinguish 
between uses of Grokster’s and StreamCast’s software products (which this 
                                                 
3 Justice Breyer finds support for summary judgment in this motley collection of 
declarations and in a survey conducted by an expert retained by MGM. That survey identified 75% 
of the files available through Grokster as copyrighted works owned or controlled by the plaintiffs, 
and 15% of the files as works likely copyrighted. 
As to the remaining 10% of the files, “there was not enough information to form reasonable 
conclusions either as to what those files even consisted of, and/or whether they were infringing or 
non-infringing.” Even assuming, as Justice Breyer does, that the Sony Court would have absolved 
Sony of contributory liability solely on the basis of the use of the Betamax for authorized time-
shifting, summary judgment is not inevitably appropriate here. Sony stressed that the plaintiffs 
there owned “well below 10%” of copyrighted television programming, and found, based on trial 
testimony from representatives of the four major sports leagues and other individuals authorized 
to consent to home-recording of their copyrighted broadcasts, that a similar percentage of program 
copying was authorized. Here, the plaintiffs allegedly control copyrights for 70% or 75% of the 
material exchanged through the Grokster and StreamCast software, and the District Court does 
not appear to have relied on comparable testimony about authorized copying from copyright 
holders. 
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case is about) and uses of peer-to-peer technology generally (which this case 
is not about). 
In sum, when the record in this case was developed, there was evidence 
that Grokster’s and StreamCast’s products were, and had been for some 
time, overwhelmingly used to infringe, and that this infringement was the 
overwhelming source of revenue from the products. Fairly appraised, the 
evidence was insufficient to demonstrate, beyond genuine debate, a 
reasonable prospect that substantial or commercially significant 
noninfringing uses were likely to develop over time. On this record, the 
District Court should not have ruled dispositively on the contributory 
infringement charge by granting summary judgment to Grokster and 
StreamCast. 
If, on remand, the case is not resolved on summary judgment in favor 
of MGM based on Grokster and StreamCast actively inducing 
infringement, the Court of Appeals, I would emphasize, should reconsider, 
on a fuller record, its interpretation of Sony’s product distribution holding. 




[Justice Breyer began by stating that while he fully agreed with 
Souter’s basis for judging that the defendants could potentially be held 
liable as “the distributor of a dual-use technology” for “actively” 
encouraging its use for infringement, he disagreed with Ginsburg’s reading 
of Sony for purposes of contributory liability. After describing the Sony 
evaluation of the VCR and whether it had produced “substantial” non-
infringing—i.e., “authorized”—taping, he then turned to the same issue on 
the Internet.] 
B 
When measured against Sony’s underlying evidence and analysis, the 
evidence now before us shows that Grokster passes Sony’s test—that is, 
whether the company’s product is capable of substantial or commercially 
significant noninfringing uses. For one thing, petitioners’ (hereinafter 
MGM) own expert declared that 75% of current files available on Grokster 
are infringing and 15% are “likely infringing.” That leaves some number of 
files near 10% that apparently are noninfringing, a figure very similar to 
the 9% or so of authorized time-shifting uses of the VCR that the Court 
faced in Sony. 
As in Sony, witnesses here explained the nature of the noninfringing 
files on Grokster’s network without detailed quantification. Those files 
include: 
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— Authorized copies of music by artists such as Wilco, Janis Ian, 
Pearl Jam, Dave Matthews, John Mayer, and others. 
— Free electronic books and other works from various online 
publishers, including Project Gutenberg. 
— Public domain and authorized software, such as WinZip 8.1. 
— Licensed music videos and television and movie segments 
distributed via digital video packaging with the permission of the 
copyright holder. 
The nature of these and other lawfully swapped files is such that it is 
reasonable to infer quantities of current lawful use roughly approximate to 
those at issue in Sony. At least, MGM has offered no evidence sufficient to 
survive summary judgment that could plausibly demonstrate a significant 
quantitative difference. To be sure, in quantitative terms these uses 
account for only a small percentage of the total number of uses of Grokster’s 
product. But the same was true in Sony, which characterized the relatively 
limited authorized copying market as “substantial.” Importantly, Sony also 
used the word “capable,” asking whether the product is “capable of” 
substantial noninfringing uses. Its language and analysis suggest that a 
figure like 10%, if fixed for all time, might well prove insufficient, but that 
such a figure serves as an adequate foundation where there is a reasonable 
prospect of expanded legitimate uses over time. And its language also 
indicates the appropriateness of looking to potential future uses of the 
product to determine its “capability.” 
Here the record reveals a significant future market for noninfringing 
uses of Grokster-type peer-to-peer software. Such software permits the 
exchange of any sort of digital file—whether that file does, or does not, 
contain copyrighted material. As more and more uncopyrighted 
information is stored in swappable form, it seems a likely inference that 
lawful peer-to-peer sharing will become increasingly prevalent. 
And that is just what is happening. Such legitimate noninfringing uses 
are coming to include the swapping of: research information (the initial 
purpose of many peer-to-peer networks); public domain films (e.g., those 
owned by the Prelinger Archive); historical recordings and digital 
educational materials (e.g., those stored on the Internet Archive); digital 
photos (OurPictures, for example, is starting a P2P photo-swapping 
service); “shareware” and “freeware” (e.g., Linux and certain Windows 
software); secure licensed music and movie files (Intent MediaWorks, for 
example, protects licensed content sent across P2P networks); news 
broadcasts past and present (the BBC Creative Archive lets users “rip, mix 
and share the BBC”); user-created audio and video files (including 
“podcasts” that may be distributed through P2P software); and all manner 
of free “open content” works collected by Creative Commons (one can search 
for Creative Commons material on StreamCast). I can find nothing in the 
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record that suggests that this course of events will not continue to flow 
naturally as a consequence of the character of the software taken together 
with the foreseeable development of the Internet and of information 
technology. 
There may be other now-unforeseen noninfringing uses that develop 
for peer-to-peer software, just as the home-video rental industry 
(unmentioned in Sony) developed for the VCR. But the foreseeable 
development of such uses, when taken together with an estimated 10% 
noninfringing material, is sufficient to meet Sony’s standard. And while 
Sony considered the record following a trial, there are no facts asserted by 
MGM in its summary judgment filings that lead me to believe the outcome 
after a trial here could be any different. The lower courts reached the same 
conclusion. 
Of course, Grokster itself may not want to develop these other 
noninfringing uses. But Sony’s standard seeks to protect not the Groksters 
of this world (which in any event may well be liable under today’s holding), 
but the development of technology more generally. And Grokster’s desires 
in this respect are beside the point. 
II 
The real question here, I believe, is not whether the record evidence 
satisfies Sony. As I have interpreted the standard set forth in that case, it 
does. And of the Courts of Appeals that have considered the matter, only 
one has proposed interpreting Sony more strictly than I would do—in a 
case where the product might have failed under any standard. In re Aimster 
Copyright Litigation, 334 F. 3d 643, 653 (CA7 2003) (defendant “failed to 
show that its service is ever used for any purpose other than to infringe” 
copyrights (emphasis added)); see Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Pub. 
Co., 158 F. 3d 693, 706–707 (CA2 1998) (court did not require that 
noninfringing uses be “predominant,” it merely found that they were 
predominant, and therefore provided no analysis of Sony’s boundaries). 
Instead, the real question is whether we should modify the Sony standard, 
as MGM requests, or interpret Sony more strictly, as I believe Justice 
Ginsburg’s approach would do in practice. 
As I have said, Sony itself sought to “strike a balance between a 
copyright holder’s legitimate demand for effective—not merely symbolic—
protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to 
engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce.” Thus, to determine 
whether modification, or a strict interpretation, of Sony is needed, I would 
ask whether MGM has shown that Sony incorrectly balanced copyright and 
new-technology interests. In particular: (1) Has Sony (as I interpret it) 
worked to protect new technology? (2) If so, would modification or strict 
interpretation significantly weaken that protection? (3) If so, would new or 
necessary copyright-related benefits outweigh any such weakening? 
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A 
The first question is the easiest to answer. Sony’s rule, as I interpret 
it, has provided entrepreneurs with needed assurance that they will be 
shielded from copyright liability as they bring valuable new technologies to 
market. Sony’s rule is clear. That clarity allows those who develop new 
products that are capable of substantial noninfringing uses to know, ex 
ante, that distribution of their product will not yield massive monetary 
liability. At the same time, it helps deter them from distributing products 
that have no other real function than—or that are specifically intended 
for—copyright infringement, deterrence that the Court’s holding today 
reinforces (by adding a weapon to the copyright holder’s legal arsenal). 
Sony’s rule is strongly technology protecting. The rule deliberately 
makes it difficult for courts to find secondary liability where new 
technology is at issue. It establishes that the law will not impose copyright 
liability upon the distributors of dual-use technologies (who do not 
themselves engage in unauthorized copying) unless the product in question 
will be used almost exclusively to infringe copyrights (or unless they 
actively induce infringements as we today describe). Sony thereby 
recognizes that the copyright laws are not intended to discourage or to 
control the emergence of new technologies, including (perhaps especially) 
those that help disseminate information and ideas more broadly or more 
efficiently. Thus Sony’s rule shelters VCRs, typewriters, tape recorders, 
photocopiers, computers, cassette players, compact disc burners, digital 
video recorders, MP3 players, Internet search engines, and peer-to-peer 
software. But Sony’s rule does not shelter descramblers, even if one could 
theoretically use a descrambler in a noninfringing way. 
Sony’s rule is forward looking. It does not confine its scope to a static 
snapshot of a product’s current uses (thereby threatening technologies that 
have undeveloped future markets). Rather, as the VCR example makes 
clear, a product’s market can evolve dramatically over time. And Sony—by 
referring to a capacity for substantial noninfringing uses—recognizes that 
fact. 
Sony’s word “capable” refers to a plausible, not simply a theoretical, 
likelihood that such uses will come to pass, and that fact anchors Sony in 
practical reality. 
Sony’s rule is mindful of the limitations facing judges where matters of 
technology are concerned. Judges have no specialized technical ability to 
answer questions about present or future technological feasibilility or 
commercial viability where technology professionals, engineers, and 
venture capitalists themselves may radically disagree and where answers 
may differ depending upon whether one focuses upon the time of product 
development or the time of distribution. Consider, for example, the 
question whether devices can be added to Grokster’s software that will 
filter out infringing files. MGM tells us this is easy enough to do, as do 
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several amici that produce and sell the filtering technology. Grokster says 
it is not at all easy to do, and not an efficient solution in any event, and 
several apparently disinterested computer science professors agree. Which 
account should a judge credit? Sony says that the judge will not necessarily 
have to decide. 
Given the nature of the Sony rule, it is not surprising that in the last 
20 years, there have been relatively few contributory infringement suits—
based on a product distribution theory—brought against technology 
providers (a small handful of federal appellate court cases and perhaps 
fewer than two dozen District Court cases in the last 20 years). I have found 
nothing in the briefs or the record that shows that Sony has failed to 
achieve its innovation-protecting objective. 
B 
The second, more difficult, question is whether a modified Sony rule 
(or a strict interpretation) would significantly weaken the law’s ability to 
protect new technology. Justice Ginsburg’s approach would require 
defendants to produce considerably more concrete evidence—more than 
was presented here—to earn Sony’s shelter. That heavier evidentiary 
demand, and especially the more dramatic (case-by-case balancing) 
modifications that MGM and the Government seek, would, I believe, 
undercut the protection that Sony now offers. 
To require defendants to provide, for example, detailed evidence—say 
business plans, profitability estimates, projected technological 
modifications, and so forth—would doubtless make life easier for 
copyrightholder plaintiffs. But it would simultaneously increase the legal 
uncertainty that surrounds the creation or development of a new 
technology capable of being put to infringing uses. Inventors and 
entrepreneurs (in the garage, the dorm room, the corporate lab, or the 
boardroom) would have to fear (and in many cases endure) costly and 
extensive trials when they create, produce, or distribute the sort of 
information technology that can be used for copyright infringement. They 
would often be left guessing as to how a court, upon later review of the 
product and its uses, would decide when necessarily rough estimates 
amounted to sufficient evidence. They would have no way to predict how 
courts would weigh the respective values of infringing and noninfringing 
uses; determine the efficiency and advisability of technological changes; or 
assess a product’s potential future markets. The price of a wrong guess—
even if it involves a good-faith effort to assess technical and commercial 
viability—could be large statutory damages (not less than $750 and up to 
$30,000 per infringed work). 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). The additional risk and 
uncertainty would mean a consequent additional chill of technological 
development. 
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C 
The third question—whether a positive copyright impact would 
outweigh any technology-related loss—I find the most difficult of the three. 
I do not doubt that a more intrusive Sony test would generally provide 
greater revenue security for copyright holders. But it is harder to conclude 
that the gains on the copyright swings would exceed the losses on the 
technology roundabouts. 
For one thing, the law disfavors equating the two different kinds of 
gain and loss; rather, it leans in favor of protecting technology. As Sony 
itself makes clear, the producer of a technology which permits unlawful 
copying does not himself engage in unlawful copying—a fact that makes 
the attachment of copyright liability to the creation, production, or 
distribution of the technology an exceptional thing. Moreover, Sony has 
been the law for some time. And that fact imposes a serious burden upon 
copyright holders like MGM to show a need for change in the current rules 
of the game, including a more strict interpretation of the test. 
In any event, the evidence now available does not, in my view, make 
out a sufficiently strong case for change. To say this is not to doubt the 
basic need to protect copyrighted material from infringement. The 
Constitution itself stresses the vital role that copyright plays in advancing 
the “useful Arts.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. No one disputes that “reward to the 
author or artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of his 
creative genius.” United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 
158 (1948). And deliberate unlawful copying is no less an unlawful taking 
of property than garden-variety theft. But these highly general principles 
cannot by themselves tell us how to balance the interests at issue in Sony 
or whether Sony’s standard needs modification. And at certain key points, 
information is lacking. 
Will an unmodified Sony lead to a significant diminution in the 
amount or quality of creative work produced? Since copyright’s basic 
objective is creation and its revenue objectives but a means to that end, this 
is the underlying copyright question. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. 
v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“Creative work is to be encouraged and 
rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of 
promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other 
arts”). And its answer is far from clear. 
Unauthorized copying likely diminishes industry revenue, though it is 
not clear by how much. The extent to which related production has actually 
and resultingly declined remains uncertain, though there is good reason to 
believe that the decline, if any, is not substantial. See, Benkler, Sharing 
Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality 
of Economic Production, 114 Yale L. J. 273, 351–52 (2004) (“Much of the 
actual flow of revenue to artists—from performances and other sources—
is stable even assuming a complete displacement of the CD market by peer-
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to-peer distribution. . . . [I]t would be silly to think that music, a cultural 
form without which no human society has existed, will cease to be in our 
world [because of illegal file swapping]”). More importantly, copyright 
holders at least potentially have other tools available to reduce piracy and 
to abate whatever threat it poses to creative production. As today’s opinion 
makes clear, a copyright holder may proceed against a technology provider 
where a provable specific intent to infringe (of the kind the Court describes) 
is present. Services like Grokster may well be liable under an inducement 
theory. 
In addition, a copyright holder has always had the legal authority to 
bring a traditional infringement suit against one who wrongfully copies. 
Indeed, since September 2003, the Recording Industry Association of 
America (RIAA) has filed “thousands of suits against people for sharing 
copyrighted material.” These suits have provided copyright holders with 
damages; have served as a teaching tool, making clear that much file 
sharing, if done without permission, is unlawful; and apparently have had 
a real and significant deterrent effect. (number of people downloading files 
fell from a peak of roughly 35 million to roughly 23 million in the year 
following the first suits; 38% of current downloaders report downloading 
fewer files because of the suits); but see Evangelista, Downloading Music 
and Movie Files is as Popular as Ever, San Francisco Chronicle, Mar. 28, 
2005, p. E1 (referring to the continuing “tide of rampant copyright 
infringement,” while noting that the RIAA says it believes the “campaign 
of lawsuits and public education has at least contained the problem”). 
Further, copyright holders may develop new technological devices that 
will help curb unlawful infringement. Some new technology, called “digital 
‘watermarking’ ” and “digital fingerprint[ing],” can encode within the file 
information about the author and the copyright scope and date, which 
“fingerprints” can help to expose infringers. Other technology can, through 
encryption, potentially restrict users’ ability to make a digital copy. 
At the same time, advances in technology have discouraged unlawful 
copying by making lawful copying (e.g., downloading music with the 
copyright holder’s permission) cheaper and easier to achieve. Several 
services now sell music for less than $1 per song. (Walmart.com, for 
example, charges $0.88 each). Consequently, many consumers initially 
attracted to the convenience and flexibility of services like Grokster are 
now migrating to lawful paid services (services with copying permission) 
where they can enjoy at little cost even greater convenience and flexibility 
without engaging in unlawful swapping. See M. Madden & L. Rainie, 
March 2005 Data Memo, supra, at 6–7 (percentage of current downloaders 
who have used paid services rose from 24% to 43% in a year; number using 
free services fell from 58% to 41%). 
Thus, lawful music downloading services—those that charge the 
customer for downloading music and pay royalties to the copyright 
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holder—have continued to grow and to produce substantial revenue. See 
Bruno, Digital Entertainment: Piracy Fight Shows Encouraging Signs 
(Mar. 5, 2005), available at LEXIS, News Library, Billboard File (in 2004, 
consumers worldwide purchased more than 10 times the number of digital 
tracks purchased in 2003; global digital music market of $330 million in 
2004 expected to double in 2005); Press Release, Informa Media Report, 
supra (global digital revenues will likely exceed $3 billion in 2010); Ashton, 
[International Federation of the Phonographic Industry] Predicts 
Downloads Will Hit the Mainstream, Music Week, Jan. 29, 2005, p. 6 (legal 
music sites and portable MP3 players “are helping transform the digital 
music market” into “an everyday consumer experience”). And more 
advanced types of non-music-oriented P2P networks have also started to 
develop, drawing in part on the lessons of Grokster. 
Finally, as Sony recognized, the legislative option remains available. 
Courts are less well suited than Congress to the task of “accommodat[ing] 
fully the varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably 
implicated by such new technology.” 
I do not know whether these developments and similar alternatives 
will prove sufficient, but I am reasonably certain that, given their 
existence, a strong demonstrated need for modifying Sony (or for 
interpreting Sony’s standard more strictly) has not yet been shown. That 
fact, along with the added risks that modification (or strict interpretation) 
would impose upon technological innovation, leads me to the conclusion 
that we should maintain Sony, reading its standard as I have read it. As so 
read, it requires affirmance of the Ninth Circuit’s determination of the 
relevant aspects of the Sony question. 
* * * 
For these reasons, I disagree with Justice Ginsburg, but I agree with 
the Court and join its opinion. 
* * * 
The entertainment industry battle was also going on in Congress. In 
2005, President Bush signed into law a new bipartisan Family 
Entertainment and Copyright Act, also known as Artists Rights and Theft 
Prevention Act, making it a federal crime to use a video camera to copy a 
film on the screen in a movie theater, and also giving the theater staff the 
right to detain anyone reasonably suspected of doing so. But the industry’s 
lack of confidence that Grokster solved its problems was shown by the filing 
of another 874 individual lawsuits, bringing the total to nearly 12,000. 
This practice had begun in 2003 when the record labels had located 
online and filed lawsuits against four college students, asserting violation 
of their copyrights. Since the potential damage awards ranged from $750 
to $150,000 for each copyrighted work made available online, these four 
defendants and their families were pleased to negotiate settlements 
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requiring each to pay total damages ranging from $12,000 to $17,000 and 
a commitment never again to use computers to gain or provide free access 
to copyrighted material. 
The viability of these lawsuits had just been dramatically expanded by 
a 2003 ruling which compelled Verizon Communications to hand over the 
names and addresses of any subscribers who had been sharing music on its 
Internet service. The court ruled that refusing to allow these subpoenas 
“would create a huge loophole in Congress’s effort to prevent copyright 
infringement on the Internet.” The industry then obtained more than 1000 
subpoenas against Verizon, Comcast, and Time Warner Cable, as well as 
universities like Princeton, MIT, and Boston College. Supported by the 
ACLU and the Consumers Union, Verizon appealed, and the universities 
asserted a special defense based on students’ privacy rights under the 
federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act. Verizon won its appeal 
in the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Nevertheless, 
the major RIAA music industry members filed thousands of new lawsuits 
against individual file-sharers they had located. 
In 2003, Apple Computer fashioned a new Internet service with 
licenses from the music labels, called the iTunes Music Store, inviting 
people to “Rip, Mix, and Burn” the licensed songs into a portable music 
player or onto a CD. Though they originally made this service available 
just to users of Apple’s Macintosh computers, they sold over one million 
songs this way in their first week, and over 10 million within a few months. 
A key reason for iTunes’ appeal was that not only did the consumers not 
have to go to a store, but they only had to pay 99 cents per song and $9.90 
for a full album. The music labels and performers were still earning their 
own full financial return because nobody had to be paying for the 
manufacture and distribution of a physical album in a store, which 
typically accounts for around 40 percent of the list $18 price of a CD. 
Indeed, the major labels soon reduced the wholesale price of CDs to reflect 
the new market realities. 
Despite the new digital medium, however, some of the same problems 
arose that were part and parcel of owning vinyl records—unwanted music. 
While in those days one could buy and sell used records from the local 
record store, it was not clear how one could do this with digital music. In 
October 2011, a company called ReDigi sought to capture this market, 
advertising itself as the virtual marketplace for “pre-owned” digital music. 
Soon after, Capitol Records filed a lawsuit, alleging copyright 
infringement. 
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CAPITOL RECORDS, LLC V. REDIGI, INC. 
United States District Court, Southern District of New York, 2013. 
934 F. Supp.2d 640. 
SULLIVAN, DISTRICT JUDGE 
Capitol Records, LLC (“Capitol”), the recording label for such classic 
vinyls as Frank Sinatra’s “Come Fly With Me” and The Beatles’ “Yellow 
Submarine,” brings this action against ReDigi Inc. (“ReDigi”), a twenty-
first century technology company that touts itself as a “virtual” 
marketplace for “pre-owned” digital music. What has ensued in a 
fundamental clash over culture, policy, and copyright law, with Capitol 
alleging that ReDigi’s web-based service amounts to copyright 
infringement in violation of the Copyright Act of 1976 (the “Copyright 
Act”), 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. Now before the Court are Capitol’s motion for 
partial summary judgment and ReDigi’s motion for summary judgment, 
both filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Because this is a 
court of law and not a congressional subcommittee or technology blog, the 
issues are narrow, technical, and purely legal. Thus, for the reasons that 
follow, Capitol’s motion is granted and ReDigi’s motion is denied. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Facts 
ReDigi markets itself as “the world’s first and only online marketplace 
for digital used music.” (Capitol 56.1 Stmt., Doc. No. 50 (“Cap. 56.1”), ¶ 6.) 
Launched on October 13, 2011, ReDigi’s website invites users to “sell their 
legally acquired digital music files, and buy used digital music from others 
at a fraction of the price currently available on iTunes.” (Id. ¶¶ 6, 9.) Thus, 
much like used record stores, ReDigi permits its users to recoup value on 
their unwanted music. Unlike used record stores, however, ReDigi’s sales 
take place entirely in the digital domain. (See ReDigi Reply 56.1 Stmt., Doc. 
No. 83 (“RD Rep. 56.1”), 4 ¶ 16.) 
To sell music on ReDigi’s website, a user must first download ReDigi’s 
“Media Manager” to his computer. (ReDigi 56.1 Stmt., Doc. No. 56 (“RD 
56.1”), ¶ 8.) Once installed, Media Manager analyzes the user’s computer 
to build a list of digital music files eligible for sale. (Id.) A file is eligible 
only if it was purchased on iTunes or from another ReDigi user; music 
downloaded from a CD or other file-sharing website is ineligible for sale. 
(Id.) After this validation process, Media Manager continually runs on the 
user’s computer and attached devices to ensure that the user has not 
retained music that has been sold or uploaded for sale. (Id. ¶ 10.) However, 
Media Manager cannot detect copies stored in other locations. (Cap. 56.1 
¶¶ 59–61, 63; see Capitol Reply 56.1 Stmt., Doc. No. 78 (“Cap. Rep. 56.1”), 
¶ 10.) If a copy is detected, Media Manager prompts the user to delete the 
file. (Cap. 56.1 ¶ 64.) The file is not deleted automatically or involuntarily, 
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though ReDigi’s policy is to suspend the accounts of users who refuse to 
comply. (Id.) 
After the list is built, a user may upload any of his eligible files to 
ReDigi’s “Cloud Locker,” an ethereal moniker for what is, in fact, merely a 
remote server in Arizona. (RD 56.1 ¶¶ 9, 11; Cap. 56.1 ¶ 22.) ReDigi’s 
upload process is a source of contention between the parties. (See RD 56.1 
¶¶ 14–23; Cap. Rep. 56.1 ¶¶ 14–23.) ReDigi asserts that the process 
involves “migrating” a user’s file, packet by packet—“analogous to a 
train”—from the user’s computer to the Cloud Locker so that data does not 
exist in two places at any one time. (RD 56.1 ¶¶ 14, 36.) Capitol asserts 
*646 that, semantics aside, ReDigi’s upload process “necessarily involves 
copying” a file from the user’s computer to the Cloud Locker. (Cap. Rep. 
56.1 ¶ 14.) Regardless, at the end of the process, the digital music file is 
located in the Cloud Locker and not on the user’s computer. (RD 56.1 ¶ 21.) 
Moreover, Media Manager deletes any additional copies of the file on the 
user’s computer and connected devices. (Id. ¶ 38.) 
Once uploaded, a digital music file undergoes a second analysis to 
verify eligibility. (Cap. 56.1 ¶¶ 31–32.) If ReDigi determines that the file 
has not been tampered with or offered for sale by another user, the file is 
stored in the Cloud Locker, and the user is given the option of simply 
storing and streaming the file for personal use or offering it for sale in 
ReDigi’s marketplace. (Id. ¶¶ 33–37.) If a user chooses to sell his digital 
music file, his access to the file is terminated and transferred to the new 
owner at the time of purchase. (Id. ¶ 49.) Thereafter, the new owner can 
store the file in the Cloud Locker, stream it, sell it, or download it to her 
computer and other devices. (Id. ¶ 50.) No money changes hands in these 
transactions. (RD Rep. 56.15 ¶ 18.) Instead, users buy music with credits 
they either purchased from ReDigi or acquired from other sales. (Id.) 
ReDigi credits, once acquired, cannot be exchanged for money. (Id.) 
Instead, they can only be used to purchase additional music. (Id.) 
To encourage activity in its marketplace, ReDigi initially permitted 
users to preview thirty-second clips and view album cover art of songs 
posted for sale pursuant to a licensing agreement with a third party. (See 
RD 56.1 ¶¶ 73–78.) However, shortly after its launch, ReDigi lost the 
licenses. (Id.) Accordingly, ReDigi now sends users to either YouTube or 
iTunes to listen to and view this promotional material. (Id. ¶¶ 77, 79.) 
ReDigi also offers its users a number of incentives. (Cap. 56.1 ¶ 39.) For 
instance, ReDigi gives twenty-cent credits to users who post files for sale 
and enters active sellers into contests for prizes. (Id. ¶¶ 39, 42.) ReDigi also 
encourages sales by advising new users via email that they can “[c]ash in” 
their music on the website, tracking and posting the titles of sought after 
songs on its website and in its newsletter, notifying users when they are 
low on credits and advising them to either purchase more credits or sell 
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songs, and connecting users who are seeking unavailable songs with 
potential sellers. (Id. ¶¶ 39–48.) 
Finally, ReDigi earns a fee for every transaction. (Id. ¶ 54.) ReDigi’s 
website prices digital music files at fifty-nine to seventy-nine cents each. 
(Id. ¶ 55.) When users purchase a file, with credits, 20% of the sale price is 
allocated to the seller, 20% goes to an “escrow” fund for the artist, and 60% 
is retained by ReDigi. (Id.) 
* * * 
III. DISCUSSION 
Section 106 of the Copyright Act grants “the owner of copyright under 
this title” certain “exclusive rights,” including the right “to reproduce the 
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords,” “to distribute copies or 
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer 
of ownership,” and to publicly perform and display certain copyrighted 
works. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), (3)–(5). However, these exclusive rights are 
limited by several subsequent sections of the statute. Pertinently, Section 
109 sets forth the “first sale” doctrine, which provides that “the owner of a 
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any 
person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the 
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy 
or phonorecord.” Id. § 109(a). The novel question presented in this action is 
whether a digital music file, lawfully made and purchased, may be resold 
by its owner through ReDigi under the first sale doctrine. The Court 
determines that it cannot. 
A. Infringement of Capitol’s Copyrights 
To state a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must establish 
that it owns a valid copyright in the work at issue and that the defendant 
violated one of the exclusive rights the plaintiff holds in the work. Twin 
Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1372 (2d Cir.1993) 
(citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361, 111 
S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991)). It is undisputed that Capitol owns 
copyrights in a number of the recordings sold on ReDigi’s website. (See Cap. 
56.1 ¶¶ 68–73; RD Rep. 56.118–19, ¶¶ 68–73; Decl. of Richard S. Mandel, 
dated July 19, 2012, Doc. No. 52 (“Mandel Decl.”), ¶ 16, Ex. M; Decl. of 
Alasdair J. McMullan, dated July 19, 2012, Doc. No. 51 (“McMullan Decl.”), 
¶¶ 3–5, Ex. 1.) It is also undisputed that Capitol did not approve the 
reproduction or distribution of its copyrighted recordings on ReDigi’s 
website. Thus, if digital music files are “reproduce[d]” and “distribute[d]” 
on ReDigi’s website within the meaning of the Copyright Act, Capitol’s 
copyrights have been infringed. 
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1. Reproduction Rights 
Courts have consistently held that the unauthorized duplication of 
digital music files over the Internet infringes a copyright owner’s exclusive 
right to reproduce. See, e.g., A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 
1004, 1014 (9th Cir.2001). However, courts have not previously addressed 
whether the unauthorized transfer of a digital music file over the 
Internet—where only one file exists before and after the transfer—
constitutes reproduction within the meaning of the Copyright Act. The 
Court holds that it does. 
The Copyright Act provides that a copyright owner has the exclusive 
right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in . . . phonorecords.” 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106(1) (emphasis added). Copyrighted works are defined to include, inter 
alia, “sound recordings,” which are “works that result from the fixation of 
a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds.” Id. § 101. Such works are 
distinguished from their material embodiments. These include 
phonorecords, which are the “material objects in which sounds . . . are fixed 
by any method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds 
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly 
or with the aid of a machine or device.” Id. § 101 (emphasis added). Thus, 
the plain text of the Copyright Act makes clear that reproduction occurs 
when a copyrighted work is fixed in a new material object. See Matthew 
Bender & Co., Inc. v. W. Pub. Co., 158 F.3d 693, 703 (2d Cir.1998). 
The legislative history of the Copyright Act bolsters this reading. The 
House Report on the Copyright Act distinguished between sound 
recordings and phonorecords, stating that “[t]he copyrightable work 
comprises the aggregation of sounds and not the tangible medium of 
fixation. Thus, ‘sound recordings’ as copyrightable subject matter are 
distinguished from ‘phonorecords[,]’ the latter being physical objects in 
which sounds are fixed.” H.R.Rep. No. 94–1476, at 56 (1976), 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5669. Similarly, the House and Senate Reports on the 
Act both explained: 
Read together with the relevant definitions in [S]ection 101, the right 
“to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords” means the 
right to produce a material object in which the work is duplicated, 
transcribed, imitated, or simulated in a fixed form from which it can be 
“perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with 
the aid of a machine or device.” 
Id. at 61, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5675; S.Rep. No. 94–473, at 58 (1975). 
Put differently, the reproduction right is the exclusive right to embody, and 
to prevent others from embodying, the copyrighted work (or sound 
recording) in a new material object (or phonorecord). See Nimmer on 
Copyright § 8.02 (stating that “in order to infringe the reproduction right, 
the defendant must embody the plaintiff’s work in a ‘material object’ ”). 
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Courts that have dealt with infringement on peer-to-peer (“P2P”) file-
sharing systems provide valuable guidance on the application of this right 
in the digital domain. For instance, in London-Sire Records, Inc. v. John 
Doe 1, the court addressed whether users of P2P software violated 
copyright owners’ distribution rights. 542 F.Supp.2d 153, 166 & n. 16 
(D.Mass.2008). Citing the “material object” requirement, the court 
expressly differentiated between the copyrighted work—or digital music 
file—and the phonorecord—or “appropriate segment of the hard disk” that 
the file would be embodied in following its transfer. Id. at 171. Specifically, 
[w]hen a user on a [P2P] network downloads a song from another 
user, he receives into his computer a digital sequence representing 
the sound recording. That sequence is magnetically encoded on a 
segment of his hard disk (or likewise written on other media). 
With the right hardware and software, the downloader can use 
the magnetic sequence to reproduce the sound recording. The 
electronic file (or, perhaps more accurately, the appropriate 
segment of the hard disk) is therefore a “phonorecord” within the 
meaning of the statute. 
Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, when a user downloads a digital music 
file or “digital sequence” to his “hard disk,” the file is “reproduce[d]” on a 
new phonorecord within the meaning of the Copyright Act. Id. 
This understanding is, of course, confirmed by the laws of physics. It 
is simply impossible that the same “material object” can be transferred over 
the Internet. Thus, logically, the court in London-Sire noted that the 
Internet transfer of a file results in a material object being “created 
elsewhere at its finish.” Id. at 173. Because the reproduction right is 
necessarily implicated when a copyrighted work is embodied in a new 
material object, and because digital music files must be embodied in a new 
material object following their transfer over the Internet, the Court 
determines that the embodiment of a digital music file on a new hard disk 
is a reproduction within the meaning of the Copyright Act. 
This finding holds regardless of whether one or multiple copies of the 
file exist. London-Sire, like all of the P2P cases, obviously concerned 
multiple copies of one digital music file. But that distinction is immaterial 
under the plain language of the Copyright Act. Simply put, it is the creation 
of a new material object and not an additional material object that defines 
the reproduction right. The dictionary defines “reproduction” to mean, inter 
alia, “to produce again” or “to cause to exist again or anew.” See Merriam-
Webster Collegiate Edition 994 (10th ed. 1998) (emphasis added). 
Significantly, it is not defined as “to produce again while the original 
exists.” Thus, the right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in . . . 
phonorecords” is implicated whenever a sound recording is fixed in a new 
material object, regardless of whether the sound recording remains fixed 
in the original material object. 
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Given this finding, the Court concludes that ReDigi’s service infringes 
Capitol’s reproduction rights under any description of the technology. 
ReDigi stresses that it “migrates” a file from a user’s computer to its Cloud 
Locker, so that the same file is transferred to the ReDigi server and no 
copying occurs. However, even if that were the case, the fact that a file has 
moved from one material object—the user’s computer—to another—the 
ReDigi server—means that a reproduction has occurred. Similarly, when a 
ReDigi user downloads a new purchase from the ReDigi website to her 
computer, yet another reproduction is created. It is beside the point that 
the original phonorecord no longer exists. It matters only that a new 
phonorecord has been created. 
* * * 
Accordingly, the Court finds that, absent the existence of an 
affirmative defense, the sale of digital music files on ReDigi’s website 
infringes Capitol’s exclusive right of reproduction. 
2. Distribution Rights 
In addition to the reproduction right, a copyright owner also has the 
exclusive right “to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted 
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership.” 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106(3). Like the court in London-Sire, the Court agrees that “[a]n 
electronic file transfer is plainly within the sort of transaction that § 106(3) 
was intended to reach [and] . . . fit[s] within the definition of ‘distribution’ 
of a phonorecord.” London-Sire, 542 F.Supp.2d at 173–74. For that reason, 
“courts have not hesitated to find copyright infringement by distribution in 
cases of file-sharing or electronic transmission of copyrighted works.” 
Arista Records LLC v. Greubel, 453 F.Supp.2d 961, 968 (N.D.Tex.2006) 
(collecting cases); see, e.g., Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014. Indeed, in New York 
Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, the Supreme Court stated it was “clear” that an 
online news database violated authors’ distribution rights by selling 
electronic copies of their articles for download. 533 U.S. 483, 498, 121 S.Ct. 
2381, 150 L.Ed.2d 500 (2001). 
There is no dispute that sales occurred on ReDigi’s website. Capitol 
has established that it was able to buy more than one-hundred of its own 
recordings on ReDigi’s website, and ReDigi itself compiled a list of its 
completed sales of Capitol’s recordings. (Cap. 56.1 ¶¶ 68–73; RD Rep. 56.1 
¶¶ 68–73.) ReDigi, in fact, does not contest that distribution occurs on its 
website—it only asserts that the distribution is protected by the fair use 
and first sale defenses. (See, e.g., ReDigi Opp’n 15 (noting that “any 
distributions . . . which occur on the ReDigi marketplace are protected”).) 
Accordingly, the Court concludes that, absent the existence of an 
affirmative defense, the sale of digital music files on ReDigi’s website 
infringes Capitol’s exclusive right of distribution. 
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3. Performance and Display Rights 
Finally, a copyright owner has the exclusive right, “in the case of . . . 
musical . . . works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly.” 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106(4). Public performance includes transmission to the public regardless 
of “whether the members of the public . . . receive it in the same place or in 
separate places and at the same time or at different times.” Id. § 101. 
Accordingly, audio streams are performances because a “stream is an 
electronic transmission that renders the musical work audible as it is 
received by the client-computer’s temporary memory. This transmission, 
like a television or radio broadcast, is a performance because there is a 
playing of the song that is perceived simultaneously with the 
transmission.” United States v. Am. Soc. Of Composers, Authors, & 
Publishers, 627 F.3d 64, 74 (2d Cir.2010). To state a claim for infringement 
of the performance right, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the public 
performance or display of the copyrighted work was for profit, and (2) the 
defendant lacked authorization from the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s 
representative. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. 315 W. 44th St. Rest. Corp., No. 
93 Civ. 8082(MBM), 1995 WL 408399, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1995). 
The copyright owner also has the exclusive right, “in the case of . . . 
pictorial [and] graphic . . . works[,] . . . to display the copyrighted work 
publicly.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(5). Public display includes “show[ing] a copy of 
[a work], either directly or by means of a film, slide, television image, or 
any other device or process.” Id. § 101. The Ninth Circuit has held that the 
display of a photographic image on a computer may implicate the display 
right, though infringement hinges, in part, on where the image was hosted. 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1160 (9th Cir.2007). 
Capitol alleges that ReDigi infringed its copyrights by streaming 
thirty-second song clips and exhibiting album cover art to potential buyers. 
(Compl. ¶¶ 25–26.) ReDigi counters that it only posted such content 
pursuant to a licensing agreement and within the terms of that agreement. 
(ReDigi Mem. 24–25.) ReDigi also asserts that it promptly removed the 
content when its licenses were terminated, and instead sent users to 
YouTube or iTunes for previews. (Id.) Capitol, in response, claims that 
ReDigi’s use violated the terms of those licenses and did not cease at the 
time the licenses were terminated. (Compare RD 56.1 ¶¶ 73–79, with Cap. 
Rep. 56.1 ¶¶ 73–79.) As such, there are material disputes as to the source 
of the content, whether ReDigi was authorized to transmit the content, 
when authorization was or was not revoked, and when ReDigi ceased 
providing the content. Because the Court cannot determine whether 
ReDigi infringed Capitol’s display and performance rights on the present 
record, ReDigi’s motion for summary judgment on its alleged infringement 
of these exclusive rights is denied. 
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B. Affirmative Defenses 
Having concluded that sales on ReDigi’s website infringe Capitol’s 
exclusive rights of reproduction and distribution, the Court turns to 
whether the fair use or first sale defenses excuse that infringement. For 
the reasons set forth below, the Court determines that they do not. 
1. Fair Use 
“The ultimate test of fair use . . . is whether the copyright law’s goal of 
‘promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts’ would be better served 
by allowing the use than by preventing it.” Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol 
Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir.1998) (quoting U.S. Const., art. 
I, § 8, cl. 8). Accordingly, fair use permits reproduction of copyrighted work 
without the copyright owner’s consent “for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research.” 17 U.S.C. § 107. The list is not 
exhaustive but merely illustrates the types of copying typically embraced 
by fair use. Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc., 150 F.3d at 141. In addition, four 
statutory factors guide courts’ application of the doctrine. Specifically, 
courts look to: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount 
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
17 U.S.C. § 107. Because fair use is an “equitable rule of reason,” courts are 
“free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.” 
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 n. 31, 
104 S.Ct. 774, 78 L.Ed.2d 574 (1984) (quoting H. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 65–
66, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5679–5680); see Iowa State Univ. Research 
Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir.1980). 
On the record before it, the Court has little difficulty concluding that 
ReDigi’s reproduction and distribution of Capitol’s copyrighted works falls 
well outside the fair use defense. ReDigi obliquely argues that uploading 
to and downloading from the Cloud Locker for storage and personal use are 
protected fair use. (See ReDigi Mem. 15.) Significantly, Capitol does not 
contest that claim. (See Tr. 12:8–23.) Instead, Capitol asserts only that 
uploading to and downloading from the Cloud Locker incident to sale fall 
outside the ambit of fair use. The Court agrees. See Arista Records, LLC v. 
Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir.2010) (rejecting application of fair use to 
user uploads and downloads on P2P file-sharing network). 
Each of the statutory factors counsels against a finding of fair use. The 
first factor requires the Court to determine whether ReDigi’s use 
“transforms” the copyrighted work and whether it is commercial. Campbell 
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v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–79, 114 S.Ct. 1164, 127 L.Ed.2d 
500 (1994). Both inquiries disfavor ReDigi’s claim. Plainly, the upload, sale, 
and download of digital music files on ReDigi’s website does nothing to “add 
[ ] something new, with a further purpose or different character” to the 
copyrighted works. Id.; see, e.g., Napster, 239 F.3d at 1015 (endorsing 
district court finding that “downloading MP3 files does not transform the 
copyrighted work”). ReDigi’s use is also undoubtedly commercial. ReDigi 
and the uploading user directly profit from the sale of a digital music file, 
and the downloading user saves significantly on the price of the song in the 
primary market. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 
U.S. 539, 562, 105 S.Ct. 2218, 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985) (“The crux of the 
profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is 
monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of 
the copyrighted material without paying the customary price.”). ReDigi 
asserts that downloads for personal, and not public or commercial, use 
“must be characterized as . . . noncommercial, nonprofit activity.” (ReDigi 
Mem. 16 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 449, 104 S.Ct. 774).) However, ReDigi 
twists the law to fit its facts. When a user downloads purchased files from 
the Cloud Locker, the resultant reproduction is an essential component of 
ReDigi’s commercial enterprise. Thus, ReDigi’s argument is unavailing. 
The second factor—the nature of the copyrighted work—also weighs 
against application of the fair use defense, as creative works like sound 
recordings are “close to the core of the intended copyright protection” and 
“far removed from the . . . factual or descriptive work more amenable to fair 
use.” UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F.Supp.2d 349, 351 
(S.D.N.Y.2000) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586, 114 S.Ct. 1164). The third factor—the portion 
of the work copied—suggests a similar outcome because ReDigi transmits 
the works in their entirety, “negating any claim of fair use.” Id. at 352, 114 
S.Ct. 1164. Finally, ReDigi’s sales are likely to undercut the “market for or 
value of the copyrighted work” and, accordingly, the fourth factor cuts 
against a finding of fair use. Cf. Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d at 
124 (rejecting application of fair use to P2P file sharing, in part, because 
“the likely detrimental effect of file-sharing on the value of copyrighted 
compositions is well documented.” (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios 
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 923, 125 S.Ct. 2764, 162 L.Ed.2d 781 
(2005))). The product sold in ReDigi’s secondary market is 
indistinguishable from that sold in the legitimate primary market save for 
its lower price. The clear inference is that ReDigi will divert buyers away 
from that primary market. ReDigi incredibly argues that Capitol is 
preempted from making a market-based argument because Capitol itself 
condones downloading of its works on iTunes. (ReDigi Mem. 18.) Of course, 
Capitol, as copyright owner, does not forfeit its right to claim copyright 
infringement merely because it permits certain uses of its works. This 
argument, too, is therefore unavailing. 
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In sum, ReDigi facilitates and profits from the sale of copyrighted 
commercial recordings, transferred in their entirety, with a likely 
detrimental impact on the primary market for these goods. Accordingly, 
the Court concludes that the fair use defense does not permit ReDigi’s users 
to upload and download files to and from the Cloud Locker incident to sale. 
* * * 
IV. CONCLUSION 
At base, ReDigi seeks judicial amendment of the Copyright Act to 
reach its desired policy outcome. However, “[s]ound policy, as well as 
history, supports [the Court’s] consistent deference to Congress when 
major technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials. 
Congress has the constitutional authority and the institutional ability to 
accommodate fully the varied permutations of competing interests that are 
inevitably implicated by such new technology.” Sony, 464 U.S. at 431, 104 
S.Ct. 774. Such defence often counsels for a limited interpretation of 
copyright protection. However, here, the Court cannot of its own accord 
condone the wholesale application of the first sale defense to the digital 
sphere, particularly when Congress itself has declined to take that step. 
Accordingly, and for the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Capitol’s 
motion for summary judgment on its claims for ReDigi’s direct, 
contributory, and vicarious infringement of its distribution and 
reproduction rights. The Court also DENIES ReDigi’s motion in its 
entirety. 
Because issues remain with respect to Capitol’s performance and 
display rights, and ReDigi’s secondary infringement of Capitol’s common 
law copyrights, as well as damages, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the parties shall submit a joint letter to 
the Court no later than April 12, 2013 concerning the next contemplated 
steps in this case. 
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motions 
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JARVIS V. A & M RECORDS 
United States District Court, District of New Jersey, 1993. 
827 F. Supp. 282. 
ACKERMAN, DISTRICT JUDGE. 
* * * 
I. Undisputed Factual Background 
The facts of this case are undisputed and relatively simple. About a 
decade ago, Boyd Jarvis wrote a song entitled “The Music’s Got Me.” He 
recorded the song with his group, Visual, and copyrighted the composition 
together with the arrangement in November 1982. The song subsequently 
was released on Prelude Records, and the undisputed evidence shows that 
Prelude Records retains the copyright to the sound recording. 
In 1989, defendant Robert Clivilles and David Cole wrote and recorded 
a song entitled “Get Dumb! (Free Your Body)” and the song was released 
in three formats on A & M Records and Vendetta Records, A & M’s 
subsidiary label. The three relevant versions are: (1) “Get Dumb! Free Your 
Body” as it appears on the “b” side of a single record called “Heartbeat” by 
the defendant group Seduction; (2) a trio of versions of “Get Dumb! Free 
Your Body” that appear on another 12 single by Cole/Clivilles Music 
Enterprises, recorded by a group called The Crew (featuring Freedom 
Williams); (3) the cassette single of the song “Get Dumb!” 
In all three of the releases of “Get Dumb!”, defendants digitally 
sampled sections of Mr. Jarvis’s “The Music’s Got Me.” Digital sampling 
has been described as: 
the conversion of analog sound waves into a digital code. The 
digital code that describes the sampled music . . . can then be 
reused, manipulated or combined with other digitalized or 
recorded sounds using a machine with digital data processing 
capabilities, such as a . . . computerized synthesizer. 
Judith Greenberg Finell, How a Musicologist Views Digital Sampling 
Issues, N.Y.L.J. p.5 n. 3 (May 22, 1992). Thus, digital sampling is similar 
to taping the original composition and reusing it in another context. In this 
case, then, throughout the defendants’ songs, one occasionally hears an 
actual piece of “The Music’s Got Me.” 
In 1990, Mr. Jarvis sued the defendants for copyright infringement. 
Defendants now move for summary judgment, on a variety of grounds. . . . 
* * * 
This is a case of what Professor Nimmer has termed “fragmented 
literal similarity,” see Nimmer on Copyright, § 13.03[A][2] at 13–46, that 
is, there is literal verbatim similarity between plaintiff’s and defendants’ 
works. In fact, the copied parts could not be more similar—they were 
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digitally copied from plaintiff’s recording. Two parts from plaintiff’s song 
were copied: first, the bridge section, which contains the words “ooh . . . 
move . . . free your body,” was taken. Second, a distinctive keyboard riff, 
which functions as both a rhythm and melody, included in the last several 
minutes of plaintiff’s song, were also sampled and incorporated into 
defendants’ work. 
As courts and commentators have repeatedly noted, the test for 
substantial similarity is difficult to define and vague to apply. Nonetheless, 
it is repeatedly said that the test to determine substantial similarity is the 
response of the ordinary lay person. 
Defendants build on the premise of the lay audience test by arguing 
that only if the two songs are similar in their entirety should the 
defendant’s song be held to have infringed plaintiff’s song. Indeed, 
defendants’ cite apparent authority for this proposition. In a case decided 
a half-century ago, a court, in rejecting the plaintiff’s argument of 
infringement, stated that “I have heard the compositions played, and to my 
ear there is a similarity, but not such a similarity as would impress one. In 
other words, I would not take the one for the other.” Allen v. Walt Disney 
Productions, Ltd., 41 F. Supp. 134, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). Similarly, the 
district judge in Arnstein v. BMI, 46 F. Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), wrote 
that “infringement must be founded upon more than the adoption of a few 
measures here and there. The theme and general melody must be 
substantially lifted.” Moreover, the defendants cite an influential article by 
Jeffrey Sherman: 
A defendant should not be held liable for infringement unless he 
copied a substantial portion of the complaining work and there 
exists the sort of aural similarity between the two works that a 
lay audience would detect. As to the first requirement, the portion 
copied may be either qualitatively or quantitatively substantial. 
As to the second, the two pieces must be similar enough to sound 
similar to a lay audience, since only then is it reasonable to 
suppose that the performance or publication of the accused work 
could in any way injure the rights of the plaintiff composer. 
J. Sherman, Musical Copyright Infringement: The Requirement of 
Substantial Similarity, Common Law Symposium, No. 92, ASCAP, p. 145 
(1977). 
However, defendants misconstrue the scope of the examination, at 
least in the context of fragmented literal similarity, where there 
unquestionably is copying, albeit of only a portion of plaintiff’s song. If it 
really were true that for infringement to follow a listener must have to 
confuse one work for the other, a work could be immune from infringement 
so long as the infringing work reaches a substantially different audience 
than the infringed work. In such a situation, a rap song, for instance, could 
never be held to have infringed an easy listening song or a pop song. See, 
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e.g., Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Brothers Records, Inc., 780 F. 
Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that rap song infringed easy listening 
song). 
Moreover, defendants’ test, applied in cases of fragmented literal 
similarity, would eviscerate the qualitative/quantitative analysis, which 
revolves around the premise that a party may be held liable when he or she 
appropriates a large section or a qualitatively important section of 
plaintiff’s work, see Werlin v. Reader’s Digest Association, 528 F. Supp. 451, 
463 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Ward, D.J.). 
Finally, such a strict test would seem to go counter to another general 
principle—that the relevant question in copyright infringement cases is 
whether the segment in question constituted a substantial portion of the 
plaintiff’s work, not whether it constituted a substantial portion of the 
defendant’s work. . . . 
Thus, infringement based on fragmented literal similarity depends on 
the truth of the principle that “the value of a work may be substantially 
diminished even when only a part of it is copied, if the part that is copied 
is of great qualitative importance to the work as a whole.” Werlin at 463. 
[The court then discussed Grand Upright and concluded that “[t]he 
proper question to ask is whether the defendant appropriated, either 
quantitatively or qualitatively, ‘constituent elements of the work that are 
original’, see Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 
U.S. 340 (1991), such that the copying rises to the level of an unlawful 
appropriation.”] 
* * * 
I now turn to the songs at issue in this case. 
Plaintiff’s song begins with a rhythm and melody utterly unlike 
defendants’ songs. But halfway through the song, the tone changes as the 
verse-chorus repetition segues into a lengthy bridge. The bridge begins 
with a series of “oohs,” sung over a distinctive rhythm, changes into a series 
of “moves” and then culminates with vocal repetitions of the phrase “free 
your body.” A couple of minutes later in plaintiff’s song, the tone again 
changes. This time, the song segues into a distinctive keyboard riff (musical 
phrase), that functions as both rhythm and melody, and for some time stays 
in the foreground of the song. It remains throughout the end of the song, 
as lyrics are sung over it. 
Nonetheless, defendants argue that the vocal portions of plaintiff’s 
song which defendants copied were non-copyrightable and therefore those 
portions must be factored out prior to performing the substantial similarity 
test. 
Since it is not unlawful to copy non-copyrightable portions of a 
plaintiff’s work, non-copyrightable elements must be factored out in an 
CH. 1  299 
  
inquiry into infringement. See Warner Brothers v. American Broadcasting 
Companies, 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983). . . . The policy behind the rule 
is to prevent a deterring effect on the creation of new works because of 
authors’ fears of copying innocuous segments. 
There is no easily codified standard to govern whether the plaintiff’s 
material is sufficiently original and/or novel to be copyrightable. “Cliched 
language, phrases and expressions conveying an idea that is typically 
expressed in a limited number of stereotypic fashions, are not subject to 
copyright protection.” Easily arrived at phrases and chord progressions are 
usually non-copyrightable. Thus, in one case, a court held that defendant’s 
appropriation of the phrase “night and noon,” in a song entirely different 
from plaintiff’s song, was not copyright infringement. O’Brien v. Chappel 
& Co., 159 F. Supp. 58, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)(Dawson, D.J.). In another case, 
a court held that when plaintiff’s and defendant’s mug coasters referenced 
ideas of enjoyment, a drinking mug, friendship, sunshine, and flowers, the 
plaintiff’s ideas were unprotected. 
However, if a piece is sufficiently distinctive, it is copyrightable. 
This case bears no relationship to the cases cited above. It is unfair to 
characterize the “oohs,” “moves” and “free your body” as cliched phrases 
typical in the field. To the contrary, they are used together in a particular 
arrangement and in the context of a particular melody. And the precise 
relationship of the phrases vis-á-vis each other was copied. There is no 
question that the combined phrase “ooh ooh ooh ooh . . . move free your 
body” is an expression of an idea that is copyrightable. Moreover, the 
keyboard line that was copied represents a distinctive melody/rhythm that 
sets it far apart from the ordinary cliched phrases held not copyrightable. 
It, too, is an expression of an idea, and is capable of being infringed. Again, 
the fact that defendants appropriated the exact arrangement of plaintiff’s 
composition says more than what can be captured in abstract legal 
analysis. 
It is certainly not clear as a matter of law that the portions copied from 
plaintiff’s song were insignificant to plaintiff’s song. To the contrary, the 
“oohs” and “move, free your body” occur in a bridge that attempts to be 
distinct and attention-grabbing. The keyboard riff begins the final portion 
of plaintiff’s song, setting the rhythm as well as the melody. 
Summary dismissal denied. 
——— 
In 2005, the Sixth Circuit provided its judgment on this score, in 
Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). The 
plaintiffs were suing the defendants for playing five times in their 1998 
movie I Got The Hook-Up, a four-second line “Get off your Ass and Jam” 
from George Clinton, Jr. and the Funkedelics’ rap song “100 Miles and 
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Runnin.” The trial judge summarily dismissed this suit on the grounds that 
no one would recognize the source. The Sixth Circuit reversed, saying first 
that one was free “to take three notes from a musical composition but not 
three notes by way of sampling from a bought recording,” because the latter 
“is a physical taking rather than an intellectual one.” They concluded by 
stating: 
Unfortunately, there is no Rosetta stone for the interpretation of 
the copyright statute. We have taken a “literal reading” approach 
. . . If this is not what Congress intended or is not what they would 
intend now, it is easy enough for the record industry, as they have 
done in the past, to go back to Congress for a clarification or 
change in the law. This is the best place for the change to be made 
rather than in the courts, because as this case demonstrates the 
court is never aware of much more than the tip of the iceberg. 
Id. at 805. 
E. COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP 
COMMUNITY FOR CREATIVE NON-VIOLENCE V. REID 
Supreme Court of the United States, 1989. 
490 U.S. 730, 109 S.Ct. 2166, 104 L.Ed.2d 811. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case, an artist and the organization that hired him to produce 
a sculpture contest the ownership of the copyright in that work. To resolve 
this dispute, we must construe the “work made for hire” provisions of the 
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 201(b), and in particular, the 
provision in § 101, which defines as a “work made for hire” a “work 
prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment” 
(hereinafter § 101(1)). 
I 
[Petitioner is the Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV), a 
nonprofit association dedicated to eliminating homelessness in America. In 
the fall of 1985, CCNV decided to participate in the Christmastime Pageant 
of Peace in Washington, D.C., by sponsoring a display to dramatize the 
plight of the homeless. 
CCNV members decided to commission a sculpture of a modern 
Nativity scene in which, instead of the traditional Holy Family, the two 
adult figures and the infant would appear as contemporary homeless 
people huddled on a street-side steam grate. The steam grate would be 
positioned atop a platform within which special-effects equipment would 
emit simulated “steam” through the grid. The title for the work was to be 
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“Third World America,” and a legend for the pedestal was to read: “and still 
there is no room at the inn.” 
CCNV was referred to respondent James Earl Reid, a Baltimore 
sculptor who agreed to complete the sculpture. The parties agreed that the 
sculpture would be made of “Design Cast 62,” a synthetic substance that 
could meet CCNV’s monetary and time constraints, could be tinted to 
resemble bronze, and could withstand the elements. The parties agreed 
that the project would cost no more than $15,000, not including Reid’s 
services, which he donated. The parties did not sign a written agreement, 
and neither party mentioned copyright. 
Reid made several sketches of figures in various poses. At CCNV’s 
request, Reid sent CCNV a sketch of a proposed sculpture showing the 
family in a creche-like setting. CCNV also took Reid to see homeless people 
living on the streets and pointed out that they tended to recline on steam 
grates, rather than sit or stand. From that time on, Reid’s sketches 
contained only reclining figures. Various CCNV member visited Reid to 
check on his. CCNV rejected Reid’s proposal to use suitcases or shopping 
bags to hold the family’s personal belongings, insisting instead on a 
shopping cart. After Reid finished the statue, it was taken to Washington, 
D.C. and mounted on its base. After the pageant, the sculpture was 
returned to Reid for minor repairs. When CCNV asked for the return of the 
sculpture for a multi-city tour, Reid refused and filed a certificate of 
copyright registration for the work. CCNV then filed a competing copyright 
claim.] 
* * * 
II 
A 
The Copyright Act of 1976 provides that copyright ownership “vests 
initially in the author or authors of the work.” As a general rule, the author 
is the party who actually creates the work, that is, the person who 
translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright 
protection. The Act carves out an important exception, however, for “works 
made for hire.” If the work is for hire, “the employer or other person for 
whom the work was prepared is considered the author” and owns the 
copyright, unless there is a written agreement to the contrary. Classifying 
a work as “made for hire” determines not only the initial ownership of its 
copyright, but also the copyright’s duration, and the owners’ renewal 
rights, § 304(a), termination rights, and right to import certain goods 
bearing the copyright. The contours of the work for hire doctrine therefore 
carry profound significance for freelance creators—including artists, 
writers, photographers, designers, composers, and computer 
programmers—and for the publishing, advertising, music, and other 
industries which commission their works. 
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* * * 
Petitioners do not claim that the statute satisfies the terms of § 101(2). 
Quite clearly, it does not. Sculpture does not fit within any of the nine 
categories of “specially ordered or commissioned” works enumerated in 
that subsection, and no written agreement between the parties establishes 
“Third World America” as a work for hire. 
[The Court turned, then, from § 101(2)’s standards for “works made for 
hire” by independent contractors to the general § 101(1) standard for 
“employees,” who presumptively make all their works for hire.] The 
starting point for our interpretation of a statute is always its language. The 
Act nowhere defines the terms “employee” or “scope of employment.” It is, 
however, well established that “[w]here Congress uses terms that have 
accumulated settled meaning under . . . the common law, a court must 
infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to 
incorporate the established meaning of these terms.” In the past, when 
Congress has used the term “employee” without defining it, we have 
concluded that Congress intended to describe the conventional master-
servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine. 
Nothing in the text of the work for hire provisions indicates that Congress 
used the words “employee” and “employment” to describe anything other 
than “ ‘the conventional relation of employer and employee.’ ” On the 
contrary, Congress’ intent to incorporate the agency law definition is 
suggested by § 101(1)’s use of the term, “scope of employment,” a widely 
used term of art in agency law. 
* * * 
[The Court then rejected CCNV’s proposal alternatives, a “right to 
control the product” as “actual control” of the product, as incompatible with 
the specific additions to Section 101(1) that Congress had enacted in 
Section 101(2).] Section 101 clearly delineates between works prepared by 
an employee and commissioned works. Sound though other distinctions 
might be as a matter of copyright policy, there is no statutory support for 
an additional dichotomy between commissioned works that are actually 
controlled and supervised by the hiring party and those that are not. 
We therefore conclude that the language and structure of § 101 of the 
Act do not support either the right to control the product or the actual 
control approaches. The structure of § 101 indicates that a work for hire 
can arise through one of two mutually exclusive means, one for employees 
and one for independent contractors, and ordinary canons of statutory 
interpretation indicate that the classification of a particular hired party 
should be made with reference to agency law. 
* * * 
Finally, petitioners’ construction of the work for hire provisions would 
impede Congress’ paramount goal in revising the 1976 Act of enhancing 
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predictability and certainty of copyright ownership. In a “copyright 
marketplace,” the parties negotiate with an expectation that one of them 
will own the copyright in the completed work. With that expectation, the 
parties at the outset can settle on relevant contractual terms, such as the 
price for the work and the ownership of reproduction rights. 
To the extent that petitioners endorse an actual control test, CCNV’s 
construction of the work for hire provisions prevents such planning. 
Because that test turns on whether the hiring party has closely monitored 
the production process, the parties would not know until late in the process, 
if not until the work is completed, whether a work will ultimately fall 
within § 101(1). Under petitioners’ approach, therefore, parties would have 
to predict in advance whether the hiring party will sufficiently control a 
given work to make it the author. “If they guess incorrectly, their reliance 
on ‘work for hire’ or an assignment may give them a copyright interest that 
they did not bargain for.” This understanding of the work for hire 
provisions clearly thwarts Congress’ goal of ensuring predictability 
through advance planning. Moreover, petitioners’ interpretation “leaves 
the door open for hiring parties, who have failed to get a full assignment of 
copyright rights from independent contractors falling outside the 
subdivision (2) guidelines, to unilaterally obtain work-made-for-hire rights 
years after the work has been completed as long as they directed or 
supervised the work, a standard that is hard not to meet when one is a 
hiring party.” Hamilton, Commissioned Works as Works Made for Hire 
Under the 1976 Copyright Act: Misinterpretation and Injustice, 135 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 1281, 1304 (1987). 
In sum, we must reject petitioners’ argument. Transforming a 
commissioned work into a work by an employee on the basis of the hiring 
party’s right to control, or actual control of, the work is inconsistent with 
the language, structure, and legislative history of the work for hire 
provisions. To determine whether a work is for hire under the Act, a court 
first should ascertain, using principles of general common law of agency, 
whether the work was prepared by an employee or an independent 
contractor. After making this determination, the court can apply the 
appropriate subsection of § 101. 
B 
We turn, finally, to an application of § 101 to Reid’s production of 
“Third World America.” In determining whether a hired party is an 
employee under the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring 
party’s right to control the manner and means by which the product is 
accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill 
required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the 
work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the 
hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; 
the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work; 
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the method of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying 
assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring 
party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee 
benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party. See Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 220(2) (1958) (setting forth a nonexhaustive list of 
factors relevant to determining whether a hired party is an employee). No 
one of these factors is determinative. 
Examining the circumstances of this case in light of these factors, we 
agree with the Court of Appeals that Reid was not an employee of CCNV 
but an independent contractor. True, CCNV members directed enough of 
Reid’s work to ensure that he produced a sculpture that met their 
specifications. But the extent of control the hiring party exercises over the 
details of the product is not dispositive. Indeed, all the other circumstances 
weigh heavily against finding an employment relationship. Reid is a 
sculptor, a skilled occupation. Reid supplied his own tools. He worked in 
his own studio in Baltimore, making daily supervision of his activities from 
Washington practicably impossible. Reid was retained for less than two 
months, a relatively short period of time. During and after this time, CCNV 
had no right to assign additional projects to Reid. Apart from the deadline 
for completing the sculpture, Reid had absolute freedom to decide when 
and how long to work. CCNV paid Reid $15,000, a sum dependent on 
“completion of a specific job, a method by which independent contractors 
are often compensated.” Reid had total discretion in hiring and paying 
assistants. Indeed, CCNV is not a business at all. Finally, CCNV did not 
pay payroll or Social Security taxes, provide any employee benefits, or 
contribute to unemployment insurance or workers’ compensation funds. 
Affirmed. 
 
JOHN CARTER V. HELMSLEY–SPEAR, INC. 
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. 
Decided Dec. 1, 1995. 
71 F.3d 77 
 
CARDAMONE, Circuit Judge:  
 
 
Defendants 474431 Associates and Helmsley–Spear, Inc. (defendants or 
appellants), as the owner and managing agent respectively, of a 
commercial building in Queens, New York, appeal from an order of the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
(Edelstein, J.), entered on September 6, 1994 following a bench trial. The 
order granted plaintiffs, who are three artists, a permanent injunction that 
enjoined defendants from removing, modifying or destroying a work of 
visual art that had been installed in defendants’ building by plaintiffs-
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artists commissioned by a former tenant to install the work. See Carter v. 
Helmsley–Spear, Inc., 861 F.Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y.1994). * * * 
 
 On this appeal we deal with an Act of Congress that protects the rights of 
artists to preserve their works. One of America’s most insightful thinkers 
observed that a country is not truly civilized “where the arts, such as they 
have, are all imported, having no indigenous life.” 7 Works of Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, Society and Solitude, Chapt. II Civilization 34 (AMS. ed. 1968). 
From such reflection it follows that American artists are to be encouraged 
by laws that protect their works. Although Congress in the statute before 
us did just that, it did not mandate the preservation of art at all costs and 
without due regard for the rights of others. 
 
 For the reasons that follow, we reverse and vacate the grant of injunctive 
relief to plaintiffs and affirm the dismissal by the district court of plaintiffs’ 




Defendant 474431 Associates (Associates) is the owner of a mixed use 
commercial building located at 47–44 31st Street, Queens, New York, 
which it has owned since 1978. Associates is a New York general 
partnership. The general partners are Alvin Schwartz and Supervisory 
Management Corp., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Helmsley Enterprises, 
Inc. Defendant Helmsley–Spear, Inc. is the current managing agent of the 
property for Associates. 
  
On February 1, 1990 Associates entered into a 48–year net lease, leasing 
the building to 47–44 31st Street Associates, L.P. (Limited Partnership), a 
Delaware limited partnership. From February 1, 1990 until June 1993, 
Irwin Cohen or an entity under his control was the general partner of the 
Limited Partnership, and managed the property through Cohen’s SIG 
Management Company (SIG). Corporate Life Insurance Company 
(Corporate Life) was a limited partner in the Limited Partnership. In June 
1993 SIG ceased its involvement with the property and Corporate Life, 
through an entity controlled by it, became the general partner of the 
Limited Partnership. The property was then managed by the Limited 
Partnership, through Theodore Nering, a Corporate Life representative. 
There is no relationship, other than the lease, between Associates, the 
lessor, and the Limited Partnership, the lessee. 
 
 Plaintiffs John Carter, John Swing and John Veronis (artists or plaintiffs) 
are professional sculptors who work together and are known collectively as 
the “Three–J’s” or “Jx3.” On December 16, 1991 SIG entered into a one-
year agreement with the plaintiffs “engag[ing] and hir[ing] the Artists ... 
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to design, create and install sculpture and other permanent installations” 
in the building, primarily the lobby. Under the agreement plaintiffs had 
“full authority in design, color and style,” and SIG retained authority to 
direct the location and installation of the artwork within the building. The 
artists were to retain copyrights to their work and SIG was to receive 50 
percent of any proceeds from its exploitation. On January 20, 1993 SIG and 
the artists signed an agreement extending the duration of their commission 
for an additional year. When Corporate Life became a general partner of 
the Limited Partnership, the Limited Partnership assumed the agreement 
with plaintiffs and in December 1993 again extended the agreement. 
 
 The artwork that is the subject of this litigation is a very large “walk-
through sculpture” occupying most, but not all, of the building’s lobby. The 
artwork consists of a variety of sculptural elements constructed from 
recycled materials, much of it metal, affixed to the walls and ceiling, and a 
vast mosaic made from pieces of recycled glass embedded in the floor and 
walls. Elements of the work include a giant hand fashioned from an old 
school bus, a face made of automobile parts, and a number of interactive 
components. These assorted elements make up a theme relating to 
environmental concerns and the significance of recycling. 
 
 The Limited Partnership’s lease on the building was terminated on March 
31, 1994. It filed for bankruptcy one week later. The property was 
surrendered to defendant Associates on April 6, 1994 and defendant 
Helmsley–Spear, Inc. took over management of the property. 
Representatives of defendants informed the artists that they could no 
longer continue to install artwork at the property, and instead had to 
vacate the building. These representatives also made statements 
indicating that defendants intended to remove the artwork already in place 
in the building’s lobby. 
 
 As a result of defendants’ actions, artists commenced this litigation. On 
April 26, 1994 the district court issued a temporary restraining order 
enjoining defendants from taking any action to alter, deface, modify or 
mutilate the artwork installed in the building. In May 1994 a hearing was 
held on whether a preliminary injunction should issue. The district court 
subsequently granted a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from 
removing the artwork pending the resolution of the instant litigation.  
 
A bench trial was subsequently held in June and July 1994, at the 
conclusion of which the trial court granted the artists the permanent 
injunction prohibiting defendants from distorting, mutilating, modifying, 
destroying and removing plaintiffs’ artwork. The injunction is to remain in 
effect for the lifetimes of the three plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ other claims, 
including their cause of action for tortious interference and a request for 
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an award of costs and attorney’s fees and that they be allowed to continue 
to add to the artwork in the lobby, as well as defendants’ counterclaim for 





I Artists’ Moral Rights [omitted]… 
 
II Work of Visual Art 
 
Because VARA is relatively new, a fuller explication of it is helpful. In 
analyzing the Act, therefore, we will follow in order the definition set forth 
in § 101, as did the district court when presiding over this litigation. The 
district court determined that the work of art installed in the lobby of 
Associates’ building was a work of visual art as defined by VARA; that 
distortion, mutilation, or modification of the work would prejudice 
plaintiffs’ honor and reputations; that the work was of recognized stature, 
thus protecting it from destruction (including removal that would result in 
destruction); and that Associates consented to or ratified the installation of 
the work in its building. The result was that defendants were enjoined from 
removing or otherwise altering the work during the lifetimes of the three 
artists. 
 
A. Singleness of the Work 
 
As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether the trial court 
correctly found that the work is a single piece of art, to be analyzed under 
VARA as a whole, rather than separate works to be considered 
individually. This finding was a factual one reviewed under the clearly 
erroneous standard. For purposes of framing the issues at trial the parties 
entered into a joint stipulation relating to numerous facts, including a 
definition of “the Work.” This stipulated definition contained a long, 
detailed list of all the sculptural elements contained in the building’s lobby. 
The district court found that, with a few precise exceptions determined to 
be separate works of art, the artwork created by plaintiffs in the lobby was 
a single work. This finding was based on testimony, credited by the trial 
judge, of the artists themselves and of their expert witnesses. 
 
 The trial court found further support for its conclusion in the method by 
which the artists created the work—each additional element of the 
sculpture was based on the element preceding it so that they would mesh 
together. The result was a thematically consistent, inter-related work 
whose elements could not be separated without losing continuity and 
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meaning. The record evidence of singleness was confirmed at the request 
of the parties by the district court’s own inspection of the work. 
 Appellants’ primary contention is that the finding of singleness is 
inconsistent with a finding that certain works of art were separate from 
the work that is the subject of this appeal. This assertion rests on the 
mistaken belief that the parties’ joint stipulation to a definition of “the 
Work” precluded an ultimate determination by the factfinder that most but 
not all of the work installed in the lobby was a single artwork. In other 
words, according to appellants, either every component in the stipulated 
definition is part of a single work or every component is an individual work; 
there is no middle ground. Appellants’ goal is to have VARA applied to each 
element of the sculpture individually, so that components that may not be 
visual art standing alone cannot be considered visual art when they are 
combined by the artists to create a whole that has a nature different than 
the mere sum of its parts. 
 
 Appellants’ goal is not attainable. The parties stipulated that when they 
used the term “the Work” it included a list of sculptural components. The 
result was that during the trial there was no dispute as to the parties’ 
meaning when referring to “the Work.” The trial court was free to find that 
a few items of “the Work” were separate works of art, while the remainder 
of “the Work” was a single, interrelated, indivisible work of art. The finding 
of singleness was based on determinations of witness credibility as well as 
the district court’s own inspection of the artwork. We cannot say that such 
a finding was clearly erroneous. 
 
B. The Statutory Definition 
 
A “work of visual art” is defined by the Act in terms both positive (what it 
is) and negative (what it is not). In relevant part VARA defines a work of 
visual art as “a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single 
copy” or in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
Although defendants aver that elements of the work are not visual art, 
their contention is foreclosed by the factual finding that the work is a 
single, indivisible whole. Concededly, considered as a whole, the work is a 
sculpture and exists only in a single copy. Therefore, the work satisfies the 
Act’s positive definition of a work of visual art. We next turn to the second 
part of the statutory definition—what is not a work of visual art. 
 The definition of visual art excludes “any poster, map, globe, chart, 
technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art, motion picture or other 
audio-visual work.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. Congress meant to distinguish works 
of visual art from other media, such as audio-visual works and motion 
pictures, due to the different circumstances surrounding how works of each 
genre are created and disseminated. See H.R.Rep. No. 514 at 9. Although 
this concern led to a narrow definition of works of visual art, 
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[t]he courts should use common sense and generally accepted standards of 
the artistic community in determining whether a particular work falls 
within the scope of the definition. Artists may work in a variety of media, 
and use any number of materials in creating their works. Therefore, 
whether a particular work falls within the definition should not depend on 
the medium or materials used. 
Id. at 11. 
 
 “Applied art” describes “two- and three-dimensional ornamentation or 
decoration that is affixed to otherwise utilitarian objects.” Carter, 861 
F.Supp. at 315, citing Kieselstein–Cord v. Accessories By Pearl, Inc., 632 
F.2d 989, 997 (2d Cir.1980). Defendants’ assertion that at least parts of the 
work are applied art appears to rest on the fact that some of the sculptural 
elements are affixed to the lobby’s floor, walls, and ceiling—all utilitarian 
objects. Interpreting applied art to include such works would render 
meaningless VARA’s protection for works of visual art installed in 
buildings. A court should not read one part of a statute so as to deprive 
another part of meaning. See, e.g., United States Nat’l Bank of Or. v. 
Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439, ––––, 113 S.Ct. 
2173, 2182, 124 L.Ed.2d 402 (1993); United States v. LaPorta, 46 F.3d 152, 
156 (2d Cir.1994). 
 
 Appellants do not suggest the entire work is applied art. The district court 
correctly stated that even if components of the work standing alone were 
applied art, “nothing in VARA proscribes protection of works of visual art 
that incorporate elements of, rather than constitute, applied art.” 861 
F.Supp. at 315. VARA’s legislative history leaves no doubt that “a new and 
independent work created from snippets of [excluded] materials, such as a 
collage, is of course not excluded” from the definition of a work of visual 
art. H.R.Rep. No. 514 at 14. The trial judge correctly ruled the work is not 
applied art precluded from protection under the Act. 
  
III Work Made for Hire 
 
Also excluded from the definition of a work of visual art is any work made 
for hire. 17 U.S.C. § 1012(B). A “work made for hire” is defined in the 
Copyright Act, in relevant part, as “a work prepared by an employee within 
the scope of his or her employment.” Id. § 101(1). Appellants maintain the 
work was made for hire and therefore is not a work of visual art under 
VARA. The district court held otherwise, finding that the plaintiffs were 
hired as independent contractors. 
 
A. Reid Tests 
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The Copyright Act does not define the terms “employee” or “scope of 
employment.” In Community for Creative Non–Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 
730, 109 S.Ct. 2166, 104 L.Ed.2d 811 (1989), the Supreme Court looked to 
the general common law of agency for guidance. It held that a multi-factor 
balancing test was required to determine if a work was produced for hire 
(by an employee) or was produced by an independent contractor. Reid, 490 
U.S. at 751, 109 S.Ct. at 2178. The Court elaborated 13 specific factors: 
the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which the 
product is accomplished.... the skill required; the source of the 
instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the 
relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to 
assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s 
discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the 
hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part 
of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in 
business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the 
hired party. 
Reid, 490 U.S. at 751–52, 109 S.Ct. at 2178–79. While all of these factors 
are relevant, no single factor is determinative. Id. at 752. See also Hilton 
International Company v. NLRB, 690 F.2d 318, 321 (2d Cir.1982). Instead, 
the factors are weighed by referring to the facts of a given case. See Aymes 
v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir.1992). 
  
The district court determined that the sculpture was not “work for hire” 
and therefore not excluded from the definition of visual art. The Reid test 
is a list of factors not all of which may come into play in a given case. See 
Aymes, 980 F.2d at 861. The Reid test is therefore easily misapplied. We 
are usually reluctant to reverse a district court’s factual findings as to the 
presence or absence of any of the Reid factors and do so only when the 
district court’s findings are clearly erroneous. By contrast, the ultimate 
legal conclusion as to whether or not the sculpture is “work for hire” is 
reviewed de novo. The district court correctly stated the legal test. But 
some of its factual findings, we think, were clearly erroneous. 
 
B. Factors Applied 
 
The district court properly noted that Aymes established five factors which 
would be relevant in nearly all cases: the right to control the manner and 
means of production; requisite skill; provision of employee benefits; tax 
treatment of the hired party; whether the hired party may be assigned 
additional projects. See 980 F.2d at 861. Analysis begins with a discussion 
of these factors. 
 
 First, plaintiffs had complete artistic freedom with respect to every aspect 
of the sculpture’s creation. Although the artists heeded advice or accepted 
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suggestions from building engineers, architects, and others, such actions 
were not a relinquishment of their artistic freedom. The evidence strongly 
supports the finding that plaintiffs controlled the work’s “manner and 
means.” This fact, in turn, lent credence to their contention that they were 
independent contractors. See Hilton, 690 F.2d at 320. While artistic 
freedom remains a central factor in our inquiry, the Supreme Court has 
cautioned that “the extent of control the hiring party exercises over the 
details of the product is not dispositive.” Reid, 490 U.S. at 752, 109 S.Ct. at 
2179. Hence, resolving the question of whether plaintiffs had artistic 
freedom does not end the analysis. 
 
 The district court also correctly found the artists’ conception and execution 
of the work required great skill in execution. Appellants’ contention that 
the plaintiffs’ reliance on assistants in some way mitigates the skill 
required for this work is meritless, particularly because each of the 
plaintiffs is a professional sculptor and the parties stipulated that 
professional sculpting is a highly skilled occupation. The right to control 
the manner and means and the requisite skill needed for execution of this 
project were both properly found by the district court to weigh against 
“work for hire” status. 
 
 The trial court erred, however, when it ruled that the defendants could not 
assign the artists additional projects. First, the employment agreement 
between SIG Management Company and the artists clearly states that the 
artists agreed not only to install the sculpture but also to “render such 
other related services and duties as may be assigned to [them] from time 
to time by the Company.” By the very terms of the contract the defendants 
and their predecessors in interest had the right to assign other related 
projects to the artists. The district court incorrectly decided that this 
language supported the artists’ claim to be independent contractors. While 
the artists’ obligations were limited to related services and duties, the 
defendants nonetheless did have the right to assign to plaintiffs work other 
than the principal sculpture. 
 
 Further, the defendants did, in fact, assign such other projects. The 
district court concedes as much, explaining that “plaintiffs did create art 
work on the property other than that in the Lobby.” Carter, 861 F.Supp. at 
319. The record shows the artists performed projects on the sixth floor of 
the building, on the eighth floor, and in the boiler room. Thus, on at least 
three different occasions the plaintiffs were assigned additional projects, 
which they completed without further compensation. The trial court 
suggests this fact “does not undermine plaintiffs’ contention that they were 
hired solely to install art work on the Property.” Id. We disagree. If the 
artists were hired to perform work other than the sculpture (as both their 
employment agreement and their actual practice suggests) then they were 
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not hired solely to install the sculpture. It makes no difference that all work 
performed by the plaintiffs was artistic in nature. The point is that the 
performance of other assigned work not of the artists’ choosing supports a 
conclusion that the artists were not independent contractors but 
employees. 
 
 We must also consider factors the district court correctly found to favor 
finding the sculpture to be work for hire. Specifically, the provision of 
employee benefits and the tax treatment of the plaintiffs weigh strongly in 
favor of employee status. The defendants paid payroll and social security 
taxes, provided employee benefits such as life, health, and liability 
insurance and paid vacations, and contributed to unemployment insurance 
and workers’ compensation funds on plaintiffs’ behalf. Moreover, two of the 
three artists filed for unemployment benefits after their positions were 
terminated, listing the building’s management company as their former 
employer. Other formal indicia of an employment relationship existed. For 
instance, each plaintiff was paid a weekly salary. The artists also agreed 
in their written contract that they would work principally for the 
defendants for the duration of their agreement on a 40–hour per week basis 
and they would only do other work to the extent that it would not “interfere 
with services to be provided” to the defendants. All of these facts strongly 
suggest the artists were employees. 
 
 Some of the other Reid factors bolster this view. The artists were provided 
with many (if not most) of the supplies used to create the sculpture. This 
factor was not, as the district court found, “inconclusive.” The court also 
wrongly ruled that plaintiffs were hired for a “finite term of engagement.” 
In fact, they were employed for a substantial period of time, their work 
continuing for over two years with no set date of termination (other than 
the sculpture’s completion). Nor was the fact that the artists could not hire 
paid assistants without the defendants’ approval “inconclusive” as the trial 
court erroneously found. Instead, this and the other just enumerated 
factors point towards an employer-employee relationship between the 
parties. 
 
 In reaching its conclusion, the district court also relied partly on the 
artists’ copyright ownership of the sculpture, viewing such ownership as a 
“plus factor.” We are not certain whether this element is a “plus factor,” 
and therefore put off for another day deciding whether copyright ownership 
is probative of independent contractor status. Even were it to be weighed 
as a “plus factor,” it would not change the outcome in this case. 
 
C. Employee Status 
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Our review of the legal conclusion drawn from balancing the various Reid 
factors persuades us that the factors that weigh in favor of finding the 
artists were employees outweigh those factors supporting the artists’ claim 
that they were independent contractors. One of the factors that did not 
persuade us was the appellants’ simplistic contention that usage of the 
words “employ” or “employment” in the agreements between the artists and 
SIG or the Limited Partnership establishes that the plaintiffs were 
employees. The use of these terms does not transform them into “magic 
words” imbued with legally controlling significance. 
 
 Again, we emphasize that despite the conclusion reached we do not intend 
to marginalize factors such as artistic freedom and skill, making them 
peripheral to the status inquiry. The fact that artists will always be 
retained for creative purposes cannot serve to minimalize this factor of the 
Reid test, even though it will usually favor VARA protection. Also, that the 
work was produced on the employer’s premises is a necessary incident to 
all nonremovable art and therefore should not carry great weight. 
Similarly, we were not swayed by the boilerplate contract language or the 
accounting decision to deduct FICA taxes. To so read § 101 runs against 
the broad remedial purposes of VARA. As discussed earlier, the moral 
rights of the artist whose artistic work comes under VARA’s umbrella are 
to be protected, not ignored, in light of Congress’ pathbreaking legislation. 
 Moreover, because the Reid test is fact-dependent, future cases involving 
the work for hire question will not always fit neatly into an employee or 
independent contractor category. We also recognize that by counting 
indicia such as health insurance and paid vacations against the artists’ 
independent contractor status, it may appear that artists regrettably are 
being forced to choose between the personal benefits inuring in an 
employment relationship and VARA’s protection of the artists’ work 
afforded only to independent contractors. Of course, when an employer 
today denies an artist “basic attributes of employment” like vacation time 
or health benefits, such denial will be wholly inconsistent with a “work for 
hire” defense. See Aymes, 980 F.2d at 862–63. 
 
 Consequently, while the existence of payroll formalities alone would not 
be controlling, see Reid, 490 U.S. at 743 n. 8, 109 S.Ct. at 2174 n. 8, in 
combination with other factors, it may lead to a conclusion that a given 
work is one made for hire. Such other factors include: plaintiffs under their 
contract could be and were in fact assigned projects in addition to the work 
in the lobby; they were paid a weekly salary for over two years for a 
contracted 40 hours of work per week; they were furnished many of the 
needed supplies necessary to create the work; and plaintiffs could not hire 
paid assistants without defendants’ consent. These factors, properly 
considered and weighed with the employee benefits granted plaintiffs and 
the tax treatment accorded them, are more than sufficient to demonstrate 
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that the artists were employees, and the sculpture is therefore a work made 




Accordingly, the district court’s order insofar as it held the work was one 
not made for hire is reversed and the injunction vacated. In all other 
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SYKES, Circuit Judge. 
 
Chapman Kelley is a nationally recognized artist known for his 
representational paintings of landscapes and flowers—in particular, 
romantic floral and woodland interpretations set within ellipses. In 1984 
he received permission from the Chicago Park District to install an 
ambitious wildflower display at the north end of Grant Park, a prominent 
public space in the heart of downtown Chicago. “Wildflower Works” was 
thereafter planted: two enormous elliptical flower beds, each nearly as big 
as a football field, featuring a variety of native wildflowers and edged with 
borders of gravel and steel. 
 
 Promoted as “living art,” Wildflower Works received critical and popular 
acclaim, and for a while Kelley and a group of volunteers tended the vast 
garden, pruning and replanting as needed. But by 2004 Wildflower Works 
had deteriorated, and the City’s goals for Grant Park had changed. So the 
Park District dramatically modified the garden, substantially reducing its 
size, reconfiguring the oval flower beds into rectangles, and changing some 
of the planting material. 
 
 Kelley sued the Park District for violating his “right of integrity” under 
the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”), 17 U.S.C. § 106A, and also 
for breach of contract. The contract claim is insubstantial; the main event 
here is the VARA claim, which is novel and tests the boundaries of 
copyright law. Congress enacted this statute to comply with the nation’s 
obligations under the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
CH. 1  315 
  
Artistic Works. VARA amended the Copyright Act, importing a limited 
version of the civil-law concept of the “moral rights of the artist” into our 
intellectual-property law. In brief, for certain types of visual art—
paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures, and exhibition photographs—
VARA confers upon the artist certain rights of attribution and integrity. 
The latter include the right of the artist to prevent, during his lifetime, any 
distortion or modification of his work that would be “prejudicial to his ... 
honor or reputation,” and to recover for any such intentional distortion or 
modification undertaken without his consent. See 17 U.S.C. § 
106A(a)(3)(A). 
 
 The district court held a bench trial and entered a split judgment. The 
court rejected Kelley’s moral-rights claim for two reasons. First, the judge 
held that although Wildflower Works could be classified as both a painting 
and a sculpture and therefore a work of visual art under VARA, it lacked 
sufficient originality to be eligible for copyright, a foundational 
requirement in the statute. Second, following the First Circuit’s decision in 
Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128 (1st Cir.2006), the 
court concluded that site-specific art like Wildflower Works is categorically 
excluded from protection under VARA. The court then held for Kelley on 
the contract claim, but found his evidence of damages uncertain and 
entered a nominal award of $1. Both sides appealed. 
 
 We affirm in part and reverse in part. There is reason to doubt several of 
the district court’s conclusions: that Wildflower Works is a painting or 
sculpture; that it flunks the test for originality; and that all site-specific art 
is excluded from VARA. But the court was right to reject this claim; for 
reasons relating to copyright’s requirements of expressive authorship and 
fixation, a living garden like Wildflower Works is not copyrightable. The 
district court’s treatment of the contract claim is another matter; the Park 




Kelley is a painter noted for his use of bold, elliptical outlines to surround 
scenes of landscapes and flowers. In the late–1970s and 1980s, he moved 
from the canvas to the soil and created a series of large outdoor wildflower 
displays that resembled his paintings. He planted the first in 1976 
alongside a runway at the Dallas–Fort Worth International Airport and 
the second in 1982 outside the Dallas Museum of Natural History. The 
wildflower exhibit at the museum was temporary; the one at the airport 
just “gradually petered out.” 
 
 In 1983 Kelley accepted an invitation from Chicago-based oil executive 
John Swearingen and his wife, Bonnie—collectors of Kelley’s paintings—
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to come to Chicago to explore the possibility of creating a large outdoor 
wildflower display in the area. He scouted sites by land and by air and 
eventually settled on Grant Park, the city’s showcase public space running 
along Lake Michigan in the center of downtown Chicago. This location 
suited Kelley’s artistic, environmental, and educational mission; it also 
provided the best opportunity to reach a large audience. Kelley met with 
the Park District superintendent to present his proposal, and on June 19, 
1984, the Park District Board of Commissioners granted him a permit to 
install a “permanent Wild Flower Floral Display” on a grassy area on top 
of the underground Monroe Street parking garage in Daley Bicentennial 
Plaza in Grant Park. Under the terms of the permit, Kelley was to install 
and maintain the exhibit at his own expense. The Park District reserved 
the right to terminate the installation by giving Kelley “a 90 day notice to 
remove the planting.” 
 
 Kelley named the project “Chicago Wildflower Works I.” The Park District 
issued a press release announcing that “a new form of ‘living’ art” was 
coming to Grant Park—“giant ovals of multicolored wildflowers” created by 
Kelley, a painter and “pioneer in the use of natural materials” who 
“attracted national prominence for his efforts to incorporate the landscape 
in artistic creation.” The announcement explained that “[o]nce the ovals 
mature, the results will be two breathtaking natural canvases of Kelley-
designed color patterns.” 
 
 In the late summer of 1984, Kelley began installing the two large-scale 
elliptical flower beds at the Grant Park site; they spanned 1.5 acres of 
parkland and were set within gravel and steel borders. A gravel walkway 
bisected one of the ovals, and each flower bed also accommodated several 
large, preexisting air vents that were flush with the planting surface, 
providing ventilation to the parking garage below. For planting material 
Kelley selected between 48 and 60 species of self-sustaining wildflowers 
native to the region. The species were selected for various aesthetic, 
environmental, and cultural reasons, but also to increase the likelihood 
that the garden could withstand Chicago’s harsh winters and survive with 
minimal maintenance. Kelley designed the initial placement of the 
wildflowers so they would blossom sequentially, changing colors 
throughout the growing season and increasing in brightness towards the 
center of each ellipse. He purchased the initial planting material—between 
200,000 and 300,000 wildflower plugs—at a cost of between $80,000 and 
$152,000. In September of 1984, a battery of volunteers planted the 
seedlings under Kelley’s direction. 
 
 When the wildflowers bloomed the following year, Wildflower Works was 
greeted with widespread acclaim. Chicago’s mayor, the Illinois Senate, and 
the Illinois Chapter of the American Society of Landscape Artists issued 
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commendations. People flocked to see the lovely display—marketed by the 
Park District as “living landscape art”—and admiring articles appeared in 
national newspapers. Wildflower Works was a hit. Here’s a picture: 
 
 For the next several years, Kelley’s permit was renewed 
and he and his volunteers tended the impressive garden. 
They pruned and weeded and regularly planted new seeds, 
both to experiment with the garden’s composition and to fill 
in where initial specimen had not flourished. Of course, the 
forces of nature—the varying bloom periods of the plants; 
their spread habits, compatibility, and life cycles; and the 
weather—produced constant change. Some wildflowers 
naturally did better than others. Some spread aggressively 
and encroached on neighboring plants. Some withered and 
died. Unwanted plants sprung up from seeds brought in by 
birds and the wind. Insects, rabbits, and weeds settled in, 
eventually taking a toll. Four years after Wildflower Works 
was planted, the Park District decided to discontinue the 
exhibit. On June 3, 1988, the District gave Kelley a 90–day 
notice of termination. 
 
 Kelley responded by suing the Park District in federal court, claiming the 
termination of his permit violated the First Amendment. The parties 
quickly settled; in exchange for dismissal of the suit, the Park District 
agreed to extend Kelley’s permit for another year. On September 14, 1988, 
the Park District issued a “Temporary Permit” to Kelley and Chicago 
Wildflower Works, Inc., a nonprofit organization formed by his volunteers. 
This permit authorized them “to operate and maintain a two ellipse 
Wildflowers Garden Display ... at Daley Bicentennial Plaza in Grant Park” 
until September 1, 1989. The permit stipulated that Kelley “will have 
responsibility and control over matters relating to the aesthetic design and 
content of Wildflower Works I,” and Wildflower Works, Inc. “shall maintain 
the Wildflower Works I at no cost to the Chicago Park District including, 
without limitation, weeding and application of fertilizer.” Although it did 
not contain a notice-of-termination provision, the permit did state that 
“[t]he planting material is the property of Mr. Chapman Kelley” and that 
Kelley “may remove the planting material” if the permit was not extended. 
Finally, the permit provided that “[t]his agreement does not create any 
proprietary interest for Chicago Wildflower Works, Inc., or Mr. Chapman 
Kelley in continuing to operate and maintain the Wildflower Garden 
Display after September 1, 1989.” 
 
 The Park District formally extended this permit each succeeding year 
through 1994. After that point Kelley and his volunteers continued to 
cultivate Wildflower Works without a permit, and the Park District took 
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no action, adverse or otherwise, regarding the garden’s future. In March 
2004 Kelley and Jonathan Dedmon, president of Wildflower Works, Inc., 
attended a luncheon to discuss the 20th anniversary of Wildflower Works. 
At the luncheon Dedmon asked Park District Commissioner Margaret 
Burroughs if Wildflower Works needed a new permit. Commissioner 
Burroughs responded, “You’re still there, aren’t you? That’s all you need to 
do.” 
 
 Three months later, on June 10, 2004, Park District officials met with 
Kelley and Dedmon to discuss problems relating to inadequate 
maintenance of the garden and forthcoming changes to Grant Park 
necessitated by the construction of the adjacent Millennium Park. The 
officials proposed reconfiguring Wildflower Works—decreasing its size 
from approximately 66,000 square feet to just under 30,000 square feet and 
remaking its elliptical flower beds into rectangles. The District’s director of 
development invited Kelley’s views on this proposal but made it clear that 
the District planned to go forward with the reconfiguration with or without 
Kelley’s approval. Kelley objected to the proposed changes, but did not 
request an opportunity to remove his planting material before the 
reconfiguration took place. A week later the Park District proceeded with 
its plan and reduced Wildflower Works to less than half its original size. 
The elliptical borders became rectilinear, weeds were removed, surviving 
wildflowers were replanted in the smaller-scale garden, and some new 
planting material was added. Dedmon sent a letter of protest to the Park 
District. 
 
 Kelley then sued the Park District for violating his moral rights under 
VARA. He claimed that Wildflower Works was both a painting and a 
sculpture and therefore a “work of visual art” under VARA, and that the 
Park District’s reconfiguration of it was an intentional “distortion, 
mutilation, or other modification” of his work and was “prejudicial to his ... 
honor or reputation.” See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A). He also alleged breach 
of contract; he claimed that Commissioner Burroughs’s remark created an 
implied contract that the Park District had breached when it altered 
Wildflower Works without providing reasonable notice. On the VARA claim 
Kelley sought compensation for the moral-rights violation, statutory 
damages, and attorney’s fees; on the contract claim he sought the fair-
market value of the planting material removed in the reconfiguration. He 
later quantified his damages, estimating the value of the plants at $1.5 
million and requesting a staggering $25 million for the VARA violation. 
 The case proceeded to a bench trial, and the district court entered 
judgment for the Park District on the VARA claim and for Kelley on the 
contract claim. The judge first concluded that Wildflower Works could be 
classified as both a painting and a sculpture and therefore qualified as a 
work of visual art under VARA. But he also held that Wildflower Works 
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was insufficiently original for copyright, a prerequisite to moral-rights 
protection under VARA. Alternatively, the judge concluded that Wildflower 
Works was site-specific art, and following the First Circuit’s decision in 
Phillips, held that VARA did not apply to this category of art. * * *  
 
Kelley appealed, challenging the adverse judgment on the VARA claim and 
the district court’s treatment of the damages issue on the contract claim. 




This case comes to us from a judgment entered after a bench trial; we 
review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its conclusions 
of law de novo. Spurgin–Dienst v. United States, 359 F.3d 451, 453 (7th 
Cir.2004). In this circuit, questions of copyright eligibility are issues of law 
subject to independent review. Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 
F.3d 513, 517 (7th Cir.2009). 
 
A. Kelley’s Moral–Rights Claim Under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 
1990 
 
1. A brief history of moral rights 
 
2. VARA’s scope 
[sections omitted]  
 
3. Is Wildflower Works a painting or sculpture? 
 
The district court held that Wildflower Works was both a painting and a 
sculpture but was insufficiently original to qualify for copyright. 
Alternatively, the court concluded that it was site-specific art and held that 
all site-specific art is implicitly excluded from VARA. Other arguments—
in particular, whether Wildflower Works satisfies additional threshold 
requirements for copyright and whether VARA’s public-presentation or 
building exceptions applied—were not reached. 
 
 On appeal Kelley contests the district court’s conclusions regarding 
originality and site-specific art. The Park District defends these holdings 
and also reiterates the other arguments it made in the district court, except 
one: The Park District has not challenged the district court’s conclusion 
that Wildflower Works is a painting and a sculpture. 
 
 This is an astonishing omission. VARA’s definition of “work of visual art” 
operates to narrow and focus the statute’s coverage; only a “painting, 
drawing, print, or sculpture,” or an exhibition photograph will qualify. 
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These terms are not further defined, but the overall structure of the 
statutory scheme clearly illuminates the limiting effect of this definition. 
Copyright’s broad general coverage extends to “original works of 
authorship,” and this includes “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.” 
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5). The use of the adjectives “pictorial” and “sculptural” 
suggests flexibility and breadth in application. In contrast VARA uses the 
specific nouns “painting” and “sculpture.” To qualify for moral-rights 
protection under VARA, Wildflower Works cannot just be “pictorial” or 
“sculptural” in some aspect or effect, it must actually be a “painting” or a 
“sculpture.” Not metaphorically or by analogy, but really. 
 
 That Kelley considered the garden to be both a painting and a sculpture—
only rendered in living material—is not dispositive. He also characterized 
it as an experiment in environmental theory, telling a reporter he was 
trying to “figure out the economic and ecological impact of introducing 
wildflowers into cities.” In promoting Wildflower Works, Kelley variously 
described the project as a “living wildflower painting,” a “study on 
wildflower landscape and management,” and “a new vegetative 
management system that beautifies [the] landscape economically with low-
maintenance wildflowers.” 
 
 Kelley’s expert, a professor of art history, reinforced his view that 
Wildflower Works was both a painting and a sculpture, but the district 
court largely disregarded her testimony as unhelpful. For its part the Park 
District initially marketed Wildflower Works as “living art,” but this adds 
little to the analysis. VARA plainly uses the terms “painting” and 
“sculpture” as words of limitation. Even assuming a generous stance on 
what qualifies, see 5 PATRY § 16:7 (suggesting a “liberal attitude toward 
what may be considered a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture”), the 
terms cannot be read coextensively with the broader categories of 
“pictorial” and “sculptural” works that are generally eligible for copyright 
under § 102(a)(5). If a living garden like Wildflower Works really counts as 
both a painting and a sculpture, then these terms do no limiting work at 
all. 
 
 The district judge worried about taking “too literalist an approach to 
determining whether a given object qualifies as a sculpture or painting.” 
His concern was the “tension between the law and the evolution of ideas in 
modern or avant garden art; the former requires legislatures to taxonomize 
artistic creations, whereas the latter is occupied with expanding the 
definition of what we accept to be art.” We agree with this important 
insight. But there’s a big difference between avoiding a literalistic 
approach and embracing one that is infinitely malleable. The judge appears 
to have come down too close to the latter extreme. 
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 In short, this case raises serious questions about the meaning and 
application of VARA’s definition of qualifying works of visual art—
questions with potentially decisive consequences for this and other moral-
rights claims. But the Park District has not challenged this aspect of the 
district court’s decision, so we move directly to the question of 
copyrightability, which is actually where the analysis should start in the 
first place. 
 
4. Is Wildflower Works copyrightable? 
 
To merit copyright protection, Wildflower Works must be an “original work 
[ ] of authorship fixed in a[ ] tangible medium of expression ... from which 
[it] can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.” 17 U.S.C. § 
102(a). The district court held that although Wildflower Works was both a 
painting and a sculpture, it was ineligible for copyright because it lacked 
originality. There is a contradiction here. As we have explained, VARA 
supplements general copyright protection and applies only to artists who 
create the specific subcategories of art enumerated in the statute. VARA-
eligible paintings and sculptures comprise a discrete subset of otherwise 
copyrightable pictorial and sculptural works; the statute designates these 
works of fine art as worthy of special protection. If a work is so lacking in 
originality that it cannot satisfy the basic requirements for copyright, then 
it can hardly qualify as a painting or sculpture eligible for extra protection 
under VARA. See Cronin, Dead on the Vine, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. 
L.. at 239 (“[I]f a work does not evince sufficient original expression to be 
copyrightable, the work should belong in a category other than ‘visual art’ 
as this term is contemplated under VARA.”). 
 
 That point aside, the district court’s conclusion misunderstands the 
originality requirement. Originality is “the touchstone of copyright 
protection today,” an implicit constitutional and explicit statutory 
requirement. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347, 
346, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991) (“Originality is a constitutional 
requirement.”); id. at 355 (The Copyright Act of 1976 made the originality 
requirement explicit.); see also Schrock, 586 F.3d at 518–19 (“As a 
constitutional and statutory matter, ‘[t]he sine qua non of copyright is 
originality.’ ” (quoting Feist, 499 U.S. at 345, 111 S.Ct. 1282)). Despite its 
centrality in our copyright regime, the threshold for originality is minimal. 
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345, 111 S.Ct. 1282; Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental 
Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977, 979 (7th Cir.1997) (“The necessary degree of 
‘originality’ is low....”). The standard requires “only that the work was 
independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other 
works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.” 
Feist, 499 U.S. at 345, 111 S.Ct. 1282 (citation omitted). The “requisite 
level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The 
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vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some 
creative spark.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 
 The district court took the position that Wildflower Works was not original 
because Kelley was not “the first person to ever conceive of and express an 
arrangement of growing wildflowers in ellipse-shaped enclosed area [s].” 
This mistakenly equates originality with novelty; the law is clear that a 
work can be original even if it is not novel. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345, 111 S.Ct. 
1282 (“Originality does not signify novelty; a work may be original even 
though it closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is 
fortuitous, not the result of copying.”). No one argues that Wildflower 
Works was copied; it plainly possesses more than a little creative spark. 
 The judge was also at a loss to discover “what about the exhibit is original. 
Is it the elliptical design? The size? The use of native instead of non-native 
plants? The environmentally-sustainable gardening method to which 
‘vegetative management system’ apparently refers?” It is true that common 
geometric shapes cannot be copyrighted. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
COMPENDIUM II: COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 503.02(a)-(b) 
(1984); 2 PATRY § 4:17 (2010). And “[i]n no case does copyright protection 
for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, 
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of 
the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in 
such a work.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
 
 The Park District suggests that Wildflower Works is an uncopyrightable 
“method” or “system,” and is also ineligible because its design uses simple 
elliptical shapes. The first of these arguments is not well-developed; the 
second is misplaced. Although Wildflower Works was designed to be largely 
self-sustaining (at least initially), it’s not really a “method” or “system” at 
all. It’s a garden. And Kelley is seeking statutory protection for the garden 
itself, not any supposed “system” of vegetative management encompassed 
within it. Regarding the use of elliptical shapes, an author’s expressive 
combination or arrangement of otherwise noncopyrightable elements (like 
geometric shapes) may satisfy the originality requirement. Roulo v. Russ 
Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 939 (7th Cir.1989); 2 PATRY § 4:17 (Geometric 
shapes or symbols cannot themselves be protected, but an original creative 
arrangement of them can be.). 
 
 The real impediment to copyright here is not that Wildflower Works fails 
the test for originality (understood as “not copied” and “possessing some 
creativity”) but that a living garden lacks the kind of authorship and stable 
fixation normally required to support copyright. Unlike originality, 
authorship and fixation are explicit constitutional requirements; the 
Copyright Clause empowers Congress to secure for “authors” exclusive 
rights in their “writings.” U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 8; see also 2 PATRY § 
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3:20 (2010) (“[T]he Constitution uses the terms ‘writings’ and ‘authors;’ 
‘originality’ is not used.”); id. § 3:22 (2010); 1 NIMMER § 2.03[A]-[B] (2004). 
The originality requirement is implicit in these express limitations on the 
congressional copyright power. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 346, 111 S.Ct. 1282 
(The constitutional reference to “authors” and “writings” “presuppose[s] a 
degree of originality.”). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly construed all 
three terms in relation to one another [or] perhaps has collapsed them into 
a single concept”; therefore, “[w]ritings are what authors create, but for one 
to be an author, the writing has to be original.” 2 PATRY § 3:20. 
 “Without fixation,” moreover, “there cannot be a ‘writing.’ ” Id. § 3:22. The 
Nimmer treatise elaborates: 
Fixation in tangible form is not merely a statutory condition to copyright. 
It is also a constitutional necessity. That is, unless a work is reduced to 
tangible form it cannot be regarded as a “writing” within the meaning of 
the constitutional clause authorizing federal copyright legislation. Thus, 
certain works of conceptual art stand outside of copyright protection. 
1 NIMMER § 2.03[B]. A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression 
“when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord ... is sufficiently permanent 
or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 17 U.S.C. § 
101. As William Patry explains: 
 
Fixation serves two basic roles: (1) easing problems of proof 
of creation and infringement, and (2) providing the dividing 
line between state common law protection and protection 
under the federal Copyright Act, since works that are not 
fixed are ineligible for federal protection but may be 
protected under state law. The distinction between the 
intangible intellectual property (the work of authorship) 
and its fixation in a tangible medium of expression (the 
copy) is an old and fundamental and important one. The 
distinction may be understood by examples of multiple 
fixations of the same work: A musical composition may be 
embodied in sheet music, on an audio-tape, on a compact 
disc, on a computer hard drive or server, or as part of a 
motion picture soundtrack. In each of the fixations, the 
intangible property remains a musical composition. 
 
2 PATRY § 3:22 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 Finally, “authorship is an entirely human endeavor.” Id. § 3:19 (2010). 
Authors of copyrightable works must be human; works owing their form to 
the forces of nature cannot be copyrighted. Id. § 3:19 n. 1; see also U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM II: COPYRIGHT OFFICE 
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PRACTICES § 503.03(a) (“[A] work must be the product of human 
authorship” and not the forces of nature.) (1984); id. § 202.02(b). 
 
 Recognizing copyright in Wildflower Works presses too hard on these basic 
principles. We fully accept that the artistic community might classify 
Kelley’s garden as a work of postmodern conceptual art. We acknowledge 
as well that copyright’s prerequisites of authorship and fixation are broadly 
defined. But the law must have some limits; not all conceptual art may be 
copyrighted. In the ordinary copyright case, authorship and fixation are 
not contested; most works presented for copyright are unambiguously 
authored and unambiguously fixed. But this is not an ordinary case. A 
living garden like Wildflower Works is neither “authored” nor “fixed” in the 
senses required for copyright. See Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 
910 (7th Cir.2005) (“A person’s likeness—her persona—is not authored and 
it is not fixed.”); see also Cronin, Dead on the Vine, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & 
TECH. L.. at 227–39. 
 
 Simply put, gardens are planted and cultivated, not authored. A garden’s 
constituent elements are alive and inherently changeable, not fixed. Most 
of what we see and experience in a garden—the colors, shapes, textures, 
and scents of the plants—originates in nature, not in the mind of the 
gardener. At any given moment in time, a garden owes most of its form and 
appearance to natural forces, though the gardener who plants and tends it 
obviously assists. All this is true of Wildflower Works, even though it was 
designed and planted by an artist. 
 
 Of course, a human “author”—whether an artist, a professional landscape 
designer, or an amateur backyard gardener—determines the initial 
arrangement of the plants in a garden. This is not the kind of authorship 
required for copyright. To the extent that seeds or seedlings can be 
considered a “medium of expression,” they originate in nature, and natural 
forces—not the intellect of the gardener—determine their form, growth, 
and appearance. Moreover, a garden is simply too changeable to satisfy the 
primary purpose of fixation; its appearance is too inherently variable to 
supply a baseline for determining questions of copyright creation and 
infringement. If a garden can qualify as a “work of authorship” sufficiently 
“embodied in a copy,” at what point has fixation occurred? When the garden 
is newly planted? When its first blossoms appear? When it is in full bloom? 
How—and at what point in time—is a court to determine whether 
infringing copying has occurred? 
 
 In contrast, when a landscape designer conceives of a plan for a garden 
and puts it in writing—records it in text, diagrams, or drawings on paper 
or on a digital-storage device—we can say that his intangible intellectual 
property has been embodied in a fixed and tangible “copy.” This writing is 
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a sufficiently permanent and stable copy of the designer’s intellectual 
expression and is vulnerable to infringing copying, giving rise to the 
designer’s right to claim copyright. The same cannot be said of a garden, 
which is not a fixed copy of the gardener’s intellectual property. Although 
the planting material is tangible and can be perceived for more than a 
transitory duration, it is not stable or permanent enough to be called 
“fixed.” Seeds and plants in a garden are naturally in a state of perpetual 
change; they germinate, grow, bloom, become dormant, and eventually die. 
This life cycle moves gradually, over days, weeks, and season to season, but 
the real barrier to copyright here is not temporal but essential. The essence 
of a garden is its vitality, not its fixedness. It may endure from season to 
season, but its nature is one of dynamic change. 
 
 We are not suggesting that copyright attaches only to works that are static 
or fully permanent (no medium of expression lasts forever), or that artists 
who incorporate natural or living elements in their work can never claim 
copyright. Kelley compares Wildflower Works to the Crown Fountain, a 
sculpture by Spanish artist Jaume Plensa that sits nearby in Chicago’s 
Millennium Park. The surfaces of Plensa’s fountain are embedded with 
LED screens that replay recorded video images of the faces of 1,000 
Chicagoans. See 
http://www.explorechicago.org/city/en/things_see_do/attractions/dca_ 
tourism/Crown_Fountain.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2011). But the 
Copyright Act specifically contemplates works that incorporate or consist 
of sounds or images that are broadcast or transmitted electronically, such 
as telecasts of sporting events or other live performances, video games, and 
the like. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “fixed” as including a “work 
consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted ... if a 
fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission”); 
see also Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 
663, 675 (7th Cir.1986); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 
1013–14 (7th Cir.1983). Wildflower Works does not fit in this category; the 
Crown Fountain is not analogous. 
 
 Though not addressing the requirement of fixation directly, the district 
court compared Wildflower Works to “[t]he mobiles of Alexander Calder” 
and “Jeff Koons’ ‘Puppy,’ a 43–foot flowering topiary.” These analogies are 
also inapt. Although the aesthetic effect of a Calder mobile is attributable 
in part to its subtle movement in response to air currents, see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Calder (last visited Feb. 10, 2011), 
the mobile itself is obviously fixed and stable. In “Puppy” the artist 
assembled a huge metal frame in the shape of a puppy and covered it with 
thousands of blooming flowers sustained by an irrigation system within the 
frame. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeff_Koons (last visited Feb. 10, 
2011). This may be sufficient fixation for copyright (we venture no opinion 
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on the question), but Wildflower Works is quite different. It is 
quintessentially a garden; “Puppy” is not. 
 
 In short, Wildflower Works presents serious problems of authorship and 
fixation that these and other examples of conceptual or kinetic art do not. 
Because Kelley’s garden is neither “authored” nor “fixed” in the senses 
required for basic copyright, it cannot qualify for moral-rights protection 
under VARA. 
 
5. Site-specific art, and the public-presentation and building exceptions 
This case also raises some important questions about the application of 
VARA to site-specific art, as well as the statute’s public-presentation and 
building exceptions. Though we need not decide these questions, we do 
have a few words of caution about the district court’s treatment of the issue 
of VARA and site-specific art. The court classified Wildflower Works as a 
form of site-specific art; we see no reason to upset this factual finding. The 
court then adopted the First Circuit’s holding in Phillips that site-specific 
art is categorically excluded from VARA. This legal conclusion is open to 
question. 
 
 Phillips involved a VARA claim brought by artist David Phillips in a 
dispute over a display of 27 of his sculptures in Boston’s Eastport Park 
across from Boston Harbor. Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 
F.3d 128, 130 (1st Cir.2006). A planned redesign of the park called for the 
removal and relocation of Phillips’s sculptures; he sought an injunction 
under VARA, claiming the removal of his sculptures would violate his right 
of integrity. Id. at 131. The district court held that although the sculptures 
qualified as a single integrated work of visual art, park administrators 
were entitled to remove them under VARA’s public-presentation exception. 
Id. at 138–39. The First Circuit affirmed on alternative grounds, holding 
that VARA does not apply to any site-specific art. 
 
 The court based this holding on a perceived irreconcilable tension between 
the public-presentation exception and the purpose of site-specific art: “By 
definition, site-specific art integrates its location as one of its elements. 
Therefore, the removal of a site-specific work from its location necessarily 
destroys that work of art.” Id. at 140. Under the public-presentation 
exception, a modification of a work of visual art stemming from a change 
in its “public presentation, including lighting or placement,” is not 
actionable unless it is caused by gross negligence. If VARA applied to site-
specific art, the First Circuit reasoned, then the statute would “purport[ ] 
to protect site-specific art” but also “permit its destruction by the 
application” of the public-presentation exception. Id. The court held that 
“VARA does not protect site-specific art and then permit its destruction by 
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removal from its site pursuant to the statute’s public presentation 
exception. VARA does not apply to site-specific art at all.” Id. at 143. 
 
 There are a couple of reasons to question this interpretation of VARA. 
First, the term “site-specific art” appears nowhere in the statute. Nothing 
in the definition of a “work of visual art” either explicitly or by implication 
excludes this form of art from moral-rights protection. Nor does application 
of the public-presentation exception operate to eliminate every type of 
protection VARA grants to creators of site-specific art; the exception simply 
narrows the scope of the statute’s protection for all qualifying works of 
visual art. The exception basically provides a safe harbor for ordinary 
changes in the public presentation of VARA-qualifying artworks; the artist 
has no cause of action unless through gross negligence the work is modified, 
distorted, or destroyed in the process of changing its public presentation. 
 Second, Phillips’s all-or-nothing approach to site-specific art may be 
unwarranted. Site-specific art is not necessarily destroyed if moved; 
modified, yes, but not always utterly destroyed. Moreover, some of VARA’s 
protections are unaffected by the public-presentation exception. An artist’s 
right of integrity can be violated in ways that do not implicate the work’s 
location or manner of public presentation; site-specific art—like any other 
type of art—can be defaced and damaged in ways that do not relate to its 
public display. And the public-presentation exception does nothing to limit 
the right of attribution, which prevents an artist’s name from being 
misappropriated. 
  
Then there is the matter of the building exception, which applies to works 
“incorporated in or made part of a building in such a way that removing 
the work from the building will cause the destruction, distortion, 
mutilation, or other modification of the work.” 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1)(A). 
These works do not get moral-rights protection if the artist: (1) consented 
to the installation of his work in the building (if pre-VARA); or (2) executed 
a written acknowledgment that removal of the work may subject it to 
destruction, distortion, mutilation, or modification (if post-VARA). Id. § 
113(d)(1)(B). On its face this exception covers a particular kind of site-
specific art. Its presence in the statute suggests that site-specific art is not 
categorically excluded from VARA.  
 
 These observations are of course general and not dispositive. Because we 
are resolving the VARA claim on other grounds, we need not decide 
whether VARA is inapplicable to site-specific art. 
 
*** 
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment in favor of the Park 
District on the VARA claim; we REVERSE the judgment in favor of Kelley 
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on the contract claim and REMAND with instructions to enter judgment 
for the Park District. 
——— 
The following decisions illustrate assessments of copyright damages. 
GASTE V. MORRIS KAISERMAN A/K/A MORRIS ALBERT 
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1988. 
863 F.2d 1061. 
JON O. NEWMAN, CIRCUIT JUDGE. 
[This case involved a copyright suit brought by Louis Gaste, French 
composer of the 1956 song “Pour Toi,” against the Brazilian composer and 
singer Morris Kaiserman (known professionally as Morris Albert) as to his 
1973 hit “Feelings.” Though “Pour Toi” (which was part of the music score 
for the movie Le Feu aux Poudres) had earned only $15,000 in revenues 
over a quarter century, the circuit court upheld the jury’s verdict that 
“Feelings” had copied the music, though not the lyrics, of “Pour Toi.” A 
further issue was the appropriateness of a $268,000 damage award against 
Fermata International Melodies, the producer and publisher of “Feelings.” 
(The jury had awarded another $233,000 against Kaiserman, which the 
trial judge reduced to $135,000 to exclude revenues attributable to foreign 
sources.) Fermata argued that its $268,000 award (which was based on 
U.S. revenues from “Feelings”) should be reduced (a) to account for the 
contribution of the lyrics (not just the music) to “Feelings,” and (b) to allow 
for the cost of producing and distributing the song.] 
* * * 
We note preliminarily that the jury apparently made some 
apportionment of profits to account for the contribution of the lyrics and for 
the expenses incurred by Fermata. The parties agreed that Fermata’s gross 
revenues from “Feelings” for the relevant time period were, in round 
numbers, $337,000. Although the record is not entirely clear on 
Kaiserman’s revenue, the relevant figure appears to be $265,000. The jury 
found damages in the amount of $268,000 against Fermata and $233,000 
against Kaiserman. Thus, the jury awarded Gaste approximately 80 
percent of Fermata’s gross revenues from “Feelings,” and 88 percent of 
Kaiserman’s revenues. 
The District Court instructed the jury that if it made an 
apportionment for the lyrics, that apportionment would apply equally to 
Fermata and to Kaiserman. The jury was also told that only Fermata was 
entitled to reductions to cover the costs it incurred. Therefore, although we 
cannot be certain of the jury’s reasoning absent a special verdict, it seems 
likely that the jury made a 12 percent reduction for both defendants to 
account for the lyrics and then made a further reduction of 8 percent for 
CH. 1  329 
  
Fermata to account for its costs. With that in mind, we take Fermata’s 
argument to be that the jury did not apportion enough and did not 
recognize enough of Fermata’s costs. 
A. Lyrics. A successful copyright plaintiff is entitled to recover only 
those profits that are “attributable to the infringement.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) 
(1983). “In establishing the infringer’s profits, the copyright owner is 
required to present proof only of the infringer’s gross revenue, and the 
infringer is required to prove his or her deductible expenses and the 
elements of profit attributable to factors other than the copyrighted work.” 
An infringing defendant is entitled to an apportionment of profits to 
account for his independent contributions only when “the evidence is 
sufficient to provide a fair basis of division so as to give the copyright 
proprietor all the profits that can be deemed to have resulted from the use 
of what belonged to him.” Confronted with imprecision in the computation 
of expenses, a court should err on the side of guaranteeing the plaintiff a 
full recovery, but want of precision is not a ground for denying 
apportionment altogether. 
There was no dispute at the trial that Kaiserman wrote the lyrics to 
“Feelings,” and that those lyrics were non-infringing. Fermata and 
Kaiserman argued to the jury that as much as 80 percent of the income 
from the song should be attributed to the lyrics. 
The evidence on the value of the lyrics was decidedly mixed. 
Kaiserman’s expert, Lou Levy, a retired music publisher, testified that 
while there was no set rule, the normal practice in the record industry 
when the lyrics and music to a song are written by different artists is to 
split the royalties “50/50.” He said a well-known lyricist or composer could 
draw a larger share and that a “bad” lyricist might get as little as 15 
percent. Levy testified that he “loved” the song “Feelings” and that he 
believed the title and lyrics were “far better” than the music itself. 
Nonetheless, he was unable to recall the words to the song on the stand 
and yet was able to sing the opening tune. He also said that the music and 
the words were inseparable and refused to estimate any percentage 
division. 
Defendants also argued at trial that the lyrics must have had some 
effect because “Pour Toi” had virtually no commercial success, while 
“Feelings” was a smash hit. On the other hand, there was also evidence 
that “Dis Lui,” a French version of “Feelings” with completely different 
words, also had considerable success. This could indicate either that the 
French words were also popular or that it was the music that gave the song 
its appeal. 
We note that in ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 508 F. 
Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), modified, 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983), the 
District Court determined that three-fourths of the income of the infringing 
song “My Sweet Lord” was due to the music plagiarized from an earlier hit 
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song, “He’s So Fine.” The Court deducted 25 percent for the defendant’s 
contribution of the lyrics to “My Sweet Lord” and for the marketability 
added to the song by the fact that the defendant was former Beatle George 
Harrison. 
Judge Conner, contrasting this case to ABKCO and declining to alter 
the jury’s damage award, noted that Kaiserman, a virtual unknown before 
“Feelings,” did not independently add the selling power of a Harrison. On 
the other hand, Fermata points out that the music to “Pour Toi” did not 
have the independently confirmed selling power of the music to “He’s So 
Fine,” which had been a No. 1 song in its own right. 
We find no grounds to reject the jury’s decision to apportion no more 
than 12 percent for the lyrics. . . . The jury had an opportunity to judge for 
itself the independent appeal of the lyrics and the music. The evidence of 
the varied success of the three songs with the same music—“Feelings,” 
“Pour Toi,” and “Dis Lui”—could reasonably have been interpreted as 
favoring either side. . . . 
B. Fermata’s Costs. [T]he jury appears to have subtracted 
approximately 8 percent from Fermata’s revenues to account for Fermata’s 
costs related to “Feelings,” in addition to the 12 percent deduction for the 
lyrics. Fermata argues that the jury’s verdict was contrary to the 
evidence. . . . 
Again, we decline to overturn the jury’s verdict. . . . Fermata’s evidence 
of its costs was sorely lacking in documentation. . . . The jury here did not 
act unreasonably in rejecting estimates of costs that were not fully 
documented. 
We also reject Fermata’s contention that nearly 90 percent of its costs 
must be attributed to “Feelings” because “Feelings” brought in nearly 90 
percent of the company’s revenues. In a very similar case, we held that 
“ ‘overhead’ which does not assist in the production of the infringement 
should not be credited to the infringer; that which does, should be; it is a 
question of fact in all cases,” Wilkie v. Santly Bros., 139 F.2d 264, 265 (2d 
Cir. 1943). In Wilkie, a music publisher found liable for infringement also 
sought to attribute nearly all of his costs to the infringing song because it 
was by far his biggest seller. The Court found no reason not to allocate the 
costs equally across all 47 songs the publisher published, because it was 
shown that the better selling songs were not more responsible for the 
overhead costs than the others. 
Here, Fermata published some 200 songs in addition to “Feelings.” It 
was Fermata’s burden to prove that its overhead was nonetheless 
attributable mainly to “Feelings.” . . . In Sygma Photo News v. High Society 
Magazine, 778 F.2d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 1985), we held that even when 
defendants had not been able to establish their costs with precision, they 
should be able to deduct the minimum amount they in all likelihood spent. 
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The jury’s decision to allow Fermata only an 8 percent reduction for its 
costs is not inconsistent with that rule. 
Affirmed. 
 
2. ATTORNEY FEES 
FOGERTY V. FANTASY, INC. 
Supreme Court of the United States, 1994. 
510 U.S. 517, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455. 
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
* * * 
Respondent advances three arguments in support of the dual standard 
followed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this case. First, it 
contends that the language of § 505, when read in the light of our decisions 
construing similar fee-shifting language, supports the rule. Second, it 
asserts that treating prevailing plaintiffs and defendants differently 
comports with the “objectives” and “equitable considerations” underlying 
the Copyright Act as a whole. Finally, respondent contends that the 
legislative history of § 505 indicates that Congress ratified the dual 
standard which it claims was “uniformly” followed by the lower courts 
under identical language in the 1909 Copyright Act. We address each of 
these arguments in turn. 
The statutory language—“the court may also award a reasonable 
attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs”—gives no hint 
that successful plaintiffs are to be treated differently than successful 
defendants. But respondent contends that our decision in Christiansburg 
Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978), in which we construed virtually 
identical language, supports a differentiation in treatment between 
plaintiffs and defendants. 
Christiansburg construed the language of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, which in relevant part provided that the court “in its discretion, 
may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of 
the costs. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k). We had earlier held, interpreting the 
cognate provision of Title II of that Act, that a prevailing plaintiff “should 
ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless some special circumstances 
would render such an award unjust.” Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 
Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). This decision was based on what we found 
to be the important policy objectives of the Civil Rights statutes, and the 
intent of Congress to achieve such objectives through the use of plaintiffs 
as “ ‘private attorneys general.’ ” In Christiansburg, supra, we determined 
that the same policy considerations were not at work in the case of a 
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prevailing civil rights defendant. We noted that a Title VII plaintiff, like a 
Title II plaintiff in Piggie Park, is “the chosen instrument of Congress to 
vindicate ‘a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.’ ” We 
also relied on the admittedly sparse legislative history to indicate that 
different standards were to be applied to successful plaintiffs than to 
successful defendants. 
Respondent points to our language in Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 
U.S. 754, 758, n. 2 (1989), that “fee-shifting statutes’ similar language is a 
‘strong indication’ that they are to be interpreted alike.” But here we think 
this normal indication is overborne by the factors relied upon in our 
Christiansburg opinion which are absent in the case of the Copyright Act. 
The legislative history of § 505 provides no support for treating prevailing 
plaintiffs and defendants differently with respect to the recovery of 
attorney’s fees. The attorney’s fees provision § 505 of the 1976 Act was 
carried forward verbatim from the 1909 Act with very little discussion. The 
relevant House Report provides simply: 
“Under section 505 the awarding of costs and attorney’s fees are 
left to the court’s discretion, and the section also makes clear that 
neither costs nor attorney’s fees can be awarded to or against ‘the 
United States or an officer thereof.’ ” 
* * * 
The goals and objectives of the two Acts are likewise not completely 
similar. Oftentimes, in the civil rights context, impecunious “private 
attorney general” plaintiffs can ill afford to litigate their claims against 
defendants with more resources. Congress sought to redress this balance 
in part, and to provide incentives for the bringing of meritorious lawsuits, 
by treating successful plaintiffs more favorably than successful defendants 
in terms of the award of attorney’s fees. The primary objective of the 
Copyright Act is to encourage the production of original literary, artistic, 
and musical expression for the good of the public. In the copyright context, 
it has been noted that “entities which sue for copyright infringement as 
plaintiffs can run the gamut from corporate behemoths to starving artists; 
the same is true of prospective copyright infringement defendants.” 
We thus conclude that respondent’s argument based on our fee-
shifting decisions under the Civil Rights Act must fail. 
Respondent next argues that the policies and objectives of § 505 and of 
the Copyright Act in general are best served by the “dual approach” to the 
award of attorney’s fees.13 The most common reason advanced in support 
                                                 
13 Respondent points to four important interests allegedly advanced by the dual standard: 
(1) it promotes the vigorous enforcement of the Copyright Act; (2) it distinguishes between the 
wrongdoers and the blameless; (3) it enhances the predictability and certainty in copyrights by 
providing a relatively certain benchmark for the award of attorney’s fees; and (4) it affords 
copyright defendants sufficient incentives to litigate their defenses. 
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of the dual approach is that, by awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing 
plaintiffs as a matter of course, it encourages litigation of meritorious 
claims of copyright infringement . . . Indeed, respondent relies heavily on 
this argument. We think the argument is flawed because it expresses a 
one-sided view of the purposes of the Copyright Act. While it is true that 
one of the goals of the Copyright Act is to discourage infringement, it is by 
no means the only goal of that Act. In the first place, it is by no means 
always the case that the plaintiff in an infringement action is the only 
holder of a copyright; often times, defendants hold copyrights too, as 
exemplified in the case at hand. 
More importantly, the policies served by the Copyright Act are more 
complex, more measured, than simply maximizing the number of 
meritorious suits for copyright infringement. The Constitution grants to 
Congress the power “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
We have often recognized the monopoly privileges that Congress has 
authorized, while “intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and 
inventors by the provision of a special reward,” are limited in nature and 
must ultimately serve the public good. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
* * * 
Because copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the 
general public through access to creative works, it is peculiarly important 
that the boundaries of copyright law be demarcated as clearly as possible. 
To that end, defendants who seek to advance a variety of meritorious 
copyright defenses should be encouraged to litigate them to the same 
extent that plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate meritorious claims of 
infringement. In the case before us, the successful defense of “The Old Man 
Down the Road” increased public exposure to a musical work that could, as 
a result, lead to further creative pieces. Thus a successful defense of a 
copyright infringement action may further the policies of the Copyright Act 
every bit as much as a successful prosecution of an infringement claim by 
the holder of a copyright. 
* * * 
[After analyzing and rejecting Fantasy’s argument that the legislative 
history of § 505 supported the dual standard for awarding attorney fees, 
the Court turned to Fogerty’s] argument that § 505 was intended to adopt 
the “British Rule.” Petitioner argues that, consistent with the neutral 
language of § 505, both prevailing plaintiffs and defendants should be 
awarded attorney’s fees as a matter of course, absent exceptional 
circumstances. For two reasons we reject this argument. . . . 
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First, just as the plain language of § 505 supports petitioner’s claim 
for disapproving the dual standard, it cuts against him in arguing for the 
British Rule. The statute says that “the court may also award a reasonable 
attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.” The word “may” 
clearly connotes discretion. The automatic awarding of attorney’s fees to 
the prevailing party would pretermit the exercise of that discretion. 
Second, we are mindful that Congress legislates against the strong 
background of the American Rule. Unlike Britain where counsel fees are 
regularly awarded to the prevailing party, it is the general rule in this 
country that unless Congress provides otherwise, parties are to bear their 
own attorney’s fees. . . . 
Thus we reject both the “dual standard” adopted by several of the 
Courts of Appeals, and petitioner’s claim that § 505 enacted the British 
Rule for automatic recovery of attorney’s fees by the prevailing party. 
Prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants are to be treated alike, but 
attorney’s fees are to be awarded to prevailing parties only as a matter of 
the court’s discretion. “There is no precise rule or formula for making these 
determinations,” but instead equitable discretion should be exercised “in 
light of the considerations we have identified.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 
U.S. 424, 436–437 (1983). Because the Court of Appeals erroneously held 
petitioner, the prevailing defendant, to a more stringent standard than 
that applicable to a prevailing plaintiff, its judgment is reversed and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
 
 
BOUCHAT V. BALTIMORE RAVENS FOOTBALL CLUB, 
INCORPORATED 
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. 
Oct. 8, 2003.  
346 F.3d 514 
 
KING, Circuit Judge: 
This appeal arises from the damages phase of a protracted copyright 
dispute involving the Baltimore Ravens football team. Frederick Bouchat, 
the holder of the infringed copyright, raises several challenges to the 
district court’s conduct of proceedings that culminated in a jury verdict 
finding him entitled to no portion of the infringers’ profits. In particular, 
Bouchat asserts that the court erroneously failed to accord him the benefit 
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of a statutory presumption that an infringer’s revenues are entirely 
attributable to the infringement. For the reasons explained below, we 
affirm. 
I. 
On November 6, 1995, the National Football League (“NFL”) announced 
that one of its teams, the Cleveland Browns, would shortly be moving to 
Baltimore. The team was to leave its entire Browns identity in Cleveland, 
and thus would need a new name and logo when it moved to its new 
Maryland home. Bouchat, a Baltimore security guard and amateur artist, 
became interested in the new team, and he began drawing logo designs 
based on the various names that the team was considering, including the 
name “Ravens.” On or about December 5, 1995, Bouchat created a drawing 
of a winged shield (the “Shield Drawing”) as a “Ravens” logo. 
  
In March of 1996, the Baltimore team adopted the name “Ravens.” In early 
April, Bouchat sent the Shield Drawing via fax to the Maryland Stadium 
Authority. Beside the Shield Drawing, Bouchat penned a note asking the 
Chairman of the Authority to send the sketch to the Ravens’ president. 
Bouchat also requested that if the Ravens used the Shield Drawing, they 
send him a letter of recognition and an autographed helmet. 
  
In a jury trial on the issue of liability, Bouchat’s Shield Drawing was found 
to have been mistakenly used by National Football League Properties, Inc. 
(“NFLP”) in NFLP’s production of the Ravens’ new logo, the “Flying B.” The 
Ravens had no knowledge that the NFLP had infringed anyone’s work and 
assumed that the Flying B was an original work owned by NFLP. The 
Ravens used the Flying B as their primary identifying symbol, and the logo 
appeared in every aspect of the Ravens’ activities, including uniforms, 
stationery, tickets, banners, on-field insignia, and merchandise. 
II. 
On May 8, 1997, Bouchat filed suit in the District of Maryland, alleging 
that the Ravens and NFLP (collectively, the “Defendants”) had infringed 
his copyright on the Shield Drawing and on several other drawings, and 
seeking ten million dollars in damages. The court bifurcated the case and 
first tried the liability issues. On November 3, 1998, the jury found that 
Bouchat had proven infringement of the Shield Drawing. [After appeals, 
the case was returned to the district court for trial on the damages.] **** 
  
Bouchat sought damages from the Ravens and NFLP pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 
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§ 504(a)(1), which renders an infringer liable for “the copyright owner’s 
actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer, as provided by 
[17 U.S.C. § 504(b) ].” Section 504(b), in turn, entitles the copyright owner 
to recover both “the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of 
the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to 
the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual 
damages.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). Because Bouchat made no claim for actual 
damages, the sole question presented for resolution in the damages trial 
was the amount, if any, of the Defendants’ profits that was attributable to 
the infringement. 
  
In his complaint, Bouchat contended that some portion of essentially all of 
the Defendants’ revenues was attributable to the infringing use of 
Bouchat’s artwork. To satisfy his initial burden under § 504(b), Bouchat 
presented evidence of the gross receipts from all NFLP and Ravens 
activities. The district court, however, awarded partial summary judgment 
to the Defendants with respect to all revenues derived from sources other 
than (1) sales of merchandise bearing the Flying B logo, and (2) royalties 
obtained from licensees who sold such merchandise (collectively, the 
“Merchandise Revenues”). The court reasoned that “[i]f the use of the 
Flying B logo to designate the Ravens could not reasonably be found to have 
affected the amount of revenue obtained from an activity, the revenue from 
that activity could not reasonably be found attributable to the 
infringement.” Id. at 617–18. Concluding that only the Merchandise 
Revenues could reasonably be found to have been affected by the 
Defendants’ unlawful use of the Flying B, the court excluded, as a matter 
of law, the remainder of the Defendants’ revenues (collectively, the “Non–
Merchandise Revenues”) from the pool of income that the jury could 
consider in awarding § 504 damages. 
  
At the close of discovery, the district court further narrowed the scope of 
the Defendants’ revenues from which the jury would be permitted to award 
§ 504 damages, when it excluded certain portions of the Merchandise 
Revenues. Specifically, the court awarded partial summary judgment to 
the Defendants as to Bouchat’s claims for profits from “minimum 
guarantee shortfalls,” “free merchandise,” trading cards, video games, and 
game programs (collectively, the “Excluded Merchandise Revenues”). *** 
  
The damages trial was conducted over a period of six days, *** and the jury 
was asked to decide whether the Defendants had proven, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the Non–Excluded Merchandise 
Revenues were attributable entirely to factors other than the Defendants’ 
infringement of Bouchat’s copyright. If the jury found that they were not, 
then it was charged to decide the percentage of the Non-Excluded 
Merchandise Revenues attributable to factors other than the infringement. 
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After a full day of deliberations, the jury answered the first question in the 
affirmative, thereby denying Bouchat any monetary recovery. On July 26, 




Bouchat’s primary contention on appeal is that the district court erred in 
awarding partial summary judgment to the Defendants with respect to 
certain portions of the Defendants’ revenues. In particular, Bouchat asserts 
that the court failed to give him the benefit of the § 504 statutory 
presumption that an infringer’s revenues are entirely attributable to the 
infringement. That presumption, he maintains, creates a question of 
material fact that cannot be resolved on summary judgment. Thus, he 
asserts, whether any portion of an infringer’s revenues are attributable to 
some source other than the infringement is a question that can be resolved 






Bouchat seeks to recover damages pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) for the 
Defendants’ infringement of his copyright. Section 504(b) entitles a 
successful copyright plaintiff to recover “any profits of the infringer that 
are attributable to the infringement.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). The statute goes 
on to specify that, 
[i]n establishing the infringer’s profits, the copyright 
owner is required to present proof only of the infringer’s 
gross revenue, and the infringer is required to prove his 
or her deductible expenses and the elements of profit 
attributable to factors other than the copyrighted work. 
Thus, § 504(b) creates an initial presumption that the infringer’s “profits 
... attributable to the infringement” are equal to the infringer’s gross 
revenue. See Konor Enters., Inc. v. Eagle Publ’ns, Inc., 878 F.2d 138, 140 
(4th Cir.1989). Once the copyright owner has established the amount of the 
infringer’s gross revenues, the burden shifts to the infringer to prove either 
that part or all of those revenues are “deductible expenses” (i.e., are not 
profits), or that they are “attributable to factors other than the copyrighted 
work.” Id. Although § 504(b) places the burden on the infringer to 
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demonstrate that certain portions of its revenues were due to factors other 
than the infringement, the infringer need not prove these amounts with 
mathematical precision. See Cream Records, Inc. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing 
Co., 754 F.2d 826, 828–29 (9th Cir.1985). 
3. 
Despite the existence of § 504(b)’s burden-shifting provision, summary 
judgment in favor of an infringer with respect to some portion of the 
infringer’s gross revenues may, in the proper circumstances, be 
appropriate. Though our Court has not spoken directly on this point, 
several of our sister circuits have awarded partial summary judgment to 
infringers, excluding as a matter of law certain portions of an infringer’s 
revenues from the jury’s § 504(b) attributability inquiry. Furthermore, an 
award of partial summary judgment to an infringer with respect to 
particular categories of revenue comports, in the proper circumstances, 
with the basic tenets of our Rule 56 jurisprudence. 
a.  
We begin by looking to the decisions of our sister circuits. The § 504(b) cases 
in which partial summary judgment in favor of an infringer with respect to 
part, or all, of the infringer’s revenues has been found proper, fall roughly 
into two categories: (1) those in which there existed no conceivable 
connection between the infringement and a given revenue stream; and (2) 
those in which, despite the existence of a conceivable link, the plaintiff 
failed to offer anything more than mere speculation as to the existence of a 
causal connection between the infringement and the claimed revenues. *** 
  
A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment “may 
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,” but rather 
must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586–87, 106 
S.Ct. 1348 (holding that, once motion for summary judgment is properly 
made and supported, opposing party bears burden of showing, by means of 
affidavits or other verified evidence, that genuine dispute of material fact 
exists); Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Sys., Inc., 33 F.3d 
390, 393–94 (4th Cir.1994). Furthermore, neither “[u]nsupported 
speculation,” Felty, 818 F.2d at 1128, nor evidence that is “merely 
colorable” or “not significantly probative,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 
S.Ct. 2505, will suffice to defeat a motion for summary judgment; rather, if 
the adverse party fails to bring forth facts showing that “reasonable minds 
could differ” on a material point, id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, then, regardless 
of “[a]ny proof or evidentiary requirements imposed by the substantive 
law,” id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, “summary judgment, if appropriate, shall 
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be entered,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). 
  
These general principles only further highlight the propriety of an award 
of summary judgment under circumstances such as those presented in On 
Davis and Mackie. Despite § 504(b)’s presumption that the recoverable 
“profits ... attributable to the infringement” are equal to the infringer’s 
gross revenues, the statute does not exempt the copyright plaintiff from the 
requirement of Rule 56 that he respond to a properly supported motion for 
summary judgment by “set[ting] forth specific facts showing that there is 
a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Should the plaintiff fail so to 
respond—whether that failure is due to the absence of any conceivable 
connection between the infringement and the claimed revenues, or instead 
simply due to the plaintiff’s inability to muster nonspeculative evidence in 
support of the alleged causal link—then summary judgment may properly 




In sum, we conclude that the Defendants could properly be awarded 
summary judgment with respect to any given revenue stream if either (1) 
there exists no conceivable connection between the infringement and those 
revenues; or (2) despite the existence of a conceivable connection, Bouchat 
offered only speculation as to the existence of a causal link between the 
infringement and the revenues. It is to these inquiries that we turn next. 
4. 
The Defendants derive revenues from six major sources: (1) sponsorships; 
(2) broadcast and other media licenses; (3) sale of tickets; (4) miscellaneous 
business activities, which appear to include provision of game-day stadium 
parking; (5) sale of official team merchandise; and (6) royalties from 
licensees who sell official team merchandise. The first four of these sources 
we characterize as the “Non–Merchandise Revenues,” while the fifth and 
sixth are the “Merchandise Revenues.” To briefly review the history 
relevant to this appeal: Early in the case, the court awarded partial 
summary judgment to the Defendants with respect to the Non–
Merchandise Revenues, leaving the Merchandise Revenues for later 
consideration. Subsequently, the court awarded partial summary 
judgment to the Defendants with respect to certain portions of the 
Merchandise Revenues, to wit, the revenue received from: “minimum 
guarantee shortfalls”; “free merchandise”; trading cards; video games; and 
game programs. 
  
Bouchat contends that, because of the Defendants’ widespread use of the 
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Flying B as the primary logo—and as an integral marketing tool—for the 
Baltimore Ravens, some portion of the revenues that the Defendants 
earned from both the Non–Merchandise Revenues and the Excluded 
Merchandise Revenues is attributable to the Defendants’ infringement of 
his copyright. When the district court awarded summary judgment to the 
Defendants as to large segments of their revenues, however, it denied 
Bouchat the opportunity to prove this contention to the jury. Despite the 
fact that § 504(b) places on the infringer the burden of proving that 
revenues are not attributable to the infringement, summary judgment was 
appropriate with respect to both the Non–Merchandise Revenues and the 
Excluded Merchandise Revenues. 
  
As detailed above, we analyze the excluded revenue streams in two steps. 
We first consider whether any of the Non–Merchandise Revenues and the 
Excluded Merchandise Revenues lacked a conceivable connection to the 
infringement. If so, summary judgment in favor of the Defendants with 
respect to those revenues was proper. Turning then to the remaining 
excluded revenues, we inquire whether, despite the existence of a 
conceivable connection between those revenues and the infringement, 
Bouchat offered only speculative evidence of such a causal link in response 
to a properly supported motion for summary judgment. If so, then 
summary judgment in favor of the Defendants was appropriate with 
respect to these revenues as well. 
a. 
Of all the excluded revenues, only the revenues from minimum guarantee 
shortfalls and free merchandise lack all conceivable connection to the 
Defendants’ infringement of Bouchat’s copyright. Because no rational trier 
of fact could find that these two subcategories of the Excluded Merchandise 
Revenues were affected by the Defendants’ adoption of the infringing 
Flying B logo, the court properly removed them from the pool of 
Defendants’ revenues submitted to the jury for consideration under § 
504(b). 
  
The levels of each licensee’s minimum guarantee and free merchandise 
obligation were established, ex ante, by the terms of the licensee’s contract 
with NFLP; neither figure could fluctuate in response to consumer 
behavior. As a consequence, the amount of revenue that the Defendants 
received in the form of minimum guarantee shortfalls and free 
merchandise was necessarily independent of any reaction that any 
individual might have had to the Flying B logo. Whereas it is at least 
hypothetically possible (albeit highly unlikely) that an individual became 
so enamored of the infringing aspects of the Flying B logo that he was thus 
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inspired to purchase tickets for the Ravens’ games, to pay for parking, to 
buy non-logo-bearing concessions, and thus to boost the Defendants’ 
revenues from these sources, a similar scenario cannot be conjured with 
respect to revenues whose levels were fixed and immutable before licensees 
had an opportunity to stock their shelves with logo-bearing goods. No 
rational trier of fact could find that the infringing Flying B logo enabled 
the defendants to generate more income from these two sources than they 
would otherwise have done. Because no portion of the Defendants’ gross 
revenues from minimum guarantee shortfalls and free merchandise could 
be attributable to the infringement of Bouchat’s copyright, the court did 
not err in awarding summary judgment to the Defendants with respect to 
these two sub-categories of the Excluded Merchandise Revenues. 
b. 
Having concluded that summary judgment in favor of the Defendants was 
proper with respect to both the minimum guarantee short-falls and the free 
merchandise, we turn now to the Non–Merchandise Revenues and the 
remaining sub-categories of the Excluded Merchandise Revenues (i.e., the 
revenues from trading cards, video games, and game programs). Our 
inquiry on this point is whether, despite the existence of a conceivable 
connection between the infringement and the level of revenue that the 
Defendants earned from these sources, the court was correct in excluding 
them through summary judgment. Because Bouchat offered only 
speculative evidence of a causal link between the infringement and the 
level of the revenues that the Defendants earned from these sources, and 
because the Defendants’ request for summary judgment was supported by 
unrebutted evidence demonstrating that these revenues were not, in fact, 
in any way attributable to the infringement, there was no issue of material 
fact for consideration by the jury. As a result, the court did not err in 
awarding summary judgment to the Defendants with respect to these 
remaining categories of revenue. 
  
When they moved for summary judgment, the Defendants successfully 
carried their initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue 
of material fact. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In 
support of their initial motion for summary judgment, the Defendants 
proffered affidavits showing that Non–Merchandise Revenues are driven 
by business and consumer interest in NFL football, and are in no way 
responsive to logo design.  In support of their subsequent summary 
judgment motion, the Defendants again proffered numerous affidavits, this 
time showing that sales of trading cards, video games, and game programs 
are driven by consumer interest in NFL football, and likewise are in no way 
responsive to logo design. The supporting affidavits established beyond 
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reasonable debate that neither any portion of the Defendants’ Non–
Merchandise Revenues, nor any portion of their revenues from trading 
cards, video games, or game programs, was attributable to the Defendants’ 
selection and use of the infringing Flying B rather than some other logo. 
 
Having met their initial burden, the Defendants successfully shifted the 
onus onto Bouchat to come forward and demonstrate that such an issue 
does, in fact, exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586–87, 
106 S.Ct. 1348. A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary 
judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] 
pleadings,” but rather must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Bouchat, however, produced no 
specific facts showing that there was a genuine issue for trial; in fact, he 
declined to respond to the summary judgment motions with any evidence 
at all, resting instead on his initial, and sole, evidentiary proffer: the total 
receipts generated by all NFLP and Ravens activities. Because Bouchat 
failed to offer any nonspeculative evidence demonstrating the existence of 
a genuine dispute of material fact, the court appropriately awarded 
summary judgment to the Defendants on the ground that the Non–
Merchandise Revenues and the revenues from trading cards, video games, 
and game programs could not reasonably be found attributable to the 
infringement. 
  
In sum, the Defendants established in their motions for summary 
judgment that there existed no causal link between their adoption of the 
infringing Flying B logo and either the Defendants’ Non–Merchandise 
Revenues or their revenues from trading cards, video games, or game 
programs. In response, Bouchat rested on his speculation that somehow, 
somewhere, some part of the Defendants’ revenues from these sources was 
influenced by the fact that the Defendants selected the Flying B rather 
than some other logo. However, because “[u]nsupported speculation is not 
sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion,” Felty, 818 F.2d at 1128, 
the court properly awarded summary judgment to the Defendants both 
with respect to the Non–Merchandise Revenues and with respect to the 
revenues from sales of trading cards, video games, and game programs. 
c. 
It is the “affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually 
unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.” Drewitt v. 
Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Once the Defendants had carried their initial burden of 
demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact regarding 
the attributability of the contested revenues, Bouchat could survive the 
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motion for summary judgment only by adducing specific, non-speculative 
evidence supporting the existence of a link between the infringement and 
the Defendants’ supposedly enhanced revenues. Because Bouchat failed to 




Finally, Bouchat contends that the district court, in its instructions to the 
jury, failed to accord him the full benefit of the statutory presumption 
contained in § 504(b). Specifically, Bouchat maintains that the court 
abused its discretion by failing to make clear to the jury that the Ravens 
bore the burden of proof in the damages trial. To the contrary, the court 
made it eminently clear in its instructions that the Ravens were obliged to 
shoulder the burden of proof. See, e.g., J.A. 563–65 (stating to jury, at the 
outset of trial, that “[i]n this case, the burden of proof is on the defendants 
to prove the extent to which the revenue derived from the sale of these 
products is attributable to factors other than the art work of the Flying B 
logo.... Question one [of the Verdict form] asks, have defendants proven by 
a preponderance of the evidence that income derived by defendants from 
the sale of products bearing the Flying B logo was attributable completely 
to factors other than the art work of the Flying B logo.”(emphasis added)); 
J.A. 903 (instructing jury immediately prior to deliberations that “[t]he 
case is about whether on the evidence the defendants ... have carried their 
burden of proof.... On those questions the defendants have the burden of 
proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” (emphasis added)). 
  
This burden of proof point was further emphasized by the first question on 
the Verdict form tendered to the jury by the court, reading “Have the 
Defendants proven by a preponderance of the evidence that income derived 
by the Defendants from the sale of products bearing the Flying B logo was 
attributable completely to factors other than the art work of the Flying B 
logo?” J.A. 564–65 (emphasis added). Viewed in context, the instructions 
plainly informed the jury of the controlling legal principles; the court 
therefore did not abuse its discretion. 
***  
AFFIRMED 
WIDENER, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
I respectfully dissent. I am of opinion that the district court erred by 
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refusing to instruct the jury that the defendants’ profits are deemed 
attributable to the alleged copyright infringement unless the defendants 
prove otherwise. *** 
 
 
FRANK MUSIC CORP V. METRO–GOLDWYN–MAYER INC. 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 
Sept. 27, 1989. 
886 F.2d 1545 
 
 
 FLETCHER, Circuit Judge: 
 
In Frank Music Corp. v. Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505 (9th 
Cir.1985) (Frank Music I ), we affirmed the district court’s holding that 
defendants infringed plaintiffs’ copyright in the dramatico-musical play 
Kismet, but remanded for reconsideration of the amount of profits 
attributable to the infringement and for consideration of whether 
defendants Donn Arden and Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer, Inc. (MGM, Inc.) 
should be liable in addition to MGM Grand Hotel, Inc. (MGM Grand). On 
remand, the district court awarded plaintiffs $343,724 against MGM 
Grand, dismissed the action against MGM, Inc. and Arden, and awarded 
plaintiffs $115,000 in attorney’s fees. Plaintiffs appeal and defendants 





The facts are fully set out in Frank Music I, 772 F.2d at 509–11. We 
reiterate only selectively. Plaintiffs are the copyright owners and authors 
of Kismet, a dramatico-musical work. MGM, Inc. under license produced a 
musical motion picture version of Kismet. Beginning April 26, 1974, MGM 
Grand presented a musical revue entitled Hallelujah Hollywood in the 
hotel’s Ziegfeld Theatre. Hallelujah Hollywood was largely created by an 
employee of MGM Grand, Donn Arden, who also staged, produced and 
directed the show. The show comprised ten acts, four billed as “tributes” to 
MGM motion pictures. Act IV was entitled “Kismet”, and was a tribute to 
the MGM movie of that name. It was based almost entirely on music from 
Kismet, and used characters and settings from that musical. Act IV 
“Kismet” was performed approximately 1700 times, until July 16, 1976, 
when, under pressure resulting from this litigation, MGM Grand 
substituted a new Act IV. 
  
Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging copyright infringement, unfair competition, 
and breach of contract. In Frank Music I, we affirmed the district court’s 
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conclusion that the use of Kismet in Hallelujah Hollywood was beyond the 
scope of MGM Grand’s ASCAP license and infringed plaintiffs’ copyright. 





A. Apportionment of Profits 
 
1. Direct Profits 
 
In Frank Music I, 772 F.2d at 514, we upheld the district court’s conclusion 
that the plaintiffs failed to prove actual damages arising from the 
infringement, but vacated the district court’s award of $22,000 in 
apportioned profits as “grossly inadequate,” and remanded to the district 
court for reconsideration. 
  
On remand, the district court calculated MGM Grand’s net profit from 
Hallelujah Hollywood at $6,131,606, by deducting from its gross revenues 
the direct costs MGM Grand proved it had incurred. Neither party 
challenges this calculation. 
  
In apportioning the profits between Act IV and the other acts in the show, 
the district court made the following finding: 
 
Act IV of “Hallelujah Hollywood” was one of ten acts, approximately a ten 
minute segment of a 100 minute revue. On this basis, the Court concludes 
that ten percent of the profits of “Hallelujah Hollywood” are attributable to 
Act IV. 
  
Plaintiffs assert that this finding is in error in several respects. First, they 
point out that on Saturdays Hallelujah Hollywood contained only eight 
acts, not ten, and that on Saturdays the show ran only 75 minutes, not 100. 
Second, Act IV was approximately eleven and a half minutes long, not ten. 
Because the show was performed three times on Saturdays, and twice a 
night on the other evenings of the week, the district court substantially 
underestimated the running time of Act IV in relation to the rest of the 
show. 
  
If the district court relied exclusively on a quantitative comparison and 
failed to consider the relative quality or drawing power of the show’s 
various component parts, it erred. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs 
Music, Ltd., 508 F.Supp. 798, 800 (S.D.N.Y.1981), modified on other 
grounds, 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir.1983). However, the district court’s 
apportionment based on comparative durations would be appropriate if the 
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district court implicitly concluded that all the acts of the show were of 
roughly equal value. Cf. Frank Music I, 772 F.2d at 518 (“Each element 
contributed significantly to the show’s success, but no one element was the 
sole or overriding reason for that success.”) While a more precise statement 
of the district court’s reasons would have been desirable, we find support 
in the record for the conclusion that all the acts in the show were of 
substantially equal value. 
  
The district court went on to apportion the parties’ relative contributions 
to Act IV itself: 
The infringing musical material was only one of several elements 
contributing to the segment. A portion of the profits attributable to Act IV 
must be allocated to other elements, including the creative talent of the 
producer and director, the talents of performers, composers, 
choreographers, costume designers and others who participated in creating 
Act IV, and the attraction of the unique Ziegfeld Theatre with its elaborate 
stage effects.... While no precise mathematical formula can be applied, the 
Court concludes that ... a fair approximation of the value of the infringing 
work to Act IV is twenty-five percent. 
  
The district court was correct in probing into the parties’ relative 
contributions to Act IV. Where a defendant alters infringing material to 
suit its own unique purposes, those alterations and the creativity behind 
them should be taken into account in apportioning the profits of the 
infringing work. Cf. Sheldon v. Metro–Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 
45, 49–51 (2d Cir.1939), aff’d, 309 U.S. 390 (1940). However, the district 
court appears to have ignored its finding in its previous decision that 
defendants used not only the plaintiffs’ music, but also their lyrics, 
characters, settings, and costume designs, recreating to a substantial 
extent the look and sound of the licensed movie version of Kismet. 
  
While it was not inappropriate to consider the creativity of producers, 
performers and others involved in staging and adapting excerpts from 
Kismet for use in Hallelujah Hollywood, the district court erred in weighing 
these contributions so heavily. In performing the apportionment, the 
benefit of the doubt must always be given to the plaintiff, not the 
defendant. Sheldon, 106 F.2d at 51. And while the apportionment may take 
into account the role of uncopyrightable elements of a work in generating 
that work’s profits, see Sheldon, 106 F.2d at 50–51 (considering role of 
movie’s actors, scenery, producers and directors); cf. McCulloch v. Albert E. 
Price, Inc., 823 F.2d 316, 320 (9th Cir.1987) (substantial similarity analysis 
can include examination of uncopyrightable elements), the apportionment 
should not place too high a value on the defendants’ staging of the work, at 
the expense of undervaluing the plaintiffs’ more substantive creative 
contributions. Production contributions involving expensive costumes and 
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lavish sets will largely be taken into account when deducting the 
defendants’ costs. Indeed, defendants concede that had they produced 
Kismet in toto, it would have been proper for the district court to award 
100% of their profits, despite their own creative efforts in staging such a 
production. 
  
The district court found that defendants’ staging of the Kismet excerpts 
was highly significant to Act IV’s success. While we believe that a 
defendant’s efforts in staging an infringing production will generally not 
support more than a de minimis deduction from the plaintiff’s share of the 
profits, we cannot say the district court’s conclusion that the defendants’ 
contributions were substantial in this case is clearly erroneous. We 
recognize that there will be shows in which the attraction of the costumes, 
scenery or performers outweighs the attraction of the music or dialogue. 
On the other hand, a producer’s ability to stage a lavish presentation, or a 
performer’s ability to fill a hall from the drawing power of her name alone, 
is not a license to use freely the copyrighted works of others. 
  
We conclude that apportioning 75% of Act IV to the defendants grossly 
undervalues the importance of the plaintiffs’ contributions. Act IV was 
essentially Kismet, with contributions by the defendants; it was not 
essentially a new work incidentally plagiarizing elements of Kismet. A 
fairer apportionment, giving due regard to the district court’s findings, 
attributes 75% of Act IV to elements taken from the plaintiffs and 25% to 
the defendants’ contributions. 
 
2. Indirect Profits 
 
In Frank Music I, we held that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, in 
addition to direct profits, a proportion of ascertainable indirect profits from 
defendants’ hotel and gaming operations attributable to the promotional 
value of Hallelujah Hollywood. The district court considered the relative 
contributions of Hallelujah Hollywood and other factors contributing to the 
hotel’s profits, including the hotel’s guest accommodations, restaurants, 
cocktail lounges, star entertainment in the “Celebrity” room, the movie 
theater, Jai Alai, the casino itself, convention and banquet facilities, tennis 
courts, swimming pools, gym and sauna, and also the role of advertising 
and general promotional activities in bringing customers to the hotel. The 
district court concluded that two percent of MGM Grand’s indirect profit 
was attributable to Hallelujah Hollywood. In light of the general promotion 
and the wide variety of attractions available at MGM Grand, this 
conclusion is not clearly erroneous. 
 
B. Prejudgment Interest 
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The district court, without comment, declined to award prejudgment 
interest. The availability of prejudgment interest under the Copyright Act 
of 1909 is an issue of first impression in this circuit. 
  
The 1909 Act does not mention prejudgment interest. Nevertheless, courts 
may allow prejudgment interest even though the governing statute is 
silent. Rodgers v. United States, 332 U.S. 371, 373 (1947). “[A] persuasive 
consideration ... is the relative equities between the beneficiaries of the 
obligation and those upon whom it has been imposed.” The goal of 
compensating the injured party fairly for the loss caused by the defendant’s 
breach of the statutory obligation should be kept in mind. Prejudgment 
interest compensates the injured party for the loss of the use of money he 
would otherwise have had. 
  
Defendants argue that Congress did not intend for prejudgment interest to 
be available under the 1909 Act. They ask us to infer this from the inclusion 
of prejudgment interest in the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1982), and the 
omission of reference to prejudgment interest in either the 1909 Act or the 
Copyright Act of 1976. Because the Patent and Copyright Acts are similar 
statutes with similar purposes, defendants argue that differences between 
the two Acts with respect to prejudgment interest are intentional. Cf. Sony 
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 435, 439 (1984) 
(patent law appropriate source of guidance for novel copyright issues, but 
noting that doctrine of contributory infringement applies in copyright 
cases, where the statute is silent, as well as in patent cases, where the 
statute specifically refers to contributory infringers). 
  
Examination of the history of prejudgment interest in the patent context 
suggests this argument is flawed. Before Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 284, 
prejudgment interest was generally available in patent infringement cases 
from the date damages were liquidated, and in exceptional cases from the 
date of infringement. See, e.g., Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 
298 U.S. 448, 459 (1936); Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 160 (1888). 
Such a remedy was available despite the fact that the patent laws then in 
effect made no mention of prejudgment interest. Indeed, the wording of the 
relevant patent statute was similar to that of § 101(b) of the 1909 Copyright 
Act. 
  
Thus, interpreting the 1909 Act in light of patent law doctrine existing at 
the time of its enactment and during much of its effective period, we cannot 
conclude that Congress intended from its silence that prejudgment interest 
would not be available under the 1909 Act. Just as courts awarded 
prejudgment interest in order to provide adequate compensation to patent 
holders before the enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 284, this same remedy should 
be available to copyright owners for the same purpose. See also Fishman v. 
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Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 584 (7th Cir.1986) (“The denial of 
prejudgment interest systematically undercompensates victims and 
underdeters putative offenders.”) (Easterbrook, dissenting). 
  
We therefore hold that prejudgment interest is an available remedy under 
the 1909 Act. Whether the circumstances of this case warrant the remedy 
is a separate question. The common-law rule during much of the effective 
period of the 1909 Act awarded prejudgment interest only on damages that 
were liquidated or readily ascertainable by mathematical computations 
and did not rely on opinion or discretion. See, e.g., General Motors, 461 
U.S. at 651–52 & n. 5 (discussing history of common law rule). But even 
where damages were not liquidated or readily ascertainable, courts had the 
power to award prejudgment interest on unliquidated damages when 
necessary to compensate the plaintiff fairly. Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 
243, 258, 45 S.Ct. 73, 79 (1924). 
  
Because the 1909 Act allows plaintiffs to recover only the greater of the 
defendant’s profits or the plaintiff’s actual damages, see Frank Music I, 772 
F.2d at 512; Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald’s 
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1176 (9th Cir.1977), an award of profits or damages 
under the 1909 Act will not necessarily be adequate to compensate a 
prevailing copyright owner. Accordingly, we conclude prejudgment interest 
ordinarily should be awarded. 
  
Awarding prejudgment interest on the apportioned share of defendant’s 
profits is consistent with the purposes underlying the profits remedy. 
Profits are awarded to the plaintiff not only to compensate for the plaintiff’s 
injury, but also and primarily to prevent the defendant from being unjustly 
enriched by its infringing use of the plaintiff’s property. See Sheldon v. 
Metro–Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399 (1940); D. Dobbs, 
Handbook on the Law of Remedies 1 (1973). For the restitutionary purpose 
of this remedy to be served fully, the defendant generally should be 
required to turn over to the plaintiff not only the profits made from the use 
of his property, but also the interest on these profits, which can well exceed 
the profits themselves. See D. Dobbs, supra, at 169–70; Fishman, 807 F.2d 
at 583–84 (giving examples of the effect of compound interest to 
demonstrate how “the time value of money works in defendants’ favor.”) 
(Easterbrook, dissenting). Indeed, one way to view this interest is as 
another form of indirect profit accruing from the infringement, which 
should be turned over to the copyright owner along with other forms of 
indirect profit. It would be anomalous to hold that a plaintiff can recover, 
for example, profits derived from the promotional use of its copyrighted 
material, but not for the value of the use of the revenue generated by the 
infringement. 
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We accordingly remand to the district court to enter an award of 
prejudgment interest. The award should be based on the fifty-two week 
Treasury bill rate, unless the district court concludes that the equities 
demand a different rate. See In re Bloom, 875 F.2d 224, 228 (9th Cir.1989); 




F. Attorney’s Fees 
Both parties appeal from the district court’s award of attorney’s fees to the 
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs argue that the district court awarded them too 
small a fee. The defendants argue that the plaintiffs are not entitled to a 
fee at all, and even if they are, the fee awarded was too high. 
  
The decision to award fees, and the amount of fees awarded, are both 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 682 F.2d 
830, 838 (9th Cir.1982); Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1132 (9th 
Cir.1979). Plaintiffs in copyright actions may be awarded attorney’s fees 
simply by virtue of prevailing in the action: no other precondition need be 
met, although the fee awarded must be reasonable. McCulloch v. Albert E. 
Price, Inc., 823 F.2d 316, 323 (9th Cir.1987) (“fees are generally awarded 
to a prevailing plaintiff”); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, 
Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 832 (11th Cir.1982). The district court correctly noted 
that such awards to prevailing plaintiffs serve the purpose of encouraging 
private enforcement and deterring infringements. The district court did not 
abuse its discretion in determining that the plaintiffs are entitled to an 
award of attorney’s fees. 
  
We conclude, however, that the district court erred in failing to explain the 
basis for the amount awarded. Plaintiffs’ counsel did not provide the 
district court with contemporaneous time records. His “reconstructed 
records” claim 1707.5 hours spent on this case from 1975 through mid-May 
1980. This reconstruction is memorialized in an itemized list. In addition, 
he estimated that he expended another 3500 hours on the case from mid-
May 1980 to the summer of 1987, listing the services performed during that 
period but not allocating his time among the various services. Counsel 
sought compensation at the rate of $250 per hour. Counsel’s only 
explanation for his failure to keep track of seven years of his work was that 
he “got out of the habit of keeping time on the case.” 
  
The district court found that counsel expended much unwarranted time—
as much as 300 hours of work where only a single hour was necessary. The 
court found the facts simple, but noted that complicated legal issues 
relating to damages were presented. As additional reasons for reducing the 
amount of the fees award, the court remarked that plaintiffs prevailed on 
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only one of three claims, and that “both sides engendered numerous delays 
and petty discovery disputes, resulting in the inordinate length of time 
necessary to resolve this case.” The court, “[i]n view of all these factors,” 
concluded that a reasonable attorney’s fee was $115,000. The district court 
made no specific findings either as to the number of hours reasonably spent 
or what was a reasonable hourly rate. 
  
The trial court correctly refused to accept uncritically plaintiffs’ counsel’s 
representations concerning the time expended. Sealy, Inc. v. Easy Living, 
Inc., 743 F.2d 1378, 1385 (9th Cir.1984). Plaintiffs bear the burden of 
showing the time spent and that it was reasonably necessary to the 
successful prosecution of their copyright claims. The lack of 
contemporaneous records does not justify an automatic reduction in the 
hours claimed, but such hours should be credited only if reasonable under 
the circumstances and supported by other evidence such as testimony or 
secondary documentation. Johnson v. University College, 706 F.2d 1205, 
1207 (11th Cir.1983). Time spent by plaintiffs’ counsel responding to 
motions or actions by the defendants should not be excluded from the fee 
award. “[A]lthough [defendants] had the right to play hardball in 
contesting [plaintiffs’] claims, it is also appropriate that [defendants] bear 
the cost of their obstructionist strategy.” Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 
F.2d 826, 841 (9th Cir.1984). The district court blamed both sides for delays 
and petty discovery disputes, without differentiating those delays and 
disputes properly the fault of the plaintiffs from those properly the fault of 
the defendants. 
  
In setting a reasonable attorney’s fee, the district court should make 
specific findings of the rate and hours it has determined to be reasonable. 
Sealy, 743 F.2d at 1385. In Moore, the district court reduced counsels’ fee 
request because, in the district court’s opinion, they “were ... inclined to 
produce a large volume of less than useful material.” 682 F.2d at 837 
(ellipsis in original). We reversed and remanded that award, holding that 
the district court abused its discretion by reducing counsels’ claimed hours 
by half and allowing less than half their normal billing rate solely on the 
ground that some of their work was less than useful. Id. at 839. Plaintiffs’ 
counsel’s inadequate showing has invited substantial discounting of his fee. 
Still, he is entitled to a reasonable amount. Before determining the 
appropriate fee, the district court should make a more detailed analysis of 
the time records presented and a finding as to the reasonable hourly rate. 
See Sealy, 743 F.2d at 1385. We accordingly remand to the district court to 
reconsider its award and to substantiate whatever fee it awards. In its 
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We vacate the damages award. We conclude that the proper apportionment 
entitles plaintiffs to 9% of the direct profits from Hallelujah Hollywood. We 
affirm the district court’s finding as to the percentage of indirect profits 
attributable to Hallelujah Hollywood. We correct the award however for a 
mathematical error. Accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled to $551,844.54 as 
their share of direct profits and $699,963.10 as their share of indirect 
profits. We conclude that prejudgment interest should have been awarded, 
and remand for a calculation of the appropriate amount. *** We vacate the 
award of attorney’s fees so that the district court may make the necessary 
findings and recompute the amount to be awarded. We remand to the 
district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
  




ZOMBA ENTERPRISES, INC. V. PANORAMA RECORDS, INC. 
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. 
June 26, 2007  
491 F.3d 574 
 
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. 
From Japan to the United States and beyond, karaoke is wildly popular. 
Countless people have lined up at various venues to perform their favorite 
songs with, and in front of, their friends. But few participants (with the 
possible exception of IP lawyers) ever stop to consider the intellectual 
property regime governing karaoke. 
  
Panorama Records, Inc. (“Panorama”), a purveyor of karaoke discs, 
resembles the majority of these participants. It entered the business of 
recording and selling karaoke discs without considering whether doing so 
infringed the intellectual property rights of others. Before long, this lack of 
foresight caught up with Panorama. 
  
This case requires us to review a district court’s entry of summary 
judgment in favor of, and monetary award to, a plaintiff copyright holder 
whose musical compositions Panorama copied on its karaoke discs. 
Ultimately, we conclude that the district court (1) correctly concluded that 
Panorama willfully infringed the plaintiffs’ copyrights, and did not abuse 
its discretion by (2) awarding the plaintiffs $806,000 in statutory damages, 
(3) denying Panorama’s motion to transfer venue, and (4) awarding the 
plaintiffs attorney fees. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s 
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judgment in all respects. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
A. Statutory Background 
 
Our Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors ... the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
Toward that end, the Copyright Act offers protection to various kinds of 
works of authorship, including “musical works, including any 
accompanying words.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2). This protection provides 
copyright owners with the exclusive rights to reproduce the works and to 
distribute these copies to the public. Id. § 106(1), (3). Anyone who violates 
these, or other, rights of the copyright owner is an “infringer,” and thus is 
liable to the owner, id. § 501(a), (b), and subject to injunctions, id. § 502, 
damages, id. § 504, and attorney fees, id. § 505. 
  
Plaintiff copyright owners whose copyrights actually have been infringed 
may elect between receiving as damages (1) their actual damages plus the 
infringer’s profits attributable to its infringement, or (2) statutory 
damages. Id. § 504(b), (c). In the standard copyright-infringement case, the 
district court has discretion to award statutory damages of any amount 
between $750 and $30,000 for each copyright infringed. Id. § 504(c)(1). 
However, if the plaintiff proves that the infringement is willful, the 
statutory-damage ceiling rises to $150,000. Id. § 504(c)(2). Conversely, if 
the defendant establishes that infringement is innocent, the statutory-
damage floor falls to $200. 
B. Factual Background 
 
Since 1998, Panorama has been in the business of manufacturing and 
selling karaoke compact discs. It issues a new disc monthly in each of a 
variety of musical genres, including country, pop, rock, and R & B. Each 
installment (or “karaoke package”) contains the top hits in that genre for 
the relevant month. Laurindo Santos is one of Panorama’s four 
shareholders, and at all times relevant to this case he was the decision-
maker regarding the release of products. 
  
The individual discs that Panorama makes and sells are in the CD+G 
format—shorthand for “compact disc plus graphics.” As Panorama 
explains, “[t]hese are compact discs on which musicians that are hired by 
Panorama record a musical composition of a work which at some time may 
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have been made popular by another artist. The CD+G contains a graphic 
element and is designed to be viewed when played on a karaoke machine.” 
The graphic element consists of the text of each song’s lyrics, and it scrolls 
across a screen as the music (sans vocals) plays, permitting karaoke 
participants to read the lyrics as they sing along. Each of Panorama’s 
karaoke packages contained nine or ten songs, with two tracks for each 
song, one track released with audible lyrics and one without. 
  
Zomba Enterprises, Inc. and Zomba Songs, Inc. (collectively, “Zomba”) are 
music publishing corporations often identified by the trade name Zomba 
Music Publishing. Zomba “is in the business of exploiting musical 
compositions for commercial gain.” Toward this purpose, and at all times 
relevant to this case, Zomba held and administered the copyrights to a 
variety of musical compositions, including songs performed by pop music 
performers such as 98 Degrees, Backstreet Boys, *NSYNC, and Britney 
Spears. 
  
Without Anna Music (“Without Anna”) is another music publishing 
company, but is not a party to this action. In 2000, Without Anna 
discovered that some of the songs to which it owned copyrights appeared 
on Panorama’s karaoke packages. In response, attorney Linda Edell 
Howard sent a cease-and-desist letter to Panorama on Without Anna’s 
behalf, demanding that Panorama quit selling unlicensed copies of Without 
Anna’s songs. When Panorama received this letter from Howard in 2000, 
it had not acquired licenses from the copyright owners of any of the songs 
it had released in its karaoke packages. Panorama then hired Vincent 
Castalucci, a licensing agent, and began negotiating licenses. Eventually, 
Panorama obtained license agreements from Without Anna. 
  
On February 28, 2002, Howard sent another cease-and-desist letter to 
Panorama, this time on behalf of Zomba. Like Without Anna, Zomba had 
discovered that Panorama’s karaoke packages contained copies of songs it 
owned. Zomba’s cease-and-desist letter specified the terms upon which 
Zomba would be willing to grant a license: a $250 fixing fee for each Zomba-
owned song on each package, plus royalties of $0.16 per song per CD+G 
sold for the first half of the five-year license term, and $0.19 per song per 
CD+G sold for the second-half of the term. Santos and Castalucci contacted 
Howard in response to this letter, but Panorama did not stop selling CD+Gs 
with Zomba’s songs on them, nor did it obtain any licenses. 
  
On April 12, 2002, Howard sent a follow-up cease-and-desist letter on 
Zomba’s behalf. Again, Santos and Castalucci responded to the letter. And 
again, Panorama failed both to obtain licenses to Zomba’s songs and to 
cease selling CD+Gs containing them. 
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C. Procedural History 
On January 13, 2003, Zomba filed its complaint, asserting thirty counts of 
copyright infringement—one count for each Zomba-owned musical 
composition that Panorama recorded and sold in its karaoke packages. 
Panorama answered, asserting no affirmative defenses other than 
estoppel, laches, waiver, and acquiescence. On April 22, 2003, the parties 
entered into a consent order in which Panorama agreed “to be restrained 
from distributing, releasing or otherwise exploiting any karaoke package 
containing compositions owned or administered by” Zomba. Within a week 
of entering this consent order, Panorama breached its agreement and 
resumed selling CD+Gs containing Zomba’s copyrighted work. This 
conduct continued, and a year later, Zomba moved for sanctions on this 
basis. 
  
After the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment but before the 
district court ruled, Panorama’s counsel withdrew on May 10, 2004. On 
June 18, 2004, the district court granted Zomba’s, and denied Panorama’s, 
motion for summary judgment on the issue of copyright infringement, 
rejecting Panorama’s fair-use defense. 
  
To determine damages, the district court scheduled a bench trial for August 
10, 2004. Panorama was unable to obtain new counsel and consequently 
failed to file any of the required pretrial documents or to appear at the 
pretrial conference held on July 29, 2004. The district court accordingly 
entered a default against Panorama on the issue of damages. Panorama 
responded by filing for bankruptcy in the Bankruptcy Court for the District 
of Massachusetts on August 9, 2004. In response, the district court stayed 
the case. 
  
After the bankruptcy court lifted its stay, *** the district court held a 
hearing to determine the amount of damages. A month later, the district 
court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. The district court 
concluded that Panorama’s infringement was willful, and accordingly 
awarded Zomba $31,000 for each of the twenty-six infringements at issue, 
for a total of $806,000. On January 23, 2006, the district court also awarded 
Zomba $76,456.16 in attorney fees and $1058.91 in costs. Panorama timely 
filed notices of appeal on December 29, 2005, and February 15, 2006. *** 
III. ANALYSIS 
On appeal, Panorama raises a series of challenges. First, it objects to the 
district court’s rejection of its fair-use defense and the district court’s 
correlative conclusion that Panorama infringed Zomba’s copyrights. Next, 
it disputes the district court’s statutory-damage calculation, arguing both 
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that any infringement was not willful and that the $806,000 damage award 
is unconstitutionally high. *** Finally, Panorama appeals the district 




Because all four fair-use factors indicate that Panorama’s copying was not 
a fair use, we conclude that the district court correctly rejected this defense 
and concluded that Panorama infringed Zomba’s copyrights. 
B. Willfulness 
 
Next, Panorama argues that even if it infringed Zomba’s copyrights, the 
district court erred by concluding that the infringement was willful and 
thus was subject to enhanced statutory damages. According to Panorama, 
any infringement was innocent, and certainly not willful. We disagree. 
  
For infringement to be “willful,” it must be done “with knowledge that 
[one’s] conduct constitutes copyright infringement.” Princeton Univ. Press, 
99 F.3d at 1392. Accordingly, “one who has been notified that his conduct 
constitutes copyright infringement, but who reasonably and in good faith 
believes the contrary, is not ‘willful’ for these purposes.” Id. This belief 
must be both (1) reasonable and (2) held in good faith.  
  
Panorama argues that it held a good-faith belief that the copying here at 
issue was a fair use, and contends that even if ultimately erroneous, this 
belief precludes a finding of willfulness. As in Princeton University Press, 
the issue is not so much whether Panorama held in good faith its belief that 
its copying was fair use (although we have serious misgivings on this 
matter), but whether Panorama reasonably believed that its conduct did 
not amount to copyright infringement. Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 
1392. To decide this issue, we must determine “whether the copyright law 
supported the plaintiffs’ position so clearly that the defendants must be 
deemed as a matter of law to have exhibited a reckless disregard of the 
plaintiffs’ property rights.” Id. We review de novo this narrow issue, but we 
note that other circuits have reviewed for clear error district courts’ 
conclusions on the broader issue of willfulness, see, e.g., Kepner–Tregoe, Inc. 
v. Vroom, 186 F.3d 283, 288 (2d Cir.1999); Chi–Boy Music v. Charlie Club, 
Inc., 930 F.2d 1224, 1227 (7th Cir.1991). Because our analysis focuses 
solely on the narrower issue, we need not determine whether Princeton 
University Press’s de novo standard applies to the broader issue of 
willfulness in general. Accordingly, we express no opinion on that issue, 
leaving it for a future case. 
  
Here, we conclude that Panorama exhibited a reckless disregard for 
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Zomba’s rights, and accordingly, that Panorama’s reliance on its fair-use 
defense was objectively unreasonable. The fact most crucial to this inquiry 
is that Panorama continued to sell karaoke packages containing copies of 
each of the relevant compositions after the district court entered its April 
22, 2003, consent order forbidding Panorama to do so. 
  
In copyright cases, it is unreasonable to rely on a defense to infringement 
after a court rejects it on the merits. Kepner–Tregoe, 186 F.3d at 288–89 
(2d Cir.1999) (holding that copyright defendant’s reliance on a defense was 
unreasonable when the Fifth Circuit had previously concluded that the 
plaintiff’s copyright was valid and enforceable). This principle does not 
dispose fully of Panorama’s position because the April 22, 2003, consent 
order did not resolve any issues on the merits. To the contrary, the order 
stated that it “shall not be construed as a finding of any fact by the 
[District] Court or a finding by the [District] Court that Plaintiff has 
established ... any ... substantive element of its case.” 
  
This caveat, however, does not justify Panorama’s continued reliance on its 
fair-use defense. By entering into the consent decree, Panorama agreed to 
cease infringing Zomba’s copyrights. Thus, it implicitly agreed to suspend 
its reliance on the fair-use defense at least temporarily, and this agreement 
was reduced to an order of the court. Because an order entered by a court 
of competent jurisdiction must be obeyed even if it is erroneously issued, 
see Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 321, 87 S.Ct. 1824, 18 
L.Ed.2d 1210 (1967), Panorama lacked any legal justification for 
continuing to distribute copies of Zomba’s copyrighted works after April 22, 
2003. Without expressing any opinion regarding the reasonableness of 
Panorama’s position before that date, we are certain that from April 22, 
2003, on, the law applicable to this case “supported [Zomba’s] position so 
clearly that [Panorama] must be deemed as a matter of law to have 
exhibited a reckless disregard of [Zomba’s] property rights.” Princeton 
Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1392. On this basis, we agree with the district 
court’s conclusion that Panorama’s infringements were willful and 
accordingly justified enhanced statutory damages. 
C. Amount of Statutory–Damage Award 
 
Panorama next challenges the district court’s $806,000 statutory-damage 
award. First, it argues that the district court abused its discretion in 
calculating the award. Next, it argues that the awards are disproportionate 
and unreasonable under the Eighth Amendment and the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
 
 1. Abuse of Discretion 
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Panorama contends that the district court believed that, after making a 
finding of willfulness, it lacked discretion to award statutory damages of 
less than $30,000 per infringement. On this basis, Panorama maintains 
that the district court abused its discretion. The record does not support 
this argument. 
  
In its conclusions of law, the district court recognized that it had “wide 
discretion in determining the amount of statutory damages to be awarded, 
constrained only by the maximum and minimum amounts.” It found “that 
the maximum statutory amount of $30,000 per work for ‘innocent’ 
infringement is not sufficient in this case because of the clearly willful 
nature of Defendant’s conduct,” but that the maximum award of $150,000 
per infringement was excessive, given the dollar amounts involved in the 
case. 
  
Nowhere did the district court indicate that it believed that it lacked 
discretion to award statutory damages of less than $30,000 per 
infringement. To the contrary, Panorama’s willfulness prompted the 
district court to conclude that the maximum penalty for nonwillful 
infringement was not sufficient given Panorama’s conduct. We therefore 
conclude that Panorama has not shown that the district court abused its 
discretion by setting the statutory damage award at $31,000 per 
infringement. 
2. Eighth Amendment 
 
Panorama next argues that such a high award of statutory damages, in 
light of the relatively low actual damages, renders the district court’s 
award an “excessive fine” under the Eighth Amendment. However, the 
Supreme Court has explained that the word “fine” in this context means a 
payment to the government. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 327, 
118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998). Consequently, the Court has held 
that the Excessive Fines Clause “does not constrain an award of money 
damages in a civil suit when the government neither has prosecuted the 
action nor has any right to receive a share of the damages awarded.” 
Browning–Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 
257, 264, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989). Panorama’s Eighth 
Amendment argument thus fails. 
3. Due Process 
 
Panorama argues, based upon BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 
U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996), and State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 
L.Ed.2d 585 (2003), that an award of statutory damages that (it alleges) is 
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thirty-seven times the actual damages violates its right to due process. 
Again, we disagree. 
  
We note at the outset that both Gore and Campbell addressed due-process 
challenges to punitive-damages awards. In both cases, the award was 
greater than one hundred times the amount of compensatory damages 
awarded. In Gore, the Court concluded that the award in question (which 
amounted to 500 times the compensatory-damages award) was “grossly 
excessive,” 517 U.S. at 574, after considering three “guideposts”: (1) “the 
degree of reprehensibility of the” defendant’s conduct; (2) “the disparity 
between the harm or potential harm suffered by [the plaintiff] and [the] 
punitive damages award”; and (3) “the difference between this remedy and 
the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases,” id. at 575. 
In Campbell, the Court considered the same three guidepost factors and 
concluded that the punitive-damages award (which amounted to 145 times 
the compensatory-damages award) “was an irrational and arbitrary 
deprivation of the property of the defendant.” 538 U.S. at 429. Regarding 
the second guidepost, neither case created a “concrete constitutional limit[ 
]” to the punitive-to-compensatory damages ratio. Id. at 424. Instead, the 
Campbell Court explicitly “decline[d] ... to impose a bright-line ratio which 
a punitive damages award cannot exceed,” although it expressed a general 
preference for single-digit ratios. Id. at 425. 
  
The Supreme Court has not indicated whether Gore and Campbell apply to 
awards of statutory damages. We know of no case invalidating such an 
award of statutory damages under Gore or Campbell, although we note 
that some courts have suggested in dicta that these precedents may apply 
to statutory-damage awards. See, e.g., Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 
331 F.3d 13, 22 (2d Cir.2003) (suggesting that “in a sufficiently serious 
case,” due process may require courts to reduce a statutory-damage award 
in a class action, and citing both Campbell and Gore); but see Lowry’s 
Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 302 F.Supp.2d 455, 459–60 (D.Md.2004) 
(concluding that Gore and Campbell do not limit statutory damages in 
copyright cases). 
  
Regardless of the uncertainty regarding the application of Gore and 
Campbell to statutory-damage awards, we may review such awards under 
St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66–67, 40 S.Ct. 71, 64 
L.Ed. 139 (1919), to ensure they comport with due process. In such cases, 
we inquire whether the awards are “so severe and oppressive as to be 
wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable.” Id. at 
67. This review, however, is extraordinarily deferential—even more so than 
in cases applying abuse-of-discretion review. Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 
U.S. 207, 210, 55 S.Ct. 365, 79 L.Ed. 862 (1935) (Congress’s purpose in 
enacting the statutory-damage provision of the 1909 Copyright Act and its 
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delineation of specified limits for statutory damages “take[ ] the matter out 
of the ordinary rule with respect to abuse of discretion”); Broad. Music, Inc. 
v. Star Amusements, Inc., 44 F.3d 485, 487 (7th Cir.1995) (interpreting the 
modern Copyright Act and noting “that the standard for reviewing an 
award of statutory damages within the allowed range is even more 
deferential than abuse of discretion”). 
  
Williams is instructive, and leads us to conclude that the statutory-damage 
award against Panorama was not sufficiently oppressive to constitute a 
deprivation of due process. In that case, a railroad charged two sisters 
sixty-six cents apiece more than the maximum rate permissible by 
regulation. 251 U.S. at 64. A state statute sought to deter such overcharges 
by providing for statutory damages of between $50 and $350 when a 
railroad charged more than the permissible rate. Id. The sisters sued 
separately, and received statutory damage awards of $75 apiece—over 113 
times the amount they were overcharged. Id. Before the Supreme Court, 
the railroad argued that the penalty was so disproportionate to the harm 
sustained that it violated due process. Rejecting this argument, the Court 
concluded that the award “properly cannot be said to be so severe and 
oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense or obviously 
unreasonable.” Id. at 67. 
  
If the Supreme Court countenanced a 113:1 ratio in Williams, we cannot 
conclude that a 44:1 ratio is unacceptable here. We acknowledge the 
Supreme Court’s preference for a lower punitive-to-compensatory ratio, as 
stated in Campbell, but emphasize that this case does not involve a 
punitive-damages award. Until the Supreme Court applies Campbell to an 
award of statutory damages, we conclude that Williams controls, not 
Campbell, and accordingly reject Panorama’s due-process argument. 
*** 
 
E. Attorney fees 
 
Lastly, Panorama argues that the district court abused its discretion by 
awarding attorney fees to Zomba. The Copyright Act provides that “the 
[district] court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs ... [and] 
may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part 
of the costs.” 17 U.S.C. § 505. In Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 114 
S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994), the Supreme Court endorsed in dicta a 
series of factors “to guide courts’ discretion” in awarding attorney fees. Id. 
at 534 n. 19. The factors include “frivolousness, motivation, objective 
unreasonableness (both in the factual and in the legal components of the 
case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations 
of compensation and deterrence.” Id. 
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According to Panorama, the district court abused its discretion by failing 
to consider the Fogerty factors. However, as Zomba notes, the parties 
provided the district court with briefing focused on the factors, so even if 
the district court did not precisely recount its assessment of the factors, it 
was alerted to them. Further, given the unreasonableness of Panorama’s 
positions and the need to deter such conduct, it is difficult to see how the 
imposition of attorney fees here could qualify as an abuse of discretion. 
IV. CONCLUSION 





Footnote 10 of the court's opinion summarizes the actual damages that 
could have been awarded in this case: "Panorama asserted that it sold a 
total of 74,734 copies of the twenty-six infringed compositions. Based upon 
this figure, Zomba lost approximately $11,957.92 in royalties, plus an 
additional $6500 in fixing fees, for a total of $18,457.92. 
Additionally, Panorama asserted that its net profit attributable to the 
twenty-six compositions at issue was $9693.86, although Panorama never 
substantiated its expenses to the district court. Assuming arguendo that 
this profit figure is accurate, Zomba would have been entitled to $28,151.78 
if it had not elected to pursue statutory damages." 
 
Footnote 11 discusses the ratio: "Dividing the statutory-damage award 
($806,000) by the lost licensing fees, as calculated by Panorama, ($18,458) 
yields a ratio of about 44:1. The 37:1 figure that Panorama advances in its 
brief includes in the denominator Panorama’s unsubstantiated net profits 
figure of $9693.86." 
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COLLOTON, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal arises from a dispute between several recording companies and 
Jammie Thomas–Rasset. There is a complicated procedural history 
involving three jury trials, but for purposes of appeal, it is undisputed that 
Thomas–Rasset willfully infringed copyrights of twenty-four sound 
recordings by engaging in file-sharing on the Internet. After a first jury 
found Thomas–Rasset liable and awarded damages of $222,000, the 
district court granted a new trial on the ground that the jury instructions 
incorrectly provided that the Copyright Act forbids making sound 
recordings available for distribution on a peer-to-peer network, regardless 
of whether there is proof of “actual distribution.” A second jury found 
Thomas–Rasset liable for willful copyright infringement under a different 
instruction, and awarded statutory damages of $1,920,000. The district 
court remitted the award to $54,000, and the companies opted for a new 
trial on damages. A third jury awarded statutory damages of $1,500,000, 
but the district court ultimately ruled that the maximum amount 
permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment was $54,000 
and reduced the verdict accordingly. The court also enjoined Thomas–
Rasset from taking certain actions with respect to copyrighted recordings 
owned by the recording companies. 
  
The companies appeal two aspects of the remedy ordered by the district 
court. They object to the district court’s ruling on damages, and they seek 
an award of $222,000, which was the amount awarded by the jury in the 
first trial. They also seek a broader injunction that bars Thomas–Rasset 
from making any of their sound recordings available to the public. For 
tactical reasons, the companies do not seek reinstatement of the third jury’s 
award of $1,500,000. They urge instead that this court should reverse the 
district court’s order granting a new trial, rule that the Copyright Act does 
protect a right to “making available” sound recordings, reinstate the first 
jury’s award of $222,000, and direct entry of a broader injunction. In a 
cross-appeal, Thomas–Rasset argues that any award of statutory damages 
is unconstitutional, and urges us to vacate the award of damages 
altogether. 
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For reasons set forth below, we conclude that the recording companies are 
entitled to the remedies they seek: damages of $222,000 and a broadened 
injunction that forbids Thomas–Rasset to make available sound recordings 
for distribution. But because the verdicts returned by the second and third 
juries are sufficient to justify these remedies, it is unnecessary for this 
court to consider the merits of the district court’s order granting a new trial 
after the first verdict. Important though the “making available” legal issue 
may be to the recording companies, they are not entitled to an opinion on 
an issue of law that is unnecessary for the remedies sought or to a 
freestanding decision on whether Thomas–Rasset violated the law by 
making recordings available. 
 
I. 
Capitol Records, Inc., Sony BMG Music Entertainment, Arista Records 
LLC, Interscope Records, Warner Bros. Records, and UMG Recordings, 
Inc., are recording companies that own the copyrights to large catalogs of 
music recordings. In 2005, they undertook to investigate suspected 
infringement of these copyrights. MediaSentry, an online investigative 
firm hired by the recording companies, discovered that an individual with 
the username “tereastarr” was participating in unauthorized file sharing 
on the peer-to-peer network KaZaA. 
  
During the relevant time period, KaZaA was a file-sharing computer 
program that allowed its users to search for and download specific files 
from other users. KaZaA users shared files using a share folder. A share 
folder is a location on the user’s computer in which the user places files—
such as audio or video recordings—that she wants to make available for 
other users to download. KaZaA allowed its users to access other users’ 
share folders, view the files in the folder, and download copies of files from 
the folder. 
  
MediaSentry accessed tereastarr’s share folder. The investigative firm 
determined that the user had downloaded copyrighted songs and was 
making those songs available for download by other KaZaA users. 
MediaSentry took screen shots of tereastarr’s share folder, which included 
over 1,700 music files, and downloaded samples of the files. But 
MediaSentry was unable to collect direct evidence that other users had 
downloaded the files from tereastarr. MediaSentry then used KaZaA to 
send two instant messages to tereastarr, notifying the user of potential 
copyright infringement. Tereastarr did not respond to the messages. 
MediaSentry also determined tereastarr’s IP address, and traced the 
address to an Internet service account in Duluth, Minnesota, provided by 
Charter Communications. MediaSentry compiled this data in a report that 
it prepared for the recording companies. 
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Using the information provided by MediaSentry, the recording companies, 
through the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), issued a 
subpoena to Charter Communications requesting the name of the person 
associated with tereastarr’s IP address. Charter informed the RIAA that 
the IP address belonged to Jammie Thomas–Rasset. The RIAA then sent a 
letter to Thomas–Rasset informing her that she had been identified as 
engaging in unauthorized trading of music and inviting her to contact them 
to discuss the situation and settle the matter. Thomas–Rasset contacted 
the RIAA as directed in the letter and engaged in settlement conversations 
with the organization. The parties were unable to resolve the matter. 
  
In 2006, the recording companies sued Thomas–Rasset, seeking statutory 
damages and injunctive relief for willful copyright infringement under the 
Copyright Act. They alleged that Thomas–Rasset violated their exclusive 
right to reproduction and distribution under 17 U.S.C. § 106 by 
impermissibly downloading, distributing, and making available for 
distribution twenty-four copyrighted sound recordings. 
  
A jury trial was held in October 2007. At trial, Thomas–Rasset conceded 
that “tereastarr” is a username that she uses regularly for Internet and 
computer accounts. She admitted familiarity with and interest in some of 
the artists of works found in the tereastarr KaZaA account. She also 
acknowledged that she wrote a case study during college on the legality of 
Napster—another peer-to-peer file sharing program—and knew that 
Napster was shut down because it was illegal. Nonetheless, Thomas–
Rasset testified that she had never heard of KaZaA before this case, did not 
have KaZaA on her computer, and did not use KaZaA to download files. 
The jury also heard evidence from a forensic investigator that Thomas–
Rasset removed and replaced the hard drive on her computer with a new 
hard drive after investigators notified her of her potential infringement. 




In their brief on appeal, the record companies urge this court to review the 
district court’s order granting a new trial after the first verdict. The 
companies argue that the court erred by holding that an individual does 
not infringe a copyright holder’s exclusive rights by making a copyrighted 
work available to the public without authorization. They argue that 
accepting their position on that issue would “lead to reversing the District 
Court’s erroneous refusal to enjoin Thomas–Rasset from making Plaintiffs’ 
copyrighted works available, but also would reinstate the first jury’s 
$9,250–per–work verdict,” for total damages of $222,000. Although the 
third jury’s verdict awarded $62,500 per work, for a total of $1,500,000, the 
companies seek only the smaller amount awarded by the first jury, because 
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they want a ruling on the legal issue whether making works available is 
part of the distribution right protected by the Copyright Act. 
  
In reply, Thomas–Rasset says that she has no objection to reinstatement 
of the first verdict, subject to her arguments on the constitutionality of the 
damages. She maintains that she still disagrees with the recording 
companies about the meaning of “distribute” in the Copyright Act, but she 
does not object to the relief that the companies request on appeal. She now 
suggests that this court should reinstate the first jury’s verdict on liability 
(albeit without making precedent on the meaning of “distribute”) and then 
determine whether the first damages award of $222,000 is constitutional. 
Thomas–Rasset is liable for willful infringement under any of the verdicts, 
and it suits her fine to cap the maximum possible damages at $222,000 
rather than $1,500,000. Thomas–Rasset also offers to acquiesce in the 
entry of an injunction that forbids her to make copyrighted works available 
for distribution. In light of these concessions, she suggests that the issue 
whether making works available is part of the distribution right protected 
by the Copyright Act is moot. 
  
Our response to these tactical maneuvers is to observe that this court 
reviews judgments, not decisions on issues. Thompson v. Mo. Bd. of Prob. 
& Parole, 39 F.3d 186, 189 n. 2 (8th Cir.1994). The record companies appeal 
the district court’s final judgment and seek additional remedies that the 
district court refused to order. The entitlement of the companies to these 
remedies—damages of $222,000 and an injunction against making 
copyrighted works available to the public—are the matters in controversy. 
That the companies seek these remedies with the objective of securing a 
ruling on a particular legal issue does not make that legal issue itself the 
matter in controversy. Once the requested remedies are ordered, the desire 
of the companies for an opinion on the meaning of the Copyright Act, or for 
a statement that Thomas–Rasset violated the law by making works 
available, is not sufficient to maintain an Article III case or controversy. 
Chathas v. Local 134 IBEW, 233 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir.2002). 
  
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that when the district court 
entered judgment after the verdict in the third trial, the court should have 
enjoined Thomas–Rasset from making copyrighted works available to the 
public, whether or not that conduct by itself violates rights under the 
Copyright Act. We also conclude that statutory damages of at least 
$222,000 were constitutional, and that the district court erred in holding 
that the Due Process Clause allowed statutory damages of only $54,000. 
We therefore will vacate the district court’s judgment and remand with 
directions to enter a judgment that includes those remedies. The question 
whether the district court correctly granted a new trial after the first 
verdict is moot. 
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A. 
After the third trial, the district court entered an injunction that prohibits 
Thomas–Rasset from “using the Internet or any online media distribution 
system to reproduce (i.e., download) any of Plaintiffs’ Recordings, or to 
distribute (i.e., upload) any of Plaintiff’s Recordings.” The recording 
companies urged the district court to amend the judgment to enjoin 
Thomas–Rasset from making any of their sound recordings available for 
distribution to the public through an online media distribution system. The 
district court declined to do so on the ground that the Copyright Act does 
not provide an exclusive right to making recordings available. The court 
further reasoned that the injunction as granted was adequate to address 
the concerns of the companies. We review the grant or denial of a 
permanent injunction for abuse of discretion. Fogie v. THORN Americas, 
Inc., 95 F.3d 645, 649 (8th Cir.1996). “Abuse of discretion occurs if the 
district court reaches its conclusion by applying erroneous legal principles 
or relying on clearly erroneous factual findings.” 
  
We conclude that the district court’s ruling was based on an error of law. 
Even assuming for the sake of analysis that the district court’s ruling on 
the scope of the Copyright Act was correct, a district court has authority to 
issue a broad injunction in cases where “a proclivity for unlawful conduct 
has been shown.” See McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 192 
(1949). The district court is even permitted to “enjoin certain otherwise 
lawful conduct” where “the defendant’s conduct has demonstrated that 
prohibiting only unlawful conduct would not effectively protect the 
plaintiff’s rights against future encroachment.” Russian Media Grp., LLC 
v. Cable America, Inc., 598 F.3d 302, 307 (7th Cir.2010). If a party has 
violated the governing statute, then a court may in appropriate 
circumstances enjoin conduct that allowed the prohibited actions to occur, 
even if that conduct “standing alone, would have been unassailable.” EEOC 
v. Wilson Metal Casket Co., 24 F.3d 836, 842 (6th Cir.1994). 
  
Thomas–Rasset’s willful infringement and subsequent efforts to conceal 
her actions certainly show “a proclivity for unlawful conduct.” The 
recording companies rightly point out that once Thomas–Rasset makes 
copyrighted works available on an online media distribution system, she 
has completed all of the steps necessary for her to engage in the same 
distribution that the court did enjoin. The record also demonstrates the 
practical difficulties of detecting actual transfer of recordings to third 
parties even when a party has made large numbers of recordings available 
for distribution online. The narrower injunction granted by the district 
court thus could be difficult to enforce. 
  
For these reasons, we conclude that the district court erred after the third 
trial by concluding that the broader injunction requested by the companies 
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was impermissible as a matter of law. An injunction against making 
recordings available was lawful and appropriate under the circumstances, 
even accepting the district court’s interpretation of the Copyright Act. 
Thomas–Rasset does not resist expanding the injunction to include this 
relief. We therefore will direct the district court to modify the judgment to 
include the requested injunction. 
 
B. 
On the question of damages, we conclude that a statutory damages award 
of $9,250 for each of the twenty-four infringed songs, for a total of $222,000, 
does not contravene the Due Process Clause. The district court erred in 
reducing the third jury’s verdict to $2,250 per work, for a total of $54,000, 
on the ground that this amount was the maximum permitted by the 
Constitution. 
  
The Supreme Court long ago declared that damages awarded pursuant to 
a statute violate due process only if they are “so severe and oppressive as 
to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable.” 
St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 67 139 (1919). Under 
this standard, Congress possesses a “wide latitude of discretion” in setting 
statutory damages. Id. at 66. Williams is still good law, and the district 
court was correct to apply it. 
  
Thomas–Rasset urges us to consider instead the “guideposts” announced 
by the Supreme Court for the review of punitive damages awards under 
the Due Process Clause. When a party challenges an award of punitive 
damages, a reviewing court is directed to consider three factors in 
determining whether the award is excessive and unconstitutional: “(1) the 
degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity 
between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the 
punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive 
damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed 
in comparable cases.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 
408, 418 (2003); see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–
75 (1996). 
  
The Supreme Court never has held that the punitive damages guideposts 
are applicable in the context of statutory damages. See Zomba Enters., Inc. 
v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 586–88 (6th Cir.2007). Due 
process prohibits excessive punitive damages because “ ‘[e]lementary 
notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate 
that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject 
him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may 
impose.’ ” Campbell, 538 U.S. at 417. This concern about fair notice does 
not apply to statutory damages, because those damages are identified and 
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constrained by the authorizing statute. The guideposts themselves, 
moreover, would be nonsensical if applied to statutory damages. It makes 
no sense to consider the disparity between “actual harm” and an award of 
statutory damages when statutory damages are designed precisely for 
instances where actual harm is difficult or impossible to calculate. See Cass 
Cnty. Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635, 643 (8th Cir.1996). Nor could 
a reviewing court consider the difference between an award of statutory 
damages and the “civil penalties authorized,” because statutory damages 
are the civil penalties authorized. 
  
Applying the Williams standard, we conclude that an award of $9,250 per 
each of twenty-four works is not “so severe and oppressive as to be wholly 
disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable.” 251 U.S. at 67. 
Congress, exercising its “wide latitude of discretion,” set a statutory 
damages range for willful copyright infringement of $750 to $150,000 per 
infringed work. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). The award here is toward the lower end 
of this broad range. As in Williams, “the interests of the public, the 
numberless opportunities for committing the offense, and the need for 
securing uniform adherence to [federal law]” support the constitutionality 
of the award. Id. at 67. 
  
Congress’s protection of copyrights is not a “special private benefit,” but is 
meant to achieve an important public interest: “to motivate the creative 
activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and 
to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited 
period of exclusive control has expired.” Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). With the rapid advancement 
of technology, copyright infringement through online file-sharing has 
become a serious problem in the recording industry. Evidence at trial 
showed that revenues across the industry decreased by fifty percent 
between 1999 and 2006, a decline that the record companies attributed to 
piracy. This decline in revenue caused a corresponding drop in industry 
jobs and a reduction in the number of artists represented and albums 
released. See Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 492 
(1st Cir.2011). 
  
Congress no doubt was aware of the serious problem posed by online 
copyright infringement, and the “numberless opportunities for committing 
the offense,” when it last revisited the Copyright Act in 1999. To provide a 
deterrent against such infringement, Congress amended § 504(c) to 
increase the minimum per-work award from $500 to $750, the maximum 
per-work award from $20,000 to $30,000, and the maximum per-work 
award for willful infringement from $100,000 to $150,000. 
  
Thomas–Rasset contends that the range of statutory damages established 
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by § 504(c) reflects only a congressional judgment “at a very general level,” 
but that courts have authority to declare it “severe and oppressive” and 
“wholly disproportioned” in particular cases. The district court similarly 
emphasized that Thomas–Rasset was “not a business acting for profit, but 
rather an individual consumer illegally seeking free access to music for her 
own use.” By its terms, however, the statute plainly encompasses 
infringers who act without a profit motive, and the statute already provides 
for a broad range of damages that allows courts and juries to calibrate the 
award based on the nature of the violation. For those who favor resort to 
legislative history, the record also suggests that Congress was well aware 
of the threat of noncommercial copyright infringement when it established 
the lower end of the range. See H.R. Rep. 106–216, at 3 (1999). 
Congressional amendments to the criminal provisions of the Copyright Act 
in 1997 also reflect an awareness that the statute would apply to 
noncommercial infringement. See No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub.L. 
No. 105–147, § 2(a), 111 Stat. 2678 (1997); see also H.R. Rep. 105–339, at 
5 (1997). 
  
In holding that any award over $2,250 per work would violate the 
Constitution, the district court effectively imposed a treble damages limit 
on the $750 minimum statutory damages award. The district court based 
this holding on a “broad legal practice of establishing a treble award as the 
upper limit permitted to address willful or particularly damaging 
behavior.” Any “broad legal practice” of treble damages for statutory 
violations, however, does not control whether an award of statutory 
damages is within the limits prescribed by the Constitution. The limits of 
treble damages to which the district court referred, such as in the antitrust 
laws or other intellectual property laws, represent congressional 
judgments about the appropriate maximum in a given context. They do not 
establish a constitutional rule that can be substituted for a different 
congressional judgment in the area of copyright infringement. Although 
the United States seems to think that the district court’s ruling did not 
question the constitutionality of the statutory damages statute, the district 
court’s approach in our view would make the statute unconstitutional as 
applied to a significant category of copyright infringers. The evidence 
against Thomas–Rasset demonstrated an aggravated case of willful 
infringement by an individual consumer who acted to download and 
distribute copyrighted recordings without profit motive. If an award near 
the bottom of the statutory range is unconstitutional as applied to her 
infringement of twenty-four works, then it would be the rare case of 
noncommercial infringement to which the statute could be applied. 
  
Thomas–Rasset’s cross-appeal goes so far as to argue that any award of 
statutory damages would be unconstitutional, because even the minimum 
damages award of $750 per violation would be “wholly disproportioned to 
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the offense” and thus unconstitutional. This is so, Thomas–Rasset argues, 
because the damages award is not based on any evidence of harm caused 
by her specific infringement, but rather reflects the harm caused by file-
sharing in general. The district court similarly concluded that “statutory 
damages must still bear some relation to actual damages.” The Supreme 
Court in Williams, however, disagreed that the constitutional inquiry calls 
for a comparison of an award of statutory damages to actual damages 
caused by the violation. 251 U.S. at 66. Because the damages award “is 
imposed as a punishment for the violation of a public law, the Legislature 
may adjust its amount to the public wrong rather than the private injury, 
just as if it were going to the state.” Id. The protection of copyrights is a 
vindication of the public interest, Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 429, and 
statutory damages are “by definition a substitute for unproven or 
unprovable actual damages.” Cass Cnty. Music Co., 88 F.3d at 643. For 
copyright infringement, moreover, statutory damages are “designed to 
discourage wrongful conduct,” in addition to providing “restitution of profit 
and reparation for injury.” F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, 344 
U.S. 228, 233 (1952). 
  
Thomas–Rasset highlights that if the recording companies had sued her 
based on infringement of 1,000 copyrighted recordings instead of the 
twenty-four recordings that they selected, then an award of $9,250 per song 
would have resulted in a total award of $9,250,000. Because that 
hypothetical award would be obviously excessive and unreasonable, she 
reasons, an award of $222,000 based on the same amount per song must 
likewise be invalid. Whatever the constitutionality of the hypothetical 
award, we disagree that the validity of the lesser amount sought here 
depends on whether the Due Process Clause would permit the extrapolated 
award that she posits. The absolute amount of the award, not just the 
amount per violation, is relevant to whether the award is “so severe and 
oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously 
unreasonable.” Williams, 251 U.S. at 67. The recording companies here 
opted to sue over twenty-four recordings. If they had sued over 1,000 
recordings, then a finder of fact may well have considered the number of 
recordings and the proportionality of the total award as factors in 
determining where within the range to assess the statutory damages. If 
and when a jury returns a multi-million dollar award for noncommercial 
online copyright infringement, then there will be time enough to consider 
it.  
 
* * * 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the recording companies are 
entitled to the remedies that they seek on appeal. The judgment of the 
district court is vacated, and the case is remanded with directions to enter 
a judgment for damages in the amount of $222,000, and to include an 
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injunction that precludes Thomas–Rasset from making any of the 
plaintiffs’ recordings available for distribution to the public through an 
online media distribution system. 
 
FELTNER V. COLUMBIA PICTURES TELEVISION, INC. 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Decided March 31, 1998 




Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 
Section 504(c) of the Copyright Act of 1976 permits a copyright owner “to 
recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory 
damages ..., in a sum of not less than $500 or more than $20,000 as the 
court considers just.” 90 Stat. 2585, as amended, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). In 
this case, we consider whether § 504(c) or the Seventh Amendment grants 
a right to a jury trial when a copyright owner elects to recover statutory 
damages. We hold that although the statute is silent on the point, the 
Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial, which includes a right 




Petitioner C. Elvin Feltner owns Krypton International Corporation, which 
in 1990 acquired three television stations in the southeastern United 
States. Respondent Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., had licensed 
several television series to these stations, including “Who’s the Boss,” 
“Silver Spoons,” “Hart to Hart,” and “T.J. Hooker.” After the stations 
became delinquent in making their royalty payments to Columbia, Krypton 
and Columbia entered into negotiations to restructure the stations’ debt. 
These discussions were unavailing, and Columbia terminated the stations’ 
license agreements in October 1991. Despite Columbia’s termination, the 
stations continued broadcasting the programs. 
  
Columbia sued Feltner, Krypton, the stations, various Krypton 
subsidiaries, and certain Krypton officers in Federal District Court 
alleging, inter alia, copyright infringement arising from the stations’ 
unauthorized broadcasting of the programs. Columbia sought various 
forms of relief under the Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act), 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101 et seq., including a permanent injunction, § 502; impoundment of all 
copies of the programs, § 503; actual damages or, in the alternative, 
statutory damages, § 504; and costs and attorney’s fees, § 505. On 
Columbia’s motion, the District Court entered partial summary judgment 
as to liability for Columbia on its copyright infringement claims. 
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Columbia exercised the option afforded by § 504(c) of the Copyright Act to 




“(1) Except as provided by clause (2) of this subsection, the copyright owner 
may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead 
of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all 
infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work, ... in a 
sum of not less than $500 or more than $20,000 as the court considers 
just.... 
“(2) In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, 
and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court 
in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of 
not more than $100,000. In a case where the infringer sustains the burden 
of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had 
no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of 
copyright, the court [in] its discretion may reduce the award of statutory 
damages to a sum of not less than $200....” 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). 
  
The District Court denied Feltner’s request for a jury trial on statutory 
damages, ruling instead that such issues would be determined at a bench 
trial. After two days of trial, the trial judge held that each episode of each 
series constituted a separate work and that the airing of the same episode 
by different stations controlled by Feltner constituted separate violations; 
accordingly, the trial judge determined that there had been a total of 440 
acts of infringement. The trial judge further found that Feltner’s 
infringement was willful and fixed statutory damages at $20,000 per act of 
infringement. Applying that amount to the number of acts of infringement, 
the trial judge determined that Columbia was entitled to $8,800,000 in 
statutory damages, plus costs and attorney’s fees. 
  
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in all relevant respects. 
Most importantly for present purposes, the court rejected Feltner’s 
argument that he was entitled to have a jury determine statutory damages. 




Before inquiring into the applicability of the Seventh Amendment, we must 
“ ‘first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by 
which the [constitutional] question may be avoided.’ ” Tull v. United States, 
481 U.S. 412, 417, n. 3 (1987). Such a construction is not possible here, for 
we cannot discern “any congressional intent to grant ... the right to a jury 
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trial,” 481 U.S., at 417, on an award of statutory damages. 
  
The language of § 504(c) does not grant a right to have a jury assess 
statutory damages. Statutory damages are to be assessed in an amount 
that “the court considers just.” § 504(c)(1). Further, in the event that “the 
court finds” the infringement was willful or innocent, “the court in its 
discretion” may, within limits, increase or decrease the amount of statutory 
damages. § 504(c)(2). These phrases, like the entire statutory provision, 
make no mention of a right to a jury trial or, for that matter, to juries at 
all. *** 
  
We thus discern no statutory right to a jury trial when a copyright owner 




The Seventh Amendment provides that “[i]n Suits at common law, where 
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by 
jury shall be preserved....” U.S. Const., Amdt. 7. Since Justice Story’s time, 
the Court has understood “Suits at common law” to refer “not merely [to] 
suits, which the common law recognized among its old and settled 
proceedings, but [to] suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and 
determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were 
recognized, and equitable remedies were administered.” Parsons v. 
Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 447, 7 L.Ed. 732 (1830). The Seventh Amendment thus 
applies not only to common-law causes of action, but also to “actions 
brought to enforce statutory rights that are analogous to common-law 
causes of action ordinarily decided in English law courts in the late 18th 
century, as opposed to those customarily heard by courts of equity or 
admiralty.” Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989). To 
determine whether a statutory action is more analogous to cases tried in 
courts of law than to suits tried in courts of equity or admiralty, we examine 
both the nature of the statutory action and the remedy sought. 
  
Unlike many of our recent Seventh Amendment cases, which have involved 
modern statutory rights unknown to 18th-century England, see, e.g., 
Wooddell v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 502 U.S. 93 
(1991) (alleged violations of union’s duties under Labor Management 
Relations Act, 1947, and Labor–Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 
of 1959); Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, supra (action to rescind fraudulent 
preference under Bankruptcy Act); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 
(1987) (Government’s claim for civil penalties under Clean Water Act); 
Curtis v. Loether, supra (claim under Title VIII of Civil Rights Act of 1968), 
in this case there are close analogues to actions seeking statutory damages 
under § 504(c). Before the adoption of the Seventh Amendment, the 
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common law and statutes in England and this country granted copyright 
owners causes of action for infringement. More importantly, copyright suits 
for monetary damages were tried in courts of law, and thus before juries. 
  
By the middle of the 17th century, the common law recognized an author’s 
right to prevent the unauthorized publication of his manuscript. See, e.g., 
Stationers Co. v. Patentees, Carter’s Rep. 89, 124 Eng. Rep. 842 (C.P.1666). 
This protection derived from the principle that the manuscript was the 
product of intellectual labor and was as much the author’s property as the 
material on which it was written. See Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2398, 
98 Eng. Rep. 201, 252 (K.B.1769) (opinion of Mansfield, C.J.) (common-law 
copyright derived from principle that “it is just, that an Author should reap 
the pecuniary Profits of his own ingenuity and Labour”). Actions seeking 
damages for infringement of common-law copyright, like actions seeking 
damages for invasions of other property rights, were tried in courts of law 
in actions on the case. See Millar v. Taylor, supra, at 2396–2397, 98 Eng. 
Rep., at 251. Actions on the case, like other actions at law, were tried before 
juries. See McClenachan v. McCarty, 1 Dall. 375, 378, 1 L.Ed. 183 (1788); 
5 J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 38.11[5] (2d ed.1996). 
  
In 1710, the first English copyright statute, the Statute of Anne, was 
enacted to protect published books. 8 Anne ch. 19 (1710). Under the Statute 
of Anne, damages for infringement were set at “one Penny for every Sheet 
which shall be found in [the infringer’s] custody, either printed or printing, 
published, or exposed to Sale,” half (“one Moiety”) to go to the Crown and 
half to the copyright owner, and were “to be recovered ... by Action of Debt, 
Bill, Plaint, or Information.” § 1. Like the earlier practice with regard to 
common-law copyright claims for damages, actions seeking damages under 
the Statute of Anne were tried in courts of law. See Beckford v. Hood, 7 
T.R. 621, 627, 101 Eng. Rep. 1164, 1167 (K.B.1798) (opinion of Kenyon, 
C.J.) (“[T]he statute having vested that right in the author, the common 
law gives the remedy by action on the case for the violation of it”). 
  
The practice of trying copyright damages actions at law before juries was 
followed in this country, where statutory copyright protections were 
enacted even before adoption of the Constitution. In 1783, the Continental 
Congress passed a resolution recommending that the States secure 
copyright protections for authors. See U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright 
Enactments: Laws Passed in the United States Since 1783 Relating to 
Copyright, Bulletin No. 3, p. 1 (rev. ed.1963) (hereinafter Copyright 
Enactments). Twelve States (all except Delaware) responded by enacting 
copyright statutes, each of which provided a cause of action for damages, 
and none of which made any reference to equity jurisdiction. At least three 
of these state statutes expressly stated that damages were to be recovered 
through actions at law ***. Although these statutes were short-lived, and 
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hence few courts had occasion to interpret them, the available evidence 
suggests that the practice was for copyright actions seeking damages to be 
tried to a jury. See Hudson v. Patten, 1 Root 133, 134 Conn.Super.1789) 
(jury awarded copyright owner £100 under Connecticut copyright statute). 
  
Moreover, three of the state statutes specifically authorized an award of 
damages from a statutory range, just as § 504(c) does today. See Copyright 
Enactments 4 (in Massachusetts, damages of not less than £5 and not more 
than £3,000); id., at 8 (in New Hampshire, damages of not less than £5 and 
not more than £1,000); id., at 9 (in Rhode Island, damages of not less than 
£5 and not more than £3,000). Although we have found no direct evidence 
of the practice under these statutes, there is no reason to suppose that such 
actions were intended to deviate from the traditional practice: The 
damages were to be recovered by an “action of debt,” see id., at 4–9, which 
was an action at law, see Maitland 357. 
  
In 1790, Congress passed the first federal copyright statute, the Copyright 
Act of 1790, which similarly authorized the awarding of damages for 
copyright infringements. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, §§ 2, 6, 1 Stat. 124, 
125. The Copyright Act of 1790 provided that damages for copyright 
infringement of published works would be “the sum of fifty cents for every 
sheet which shall be found in [the infringer’s] possession, ... to be recovered 
by action of debt in any court of record in the United States, wherein the 
same is cognizable.” § 2. Like the Statute of Anne, the Copyright Act of 
1790 provided that half (“one moiety”) of such damages were to go to the 
copyright owner and half to the United States. For infringement of an 
unpublished manuscript, the statute entitled a copyright owner to “all 
damages occasioned by such injury, to be recovered by a special action on 
the case founded upon this act, in any court having cognizance thereof.” § 
6. 
  
There is no evidence that the Copyright Act of 1790 changed the practice 
of trying copyright actions for damages in courts of law before juries. As we 
have noted, actions on the case and actions of debt were actions at law for 
which a jury was required. Moreover, actions to recover damages under the 
Copyright Act of 1831—which differed from the Copyright Act of 1790 only 
in the amount (increased to $1 from 50 cents) authorized to be recovered 
for certain infringing sheets—were consistently tried to juries. See, e.g., 
Backus v. Gould, 7 How. 798, 802, 12 L.Ed. 919 (1849) (jury awarded 
damages of $2,069.75); Reed v. Carusi, 20 F. Cas. 431, 432, No. 11,642 
(D.Md.1845) (CC Md.1845) (jury awarded damages of $200); Millett v. 
Snowden, 17 F. Cas. 374, 375 (No. 9,600) (S.D.N.Y.1844) (jury awarded 
damages of $625); Dwight v. Appleton, 8 F.Cas. 183, 185 (No. 4,215) 
(C.D.N.Y.1843) (jury awarded damages of $2,000). 
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Columbia does not dispute this historical evidence. In fact, Columbia 
makes no attempt to draw an analogy between an action for statutory 
damages under § 504(c) and any historical cause of action—including those 
actions for monetary relief that we have characterized as equitable, such 
as actions for disgorgement of improper profits. See Teamsters v. Terry, 
494 U.S. 558, 570–571 (1990); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S., at 424. 
Rather, Columbia merely contends that statutory damages are clearly 
equitable in nature. 
  
We are not persuaded. We have recognized the “general rule” that 
monetary relief is legal, Teamsters v. Terry, supra, at 570, and an award 
of statutory damages may serve purposes traditionally associated with 
legal relief, such as compensation and punishment. See Curtis v. Loether, 
415 U.S., at 196 (actual damages are “traditional form of relief offered in 
the courts of law”). Nor, as we have previously stated, is a monetary remedy 
rendered equitable simply because it is “not fixed or readily calculable from 
a fixed formula.” Id., at 422, n. 7. And there is historical evidence that cases 
involving discretionary monetary relief were tried before juries. See, e.g., 
Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 77 (1791) (jury award of “exemplary damages” 
in an action on a promise of marriage). Accordingly, we must conclude that 
the Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial where the copyright 
owner elects to recover statutory damages. 
  
The right to a jury trial includes the right to have a jury determine the 
amount of statutory damages, if any, awarded to the copyright owner. It 
has long been recognized that “by the law the jury are judges of the 
damages.” Lord Townshend v. Hughes, 2 Mod. 150, 151, 86 Eng. Rep. 994, 
994–995 (C.P. 1677). Thus in Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935), the 
Court stated that “the common law rule as it existed at the time of the 
adoption of the Constitution” was that “in cases where the amount of 
damages was uncertain[,] their assessment was a matter so peculiarly 
within the province of the jury that the Court should not alter it.” Id., at 
480 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). And there is 
overwhelming evidence that the consistent practice at common law was for 
juries to award damages. *** 
  
More specifically, this was the consistent practice in copyright cases. In 
Hudson v. Patten, 1 Root, at 134, for example, a jury awarded a copyright 
owner £100 under the Connecticut copyright statute, which permitted 
damages in an amount double the value of the infringed copy. In addition, 
juries assessed the amount of damages under the Copyright Act of 1831, 
even though that statute, like the Copyright Act of 1790, fixed damages at 
a set amount per infringing sheet. See Backus v. Gould, supra, at 802 (jury 
awarded damages of $2,069.75); Reed v. Carusi, supra, at 432 (same, but 
$200); Dwight v. Appleton, supra, at 185 (same, but $2,000); Millett v. 
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Snowden, supra, at 375 (same, but $625). 
  
Relying on Tull v. United States, supra, Columbia contends that the 
Seventh Amendment does not provide a right to a jury determination of the 
amount of the award. In Tull, we held that the Seventh Amendment grants 
a right to a jury trial on all issues relating to liability for civil penalties 
under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1319(d), see 481 U.S., at 
425, but then went on to decide that Congress could constitutionally 
authorize trial judges to assess the amount of the civil penalties, see id., at 
426–427. According to Columbia, Tull demonstrates that a jury 
determination of the amount of statutory damages is not necessary “to 
preserve ‘the substance of the common-law right of trial by jury.’ ” Id., at 
426. 
  
In Tull, however, we were presented with no evidence that juries 
historically had determined the amount of civil penalties to be paid to the 
Government. Moreover, the awarding of civil penalties to the Government 
could be viewed as analogous to sentencing in a criminal proceeding. See 
481 U.S., at 428 (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Here, of course, there is no similar analogy, and there is clear and direct 
historical evidence that juries, both as a general matter and in copyright 
cases, set the amount of damages awarded to a successful plaintiff. Tull is 
thus inapposite. As a result, if a party so demands, a jury must determine 
the actual amount of statutory damages under § 504(c) in order “to preserve 
‘the substance of the common-law right of trial by jury.’” Id., at 426. 
* * * 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Seventh Amendment provides 
a right to a jury trial on all issues pertinent to an award of statutory 
damages under § 504(c) of the Copyright Act, including the amount itself. 
The judgment below is reversed, and we remand the case for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
  





A bit of trivia: John G. Roberts, Jr., Washington, DC, argued on behalf of 











FOGERTY V. FANTASY, INC. 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Decided March 1, 1994 
114 S.Ct. 1023 
 
 
Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 
The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 505, provides in relevant part that 
in any copyright infringement action “the court may ... award a reasonable 
attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.” The question 
presented in this case is what standards should inform a court’s decision to 
award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in a copyright infringement 
action—a question that has produced conflicting views in the Courts of 
Appeals. 
  
Petitioner John Fogerty is a successful musician, who, in the late 1960’s, 
was the lead singer and songwriter of a popular music group known as 
“Creedence Clearwater Revival.” In 1970, he wrote a song entitled “Run 
Through the Jungle” and sold the exclusive publishing rights to 
predecessors-in-interest of respondent Fantasy, Inc., who later obtained 
the copyright by assignment. The music group disbanded in 1972 and 
Fogerty subsequently published under another recording label. In 1985, he 
published and registered a copyright to a song entitled “The Old Man Down 
the Road,” which was released on an album distributed by Warner Brothers 
Records, Inc. Respondent Fantasy, Inc., sued Fogerty, Warner Brothers, 
and affiliated companies in District Court, alleging that “The Old Man 
Down the Road” was merely “Run Through the Jungle” with new words. 
The copyright infringement claim went to trial and a jury returned a 
verdict in favor of Fogerty. 
  
After his successful defense of the action, Fogerty moved for reasonable 
attorney’s fees pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505. The District Court denied the 
motion, finding that Fantasy’s infringement suit was not brought 
frivolously or in bad faith as required by Circuit precedent for an award of 
attorney’s fees to a successful defendant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 
and declined to abandon the existing Ninth Circuit standard for awarding 
attorney’s fees which treats successful plaintiffs and successful defendants 
differently. Under that standard, commonly termed the “dual” standard, 
prevailing plaintiffs are generally awarded attorney’s fees as a matter of 
course, while prevailing defendants must show that the original suit was 
frivolous or brought in bad faith. In contrast, some Courts of Appeals follow 
the so-called “evenhanded” approach in which no distinction is made 
between prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants. The Court of 
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Appeals for the Third Circuit, for example, has ruled that “we do not 
require bad faith, nor do we mandate an allowance of fees as a concomitant 
of prevailing in every case, but we do favor an evenhanded approach.” Lieb 
v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 156 (1986). 
  
We granted certiorari to address an important area of federal law and to 
resolve the conflict between the Ninth Circuit’s “dual” standard for 
awarding attorney’s fees under § 505, and the so-called “evenhanded” 
approach exemplified by the Third Circuit. We reverse. 
  
Respondent advances three arguments in support of the dual standard 
followed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this case. First, it 
contends that the language of § 505, when read in the light of our decisions 
construing similar fee-shifting language, supports the rule. Second, it 
asserts that treating prevailing plaintiffs and defendants differently 
comports with the “objectives” and “equitable considerations” underlying 
the Copyright Act as a whole. Finally, respondent contends that the 
legislative history of § 505 indicates that Congress ratified the dual 
standard which it claims was “uniformly” followed by the lower courts 
under identical language in the 1909 Copyright Act. We address each of 
these arguments in turn. 
  
The statutory language—“the court may also award a reasonable 
attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs”—gives no hint 
that successful plaintiffs are to be treated differently from successful 
defendants. But respondent contends that our decision in Christiansburg 
Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978), in which we construed virtually 
identical language, supports a differentiation in treatment between 
plaintiffs and defendants. 
  
Christiansburg construed the language of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, which in relevant part provided that the court, “in its discretion, 
may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the 
costs....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k). We had earlier held, interpreting the 
cognate provision of Title II of that Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a–3(b), that a 
prevailing plaintiff “should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless some 
special circumstances would render such an award unjust.” Newman v. 
Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). This decision was 
based on what we found to be the important policy objectives of the Civil 
Rights statutes, and the intent of Congress to achieve such objectives 
through the use of plaintiffs as “ ‘private attorney[s] general.’ ” Ibid. In 
Christiansburg, supra, we determined that the same policy considerations 
were not at work in the case of a prevailing civil rights defendant. We noted 
that a Title VII plaintiff, like a Title II plaintiff in Piggie Park, is “the 
chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate ‘a policy that Congress 
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considered of the highest priority.’ ” 434 U.S., at 418. We also relied on the 
admittedly sparse legislative history to indicate that different standards 
were to be applied to successful plaintiffs than to successful defendants. 
  
Respondent points to our language in Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 
754, 758, n. 2 (1989), that “fee-shifting statutes’ similar language is a 
‘strong indication’ that they are to be interpreted alike.” But here we think 
this normal indication is overborne by the factors relied upon in our 
Christiansburg opinion that are absent in the case of the Copyright Act. 
The legislative history of § 505 provides no support for treating prevailing 
plaintiffs and defendants differently with respect to the recovery of 
attorney’s fees. The attorney’s fees provision of § 505 of the 1976 Act was 
carried forward verbatim from the 1909 Act with very little discussion. The 
relevant House Report provides simply: 
  
“Under section 505 the awarding of costs and attorney’s fees are left to the 
court’s discretion, and the section also makes clear that neither costs nor 
attorney’s fees can be awarded to or against ‘the United States or an officer 
thereof.’ ” H.R.Rep. No. 94–1476, p. 163 (1976). 
 
Other courts and commentators have noted the paucity of legislative 
history of § 505. *** 
 
The goals and objectives of the two Acts are likewise not completely similar. 
Oftentimes, in the civil rights context, impecunious “private attorney 
general” plaintiffs can ill afford to litigate their claims against defendants 
with more resources. Congress sought to redress this balance in part, and 
to provide incentives for the bringing of meritorious lawsuits, by treating 
successful plaintiffs more favorably than successful defendants in terms of 
the award of attorney’s fees. The primary objective of the Copyright Act is 
to encourage the production of original literary, artistic, and musical 
expression for the good of the public. See infra, at 1029–1030. In the 
copyright context, it has been noted that “[e]ntities which sue for copyright 
infringement as plaintiffs can run the gamut from corporate behemoths to 
starving artists; the same is true of prospective copyright infringement 
defendants.” Cohen, supra, at 622–623. 
  
We thus conclude that respondent’s argument based on our fee-shifting 
decisions under the Civil Rights Act must fail. 
  
Respondent next argues that the policies and objectives of § 505 and of the 
Copyright Act in general are best served by the “dual approach” to the 
award of attorney’s fees. The most common reason advanced in support of 
the dual approach is that, by awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing 
plaintiffs as a matter of course, it encourages litigation of meritorious 
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claims of copyright infringement. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Albert E. Price, 
Inc., 823 F.2d 316, 323 (CA9 1987) (“Because section 505 is intended in part 
to encourage the assertion of colorable copyright claims, to deter 
infringement, and to make the plaintiff whole, fees are generally awarded 
to a prevailing plaintiff”); Diamond v. Am–Law Publishing Corp., 745 F.2d 
142, 148 (CA2 1984). Indeed, respondent relies heavily on this argument. 
We think the argument is flawed because it expresses a one-sided view of 
the purposes of the Copyright Act. While it is true that one of the goals of 
the Copyright Act is to discourage infringement, it is by no means the only 
goal of that Act. In the first place, it is by no means always the case that 
the plaintiff in an infringement action is the only holder of a copyright; 
often times, defendants hold copyrights too, as exemplified in the case at 
hand. See Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F.2d, at 155 (noting that 
“in many cases the defendants are the [copyright] holders”). 
  
More importantly, the policies served by the Copyright Act are more 
complex, more measured, than simply maximizing the number of 
meritorious suits for copyright infringement. The Constitution grants to 
Congress the power “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
We have often recognized the monopoly privileges that Congress has 
authorized, while “intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and 
inventors by the provision of a special reward,” are limited in nature and 
must ultimately serve the public good. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). For example, in Twentieth 
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975), we discussed the 
policies underlying the 1909 Copyright Act as follows: 
 
“The limited scope of the copyright holder’s statutory monopoly ... reflects 
a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to 
be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve 
the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and 
the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair 
return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this 
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.” 
 
We reiterated this theme in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone 
Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–350 (1991), where we said: 
 
“The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, 
but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’ To this end, 
copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but 
encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed 
by a work.” 
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Because copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the 
general public through access to creative works, it is peculiarly important 
that the boundaries of copyright law be demarcated as clearly as possible. 
To that end, defendants who seek to advance a variety of meritorious 
copyright defenses should be encouraged to litigate them to the same 
extent that plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate meritorious claims of 
infringement. In the case before us, the successful defense of “The Old Man 
Down the Road” increased public exposure to a musical work that could, as 
a result, lead to further creative pieces. Thus a successful defense of a 
copyright infringement action may further the policies of the Copyright Act 
every bit as much as a successful prosecution of an infringement claim by 
the holder of a copyright. 
  
Respondent finally urges that the legislative history supports the dual 
standard, relying on the principle of ratification. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 
U.S. 575, 580 (1978) (“Congress is presumed to be aware of an 
administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that 
interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change ...”). Respondent 
surveys the great number of lower court cases interpreting the identical 
provision in the 1909 Act, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1976 ed.), and asserts that “it 
was firmly established” that prevailing defendants should be awarded 
attorney’s fees only where the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous or brought 
with a vexatious purpose. Furthermore, respondent claims that Congress 
was aware of this construction of former § 116 because of two copyright 
studies submitted to Congress when it was studying revisions to the Act. 
*** 
  
Before turning to the import of the two studies and the cases decided under 
the 1909 Act, we summarize briefly the factual background of Lorillard, 
whence comes the statement upon which respondent relies. There the 
question was whether there was a right to jury trial in an action for lost 
wages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). 
In enacting that statute, Congress provided, inter alia, that the provisions 
of the ADEA were to be “enforced in accordance with the ‘powers, remedies 
and procedures’ ” of specified sections of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA), 81 Stat. 604, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). Lorillard, 434 U.S., at 580. In the 
three decided cases which had treated the right to jury trial under the 
FLSA, each court had decided that there was such a right. In enacting the 
ADEA, “Congress exhibited both a detailed knowledge of the FLSA 
provisions and their judicial interpretation and a willingness to depart 
from those provisions regarded as undesirable or inappropriate for 
incorporation.” Id., at 581.  *** 
  
Our review of the prior case law itself leads us to conclude that there was 
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no settled “dual standard” interpretation of former § 116 about which 
Congress could have been aware. We note initially that at least one 
reported case stated no reason in awarding attorney’s fees to successful 
defendants. See, e.g., Marks v. Leo Feist, Inc., 8 F.2d 460, 461 (CA2 1925) 
(noting that the Copyright Act gave courts “absolute discretion,” the court 
awarded attorney’s fees to prevailing defendant after plaintiff voluntarily 
dismissed suit). More importantly, while it appears that the majority of 
lower courts exercised their discretion in awarding attorney’s fees  to 
prevailing defendants based on a finding of frivolousness or bad faith, not 
all courts expressly described the test in those terms. In fact, only one pre–
1976 case expressly endorsed a dual standard. Breffort v. I Had a Ball Co., 
271 F.Supp. 623 (SDNY 1967). This is hardly the sort of uniform 
construction that Congress might have endorsed. 
  
In summary, neither of the two studies presented to Congress, nor the 
cases referred to by the studies, support respondent’s view that there was 
a settled construction in favor of the “dual standard” under § 116 of the 
1909 Copyright Act. 
  
We thus reject each of respondent’s three arguments in support of the dual 
standard. We now turn to petitioner’s argument that § 505 was intended 
to adopt the “British Rule.” Petitioner argues that, consistent with the 
neutral language of § 505, both prevailing plaintiffs and defendants should 
be awarded attorney’s fees as a matter of course, absent exceptional 
circumstances. For two reasons we reject this argument for the British 
Rule. 
  
First, just as the plain language of § 505 supports petitioner’s claim for 
disapproving the dual standard, it cuts against him in arguing for the 
British Rule. The statute says that “the court may also award a reasonable 
attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.” The word “may” 
clearly connotes discretion. The automatic awarding of attorney’s fees to 
the prevailing party would pretermit the exercise of that discretion. 
  
Second, we are mindful that Congress legislates against the strong 
background of the American Rule. Unlike Britain where counsel fees are 
regularly awarded to the prevailing party, it is the general rule in this 
country that unless Congress provides otherwise, parties are to bear their 
own attorney’s fees. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 
U.S. 240, 247–262 (1975) (tracing the origins and development of the 
American Rule); Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S., at 758. While § 505 
is one situation in which Congress has modified the American Rule to allow 
an award of attorney’s fees in the court’s discretion, we find it impossible 
to believe that Congress, without more, intended to adopt the British Rule. 
Such a bold departure from traditional practice would have surely drawn 
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more explicit statutory language and legislative comment. Cf. Isbrandtsen 
Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952) (“Statutes which invade the 
common law ... are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of 
long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose 
to the contrary is evident”). Not surprisingly, no court has held that § 505 
(or its predecessor statute) adopted the British Rule. 
  
Thus we reject both the “dual standard” adopted by several of the Courts 
of Appeals and petitioner’s claim that § 505 enacted the British Rule for 
automatic recovery of attorney’s fees by the prevailing party. Prevailing 
plaintiffs and prevailing defendants are to be treated alike, but attorney’s 
fees are to be awarded to prevailing parties only as a matter of the court’s 
discretion. “There is no precise rule or formula for making these 
determinations,” but instead equitable discretion should be exercised “in 
light of the considerations we have identified.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 
U.S. 424, 436–437 (1983). Because the Court of Appeals erroneously held 
petitioner, the prevailing defendant, to a more stringent standard than 
that applicable to a prevailing plaintiff, its judgment is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
  
It is so ordered. 
 
KIRTSAENG V. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Decided June 16, 2016 
136 S.Ct. 1979 
 
Justice KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 
Section 505 of the Copyright Act provides that a district court “may ... 
award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party.” 17 U.S.C. § 505. 
The question presented here is whether a court, in exercising that 
authority, should give substantial weight to the objective reasonableness 
of the losing party’s position. The answer, as both decisions below held, is 
yes—the court should. But the court must also give due consideration to all 
other circumstances relevant to granting fees; and it retains discretion, in 
light of those factors, to make an award even when the losing party 
advanced a reasonable claim or defense. Because we are not certain that 
the lower courts here understood the full scope of that discretion, we return 




*** [The facts of this case can be found in the first sale section of this 
casebook, where the Court held that the first-sale doctrine allows the resale 
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of foreign-made books, just as it does domestic ones.] 
  
Returning victorious to the District Court, Kirtsaeng invoked § 505 to seek 
more than $2 million in attorney’s fees from Wiley. The court denied his 
motion. Relying on Second Circuit precedent, the court gave “substantial 
weight” to the “objective reasonableness” of Wiley’s infringement claim. In 
explanation of that approach, the court stated that “the imposition of a fee 
award against a copyright holder with an objectively reasonable”—
although unsuccessful—“litigation position will generally not promote the 
purposes of the Copyright Act.” Here, Wiley’s position was reasonable: 
After all, several Courts of Appeals and three Justices of the Supreme 
Court had agreed with it. And according to the District Court, no other 
circumstance “overr[o]de” that objective reasonableness, so as to warrant 
fee-shifting. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding in a brief summary 
order that “the district court properly placed ‘substantial weight’ on the 
reasonableness of [Wiley’s] position” and committed no abuse of discretion 
in deciding that other “factors did not outweigh” the reasonableness 
finding. 
  
We granted certiorari to resolve disagreement in the lower courts about 




Section 505 states that a district court “may ... award a reasonable 
attorney’s fee to the prevailing party.” It thus authorizes fee-shifting, but 
without specifying standards that courts should adopt, or guideposts they 
should use, in determining when such awards are appropriate. 
  
In Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994), this Court recognized the 
broad leeway § 505 gives to district courts—but also established several 
principles and criteria to guide their decisions. See id., at 519 (asking “what 
standards should inform” the exercise of the trial court’s authority). The 
statutory language, we stated, “clearly connotes discretion,” and eschews 
any “precise rule or formula” for awarding fees. Id., at 533, 534. Still, we 
established a pair of restrictions. First, a district court may not “award[ ] 
attorney’s fees as a matter of course”; rather, a court must make a more 
particularized, case-by-case assessment. Id., at 533. Second, a court may 
not treat prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants any differently; 
defendants should be “encouraged to litigate [meritorious copyright 
defenses] to the same extent that plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate 
meritorious claims of infringement.” Id., at 527. In addition, we noted with 
approval “several nonexclusive factors” to inform a court’s fee-shifting 
decisions: “frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness[,] and the 
need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of 
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compensation and deterrence.” Id., at 534, n. 19. And we left open the 
possibility of providing further guidance in the future, in response to (and 
grounded on) lower courts’ evolving experience. See id., at 534–535; Martin 
v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 140 (2005) (noting that Fogerty 
was not intended to be the end of the matter). 
  
The parties here, though sharing some common ground, now dispute what 
else we should say to district courts. Both Kirtsaeng and Wiley agree—as 
they must—that § 505 grants courts wide latitude to award attorney’s fees 
based on the totality of circumstances in a case. Yet both reject the position, 
taken by some Courts of Appeals, that Fogerty spelled out the only 
appropriate limits on judicial discretion—in other words, that each district 
court should otherwise proceed as it sees fit, assigning whatever weight to 
whatever factors it chooses. Rather, Kirtsaeng and Wiley both call, in 
almost identical language, for “[c]hanneling district court discretion 
towards the purposes of the Copyright Act.” But at that point, the two part 
ways. Wiley argues that giving substantial weight to the reasonableness of 
a losing party’s position will best serve the Act’s objectives. By contrast, 
Kirtsaeng favors giving special consideration to whether a lawsuit resolved 
an important and close legal issue and thus “meaningfully clarifie[d]” 
copyright law. 
  
We join both parties in seeing a need for some additional guidance 
respecting the application of § 505. In addressing other open-ended fee-
shifting statutes, this Court has emphasized that “in a system of laws 
discretion is rarely without limits.” Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 
754, 758 (1989). Without governing standards or principles, such 
provisions threaten to condone judicial “whim” or predilection. Martin, 546 
U.S., at 139. At the least, utterly freewheeling inquiries often deprive 
litigants of “the basic principle of justice that like cases should be decided 
alike,” Martin, 546 U.S., at 139—as when, for example, one judge thinks 
the parties’ “motivation [s]” determinative and another believes the need 
for “compensation” trumps all else, Fogerty, 510 U.S., at 534, n. 19. And so 
too, such unconstrained discretion prevents individuals from predicting 
how fee decisions will turn out, and thus from making properly informed 
judgments about whether to litigate. For those reasons, when applying fee-
shifting laws with “no explicit limit or condition,” Halo, ante, at 8, we have 
nonetheless “found limits” in them—and we have done so, just as both 
parties urge, by looking to “the large objectives of the relevant Act,” Zipes, 
491 U.S., at 759. 
  
In accord with such precedents, we must consider if either Wiley’s or 
Kirtsaeng’s proposal well advances the Copyright Act’s goals. Those 
objectives are well settled. As Fogerty explained, “copyright law ultimately 
serves the purpose of enriching the general public through access to 
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creative works.” 510 U.S., at 527; see U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”). The statute achieves 
that end by striking a balance between two subsidiary aims: encouraging 
and rewarding authors’ creations while also enabling others to build on 
that work. See Fogerty, 510 U.S., at 526. Accordingly, fee awards under § 
505 should encourage the types of lawsuits that promote those purposes. 
(That is why, for example, Fogerty insisted on treating prevailing plaintiffs 
and prevailing defendants alike—because the one could “further the 
policies of the Copyright Act every bit as much as” the other. 510 U.S., at 
527.) On that much, both parties agree. The contested issue is whether 
giving substantial weight to the objective (un)reasonableness of a losing 
party’s litigating position—or, alternatively, to a lawsuit’s role in settling 
significant and uncertain legal issues—will predictably encourage such 
useful copyright litigation. 
  
The objective-reasonableness approach that Wiley favors passes that test 
because it both encourages parties with strong legal positions to stand on 
their rights and deters those with weak ones from proceeding with 
litigation. When a litigant—whether plaintiff or defendant—is clearly 
correct, the likelihood that he will recover fees from the opposing (i.e., 
unreasonable) party gives him an incentive to litigate the case all the way 
to the end. The holder of a copyright that has obviously been infringed has 
good reason to bring and maintain a suit even if the damages at stake are 
small; and likewise, a person defending against a patently meritless 
copyright claim has every incentive to keep fighting, no matter that 
attorney’s fees in a protracted suit might be as or more costly than a 
settlement. Conversely, when a person (again, whether plaintiff or 
defendant) has an unreasonable litigating position, the likelihood that he 
will have to pay two sets of fees discourages legal action. The copyright 
holder with no reasonable infringement claim has good reason not to bring 
suit in the first instance (knowing he cannot force a settlement and will 
have to proceed to judgment); and the infringer with no reasonable defense 
has every reason to give in quickly, before each side’s litigation costs 
mount. All of those results promote the Copyright Act’s purposes, by 
enhancing the probability that both creators and users (i.e., potential 
plaintiffs and defendants) will enjoy the substantive rights the statute 
provides. 
  
By contrast, Kirtsaeng’s proposal would not produce any sure benefits. We 
accept his premise that litigation of close cases can help ensure that “the 
boundaries of copyright law [are] demarcated as clearly as possible,” thus 
advancing the public interest in creative work. But we cannot agree that 
fee-shifting will necessarily, or even usually, encourage parties to litigate 
those cases to judgment. Fee awards are a double-edged sword: They 
increase the reward for a victory—but also enhance the penalty for a 
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defeat. And the hallmark of hard cases is that no party can be confident if 
he will win or lose. That means Kirtsaeng’s approach could just as easily 
discourage as encourage parties to pursue the kinds of suits that 
“meaningfully clarif[y]” copyright law. It would (by definition) raise the 
stakes of such suits; but whether those higher stakes would provide an 
incentive—or instead a disincentive—to litigate hinges on a party’s 
attitude toward risk. Is the person risk-preferring or risk-averse—a high-
roller or a penny-ante type? Only the former would litigate more in 
Kirtsaeng’s world. See Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure 
and Judicial Administration, 2 J. Legal Studies 399, 428 (1973) (fees 
“make[ ] the expected value of litigation less for risk-averse litigants, which 
will encourage [them to] settle[ ]”). And Kirtsaeng offers no reason to think 
that serious gamblers predominate. See, e.g., Texas Industries, Inc. v. 
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 636, n. 8 (1981) (“Economists 
disagree over whether business decisionmakers[ ] are ‘risk averse’ ”); 
CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 430 (2011) (“[M]ost individuals are 
risk averse”). So the value of his standard, unlike Wiley’s, is entirely 
speculative. 
  
What is more, Wiley’s approach is more administrable than Kirtsaeng’s. A 
district court that has ruled on the merits of a copyright case can easily 
assess whether the losing party advanced an unreasonable claim or 
defense. That is closely related to what the court has already done: In 
deciding any case, a judge cannot help but consider the strength and 
weakness of each side’s arguments. By contrast, a judge may not know at 
the conclusion of a suit whether a newly decided issue will have, as 
Kirtsaeng thinks critical, broad legal significance. The precedent-setting, 
law-clarifying value of a decision may become apparent only in retrospect—
sometimes, not until many years later. And so too a decision’s practical 
impact (to the extent Kirtsaeng would have courts separately consider that 
factor). District courts are not accustomed to evaluating in real time either 
the jurisprudential or the on-the-ground import of their rulings. Exactly 
how they would do so is uncertain (Kirtsaeng points to no other context in 
which courts undertake such an analysis), but we fear that the inquiry 
would implicate our oft-stated concern that an application for attorney’s 
fees “should not result in a second major litigation.” Zipes, 491 U.S., at 766. 
And we suspect that even at the end of that post-lawsuit lawsuit, the 
results would typically reflect little more than educated guesses. 
  
Contrary to Kirtsaeng’s view, placing substantial weight on objective 
reasonableness also treats plaintiffs and defendants even-handedly, as 
Fogerty commands. No matter which side wins a case, the court must 
assess whether the other side’s position was (un)reasonable. And of course, 
both plaintiffs and defendants can (and sometimes do) make unreasonable 
arguments. Kirtsaeng claims that the reasonableness inquiry 
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systematically favors plaintiffs because a losing defendant “will virtually 
always be found to have done something culpable.” But that conflates two 
different questions: whether a defendant in fact infringed a copyright and 
whether he made serious arguments in defense of his conduct. Courts every 
day see reasonable defenses that ultimately fail (just as they see reasonable 
claims that come to nothing); in this context, as in any other, they are 
capable of distinguishing between those defenses (or claims) and the 
objectively unreasonable variety. And if some court confuses the issue of 
liability with that of reasonableness, its fee award should be reversed for 
abuse of discretion. 
  
All of that said, objective reasonableness can be only an important factor 
in assessing fee applications—not the controlling one. As we recognized in 
Fogerty, § 505 confers broad discretion on district courts and, in deciding 
whether to fee-shift, they must take into account a range of considerations 
beyond the reasonableness of litigating positions. See supra, at 1985. That 
means in any given case a court may award fees even though the losing 
party offered reasonable arguments (or, conversely, deny fees even though 
the losing party made unreasonable ones). For example, a court may order 
fee-shifting because of a party’s litigation misconduct, whatever the 
reasonableness of his claims or defenses. See, e.g., Viva Video, Inc. v. 
Cabrera, 9 Fed.Appx. 77, 80 (C.A.2 2001). Or a court may do so to deter 
repeated instances of copyright infringement or overaggressive assertions 
of copyright claims, again even if the losing position was reasonable in a 
particular case. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. WB Music Corp., 520 
F.3d 588, 593–595 (C.A.6 2008) (awarding fees against a copyright holder 
who filed hundreds of suits on an overbroad legal theory, including in a 
subset of cases in which it was objectively reasonable). Although objective 
reasonableness carries significant weight, courts must view all the 
circumstances of a case on their own terms, in light of the Copyright Act’s 
essential goals. 
  
And on that score, Kirtsaeng has raised serious questions about how fee-
shifting actually operates in the Second Circuit. To be sure, the Court of 
Appeals’ framing of the inquiry resembles our own: It calls for a district 
court to give “substantial weight” to the reasonableness of a losing party’s 
litigating positions while also considering other relevant circumstances. 
See 605 Fed.Appx., at 49–50; Matthew Bender, 240 F.3d, at 122. But the 
Court of Appeals’ language at times suggests that a finding of 
reasonableness raises a presumption against granting fees—and that goes 
too far in cabining how a district court must structure its analysis and what 
it may conclude from its review of relevant factors. Still more, district 
courts in the Second Circuit appear to have overly learned the Court of 
Appeals’ lesson, turning “substantial” into more nearly “dispositive” 
weight. As Kirtsaeng notes, hardly any decisions in that Circuit have 
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granted fees when the losing party raised a reasonable argument (and none 
have denied fees when the losing party failed to do so). See For these 
reasons, we vacate the decision below so that the District Court can take 
another look at Kirtsaeng’s fee application. In sending back the case for 
this purpose, we do not at all intimate that the District Court should reach 
a different conclusion. Rather, we merely ensure that the court will 
evaluate the motion consistent with the analysis we have set out—giving 
substantial weight to the reasonableness of Wiley’s litigating position, but 
also taking into account all other relevant factors. 
  
* * * 
 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
UNITED STATES V. LIU 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 
Oct. 1, 2013  
731 F.3d 982 
 
 
NGUYEN, Circuit Judge: 
 
Julius Liu appeals his convictions and sentence for criminal copyright 
infringement and trafficking in counterfeit labels. Liu’s company, Super 
DVD, commercially replicated CDs and DVDs for various clients on a scale 
that subjects him to substantial criminal liability if a client—and, by 
extension, Liu—lacked permission from the copyright holder to make the 
copies. 
  
Under the relevant criminal statutes, Liu’s guilt turns on whether he acted 
“willfully” and “knowingly.” We hold that the term “willfully” requires the 
government to prove that a defendant knew he was acting illegally rather 
than simply that he knew he was making copies. Similarly, to “knowingly” 
traffic in counterfeit labels requires knowledge that the labels were 
counterfeit. Because the district court improperly instructed the jury 




I. The Replication of CDs and DVDs 
 
Commercial CD and DVD replication differs from the process of recording 
content onto CDs and DVDs in that prerecorded discs have their content 
stamped onto them—requiring a molding machine and a stamper—rather 
than burned. To create a CD stamper, a process known as “mastering,” 
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some source material containing digital content is necessary, such as a 
tape, recordable CD, or music file. Counterfeiters making a “straight 
counterfeit,” i.e., an exact copy of an existing CD, can start with either a 
legitimate or counterfeit version of the CD. Counterfeiters making a 
previously nonexistent compilation of tracks take multiple legitimate disks 
and burn the relevant tracks onto a recordable CD, which then serves as 
the source material for the stamper. 
  
Replication plants process orders for customers, who are typically the 
publishers (or persons purporting to be the publishers) who own the 
reproduction rights to the works in question. While a few plants specialize 
in mastering, most deal exclusively with replicating. Plants offering both 
types of services are rare because of the higher cost associated with 
mastering, which requires more expensive equipment, larger premises, a 
clean room environment, and greater expertise to operate. A replication 
plant that does not create stampers in-house will outsource the work to a 
mastering plant. 
 
II.  The Investigation of Liu and Super DVD 
 
Liu has worked in the replication industry since the early 1990s. In 2000, 
he founded, and became the CEO of, a DVD-manufacturing company called 
Super DVD. By 2001, Super DVD employed about 65 people and operated 
four replication machines at its Hayward, California warehouse. 
  
In mid–2001, Super DVD fell on hard financial times. The manufacturer of 
one of its replication machines went bankrupt and the machine was taken 
back to Irvine, California. Two of the other machines were repossessed 
because Super DVD fell behind on its lease payments. Use of the final 
replication machine was frozen due to a dispute over royalties between the 
machine manufacturer and another company. Super DVD’s engineers left 
for other employment, and in 2003 the company did not renew its business 
license with the city. In an effort to lease the factory space, Liu showed the 
property to approximately 10–15 persons per week. 
  
Meanwhile, the government had become suspicious of Super DVD’s 
operations. In May 2003, Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents 
raided the warehouse of Vertex International Trading, a computer software 
reseller based in Coral Springs, Florida, where agents recovered 
counterfeit copies of the Symantec software “Norton Anti–Virus 2003” and 
related documentation. The documentation included purchase orders, 
handwritten notes, and FedEx shipping labels from more than 50 vendors, 
including Super DVD. 
  
Later that month, private investigator Cynthia Navarro, working on behalf 
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of Symantec, posed as a potential lessee to investigate Super DVD’s 
warehouse. While there, Navarro observed a man using one of two 
machines that she believed were used for CD or DVD replication. Through 
a window, she could see into a locked room that was filled wall to wall with 
spindles of CDs. 
  
At the end of July 2003, agents executed a search warrant on the Super 
DVD warehouse and recovered thousands of DVDs and CDs. One room 
stored CDs and DVDs, and another held stampers, artwork, and masters. 
The CDs included a compilation of rap tracks, Rap Masters Vol. 2; three 
compilations of Latin music tracks, Los Tucanes de Tijuana: Romanticas, 
Lo Mejor de la Mafia, and 3 Reyars [sic] del Tex Mex: Romanticas; and a 
greatest hits album, Beatles 1. The agents also recovered DVD copies of the 
film Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon. Liu did not have authorization from 
the copyright holders to replicate any of these works. 
  
During an interview and at trial, Liu admitted that Super DVD 
manufactured the Crouching Tiger DVDs in 2001 for a company called R 
& E Trading. R & E gave Super DVD a stamper with the name “Tiger” on 
it but not the full title of the film. The DVDs were still in Super DVD’s 
warehouse at the time the search warrant was executed because R & E had 
rejected them, claiming that the movies would freeze. Liu stated that when 
R & E refused to pay for the order, he became personally involved and 
realized that R & E did not have the rights to duplicate such a famous 
movie. Super DVD filed a lawsuit against R & E alleging that R & E 
deceived it about the copyrights. The lawsuit sought payment from R & E 
on about 40 invoices totaling approximately $85,000, including work done 
on the Crouching Tiger movie. Super DVD obtained a jury verdict for 
approximately $600. 
  
Liu generally denied any knowledge of or involvement in replicating the 
other works. Liu explained that he became involved with the Latin music 
compilations when one of the former Super DVD engineers introduced Liu 
to his uncle, Juan Valdez, a famous mariachi singer. Liu and Valdez got 
together and played music—Liu on the guitar, Valdez singing. Valdez 
expressed interest in publishing CDs, and Liu told him that he didn’t have 
the facility to do it but suggested companies that could take care of the 
mastering, printing, and even the sleeve. Liu volunteered to do the 
overwrapping for Valdez because it only cost him “pennies.” Valdez told Liu 
that he created the tracks by mixing his voice with music from a Karaoke 
machine and that he had paid for the license. Liu listened to some of the 
tracks and, believing that it was Valdez’s voice, thought that the music 
“belong[ed] to him.” 
 
III. Liu’s Convictions and Sentence 
CH. 1  393 
  
 
The government charged Liu with three counts of criminal copyright 
infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1) 
based on the music CDs, the Crouching Tiger DVD, and the Norton Anti-
Virus software. A fourth count alleged that Liu trafficked in the counterfeit 
labels on the software, 18 U.S.C. § 2318(a). Following a three-day jury trial, 
Liu was convicted on all counts. The district court sentenced Liu to four 




I. The District Court Erred in Instructing the Jury on the 
“Willfulness” and “Knowledge” Elements 
 
A. Standard of Review 
 
“When a party properly objects to a jury instruction, we review de novo 
whether the instructions given ‘accurately describe the elements of the 
charged crime.’ ” United States v. Munguia, 704 F.3d 596, 598 (9th 
Cir.2012) (quoting United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913, 921 (9th 
Cir.2007) (en banc)). A district court’s omission or misstatement of an 
element of an offense in the jury instructions is subject to harmless error 
review. United States v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524, 544 (9th Cir.2011) (quoting 
United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1247 (9th Cir.2009)). We review 
unpreserved errors in the jury instructions for plain error. United States 
v. Phillips, 704 F.3d 754, 762 (9th Cir.2012) (citing United States v. 
Moreland, 622 F.3d 1147, 1166–67 (9th Cir.2010)). *** 
 
B. The “Willfulness” Element of Criminal Copyright Infringement Requires 
Knowledge that the Conduct Was Unlawful 
 
Copyright infringers have been subject to civil liability since the Nation’s 
founding. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 2, 1 Stat. 124, 124–25. In a civil 
suit, liability for copyright infringement is strict. “[T]he innocent intent of 
the defendant constitutes no defense to liability.” Monge v. Maya 
Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir.2012) (citing 4 Melville B. 
Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 13.08[B][1] (Matthew 
Bender rev. ed.2011)). 
  
Congress first imposed criminal liability for certain types of infringement 
in the late nineteenth century. See Act of January 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 
481, 482. The general approach to criminal copyright enforcement—then, 
as now—has been to punish only those violations that are both willful and 
economically motivated. See id. (punishing as misdemeanor infringement 
that is “willful and for profit”); accord 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(A)) (imposing 
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criminal liability on “[a]ny person who infringes a copyright willfully and 
for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain”). 
  
Of the two factors that distinguish criminal from noncriminal copyright 
violations, willfulness and commerciality, the latter is of little practical 
importance. The Copyright Act defines “financial gain” broadly to include 
“receipt, or expectation of receipt, of anything of value, including the 
receipt of other copyrighted works.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. The commerciality 
requirement thus “does not meaningfully winnow down the population of 
copyright defendants potentially liable to incarceration.... [T]he only bar 
against an overzealous prosecutor criminalizing nearly every copyright 
infringement case lies in the other prerequisite to criminal liability: 
willfulness.” 4 Nimmer, supra, § 15.01[A][2]. 
  
But the term “willfully” is ambiguous. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 
U.S. 135, 141 (1994) ( “‘Willful’ ... is a ‘word of many meanings….’”). To 
infringe willfully could simply mean to intentionally commit the act that 
constitutes infringement. Alternatively, it could mean that the defendant 
must act with a “ ‘bad purpose’ or ‘evil motive’ in the sense that there was 
an ‘intentional violation of a known legal duty.’ ” United States v. Moran, 
757 F.Supp. 1046, 1048 (D.Neb.1991). The 1976 Copyright Act does not 
define “willfully,” and its legislative history offers little guidance. 
  
When faced with a criminal statute containing an ambiguous “willfulness” 
element, courts normally resolve any doubt in favor of the defendant. 
Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 148. Although the general rule is that “ignorance of the 
law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution,” the modern 
proliferation of statutes and regulations “sometimes ma[kes] it difficult for 
the average citizen to know and comprehend the extent of the duties and 
obligations imposed by the ... laws.” Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199–200. Thus, the 
government must prove that the defendant acted “willfully”—that is, with 
“specific intent to violate the law”—to be convicted of certain federal 
criminal offenses. Id. at 200; see also Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 
191–92 (1998) (“As a general matter, when used in the criminal context, a 
‘willful’ act is one undertaken with a ‘bad purpose.’ In other words, in order 
to establish a ‘willful’ violation of a statute, ‘the Government must prove 
that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.’”). 
  
In reviewing a conviction for criminal copyright infringement, we, and 
numerous other circuits, have assumed that proof of the defendant’s 
specific intent to violate someone’s copyright is required. See United States 
v. Beltran, 503 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.2007); United States v. Minor, 756 F.2d 
731, 734 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Gottesman, 724 F.2d 1517, 1522 
(11th Cir.1984); United States v. Whetzel, 589 F.2d 707, 712 
(D.C.Cir.1978). But compare United States v. Backer, 134 F.2d 533, 535 
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(2d Cir.1943) (finding sufficient evidence that the defendant had willfully 
copied where he “deliberately had the copies made and deliberately sold 
them for profit”), with United States v. Rose, 149 U.S.P.Q. 820, 824 
(S.D.N.Y.1966) (instructing, notwithstanding Backer, that the government 
must prove the defendant acted “voluntarily and purposely and with 
specific intent to do that which the law forbids—that is to say, with bad 
purpose either to disobey or disregard the law”). We now explicitly hold 
that “willfully” as used in 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) connotes a “voluntary, 
intentional violation of a known legal duty.” Cheek, 498 U.S. at 201. 
  
The Copyright Act’s legislative history supports our interpretation. In 
1997, Congress updated the statutory provision governing criminal 
copyright infringement by inserting the language that Liu requested: 
“evidence of reproduction or distribution of a copyrighted work, by itself, 
shall not be sufficient to establish willful infringement.” No Electronic 
Theft (NET) Act, Pub.L. 105–147, § 2(b), 111 Stat 2678, 2678 (1997) 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 506(c)). This language was in response 
to the “on-going debate about what precisely is the ‘willfulness’ standard in 
the Copyright Act.” 143 Cong. Rec. S12,689 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) 
(statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch); see also id. at 12,690 (statement of Sen. 
Patrick Leahy) (“This clarification was included to address the concerns 
expressed ... because the standard of ‘willfulness’ for criminal copyright 
infringement is not statutorily defined and the court’s interpretation[s] 
have varied somewhat among the Federal circuits.”). Upon passage of the 
bill in the Senate, Senator Hatch stated that willful “ought to mean the 
intent to violate a known legal duty.... As Chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee, that is the interpretation that I give to this term. Otherwise, I 
would have objected and not allowed this bill to pass by unanimous 
consent.” 143 Cong. Rec. S12, 689. 
  
As a practical matter, requiring only a general intent to copy as a basis for 
a criminal conviction would not shield any appreciable amount of 
infringing conduct from the threat of prosecution. Civil liability will not lie 
if an author fortuitously creates a work that is substantially similar to 
another author’s copyrighted work. See Airframe Sys., Inc. v. L–3 
Commc’ns Corp., 658 F.3d 100, 106 (1st Cir.2011) (“[E]ven when two works 
are substantially similar with respect to protectable expression, if the 
defendant did not copy as a factual matter, but instead independently 
created the work at issue, then infringement liability must be denied.”). To 
infringe a copyright, one must copy the protected work. See, e.g., L.A. 
Printex Indus., Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841, 846 (9th Cir.2012) 
(“To establish copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove two elements: 
‘(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements 
of the work that are original.’”). Copying is of necessity an intentional act. 
If we were to read 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)’s willfulness requirement to mean 
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only an intent to copy, there would be no meaningful distinction between 
civil and criminal liability in the vast majority of cases. That cannot be the 
result that Congress sought. 
  
In the present case, notwithstanding the parties’ agreement to add an 
instruction that “[e]vidence of reproduction or distribution of a copyrighted 
work, by itself, shall not be sufficient to establish willful infringement of a 
copyright,” 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2), the district court did not include the 
requested language. In fact, the district court exacerbated the omission by 
defining willful infringement without the crucial knowledge component: 
In order for the defendant to be found guilty of [copyright infringement], 
the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt: 
First, that on a date beginning in 2001 and continuing to on or about July 
31, 2003, in the Northern District of California, defendant willfully 
infringed, that is, without authorization, duplicated, reproduced, or sold 
compact disks that infringed the copyright belonging to the owners of the 
works.... 
By defining “willfully infringed” without any requirement that the 
defendant knew he was committing copyright infringement, the district 
court instructed the jury to apply a civil liability standard. 
  
The district court further compounded this error a short time later, 
instructing the jury that “[a]n act is done ‘willfully’ if the act is done 
knowingly and intentionally, not through ignorance, mistake, or accident.” 
We recently considered a virtually identical instruction in United States v. 
Berry, 683 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir.2012). The district court had instructed the 
jury that “an act is done willfully if the defendant acted or failed to act 
knowingly and intentionally and did not act or fail to act through 
ignorance, mistake, or accident.” Id. at 1021. Finding error, we explained 
that “the instruction given merged the concepts of ‘knowing’ and ‘willful’ 
without conveying the culpable state of mind that the term ‘willfully’ is 
designed to invoke in the criminal arena.” Id. 
  
We conclude that the district court in this case erred by defining willfulness 
such that the jury could have convicted Liu without finding that he knew 
that his actions were unlawful. 
 
C. The Instructional Error Was Not Harmless 
 
Liu’s convictions on the copyright infringement counts cannot stand unless 
the instructional error was harmless. “An error in describing an element of 
the offense in a jury instruction is harmless only if it is ‘clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant 
guilty absent the error.’ ” Munguia, 704 F.3d at 603–04.  
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The conclusion was irresistible that the infringing CDs and DVDs were 
replicated in the Super DVD warehouse. The discs all were found there 
with the exception of the Norton Anti–Virus software, which was 
discovered at the Vertex warehouse along with purchase orders and 
shipping labels linking it to Liu and Super DVD. Almost all of the music 
CDs bore Liu’s initials, “JL.” Liu admitted to reproducing the Crouching 
Tiger DVDs for R & E Trading, and there was a written agreement from 
early 2001 between Super DVD and R & E to press 2,000 copies of the 
Beatles CD. Although Liu claimed to have no knowledge of how the other 
discs were made, suggesting that the orders may have been handled by his 
sales staff, it is unclear whether the jury disbelieved him, thought he had 
forgotten, or found his employees’ acts attributable to him. 
  
Whatever the case, Liu’s state of mind was critical. Liu was aware of 
copyright laws and admittedly had been sued for copyright infringement in 
the past. His guilt thus hinged on whether he knew that his clients did not 
have authorization to replicate the disks at issue. 
  
Liu presented evidence that his customers signed agreements stating that 
they had the copyright to the works in question and promising “to be 
responsible for all copyright related legal responsibilities.” His expert 
witness testified that other replicators also rely on such agreements rather 
than carefully investigate each customer. Liu testified that he attempted 
to verify that there were no copyright violations on the Latin music 
compilations by listening to the some of the tracks and satisfying himself 
that it was Valdez’s voice. He further claimed that he did not realize R & 
E’s order for Crouching Tiger DVDs was unauthorized until he became 
embroiled in the payment dispute, at which time he filed a lawsuit against 
R & E. The fact that he initiated a lawsuit over a dispute involving 
thousands of infringing copies of Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon that he 
created is arguably compelling evidence that he did not understand his 
conduct to have been wrongful. 
  
We cannot say that the jury would not have credited some or all of this 
evidence had the jury appreciated its relevance. The evidence may have 
supported a finding that Liu did not know that he was illegally copying 
copyrighted material and thus he did not willfully infringe the copyrights. 
Therefore, the failure to provide a proper willfulness instruction was not 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
  
We reject the government’s contention that any error was harmless 
because, on the second day of trial, the district court correctly described the 
concept of willfulness to the jury. The court stated that “one of the issues 
in this case [is that] the government claims that Mr. Liu did certain conduct 
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willfully, which means that he did it intentionally, that he knew what was 
going on and he knew that it was a violation of someone’s rights under the 
copyright laws, or he had good reason to know that.” But this statement is 
itself problematic. Having “good reason to know” one is violating the law is 
not tantamount to knowing it. 
  
Even if the court’s statement accurately conveyed the willfulness standard 
to the jury, a correct statement of the law given during trial does not cure 
an incorrect one delivered immediately prior to deliberations. See Seltzer 
v. Chesley, 512 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir.1975) (“Erroneous instructions can 
be corrected by the trial judge only by expressly correcting them and by 
directing the members of the jury to expunge the erroneous statements 
from their minds.”). 
  
Further, the district court’s statement about willfulness was made in a 
context that had nothing to do with the elements of criminal copyright 
infringement. The court was in the middle of delivering unrelated 
comments about character evidence. It immediately minimized the need 
for the jury to pay attention to its comments, adding that “[t]hose are all 
things I’ll tell you about when I give you my instructions on the law.” Thus, 
it is inconceivable that the district court’s partially correct statement on 
willfulness mid-trial overcame the effect of its erroneous statements in the 
oral and written jury instructions given to the jury immediately prior to 
deliberations. 
  
Accordingly, we vacate Liu’s convictions and sentence for criminal 
copyright infringement on counts one through three and remand to the 
district court. For reasons we will explain, count two must be dismissed. 
 
*** 
 
 
